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ABSTRACT 
Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907-1972), a refugee scholar from Hitler's Europe, became a 
significant Jewish theologian and a famous social activist in the United States of America. 
The thesis begins with a brief biography, which puts his work into context, personally, 
culturally, and historically. There follows an examination of the style and method of 
presentation ofHeschel's thought, asking why it is that some commentators reject him as a 
serious thinker. He is then located within the tradition and discipline of theology, with an 
examination of what he calls "depth-theology". Part II begins with an examination of 
Heschel's major contribution to modem theology-"the divine pathos"-and its place in 
the impassibility/passibility controversy. Its influence on other (Christian) theologians is 
demonstrated, together with a response to major criticism (from Eliezer Berkovits). 
Heschel's theological anthropology is then shown to be entirely dependent upon the 
concept of the divine pathos, and to have lasting value. Finally, the thesis explores 
Heschel's commitment to interfaith dialogue (specifically with Christians) made possible 
by the universal applicability of his insights into the nature of God, humankind, and the 
relationship between them. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
INTRODUCTION 
I graduated in 1971, with a BA in "Special Theology" (Theology, Philosophy and Studies 
of Religion) from the University of Bristol. I was twenty-five years old. I had entered the 
Department of Theology from a scientific career, having left school at the age of seventeen, 
with a set of modest A-level results in the pure and applied sciences, to work in industry 
and local government as a control chemist. Alongside my Bristol studies, I trained for the 
Methodist Ministry at Wesley College. All I knew about Judaism before I entered 
university and theological college I had learned in Sunday School and church. Three years 
of higher education left me none the wiser-though I knew more than I needed to know 
about the Baganda of East Central Africa! My awareness of "The Jews" was gleaned from 
Biblical studies, and I knew nothing of their two thousand years of history in the Common 
Era. I knew and used the expression "Judeo-Christian tradition", but for me the "Judeo-" 
bit was definitely "BC". In my first quarter-century, mostly spent on the outskirts of 
London, I had never been aware of a single Jewish person, let alone a practising Jewish 
congregation. 
On graduation, with the support of the principal of Wesley College, I was fortunate enough 
to be awarded a World Council of Churches Scholarship, and my wife of a year and I set 
off for a remarkably good year in a most unlikely place. We had never before left the 
shores of our homeland when we journeyed to a small city in the middle of the Canadian 
.. 
11 
Prairies, and I became a graduate student at St. Andrew's College, a (formerly 
Presbyterian) theological college of the United Church of Canada, on the campus of the 
University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon. We grew up a good deal in that year, and my 
horizons, like those of the prairies themselves, rapidly became wider and clearer-a 
process already begun at Bristol. I am grateful to those who encouraged me during the 
year, both fellow students and members of the faculty, and especially to Professor Douglas 
John Hall, who seemed ever willing to lay on additional exciting courses to enable me to 
meet the requirements of the Graduate School of Theology for admission to the degree of 
Master of Sacred Theology (STM). The requirements presumed an American-style higher 
education-a liberal arts degree followed by specialisation in terms of a Bachelor of 
Divinity degree-before admission to the STM course. My arts degree in theology was a 
puzzle to the faculty, but, after correspondence with Professor Kenneth Grayston in Bristol, 
I was finally admitted on condition that I took two additional classes in the two year course 
(one year residence, assessment by examination and dissertation). 
It was through Professor Hall that I became familiar with the place-name "Auschwitz". In 
Holy Week 1972 he read to the college community at worship the story from Elie Wiesel's 
Night of the little Jewish servant with "the face of a sad angel" hanged at Auschwitz, dying 
slowly between the two adult prisoners executed at the same time.! The insistent question, 
"Where is God? Where is He?" is answered, "Where is He? Here He is. He is hanging 
here on this gallows ... " 
1 Elie Wiesel, Night, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1981, p.76f. 
III 
So I was introduced to Wiesel's writings. I vividly remember sitting up all one night to 
read Night from cover to cover, not being able to put it down, and being deeply affected. 
Hall also introduced me to the work of Abraham Joshua Heschel, through the medium of 
Who Is Man? It was only later that I discovered this to be the least characteristic of 
Heschel's books, being based entirely on a set of lectures. I was instantly hooked! At first 
it was his poetic language that captivated me. Then I found I wanted to say "yes" to his 
theological assertions time after time. This surprised me: I did not know why a Christian 
theologian would find Jewish theology so much to his liking and so helpful to the 
development of his own theology. I later learned that my response to Heschel is not 
uncommon. 
As my academic year in Canada drew to a close, graduation day arrived at St. Andrew's 
College, and a deliberate gesture was made that came to the notice of the whole nation 
through coast-to-coast media attention. There had been alarm amongst some members of 
the United Church of Canada that an independent journal, perceived to be the voice of the 
Church, was reprinting anti-Semitic articles from white-supremacist pUblications in the 
United States. Protests to the Church hierarchy merely elicited an affirmation of the 
independence of the journal and a commitment to editorial freedom. St. Andrew's College 
responded to this inaction by awarding an Honorary Doctor of Divinity degree to Rabbi 
Emil L. Fackenheim, then Professor of Philosophy at Toronto. The connection was a 
personal one: Fackenheim's wife Rose was a long standing friend of Hall's wife Rhoda. 
IV 
At the convocation in Knox United Church, Saskatoon, the local Rabbi, Saul Diamond, 
read from the prophesies of Isaiah. He read in Hebrew and then in English. Professor 
Fackenheim gave the convocation address: what he did was to tell stories-stories about 
"the righteous among the nations" who risked their own lives to save Jews from the 
Holocaust. We sat spellbound. We would have sat there all night. After the convocation 
some of us, a small group of Professor Hall's students, were invited back to our teacher's 
house on Temperance Avenue to continue the conversation. Rabbi Diamond came too. It 
soon became clear that the Saskatoon Rabbi, quite agitated, had something he wished to 
share with Fackenheim, and was willing to share with the rest of us. It concerned Wiesel's 
little servant hanged at Auschwitz: Rabbi Diamond believed him to be his brother, and had 
some documents he wanted Fackenheim to see. 
For those of us who were young students, post-war born and raised, it was a telling 
moment. A story that had affected us deeply became real: it was no longer a story-here, 
talking with us, were people who experienced it. We could not stop talking, asking 
questions, listening. Fackenheim had been ordained as a rabbi in Berlin in 1939. He 
himself had been incarcerated in a concentration camp, but his release had been made 
possible. That night I heard about Kristallnacht for the first time: it was an eye-witness 
account. We talked until 2.00 a.m., when Fackenheim reminded us that in Toronto it was 
already 4.00 a.m., and would we please permit him to go to bed? The gathering quickly 
broke up, but the memories of that night remain strong and effective in me. 
v 
In the early 1970s, already more than a quarter of a century (and a lifetime so far as I was 
concerned) after the end of the Second World War, the Holocaust was something "new"-
people were only just beginning to speak about it. There was "a remarkable timelag".2 
David Blumenthal personalises it: 
When I was in high school (1952-56), we did not talk about the 
holocaust. When I was in college (1956-60), which included a year in 
divided Jerusalem a scant few hundred yards from Jordanian gun 
emplacements, we did not talk about the holocaust. When I was in 
rabbinical school (1960-64), which again included a year in divided 
Jerusalem, I heard one lecture on the holocaust. It was not until my 
third year as an active rabbi (1967) that the holocaust was mentioned, 
and then in a liturgical context. During these years, too, my great 
uncle Max, the only member of the family to survive and to come to 
America, lived half an hour from us; but I did not know him. A 
curtain of silence hung heavily around him, as it hung around the 
years he represented. 3 
Many reasons are suggested for "the great silence" after Auschwitz,4 and for the breaking 
of that silence,5 but a discussion of these is not within the scope of this work. I draw 
attention to the phenomenon merely to underline the timing and the devastating nature of 
my personal introduction to the Holocaust and to living Judaism. 
2 Hans Kling, Judaism, SCM Press, London, 1992, p.585. 
3 David R. Blumenthal, The Holocaust as the Central Symbol of the Twentieth Century, unpublished paper, 
p.4. 
4 "The questions were too painful to ask" (Jonathan Sachs, Faith in the Future, Darton, Longman and 
Todd, London, 1995, pp.237-9). "A prolonged psychic distress rendered modern Jewish theologians mute . 
. . There was simply no language with which to talk about the Holocaust" (Zachary Braitrnan, (God) after 
Auschwitz: Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1998, p.7). 
Alan Unterman suggests that a groundswell of emotion prevented rational discussion, which is why the early 
response was "literature rather than theology" (Alan Unterman, Jews: Their Religion, Beliefs and Practices, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Boston, 1981, p.87). 
5 Guilt complex among American Jews; the Eichmann trial; Wiesel's Night; the Civil Rights movement; 
The Six Day War; "death of God" theology (Kling, Judaism, p.585). Blumenthal adds the ageing of the 
survivor generation, and the necessity to record their stories (The Holocaust as the Central Symbol, p.4t). 
There is also the emergence of the "third generation" (the "first generation" referring to the massive 
immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe into the USA, 1880-1924; the "second generation" being more 
concerned for cultural assimilation than for original religious thought; the "third generation" producing "both 
theologians and an audience for theology"), Robert G. Goldy, The Emergence of Jewish Theology in 
Amcrica, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1990, p.1 f. 
VI 
When our year in Canada was over we returned to England, and I began, very modestly, to 
build my Heschellibrary. We lived in Oxford for a year, whilst I studied at the University 
Department of Educational Studies, and at the same time completed and submitted my 
dissertation to the Graduate School of Theology in Saskatoon. I was able to use the 
Bodleian Library, but browsing was done in Blackwell's Bookshop. Heschel's death at the 
end of 1972 passed unnoticed in our household, but my copies of Between God and Man 
(Fritz Rothschild's selection and introduction of Heschel's work) and Man Is Not Alone are 
inscribed "Oxford 1973". My copies of God in Search of Man, The Prophets and The 
Insecurity of Freedom, also date from this time in Oxford. Who Is Man? I had brought 
back from Canada. 
If, as has been suggested, we should consider the publication of his American-written 
books to be the milestones of Heschel's career,6 then that career is not yet over: the 
English translation of his major Hebrew work on Rabbinic theology, Torah min ha-
shamayim be-ispaklaryah shel ha-dorot, is still awaited;7 some of his essays translated 
from German and Hebrew, together with a Yiddish poem, appeared for the first time in 
English in an anthology of 1996 entitled Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity;8 
6 Franklin B. Sherman, The Promise of Heschel, J. B. Lippincott, Philadelphia and New York, 1970, p.18. 
7 Published in Hebrew in two volumes by Soncino Press, London and New York, 196211965, and to be 
published in English translation as Heavenly Torah: The Theology of Classical Judaism, (Tr. Gordon 
Thacker), Continuum, New York, 2000 (the publication having been delayed several times). 
8 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 
1996. 
Vll 
and the first volume of an authorised biography, dealing with Heschel's life before he 
arrived in the United States of America in 1940, was published in 1998.9 His major books 
are still available, many in new editions, and continue to infonn Jewish and Christian 
Theology. For instance, Walter Brueggemann's major biblical work of 1997, Theology of 
the Old testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy, owes much to Hesche!. 10 And it seems 
that Heschel' s work is more appreciated amongst his co-religionists twenty-seven years 
after his death than ever it was in his own lifetime. 
Heschel, by his own conscIOUS choice, was "a modem Western man", I I studying and 
working m an intellectual world dominated by Enlightenment questions and 
presuppositions. Yet it was never a perfect "fit": his writing is poetic in style; his theology 
intuitive rather than systematic; he was not "detached" in his approach to his subject; he 
was labelled a traditionalist, neo-Orthodox. When once asked to define "what kind of Jew" 
he was, he replied, "I am not a noun in search of an adjective".12 I suspect that one reason 
why he is still "current" is that, rather than being a traditionalist (the word, used 
pejoratively, meaning "behind the times"), he was actually ahead of his time, speaking 
more clearly to his successors than to his contemporaries. 
9 Edward K. Kaplan and Samuel H. Dresner, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Prophetic Witness, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London, 1998. Dresner spoke about the work when I visited him at his home in 
Riverdale, New York City, on 6th June 1997. The draft was shown to me by Mrs. Sylvia Heschel at her 
home in Riverside Drive, Manhattan, Sunday 15th June 1997. See my review: Reviews in Religion and 
Theology, Vo1.6, No.1, Feb.1999, pp.64-66. 
10 Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy, Fortress Press, 
Minneapolis, 1997. 
I I Maurice Friedman, Abraham Joshua Hesche! and Elie Wiesel: You are My Witnesses, Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux, New York, 1987, p.9. 
12 John C. Merkle, The Genesis of Faith: The Depth Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel, Macmillan, 
New York, 1985,p.12. 
VIll 
Heschel's concern for spirituality spilled over into social concern. Because of what he did, 
as well as by what he said, he can also help us confront the challenges facing the world at 
the beginning of the third millennium of the Common Era: poverty, pluralism and peace. 
Heschel continues to fascinate me. Some of his writing is dated; the political and social 
situations that so exercised him have changed beyond recognition; yet he remains current, 
and the question of what it means to be human remains urgent. This work is an attempt to 
show that Heschel's theological anthropology-his understanding of what it means to be 
human-based on his unique contribution to the debate about God-the divine pathos-
has a part to play in the survival of "humanity", in all senses of that word, in the twenty-
first century. 
MICHAEL CHESTER, 
Bath, 2000. 
1 
PART I 
CHAPTER 1 
ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, 1907 -1972 
Warsaw Foundations 
When Abraham Joshua Heschel arrived in the United States of America in 1940 he was 
already the product of two different worlds-that of the traditional piety and learning of 
Eastern European Ashkenazic Judaism, and that of the scholarship and modem philosophy 
of the western world as found in pre-war Berlin. The cultures of three European capitals-
Warsaw, his birthplace in Congress Poland, then part of the Russian Empire; Vi Ina (now 
Vilnius), noted for Jewish learning and piety and known as "the Jerusalem of Lithuania"; I 
and Berlin, the academic goal of his teenage years2-were integrated in him. 
Heschel said of himself, "I was born in Warsaw ... but my cradle stood in Mezbizh".3 
Mezbizh (Miedzyb6rz) in the Ukraine was the home for the last twenty years of his life of 
the founder of Hasidism, Israel ben Eliezer (1698 - 1760), known as the Baal Shem Tov.4 
I Louis Jacobs, The Jewish Religion: A Companion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 577. 
2 Samuel Dresner in conversation, Riverdale, New York, 6th June 1997: "He was too curious a person to 
deny himself the possibility of seeing what was out there. He had to go to Vilna to get a secular degree, but 
Berlin was the goal. I think we have determined who the people were who influenced him to go." (The latter 
sentence refers to the first volume of a biography of Heschel by Dresner and Edward K. Kaplan, in draft at 
the time of the conversation, and shown to me by Mrs. Sylvia Heschel, later published as Kaplan and 
Dresner, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Prophetic Witness. 
3 Abraham Joshua Heschel, A Passion for Truth, Jewish Lights Publishing, Woodstock, Vermont, 1995 
(originally published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1973), p. xiii. 
4 "Master of the Good Name", often referred to by the acronym "Besht". For a recent "quest for the 
historical Baal Shem Tov", see Moshe Rosman, Founder of Hasidism, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1996. 
2 
Although Heschel's parents, Moshe Modecai Heschel and his wife Reizen had moved , 
from Mezbizh to Warsaw, they still thought of the fonner as "home". The family traced its 
descent direct from Dov Baer, "the Great Maggid of Meseritz"5 (died 1772), successor to 
the Baal Shem Tov. Their youngest child was born on January lIth 1907 and named for 
his great-great-great-grandfather, Abraham Joshua Heschel (1748 - 1825), the "Apter 
Rav", a renowned rabbi of Mezbizh, who had been buried beside the Baal Shem Tov.6 
Thus his full name was Abraham Joshua Heschel Heschel,? but for articles published in the 
Berlin Jewish newspaper Jadisches Gemeindeblatt in 1936 he signed himself "Dr. 
Abraham Heschel", reverting to the famous abridgement of his Hasidic name only when 
writing in English in 1945-the year in which he became a naturalised citizen of the 
United States of America and took up his post at the Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America. 8 
5 Variously spelled: e.g. Mezhirich, Mezhirech, Miedzyrzecz. 
6 Abraham Joshua Heschel (1748-1825) was rabbi fust in Apt (Opatow) and later in Mezbizh (Miedzyborz). 
He was popularly known as "The Lover of Israel" (,Ohev Yisra'el), which is both the title of his book and 
the inscription on his grave. See Samuel H. Dresner (Ed.), introduction to Abraham Joshua Heschel, The 
Circle of the Baal Shem Tov, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985, p.viii, note 1. 
7 Wolfe Kelman, "A Tribute to Rabbi Heschel", John C. Merkle (Ed), Abraham Joshua Hesche/: Exp/oring 
his Life and Thought, Macmillan, New York, 1985, p.31. 
8 Edward K. Kaplan, Holiness in Words: Abraham Joshua Hesche/'s Poetics of Piety, State University of 
New York Press, Albany, 1996, pp. 7. See p.168 note 11: "It would have been misunderstood, in Western 
Europe, to state his full Hasidic name," and p.12 : "by stating his full name for the first time, the American 
academic had discreetly reappropriated his Hasidic ancestry". 
3 
On both sides of his family Heschel was descended from distinguished Hasidic rebbes,9 
regarded as "nobility" in the world of Ashkenazic Jewry. Many of those who inspired and 
led the pietistic revival that began in the eighteenth century among the Jews of Eastern 
Europe were his ancestors: the Great Maggid, the Apter Rav and Israel Friedman of 
Ruzhin (1797 - 1850) on his father's side, and Pinchas of Koretz (1726 - 1791) and Levi 
Yitzhak of Berditchev (1740 - 1793) on his mother's.lo As the youngest child, Avrumele 
("little Abraham" in Yiddish) was fussed over by his sisters Sarah Brakha, Esther Sima, 
Devorah Miriam, and Gittel, and his brother Jacob. He was accorded the courtesies due to 
the families of Hasidic rebbes: adults would rise when he entered the room, and he would 
be lifted onto the table to give his opinion on Hebrew texts. I I Raised in a devout 
community, he was a child prodigy, mastering and retaining from an early age the classical 
Jewish texts, Bible, Talmud, Kabbalah, and Hasidic sources. Although he was only nine 
years of age when his father died in an influenza epidemic, there were some who wanted 
the child to succeed him immediately. The Hasidim began to bring their petitions to him. 
"We thought", said a brother-in-law and cousin, the rebbe of Kopyczynce (Kopitchinitz), 
"that he would be the Levi Yitzhak of our generation". 12 
9 For key texts on Hasidism, see Moshe Idel, Hasidism: Between Ecstasy and Magic, State University of 
New York Press, Albany NY, 1995, Rivka Schatz-Uffenheimen, Hasidism as Mysticism: Quietistic Elements 
in Eighteenth Century Hasidic Thought, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1993, Ada Rapaport-
Albert, Hasidism Reappraised, Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Oxford, 1996. See also Byron L. 
Sherwin's search for his own Hasidic roots in Poland, Sparks Amidst the Ashes: The Spiritual Legacy of 
Polish JeH'!)" Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, in which he acknowledges his personal spiritual 
debt to Heschel (p.46). Heschel' s A Passion for Truth has itself been described as "probably the best book 
on Hasidism to appear in the English language" (Leon Stitskin, review of Passion, in Library Journal, 
August 1973, p.2314). 
10 There is a genealogy for Heschel in Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, pp.xi-xiii. 
II Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.ix. See Kaplan and Dresner, 
Prophetic Witness, pp.23-28. 
12 Dresner (Ed), Circle of the Baal Shem Tov, p.xxvii. Levi Yitzhak of Berditchev (1740-1809), an ancestor 
ofHeschel's on his mother's side of the family, was a disciple of the Great Maggid, who "became a foremost 
exponent of Hasidism in his writings and through his life ... the most loveable figure among the Hasidic 
masters, belongs to the folklore of all Jews ... in his eloquent pleadings to the Almighty to look with favour 
on His people." (Jacobs, The Jewish Religion, p.316f.) 
4 
In his final book Heschel records that "the earliest fascination I can recall is associated 
with the Baal Shem ... a model too sublime to follow, yet too overwhelming to ignore." 
Then in his ninth year "the presence of Reb Menahem Mendl of Kotzk, known as the 
Kotzker, entered [his] life".13 As Hasidism had brought about a revolution in Judaism by 
freeing the emotions and imagination long repressed by recession and by stultifying 
Talmudic speculation, so the Kotzker (1787 - 1859) brought about a revolution of 
Hasidism and in many ways opposed it, believing that the truth was under threat. 14 
It is my view that the movement called into being by Reb Israel Baal 
Shem Tov, the Besht, reached both its climax and its antithesis in Reb 
Menahem Mendl of Kotzk. The Kotzker brought about a revolution 
within Hasidism. While Mezbizh emphasized love, joy, and 
compassion for the world, Kotzk demanded constant tension and 
unmitigated militancy in combating this-worldliness. The Baal Shem 
was kind to everyone, the Kotzker harsh. The passionate indignation 
of the Prophets came back to life in the Kotzker. .. He inscribed one 
word on his banner: Emeth, Truth. 15 
The Kotzker was to remain "a steady companion and a haunting challenge" to Heschel, 
who wrote: "I found my soul at home with the Baal Shem but driven by the Kotzker ... 
My heart was in Mezbizh, my mind in Kotzk".16 This personal struggle was to remain 
with Heschel, and to be theologically creative in him, for the rest of his life. He spoke of it 
in a private interview he gave about fourteen months before his death: 
13 Heschel, Passion/or Truth, p.xiv. 
14 Ibid., pp.3-I2 
15 Ibid., plO 
16 Ib'd . I ., p.XIV. 
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A very important principle in Judaism, I believe, is the principle of 
polarity. Judaism cannot be reduced to one thing. Throughout my life 
I have seen the whole dominated by the force of polarity. Human 
nature is dominated by polarity ... I was influenced greatly by both-
the Baal Shem and the Kotzker. I would say that my task is to 
establish a polarity, to find some kind of calculus by which to 
establish a polarity of the Kotzker and the Baal Shem-or of the 
polarity in Judaism altogether. 17 
Although the young Heschel spent most of his waking hours in the study of Rabbinic 
literature, his understanding of Judaism and its attitude to existence was not primarily the 
result of book-learning, but rather of the impact of living his most impressionable years 
among people who were "sure that everything hinted at something transcendent". 18 
The literary style that Heschel developed was not just a product of his own genius and 
personality, but an inheritance from his cultural background. In The Earth is the Lord's, 
his evocative eulogy for his own people, a celebration of "the inner world of the Jew in 
Eastern Europe", Heschel draws a distinction between the writings produced by the 
Sephardic Jews and those of his Ashkenazic ancestors: 19 
17 Jack D. Spiro, "Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel: an appreciation", Religious Education, Vo1.68, 
March/April 1973, p.220. 
18 Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Earth is the Lord 's: The Inner World of the Jew in Eastern Europe, Jewish 
Lights, Woodstock, Vermont, 1995, p. 56. See also Fritz A. Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man: an 
Intelpretation of Judaism, The Free Press, New York, 1959, p. 8f. 
19 "Ashkenazic" refers to Jews whose ancestors lived in Germany and the surrounding countries in the 
Middle Ages, as distinct from those with Spanish or oriental ancestory, the Sephardim. The differences 
between the two groups are in matters of custom and practice-tradition- rather than "doctrine", and 
different legal authorites are followed. The Ashkenazic tradition was of intense devotion to study, expressed 
most visibly in their yeshivot, and in the rigid observance of Halacha. Ladino is the popular language of the 
Sephardim, and Yiddish of the Ashkenazim, the latter developing a popular Yiddish literature which persists 
to modem times. The "Golden Age" of Sephardic culture was in pre-expulsion Spain (i.e. before 1492), and 
the Sephardim were far less influenced than the Ashkenazim by the Haskalah ("enlightenment") and the 19th 
century emancipation of the Jews. 
6 
Sephardic books are distinguished by their strict logical arrangement. 
Composed according to a clear plan, every one of their details has its 
assigned place, and the transitions from one subject to another are 
clear and simple. Ashkenazic writers forego clarity for the sake of 
depth. The contours of their thoughts are irregular, vague, and often 
perplexingly entangled; their content is restless, animated by inner 
wrestling and a kind of baroque emotion. 
Sephardic books are like Raphaelesque paintings, Ashkenazic 
books are like the works of Rembrandt-profound, allusive and full of 
hidden meanings. The former favour the harmony of a system, the 
latter the tension of dialectic; the former are sustained by a balanced 
solemnity, the latter by impulsive inspiration. The strength of the 
Sephardic scholars lies in their mastery of expression, that of the 
Ashkenazim in the unexpressed overtones of their words. A spasm of 
feeling, a passionate movement of thought, and explosive enthusiasm, 
will break through the form. 
Sephardic books are like neatly trimmed parks, Ashkenazic 
writings like enchanted forests ... 20 
Drawing an antithesis in order to make a point became one of Heschel's favourite literary 
techniques, although it should be understood that he usually appreciated both "sides" 
whilst favouring one. Thus, above, whilst he seems to favour the mysterious gravity of a 
Rembrandt, at the same time he admires Raphael's clarity of line. As Edward Kaplan 
reminds us: 
Even readers who do not relish these painters, or hold them in the 
mind's eye, recognize the opposition. On whichever side we find 
ourselves, we can surmize the validity of the other approach-
although Heschel's own style accumulated "explosive" moments of 
insight. Implicitly he admits that his own organization is more 
"passionate" than linear.2! 
20 Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Earth is the Lord's, Jewish Lights, Woodstock, Vennont, 1995, p.30f. 
Heschel, typically, overemphasises the differences between Askenazic and Sephardic literature to make his 
point about the style of, specifically, Ashkenazic writings. The Hasidic movement amongst the Ashkenazim 
generated a new hagiography, beginning with Shivhei ha-Besht, about the Baal Shem Tov, which reached its 
peak of creativity 1865 - 1914, and which continues to the present. 
21 Kaplan, Holiness in Ji'ords, p.25. 
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Kaplan suggests that we could avoid any misunderstanding of this particular technique of 
Heschel's by appreciating it as an attempt to embrace the complexity of religious 
consciousness. Since both "sides" retain their positive value, his apparent downplaying of 
Sephardic culture affinned that tradition too, and the contrast of Sephardic "order" and 
Ashkenazic "depth" is in fact a dynamic model of Jewish cultural pluralism, presenting "a 
fair and infonnative survey of intellectual and spiritual history", with a specific purpose: 
"to scrutinize today's responsibilities".22 
Heschel considered words to be precious and powerful: "words created worlds ... each 
word has an impact ... "23 and clearly, in his characterisation of the works of his 
Ashkenazic forebears he was describing his own writings: 
Their sayings were pointed, aiming at an idea in one bound, instead of 
approaching it gradually and slowly. The East European Jews had a 
predilection for elliptic sentences, for the incisive epigrammatic fonn, 
for the flash of the mind, for the thunderclap of an idea. They spoke 
briefly, sharply, quickly and directly; they understood each other with 
a hint; they heard two words where only one was said. Mentioning 
the more obvious of two premises was considered trite. 24 
The young Abraham Joshua Heschel had been steeped in the literature and culture of 
Eastern European Jewry. A private tutor had directed his study of texts from the age of 
three or four, following an ancient pedagogical method. He would have memorised the 
prayer book (siddur) and the Torah, translating the weekly Torah selection into Yiddish 
22 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.2S. 
23 Susannah Heschel, "My Father", in Harold Kasimow and Byron L. Sherwin (Eds.) No Religion is an 
Island: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1991, 
p.31. 
24 Heschel, The Earth is the Lord 's, p.59. 
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and discussing its meaning and application with his tutor. He had an exceptional memory, 
retaining practically everything he read or heard. 25 During the next stage of learning, he 
came to know Humash mit Rashi (the Pentateuch with the classical interpretations of 
Rashi-Rabbi Shlomo Itzhaki, 1040-1105) by heart, and along with Bible came elements 
of the code of Jewish law complied by Joseph Caro, the Shulan Arukh. By the age of eight 
he would have begun the study of Talmud, followed by Midrash and Hasidic texts. His 
education was reinforced by daily worship, so that together study and worship embodied 
what Heschel later called "the austere music of the Talmud's groping for truth [and] the 
sweet melodies of exemplified piety of ancient sages".26 The theory of language which 
Heschel later developed in his American works of religious philosophy was an attempt to 
explain the "profound participation in words" during this part of his life, filled with "study 
songs" and frequent prayers.27 By the time he reached the age of thirteen and became bar 
mitzvah Heschel had already mastered the required texts to become a practising rabbi,28 
and was reading widely in Hasidic, kabbalistic and Agadic literature, taking a special 
interest in Hasidic classics such as "The Light of the Eyes" (Me/or Einayim) of Menahem 
Nahum of Chernobyl, "The Holiness of Levi" (Kedushat Levi) by Heschel's ancestor Levi 
Yitzhak of Berditchev, and "The Generations of Jacob Joseph" (Toldot Yaakov), which sets 
out major teachings of the Baal Shem Tov.29 
25 Kaplan & Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.23. Samuel Dresner (in an interview at his home in Riverdale, 
New York, 6th June 1997), told me how he had once bought a very rare Hasidic book of some twenty pages, 
which neither "the best dealer" nor "the best bibliographer" had ever seen. He took it to Heschel, who told 
him to sit down, whilst he read the book in half-an-hour, and handed it back having memorised it. 
26 Heschel, Earth is the Lord's, p.46. 
27 Kaplan & Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.2S. See also Kaplan, Holiness in Words. p.4S-S9. 
28 When he was sixteen he was ordained by his tutor, the prominent Talmud scholar Rabbi Menahem Zemba 
(1883-1943) of the Warsaw Rabbinical Council. See Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.47. 
29 Kaplan & Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.47. 
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Before he was sixteen years old, he was studying at the Mesivta Yeshiva, the foremost 
Hasidic institution of traditional learning, which probably prompted his desire to gain 
secular knowledge, supplementing Jewish studies by coming to some awareness of 
contemporary culture. The secular authorities required the Yeshiva to teach Polish 
language, mathematics, history, and literary and scientific subjects, so that Orthodox 
students could prepare to enter a Gymnasium (secular high school) and prepare for 
university entrance. He came under the influence of Fishl Schneersohn (1887-1958), 
physician, psychiatrist, writer and pUblic-speaker, who helped the young man recognise 
that his Hasidic world was too narrow. Schneersohn was a model of the modem scholar, 
religious thinker and social activist that Heschel would become, and had himself made the 
journey from shtetl to university which Heschel would make. 3o 
By the time Heschel was fifteen his commentaries on Talmud and later Rabbinic works 
were being published in the Hebrew-language Warsaw monthly journal Sha 'aray Torah 
("The Gates of Torah")-short pieces clarifying difficult passages of Talmud and detecting 
minute distinctions. He later acknowledged how such exercises could either become "hair-
splitting dialectics" and "intellectual phantoms", or could nourish the imagination. 
30 Kaplan & Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.53. 
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For him the study of Talmud 
... stimulated ingenuity and independence of mind, encouraging the 
students to create new out of old ideas. Over and above that, the 
stonn of the soul that was held in check by rigorous discipline, the 
inner restlessness, found a vent in flight of intellect. Thinking became 
full of vigor, charged with passion. The mind melted the metal of 
Talmudic ideas and forged it into fantastic moulds, zigzags, in which 
thought at first became startled, lost its way, but at the end succeeded 
in disentangling itself.3! 
A year later he had found another voice, indeed "charged with passion"-Yiddish literary 
prose and poetry. And it was in his poetry, his first truly autobiographical writings, that he 
gradually declared himself to the world at large. The Headquarters of the Yiddish Writers 
and Journalists Association was close to the Heschel home, and the young man was drawn 
to the secular Yiddish-speaking community of emancipated yet observant Jews. When the 
new Yiddish weekly Literarishe Bleter was seeking manuscripts, Heschel offered some of 
his work, as the literary editor, Melekh Ravitch, recalled: 
Suddenly I begin to think that someone has entered the room and is 
looking at me. I pay no attention. Five minutes pass. There is still 
someone in the room. I raise my eyes and for a moment I am startled. 
In a comer by the green door stands a tall and slender young lad, in 
Warsaw Hasidic attire. A long, black gannent, almost to the ground, 
scarcely showing his boots, a round hat on his head with a small, 
pinched peak. A severe face, though he looks at me very gently and 
guiltily, he also looks gruff. His eyes are black, deep, large; his skin 
brownish, with the first, young sprouts of a dark beard. His lips are 
full, passionate, deep red. Somewhat of a twitch and a thin grimace 
around the mouth, something like a whimsical reproach. His face is 
not too strongly Jewish, not so classically Semitic-but the twitch 
immediately makes him a Jew, a Hasid, even like a rabbi. The young 
man knows that I am preparing a literary almanac-he has brought 
some "songs".32 
3! Heschel, The Earth is the Lord's, p.54. 
32 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.64, quoting from Melekh Ravitch, Mayn Leksikon (Yiddish), 
Montreal, 1947, pp.21-23. Ravitch's recollection of Heschel's height is mistaken: Heschel was shorter than 
average. 
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Ravitch took some prose and several poems. Heschel's first published poem appeared in 
the new anthology, Varshaver Shriftn ("Warsaw writings"), late in 1926, and three years 
after this debut he decided to make his move to enter the modem world. 
His expertise in Torah, Talmud, Midrash, Zohar and Hasidic texts did not qualify him for 
university entrance in Poland or Germany. For that he required a diploma from a 
Gymnasium, preferably supplemented by the Abitur examination in Latin, modem 
languages (Polish and German), history, literature and mathematics. He began to read 
secular books in addition to his Talmud studies. His mother, "an unusual woman, clever 
and strong, who maintained the shtibl33 after her husband's death and appreciated her son's 
gifts",34 was concerned when she could not hear him chanting Gemara from his room. 35 
She found that he was learning Polish in preparation for leaving Warsaw for Vi Ina en route 
for Berlin, to gain a secular education, and become "a modem Western man".36 A meeting 
of the family was convened in Vienna, and his uncle, the Novominsker Rebbe, tried to 
dissuade Heschel from his resolve to leave. The young Abraham had grown up at the table 
of the Novominsker Rebbe, his mother's twin-brother, Alter Israel Simon Perlow, and the 
uncle was one of the most important influences upon the nephew's life. 37 It was he who 
introduced Heschel to the Hasidic manner of Kotzk, and thus helped generate the tension 
33 Hasidic house of prayer. 
34 Dresner, introduction to The Circle of the Baal Shem Tov, xxvii. 
35 Gemara is the study of Talmud. Originally the term referred to the commentary and discussions on the 
Mishnah that surround the latter on the printed page of the Talmud, but Jewish printers substituted the word 
for "Talmud", anxious lest the Talmud be banned when Christian polemicists claimed that the Talmud 
contained anti-Christian statements. Jacobs, The Jewish Religion, p.181 f. R. J. Zwi Werblowsky and 
Geoffrey Wigoder (Eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1997, p.267. 
36 Friedman, Abraham Joshua Hesche! and Elie Wiese!, p.9. 
37 Dresner, introduction to The Circle of the Baa! Shem Tov, p.xxviii. 
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from which Heschel's mature personality would emerge. 38 When Heschellater composed 
his classic picture of Jewish piety, 39 the one model whom he identified for his students 
was the rabbi of Novominsk.4o 
His life was consistent with his thought. .. He was a complete 
person. Not one minute of the day was allowed to pass without 
attempting to serve God with all of his strength. He gave himself over 
to a tremendous task: the service of the Almighty at every moment 
with every act. 41 
He had helped Heschel's father move to Warsaw, found a suitable place for him, and, after 
the latter's early death, acted as mentor to the family. The uncle liked to have the young 
Abraham sit at his right hand when he addressed the Hasidim at the Sabbath table:+2 
38 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.36. 
39 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "An Analysis of Piety", Review of Religion, Vo1.6, No.3, March 1942, pp.293-
307. This was Heschel's first American article. Incorporated as "The Pious Man", Chapter 26, Abraham 
Joshua Heschel, Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1951, 
pp.273-296. See also Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, pp.305-317. 
40 Samuel H. Dresner, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Man", in Joshua Stampfer (Ed.), Prayer and Politics. 
the Twin Poles of Abraham Joshua Heschel, Institute of Judaic Studies, Portland OR, 1985, p.2, and in 
Dresner, "Heschel the Man", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p. 4. See Dresner, "The 
Contribution of Abraham Joshua Heschel", Judaism, Vo1.32, Winter 1983, p.62f, and Dresner, introduction 
to The Circle of the Baal Shem Tov, p.xxviii. See also Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.134, and Kaplan and 
Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.43ff. 
41 Abraham Joshua Heschel, quoted by Dresner, Circle of the Baal Shem Tov, p.xxix: "Famed for his 
talmudic learning and as a kabbalist, his piety and love of Israel were well-known. He presided at the third 
Sabbath meal ... in a mood of ecstasy: his songs and words of Torah were wonderful, while his gestures and 
his face were marvellous to behold." Cf. H. Rabinowicz, The World of Hasidism, Valentine, London, 1970, 
pp. 164ff. 
42 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.45. 
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When the Novominsker Rebbe saw that his efforts to dissuade his nephew from leaving for 
Vilna and Berlin were to no avail, he agreed to the young man's plan: "You can go, but 
only you. "43 At the age of eighteen, Heschel enrolled at the secular Yiddish 
Realgymnasium in Vi Ina, probably at Schneersohn's recommendation,44 to prepare himself 
for the requirements of a modem academic life. He also joined a group of Yiddish poets, 
the Jung Vilna, and his first book-perhaps his most autobiographical-was a volume of 
his Vilna poems, published in Warsaw in 1933 (the year he completed his doctoral 
dissertation for the University of Berlin), and dedicated to the memory of his father. The 
title is Der Shem Ham 'Forash-Mentsh (God's Ineffable Name-Man).45 
43 Dresner, introduction to The Circle of the Baal Shem Tov, p.xxviii. See also Kaplan and Dresner, 
Prophetic Witness, p.71. 
44 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.79. 
45 Heschel's first published poem appeared in Varshaver shriftn, published by the Warsaw Writers and 
Journalists Club, 1926-7. A sequence of verses appeared in the New York Yiddish periodical Zukunjt 
("Future"), December 1929 and November 1930. Der Shem Ham 'Forash-Mentsh was published by Verlag 
Indzel, Warsaw, 1933. It contains sixty-six poems, seven of which, in Zalman M. Schachter's translation, 
are included in his tribute to Heschel, "Abraham Joshua Heschel, Poet", Sh 'ma: a journal of Jewish 
responsibili(v, Vol.3, No.46, JanualY 19th 1973, p.45-47, in which Schachter comments: "perhaps all of 
Heschel's work afterwards is ... to make explicit what was already implicit in his poems". Schachter 
circulated a mimeographed translation of the entire book of poems (Winnipeg, 1971). Nine poems, translated 
and introduced by Morton Leifman, "from De,. Shem Hameforash: Mensch", appear in Conservative 
Judaism, Vol.L, No.2-3, Winter-Spring 1998, pp.5-21. For commentary on Heschel's poetry see Kaplan and 
Dresner, Prophetic Witness, pp.89-92, 141-152. 
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The Berlin Years 
Heschel completed his examinations at the Realgymnasium in June 1927 and went on to 
study in what he considered to be the centre of European cultural and intellectual life-
Berlin. At the age of twenty he enrolled at the Friedrich Wilhelm Universitat (now 
Humboldt University). In April 1929 he completed the preliminary studies in German 
language and literature, Latin, mathematics, German history and geography required of 
foreign students, and he matriculated. His main subject at the university was philosophy, 
with art history and Semitics. He also enrolled at the (liberal) Hochschule fur die 
Wissenschafl des Judentums (Academy for Scientific Jewish Studies), where he engaged in 
the modem scientific study of Jewish texts and history, taught by some of the great names 
of German-Jewish scholarship: Hanoch Albeck, Ismar Elbogen, Julius Guttmann and Leo 
Baeck.46 He also maintained informal contact with the modem Orthodox rabbinical 
seminary located at the other end of Artillerie StrafJe. 47 
He was comfortable-and uncomfortable-in both institutions, for 
different reasons. People in the Hasidic prayer houses became cool to 
Heschel when they learned that he was not studying at the Orthodox 
Rabbinical institution but at the scientific, Liberal one. They were 
unsettled by this evidence ofHeschel's independence.48 
46 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, pp.113-118. 
47 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xi. 
48 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Wirness, p.l02. 
15 
In Berlin, then, Heschel felt the full force of the tension between the claims of ancestral 
piety and the demands of modem secularism-a tension he was to maintain and make 
creative for the rest of his life, as he sought to reinterpret ancient truth to modem people 
whilst at the same time challenging the superficiality of much modem life and thought. 
I came with great hunger to the University of Berlin to study 
philosophy. I looked for a system of thought, for the depth of the 
spirit, for the meaning of existence. Erudite and profound scholars 
gave courses in logic, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics and 
metaphysics. .. I was exposed to the austere discipline of unremitting 
inquiry and self-criticism. Yet, in spite of the impressive intellectual 
attainments offered to me, I became increasingly aware of the gulf that 
separated my views from those held at the University. I had come 
with a sense of anxiety: how can I rationally find a way where 
ultimate meaning lies . .? Why am I here at all, and what is my 
purpose? I did not even know how to phrase my concern. But to my 
teachers that was a question unworthy of philosophical analysis. My 
assumption was: man's dignity consists in his having been created in 
the likeness of God. My question was: how must man, a being who is 
in essence the image of God, think, feel and act? To them, religion 
was a feeling. To me, religion included the insights of the Torah 
which is a vision of man from the point of view of God. They spoke 
of God from the point of view of man. To them God was an idea, a 
postulate of reason. They gave Him the status of being a logical 
possibility. But to assume that He had existence would have been a 
crime against epistemology.49 
In December 1929 Heschel passed the Hochschule examinations in Hebrew language, 
Bible and Talmud, Midrash, liturgy, philosophy of religion, and Jewish history and 
literature. The following May he was awarded a prize for his paper on "Visions in the 
Bible", and was appointed a lecturer in talmudic exegesis. In July 1934 he was granted a 
(liberal) rabbinical degree, with a graduating thesis entitled, "Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha 
and Halacha".50 
49 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Meaning of Observance", in Jacob Neusner (Ed.), Understanding Je\\'ish 
Theology, Ktav, New York, 1973, p.94f. 
50 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xi. 
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In the faculty of philosophy at the University, the School of Phenomenology was at its 
height, and Heschel was to make use of its techniques in his task of discovering the 
relevance of the classical documents of Judaism for modem people. His doctoral 
dissertation was a phenomenological, theological and literary analysis of prophetic 
consciousness, in which he developed the conceptual framework for the whole of his later 
philosophy of Judaism. However, Heschel was always careful to avoid forcing Greek 
metaphysics and Neo-Kantian concepts upon Biblical thought, considering his teachers to 
be "prisoners of a Greek-German way of thinking [who] were fettered in categories which 
presupposed certain metaphysical assumptions which could never be proved".51 
Heschel's dissertation, entitled Das prophetische Bewufitsein ("Prophetic Consciousness") 
was submitted in December 1932. Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on 30th 
January 1933. Heschel was orally examined for his doctorate on February 23rd. Five days 
later the Reichstag building was set on fire. In April Heschel witnessed the act of book-
burning in a large open square in the centre of the University, and recorded his disgust in 
an anonymously published Yiddish poem entitled, "On the Day ofHate".52 The Nazi Party 
seized power in July. 
51 Heschel, "The Meaning of Observance", p.94f. 
52 Translation by Leonard Wolf, in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p. 71 f. 
The original, written in Yiddish as "In tog fun has", under the pseudonym "Itzig", in Haynt, Warsaw, May 
10th 1933. Heschel claimed authorship when he republished it in a brochure with YIVO, commemorating 
the 25th anniversary of the founding ofYung Vilna (25 Yor Yung Vilne, 1929-54), Leizer Ran, Nusakh Vilne, 
New York, 1955, pA3f): "Berlin, 1 April 1933; written when the Nazis in the Berlin Opern-Platz burned the 
works of Jewish philosophers." See Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.195, note 2. Translation by Jeffrey 
Shandler, "Hesche I and Yiddish", The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Vol.2, 1993, pp.260-263. 
Jewish Law forbids the burning of books that contain the divine name, even if they are disused, secular or 
heretical. Such books are put away to molder, or buried, often in the grave of a scholar or pious man at his 
intern1ent. Thus the ceremonial burning of books became a symbol of arch-heresy-the philosophical works 
of Maimonides were publicly burned in southern France in 1233, and Mordecai M. Kaplan's 
Reconstructionist prayer book was burned by extreme Orthodox elements in New York in modem times. 
The burning of Jewish books by non-Jewish authorities has been a mark of anti-Semitism: twenty-four cart-
loads of the Talmud were burned in Paris in 1242, and Jewish books were burned in Rome in 1332 and 1553. 
(Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion, p.139). 
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It was a requirement that Heschel's dissertation be published before his doctorate could be 
awarded. However, he had no money for the publication, and eventually it was forbidden 
for books by Jewish authors to be published at all in Germany. It was not until the Spring 
of 1936 that the book was published in Cracow by the Polish Academy of Sciences. The 
publication was underwritten by the Erich Reiss Publishing House in Berlin, for whom 
Heschel was working as editor of a series on Jewish thought and history, ludentum ill 
Geschichte und Gegenwart. 53 Erich Reiss had already commissioned and published 
Heschel's biography of Maimonides. 54 
The University had agreed to the non-German publisher as a conceSSIOn, and Heschel 
eventually received his diploma on 11 th December 1935, three years after he had 
submitted his dissertation. Without his doctoral degree it would have been considerably 
more difficult for him to escape from Europe in 1939. After receiving his doctorate 
Heschel remained in Berlin, teaching at the Hochschule and at the liidisches Lehrhaus, and 
editing for Erich Reiss Verlag, who published in 1937 his biographical essay on Don Isaac 
Abravane1. 55 Eight brief biographical essays on Tannaim were published in 1936 in 
liidisches Gemeindeblatt, a Berlin Jewish newspaper. 56 
53 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Die Prophetie, Polish Academy of Sciences, Cracow, 1936. 
54 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Maimonides: Eine Biographie, Erich Reiss Verlag, Berlin, 1935. 
The English translation, Maimonides: A Biography, translated by Joachim Neugroschel, was published in 
1982 by Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, and reissued by Image Books (Doubleday), New York, 1991. 
Reiss had asked the 28-year-old Heschel to write the book for the 800th anniversary of Maimonides' birth, 
the manuscript being completed in two weeks. See Susannah Heschel, introduction to Moral Grandeur and 
Spiritual Audacity, p.xiv. 
55 Abraham Joshua Hesche!, Don lizchak Abravanel, Erich Reiss Verlag, Berlin, 1937. 
56 "Personlichkeiten der jiidischen Geschichte", ladisches Gemeindeblatt, Berlin, February 23, March 8, 29, 
April 12, 26, May 17, 31, August 16, 1936. Heschel at least partly earned his living in Berlin by writing for 
the Berlin Jewish Community newpaper: told to me by Samuel H. Dresner, 6th June 1997. 
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In the meantime Die Prophetie was receiving favourable reviews both in Gennany and 
abroad. In the United States of America The Philosophical Review heralded it as "one of 
the most important contributions to the general philosophy of religion that the last few 
years have produced". 57 
Heschel frequently lectured to Jewish Groups in Gennany and began to gain recognition as 
a scholar. When he met Martin Buber, Eduard Strauss and Ludwig Feuchtwanger in 
Frankfurt-am-Main in March 1936 they had all read Die Prophetie. Eight months later 
Buber invited Heschel to become director of the Mittelstelle fur Judische Erwachsenen 
Bildung in Frankfurt, an offer Heschel accepted when they met in Berlin in January, just 
after Heschel's thirtieth birthday. He moved to Frankfurt on 1st March 1937, and a few 
days later wrote: 
The last days in Frankfurt were lovely. Many people from 
throughout Gennany took part in the conference of the Mittelstelle. 
Between Feuchtwanger-a very spiritual man-and me a friendship 
developed. We understood each other excellently and wished we 
could spend a few days together. Perhaps for that reason I will one 
day visit Munich. The most delightful was a discussion with Buber, to 
whom I gave my article in the Rundschreiben to read. He: "It's a 
level too high! The part on prayer [text] is good, the part on praying 
[what prayer is] does not belong in the Rundschreiben." I: "The 
assignment is not to learn to read the text but to learn how to pray. 
The second is more important." Friendly quarrel. Buber pushed 
Eduard Strauss into the discussion by saying, "Heschel is a lovely 
youngster, but so stubborn!" This discussion went on so that I long 
with joy for the next one ... 58 
57 Sven Nilson, "review of Die Prophetie", The Philosophical Review, Vo1.46, September 1937, p. 556. 
58 Abraham Joshua Heschel, letter, March 26th 1937, in Susannah Heschel, Moral Grandeur and Spiritual 
Audacifl', p.xv. 
19 
It was in Frankfurt that Fritz Rothschild, a young observant Jew from Frankfurt, who was 
later to become a student, colleague, editor and interpreter of Heschel in America, first 
heard Heschel speak, as he presented the Bible to a sceptical group of secular, left-wing, 
Zionist youth leaders.59 
For several years, living under the darkening cloud of Nazism, Heschel had been seeking a 
position outside Germany, learning English, and sending letters and copies of his 
publications to scholars in Europe and the United States. He was helped, as were many 
others, by the anti-Nazi Quaker community in Frankfurt and their leader Rudolf Schlosser. 
Heschel wrote and delivered his lecture "The Meaning of This Hour" to the Frankfurt 
Quakers in March 1938, speaking of the responsibility of religious leaders in Nazi 
Germany.60 The Quaker leaders wrote with personal references to the American Consulate 
in support of Heschel's visa application. 61 He was invited by the Quakers in England to 
teach at their Woodbrooke School, but was unable to obtain a visa. In February 1938 the 
Jewish community in Prague invited him to teach in their new rabbinical school from the 
next academic year. 62 They had been promised support from President Eduard Benes, and 
59 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p. 9, and Fritz A. Rothschild in conversation at the Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America, June 4th 1997. See Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.251. 
60 The lecture was expanded into an essay and published in The Hebrew Union College Bulletin, 1943, as 
"The Meaning of This War". Martin Buber had been invited to speak but, suffering from influenza, 
delegated the task to Heschel. "Buber's assistant" was described by one listener as "a very serious young 
man, with strong inner concentration, [who] attempted to fathom the meaning of this new persecution of the 
Jewish people". Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.163. Kaplan cites Margaret Lachmund (ed.), Begegnung mit 
dem ludentum. Ein Gedenkbuch, Heft 2 (Bad Pyrmont, 1962, p.11). 
61 Susannah Heschel, Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xiv, citing a letter from Clarence Pickett of 
the American Friends Service Committee, to the American Consul in Warsaw, June 12th 1939. 
62 Letter from Oberster Rat der Jildischen Kultusgemeinder-Verbande in Boehmen, Mahren and Schlesien, 
February 16th 1938, cited by Susannah Heschel, Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p. xvii. 
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Charles University had offered accommodation, but the project never came to fruition. 
Meanwhile, Heschel's reputation as a biblical scholar was growing, and would eventually 
assist in his escape from the war in Europe, and the Nazi extermination of the Jews. Die 
Prophetie became one of the Polish Academy's most widely reviewed books, receiving 
praise from Protestant, Catholic and Jewish scholars in Europe and in the United States. 63 
On 28th October 1938 eighteen thousand Polish passport-holding Jews were expelled from 
Germany. In the middle of the night the Gestapo arrived at the room Heschel rented from 
the Adler family in Frankfurt and gave him an hour to pack. He carried two heavy 
suitcases of manuscripts and books to the police station where he was held overnight, and 
the next day he was put onto a packed train for the Polish border, standing for the entire 
three-day journey.64 
Seven months earlier the Polish authorities had passed a law requiring its Jewish citizens 
who had lived abroad for more than five years to renew their passports or lose the right of 
return. Few of the 70,000 "Polish" Jews resident in Austria and Germany (many born 
there and not speaking Polish) applied. The Polish authorities therefore denied entry to 
their Jewish citizens, and many, including Heschel, were held in a detention camp at 
Zbaszyn at the border for months under miserable conditions. Heschel was fortunate in that 
his family was able to secure his release, and he returned to Warsaw to live with his mother 
63 Kaplan and Dresner, ProphetiC Witness, p.255. 
()4 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xvii 
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and sisters. From November 1938 to June 1939 he lectured on Jewish philosophy and 
Bible at Warsaw's Instytut Nauk Judaistycznych (Institute for Jewish Studies), an academy 
of similar orientation to the Hochschule in Berlin. It was an academic appointment 
commensurate with Heschel's qualifications, but of the kind no longer available to Jews in 
Germany. 65 
He continued desperately to seek a way out of Europe, and was able to leave Warsaw for 
London just six weeks before the German invasion of Poland which precipitated the 
Second World War, thus escaping the fate that was to befall those with whom he shared his 
heritage. He was to speak of it in the opening words of his inaugural lecture as Harry 
Emerson Fosdick Visiting Professor at Union Theological Seminary in New York, 1965: 
I speak as a person who was able to leave Warsaw, the city in which I 
was born, just six weeks before the disaster began. My destination 
was New York; it would have been Auschwitz or Treblinka. I am a 
brand plucked from the fire in which my people was burned to death. 
I am a brand plucked from the fire of an altar of Satan on which 
millions of human lives were exterminated to evil's greater glory, and 
on which so much else was consumed: the divine image of so many 
human beings, many people's faith in the God of justice and 
compassion, and so much of the secret and power of attachment to the 
Bible bred and cherished in the hearts of men for nearly two thousand 
years.66 
65 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.280. ... . 
66 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", in Kasimow and Sherwm (Eds.), No ReligIOn IS all 
Island, p.3. 
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Heschel escaped the European Holocaust because of the efforts of Julian Morgenstern, 
President of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati. As early as 1934 Morgenstern and 
the Board of Governors of the college had been concerned about the fate of Jewish 
Scholars in Europe, and had developed a plan for getting some of them to America. 67 
Heschel had been recommended to Morgenstern because of his publications and reputation 
in Germany, and it was to everyone's advantage that he was unmarried. Morgenstern 
wrote (6th April 1939) a formal letter to Heschel in Warsaw inviting him to serve as 
Research Fellow in Bible and Jewish philosophy for two years, at an annual salary of $500, 
plus board and lodging.68 
The American Consul in Warsaw told him that because of a quota system for the issue of 
visas it would take at least nine months for his case to be considered, but Heschel travelled 
to Stuttgart and completed the necessary paperwork at the Consulate there. He was 
number 615 on the Polish quota.69 In the summer of 1939 he finally left Warsaw for 
London, arriving on 13th July, to be welcomed by his brother Jacob who had arrived with 
his family five months earlier, and was rabbi to an Orthodox congregation. During six 
months in London he established an Institute for Jewish Learning (in February 1940), with 
the help of other refugee scholars and the Theodore Herzl Society. The students were 
themselves refugees, many intent on settling in Palestine.7o 
67 Alfred Gottschalk, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: A Man of Dialogue", Conservati\'e Judaism, Vol.28, No.1, 
Fall 1973, p.24. See also Michael Meyer, "The Refugee Scholars Project of the Hebrew Union College", in 
Bertram W. Kom (Ed.), A Bicentennial Festschrift for Jacob R. Marcus, American Jewish Historical Society, 
Walthem, and Ktav, New York, 1976, pp.359-75. 
68 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.9, and p.168 note 13. See Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and 
Spiritual Audacity, p. xviii. 
69 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.286. 
70 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xviii. 
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Morgenstern wrote, via Heschel's Warsaw address, to explain that in order to qualify for a 
non-quota visa Heschel would have to show that he had taught for two full years at a 
comparable institution to the Hebrew Union College. Heschel replied the same day, 28th 
July 1939, to indicate that his teaching experience in Frankfurt and Warsaw met the 
requirement. He added, in halting English: "I would very much like to study the English 
language and to continue the work on a philosophical book on the prayer. Two chapters 
therefrom will be published before long".?1 
A month after the outbreak of the European war, following Hitler's invasion of Poland, 
Morgenstern responded to the State Department's demand that only teachers and not 
researchers could apply for a non-quota visa by changing the title and condition of 
Heschel's appointment. 
It gives me very great pleasure to extend to you, in the name of the 
Hebrew Union College, located in Cincinnati, Ohio, a call as teaching 
member of the Faculty, with the title of Instructor in Bible, for an 
indeterminate period, at a salary of $1 ,500.00 for the first year. By the 
term "indeterminate period" I mean that it is our intention that this 
appointment shall be permanent, subject of course to the rules and 
regulations of the Hebrew Union College regularly governing the 
appointment and permanence in office of members of its Faculty. I 
am sending a copy of this letter to the American Consul in Dublin by 
this same mail. I would urge therefore that you contact the Consul 
immediately in order to expedite as much as possible your departure 
for the United States.72 
71 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.9f. . . 
72 Kaplan and Dresner, Prophetic Witness, p.294. Morgenstern had learned that the Amencan Consul in 
London had "received positive instructions to issue no more visas". 
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Hesche) in America 
Heschel finally received his American visa in January 1940, and arrived in New York two 
months later. He first stayed with his sister Sarah and her family in New York, and then 
moved to Cincinnati to take up his post as "instructor" at the Hebrew Union College, 
where he lived in a student dormitory. His five years there were difficult and lonely. 
Perhaps the whole experience of leaving Germany and arriving in America was in itself 
enough of a culture-shock, so that any experience of American Judaism would have been 
soul-searing for him.73 He was a penniless refugee, speaking poor English at first, and a 
traditional, observant Jew at an aggressively Reform college. He was not able even to eat 
in the college cafeteria, because no kosher food was available. There was little sympathy 
from students or staff for the Hasidic piety of his background and practice. His students' 
background in Jewish texts was much weaker than he had been able to expect in Berlin,74 
and they did not treat him with the kind of respect he had come to expect since his 
boyhood. 75 
Heschel constantly struggled to bring his mother and sister from Warsaw, and to save other 
friends, colleagues and relatives from the situation in Europe. He felt that the American 
Jewish community was complacent, refusing to recognise the urgency and the danger of 
the situation. There was even some hostility towards the European Jews,?6 There were 
73 Albert Friedlander in conversation at Leo Baeck College, London, 19th May 1997. 
74 Susannah Heschel, Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xix. 
75 Samuel H. Dresner in conversation, New York, 6th June 1997. 
76 Susannah Heschel, op. cit. See also Susannah Heschel, "My Father" in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds), No 
Religion is an Island, p. 28, and "Hesche I as Mensch: Testimony of his Daughter", in Jacob Neusner and 
Noam M. M. Neusner (Eds.), To GroH' in Wisdom: An Anthology of Abraham Joshua Heschel, Madison 
Books, Lanham, 1990, p.199. For a discussion of the part played by the American press in creating public 
opinion, see Deborah E. Lipstadt, Beyond Belief The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust 
1933-1945 The Free Press, New York, 1986. , 
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strict VIsa quotas, and a general unwillingness in the bureaucracy to assist In the 
immigration of Jews. 77 He was still seeking visas for his mother and sister when news of 
their murder reached him in Cincinnati. He spoke of his grief and powerlessness only 
much later, in an interview published in Yiddish: 
I was an immigrant, a refugee. No one listened to me. Let me 
mention three examples: in 1941 I met with a prominent Jewish 
communal leader, a devout Zionist. I told him that the Jews of 
Warsaw endure in the belief that American Jewry is working 
ceaselessly on their behalf. Were they to know of our indifference, 
Jews in Warsaw would perish from shock. My words fell on deaf 
ears. [Another incident in 1942.] 
In 1943 I attended the American Jewish Conference of all Jewish 
organizations, to appeal that they act to extinguish the flames that had 
engulfed East European Jewry. The "conference" had a long 
agenda-Eretz Yisrael, fascism, finances, etc.-the last item of which 
was Jews under the Germans. By the time they reached this issue, 
almost all the representatives had left. I went away brokenhearted. 
[Interviewer: "What then, in fact, did you doT'] 
I went to Rabbi Eliezer Silver's synagogue in Cincinnati, recited 
Psalms, fasted, and cried myself out. I was a stranger in this country. 
My word had no power. When I did speak, they shouted me down. 
They called me a mystic, unrealistic. I had no influence on leaders of 
American Jewry.78 
When the German armed forces invaded Poland, Heschel's sister Esther Sima was killed in 
the bombing of Warsaw, and his mother and sister Gittel had to abandon their apartment. 
He was able to send them food and money through Arthur Spanier, who had worked as an 
instructor and librarian in the Hochschule in Berlin after being dismissed as Director of the 
77 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.119. 
78 Interview by Gershon Jacobson, Day-Morning Journal (Yiddish), 13th June 1963, cited in English in 
Dresner, The Circle a/the Baal Shem Tov, p.xxv. Rabbi Silver, an activist who rescued many European 
Jews, offered Heschel personal support during his years in Cincinnati. 
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Judaica Division of the Prussian State Library in 1935, and who had fled to the 
Netherlands in 1938. In postcards his mother and sister worried about his well-being and 
begged for news that he was safe: "Every day that we receive a letter from you," Gittel 
wrote, "is a holiday for us"J9 Heschel's mother was killed in the Warsaw Ghetto, Gittel 
probably in Treblinka, and another sister Devorah Miriam Dremer, who lived in Vienna, 
was killed in Auschwitz in 1944. His oldest sister, Sarah, had emigrated to the United 
States in February 1939 with her husband, also named Abraham Joshua Heschel, the rebbe 
of Kopitzhinitz, and she and his brother Jacob (with his family in London) were to be the 
only survivors from Heschel's immediate family.80 
At Hebrew Union College Heschel taught Jewish philosophy and Rabbinics. His 
spirituality having suffered a further transplantation-shock into a largely secular American 
Judaism, he found himself once again in the midst of conflict between the traditional and 
the modem, now expressed in the familiar distinctions between Orthodox, Conservative 
and Reform Judaism. Hebrew Union College had gone far down the road of adapting 
Jewish thought and practice to modem western traditions and assumptions. 
79 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xix. See also Susannah Heschel, 
"Hesche I as Mensch", p.199. 
80 Some cousins from Warsaw were also in New York. See Susannah Heschel, Moral Grandeur and 
Spiritual A udaciy., p.xix. 
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However, some of the students at Cincinnati helped ease Hesche! 's sense of exile. Among 
them was Samuel Dresner, who met him in 1942, was with him almost every day, and then 
moved with him to the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York, in 1950. "1 
suppose a devoted student was one of the few people he could be with", said Dresner. 
"With the first words that came out of his mouth, I was convinced that this was a great 
human being".81 His students also helped him improve his English, and within two years 
he was publishing in his newly adopted language. It is said that he could remember the 
place and occasion on which he learned each new English word. 82 
In his introduction to an address by Heschel to the Rabbinic Assembly of America in 1968 
("The Theological Dimension of Medinat Yisrae!") Dresner speaks of how impoverished 
American Judaism had become, and then tells how Heschel taught at Hebrew school: 
I remember, as a student at the Hebrew Union College, being 
surprised to learn that Dr. Heschel-after all a professor-had 
volunteered to spend each Shabbos afternoon teaching the highest 
class in the local Hebrew school. I found it hard to comprehend, until 
I myself visited the class. There in a small unlit room were eight or 
nine students deeply immersed in the study of Isaiah. During the 
lesson the words of the prophet came alive in all their power, 
illuminating the students' faces. For the moment I thought the navi 
himself was present. 
When it grew too dark to read, Dr. Heschel began to sing a nigun, 
and those American-born youngsters who had never before heard such 
melodies ... joined in eagerly. Mind and soul together were being 
nourished. Study had become worship. The lives of the students were 
never the same after that year. Two became rabbis; others teachers; 
others settled in Israel. 
81 Samuel H. Dresner, in conversation, New York, 6th June 1997. 
82 Told to me by Fritz A. Rothschild, Jewish Theological Seminary ofNe\\' York, June 4th 1997. See also 
Louis Finkelstein, "Three Meetings with Abraham Joshua Heschel", Conservative Judaism. Vol.28, No.1, 
Fall 1973, p.20. 
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That afternoon I grasped three things about our teacher which 
beca~e even clearer in the passing years. First, far from despairing of 
Amencan Jewry, he believed a spark lay hidden in each Jew, 
especially the youth, waiting to be kindled. Secondly, he transcended 
the limitations of academic institutions and would find his students 
beyond as well as within their walls, not hiding in the comfort of his 
study, but opening his doors to all. And, thirdly, he knew how to 
kindle the spark. 83 
Heschel's first book in English was The Quest for Certainty in Sa 'adia 's Philosophy, 
published in 1944.84 The two articles brought together in the book had been written for the 
one-thousandth anniversary of the death of Rabbi Sa'adia Gaon. "The Quest for Certainty" 
in the title is a direct reference to John Dewey's ultimate statement of pragmatism,85 but 
Heschel's essay rearticulated Sa'adia's adaptation of Kalam to Judaism-his attempt to 
explain Judaism to someone so steeped in Kalam that he could think only in the Arabic 
philosophical categories that he found intelligible, plausible and cogent. 86 Heschel thus 
continued his studies of medieval Jewish philosophers begun in Berlin with a penetrating 
study of the major questions pursued by the foremost medieval Jewish spiritual leader, 
Talmudist, biblical exegete and philosopher 87-questions with which Heschel himself was 
to grapple for the rest of his life: the meaning of truth, the source of religious knowledge; 
83 Samuel Dresner, "Introduction of Dr. Abraham Joshua Heschel", Proceedings of the Rabbinic Assembly 
of America, Vol.32, 1968, p.89. 
84 Abraham Heschel, The Questfor Certainty in Saadia 's Philosophy, Philip Feldheim, New York, 1944. 
First published as two articles in The Jewish Quarterly Ret'ieH', Vol.33 (1943), Nos.2-3, pp,265-313, and 
Vo1.34 (1944), No.4, pp,391-408. 
85 John Dewey (1859-1952) proposed radical pragmatism as a response to "epistemological and moral 
fallibilism"-the assertion that no knowledge-claim, no moral rule, principle or ideal is ever certain, immune 
from all possible criticism and revision. See Ted Honderich (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.197. 
86 See Gerson D. Cohen, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Interpreter of Classical Jewish Thought", 
Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly, Vol.45, 1984, p.l 07. Kalam is a form ofIslamic scholasticism 
dating from the eighth century, and centred on the question of free will. The school remained highly 
influential, especially in Jewish circles. See Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion, p,388, 
87 Sa 'adia Gaon (882-942) was head of the college at Sura (Babylon). He translated the Bible into Arabic, 
compiled a Prayer Book, and wrote the first systematic Jewish theology: Emunot I'e-Deof (Beliefs and 
OpinionsJ-a philosophical defence of Rabbinic Judaism. See Jacobs, The Jewish Religion, p.433, and 
o.~rord Dictionmy of the Jewish Religion, p.594. 
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revelation and reason, doubt and faith. 88 Indeed, Heschel's comment that Sa'adia 
"penetrated below the deep mines of Bible and Talmud, where he had unearthed a wealth 
of wisdom and learning in order to ascertain what lay in the substratum",89 is an apt 
description of the work he later came to call "depth theology". 
On 7th January 1945 Heschel gave an address in his native Yiddish at YIVO, the Institute 
for Jewish Scientific Research in New York, on Eastern European Jewish life. It was a 
eulogy for a way of life that had been destroyed in the European Holocaust, and an 
expression of a personal sense of bereavement.9o When he had finished the audience, 
made up largely of secular Yiddish writers, spontaneously stood to say kaddish, the Jewish 
memorial prayer for the dead. His address was expanded into The Earth Is the Lord's: the 
inner life of the Jew in Eastern Europe. By the time the book was published he had long 
moved to New York. 
88 Merkle, Genesis of Faith, p.ll. 
89 Heschel, "The Quest for Certainty", Jewish Quarterly Review, Vo1.33, p.266. 
90 Byron L. Sherwin, "Abraham 1. Heschel", The Torch, Spring 1969, p.5: "?nce I saw the original 
manuscript of this book. It was in Yiddish. Every page was smudged and stamed. I must have looked 
puzzled. He put his hand on my shoulder and explained with one word-'Tears'." 
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Heschel remained grateful to Hebrew Union College, which had saved his life by enabling 
him to leave Europe. 91 Yet he was conscious that his philosophy of Judaism was not that 
of the college, and in 1945 he resigned his position.92 In May of that year, during his last 
semester at Cincinnati, he became a naturalised American citizen. He began the new 
academic year at the centre of Conservative Judaism as a member of the faculty of The 
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, where he was to remain for the rest of his life. 
In Cincinnati Heschel had met Sylvia Strauss, a concert pianist who had left her home 
town of Cleveland to study with Severin Eisenberger. When they first met, she and 
Heschel were both guests at the home of Professor Jacob Marcus, and she was asked to 
play. After attending her concert at the Cincinnati music conservatory, he took her out to 
celebrate. According to their daughter, "There was an instant rapport between them; she 
had studied philosophy and literature and was a sensitive, religious person. He fell in love 
with her artistry, her mind, her gentleness and her soul".93 Sylvia Strauss also moved to 
91 Abraham Joshua Heschel: " ... it was Dr. Julian Morgenstern who extended an invitation to me to come 
to the college while I was still in Warsaw, and it was through the Hebrew Union College that I was able to 
come to the United States in March 1940. It gives me great joy to be able to express my gratitude to him on 
this occasion." In "Towards an Understanding of Halacha", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and 
Spiritual Audaci()', p.126. 
92 Gottschalk, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: A Man of Dialogues", p.24f. Heschel's letter of resignation 
reads: "It is with a heavy heart that I herewith express my desire to resign my position on the Faculty of the 
Hebrew Union College. Since my arrival in this country five years ago, which was made possible through 
the kind and generous invitation of the College, I have spared no effort to serve the College, both through my 
work in the classroom, and personal contacts with the students. I have tried to contribute everything within 
my power to the scholastic and spiritual development of my pupils, and the results of my labor have often 
given me much personal satisfaction. However, from the beginning of my affiliation with the College, I fully 
realized that the Hebrew Union College stands for a distinctive philosophy of Judaism, which, of course, it 
tries to realize in practice. I have constantly studied its point of view and I have come to understand and to 
appreciate in ever increasing measure the task and the service of the College in the life of the Jewish 
community in America. Yet, while I find that there are ideals and obligations which I wholeheartedly share, 
I do not feel that my own interpretation of Judaism is in full accord with the teachings of the College. I have 
given much thought to this divergence; it was my good fortune to have been able to discuss the issue with 
you, Dr. Morgenstern, during the past five years, in the spirit of friendship and understanding. As a result of 
a thorough examination of these circumstances, I have reached the decision that the honorable thing for me to 
do is to resign my position as Associate Professor of Jewish Philosophy and Rabbinics of the Faculty of the 
Hebrew Union College, a position to hold which I regard as a high distinction." 
93 Susannah Heschel, "Heschel as Mensch", p.200. 
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New York, to study with Eduard Steuermann, on the recommendation of Arthur 
Rubenstein. She and Heschel were married on 10th December 1946 at her parents' home 
in Los Angeles. 
Heschel understood and was accepted by "almost the entire spectrum of Jewish life-from 
the Zionists and the Hebraists to the Yiddishists, and from the Reform and Conservative to 
the Orthodox and the Hasidim".94 There is a story that when once asked whether he was 
Orthodox, Conservative or Reform, Heschel replied that he was "not a noun in search of an 
adjective", yet Merkle cites Sylvia Heschel in support of his alignment to the Conservative 
Movement, together with the fact that he remained at the Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America for the last twenty-seven years of his life. 95 In a sense there was nowhere else for 
him to go: there were only two chairs in Jewish Studies at universities, at Columbia and 
Harvard, and they were firmly occupied. 96 Gershom Sholem, who was Professor of Jewish 
Mysticism at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, would have been uncomfortable with 
Heschel's theology, and would have resisted an appointment for him there. 97 Dresner later 
represented Heschel to the (Conservative) Rabbinical Assembly of America as having 
chosen to identify himself with the Conservative movement and the Conservative 
rabbinate: 
94 Dresner, introduction to The Circle of the Baal Shem Tov, p.viii. 
95 Merkle, Genesis of Faith, p.12. See also Dresner, introduction to The Circle of the Baal Shem To\', p. viii, 
'Though himself eschewing labels, identifying wholly with none of these schools, and all the while holding 
his own views, Heschel established good relations with each of the factions, since he believed each 
represented, in greater or lesser measure, an affirmation of Jewish life". 
96 Salo Wittrnayer Baron (1896-1989) had tenure at Columbia, and Harry Austryn Wolfson (1887-1974) at 
Harvard. 
97 Dresner in conversation, 6th June 1997. 
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It is among us that he has made his home. It is with us that he has 
sought fellowship, labouring patiently at our side to find answers for 
the perplexing questions we face, though ever reminding us of the 
greater question to which only our lives can be an answer.98 
Yet at first Heschel was no better received by his students at the Conservative Seminary in 
New York than he had been at the Reform College in Cincinnati. Thirty-eight years later, 
and more than ten years after Heschel's death, the Chancellor of the Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America, who had himself been a student at the seminary when Heschel 
arrived in 1945, explained why: 
I remember how we sat crowded . .. We had come to hear this great 
new luminary who had just arrived from Hebrew Union College. To a 
large extent, we found him unintelligible. .. We had been so steeped, 
not in John Dewey, but in Dewey's Jewish exegete, Mordecai M. 
Kaplan, that Heschel represented an almost insurmountable barrier. 
For half a century, Mordecai M. Kaplan had been the regnant, 
charismatic force in the Jewish Theological Seminary. And 
succeeding him, or taking over his role, was a man who spoke not in 
terms that contradicted Kaplan, but in terms that side-stepped him, 
indeed, ignored him completely, and reaffirmed the validity, the 
relevance, and the exegetical applicability of people and systems of 
thought who and which, as a result of our own historical training, we 
had come to believe were antiquated, and from a world that had no 
meaning for us. 99 
Gerson D. Cohen admits that Heschel was isolated even from his closest allies on the 
faculty, yet claims that Heschel became what he did because of the Seminary: "It was 
because of the tradition of academic freedom, it was because of the tradition of saying 
what you want to say, provided it is defensible scholastically, that he was able to produce 
works that are now [1984] beginning to take on a life and have a meaning of their own".IOO 
98 Dresner, "Introduction of Dr. Abraham Joshua Heschel", p.87. 
99 Gerson D. Cohen, "Abraham Joshua Heschel", p.l 07f. 
100 Ibid., p.ll!. 
33 
On the other hand there were students who warmed to him. Eugene B. Borowitz, writing 
immediately after Heschel's death, contrasted him with those who talked of "Discipline, 
Tradition, Value, Peoplehood, Survival-anything ... but a God who might arouse, inspire 
or even overwhelm us by His presence": 
Amidst all [the] many post-World War II Jews and Judaisms Abraham 
Heschel appeared, sui generis. Where the Litvaks or the Germans or 
the pseudo-Germans had come to the university sensibility with a cold 
Mignagdic (rationalist/legalist) Judaism, Heschel brought a glowing 
Hasidic faith to his Berlin studies. Unlike Buber, his Hasidism was 
first hand, a matter of cradle-songs and family association, not the 
acquired mysticism of a jin-de-sifxle intellectual. What he learned in 
Europe he brought to America and adapted to our naturalist mentality. 
So when he spoke to all the scientific, psychological, sociological, 
philosophic anti-religious theses which were the unspoken dogmas of 
our secular education, we could hear him answer not only out of 
Jewish learning but out of a Jewish soul. We responded to his 
teaching warmly for we were sick of Judaism as Kant or Dewey or 
watered-down Freud and we sought a Judaism that knew God wants 
the heart and not just the head. lol 
In an article written almost a year after Heschel' s death Robert McAfee Brown, one of his 
collaborators in the anti-Vietnam War book Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience. 102 writing 
about Heschel for Christians, suggested that his importance is symbolised by his faculty 
title: at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America he occupied the chair of Jewish 
Ethics and Mysticism: 
101 Eugene B. Borowitz, "Abraham Joshua Heschel, Model", Sh 'rna: a Journal 0/ Jewish Responsibility, 
V01.3, No.46, January 19th 1973, p.41f. 
102 Robert McAfee Brown, Abraham 1. Heschel, Michael Novak. Vietnam: Crisis a/Conscience, 
Association Press, Beluman House, Herder and Herder, New York, 1967. 
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[We] find today that most of the people who are engaged in the 
religious enterprise tend to get preoccupied, if not swallowed up, in 
one of those two areas to the virtual exclusion of the other. An 
ethicist we can understand even if we don't like his ethics, a mystic 
we know something about even if we can't follow him in his approach 
to reality; but an ethical mystic or a mystical ethicist? That is a 
strange breed. What would such a person look like? My friend, let 
me tell you something. I have an answer. I have been writing about 
him in every paragraph.! 03 
Susannah, the only child of Abraham and Sylvia Heschel, points out that it was only after 
marriage that her father began his major theological writings, and that in this too he was 
following tradition: 
It makes sense: spirituality in Judaism requires a partnership, not an 
ascetic withdrawal. My father, too, needed a companion, someone 
who loved him and understood him, and someone he could love and 
be devoted to, before he could open his soul to the world in his books; 
indeed, he dedicated God in Search of Man to his new wife. 104 
!03 Robert McAfee Brown, "Abraham Heschel: A Passion for Sincerity", Christianity alld Crisis, Yol.33, 
No.21, December 10th 1973, p.258. See also Robert McAfee Brown, "Some Are Guilty, All Are 
Responsible: Heschel's Social Ethics", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.125. 
!04 Susalmah Heschel "Heschel as Mensch", p.20!. See also Susannah Heschel, introduction to Moral 
Grandeur and Spiritudl Audacity, p.xx. The dedication of God in Search oj,\1an reads, "To Sylvia". 
Heschel had not made a dedication of any of his earlier books. 
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Writing and Speaking 
The Earth Is the Lord's: the inner life of the Jew in Eastern Europe, the expansion of his 
YIVO address of 7th January 1945, was published in 1949. It tells how the profound 
religious faith of the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe before the Holocaust 
expressed itself in the life of worship, faith and observance. 105 A companion volume, The 
Sabbath: its meaning for modern man, followed in 1951. 106 Together they represent 
Heschel's enterprise of linking the traditional heritage with the modem situation. The two 
books appeared in a combined edition in 1963. 
Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion was also published in 1951, and brought 
Heschel to the attention of a wider audience than that concerned with Judaism per se. In a 
review, Reinhold Niebuhr predicted that Heschel "will become a commanding and 
authoritative voice not only in the Jewish Community but in the religious life of 
America". 107 Niebuhr taught at Union Theological Seminary, close to the Jewish 
Theological Seminary, on the opposite comer of Broadway and 122nd Street in New York 
City, and he and Heschel developed a warm friendship. They were near neighbours on 
Riverside Drive, and often walked and talked together. 108 
105 See above, p.16. 
106 Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath: Its Meaningfor Modern Man, Farrar, Straus and Young, New 
York, 1951. 
107 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Masterly Analysis of Faith", The New York Herald Tribune Book Re\'ieH', 
April 1st 1951, p.12. 
108 Mrs. Sylvia Heschel still lives in their home at 425 Riverside Drive, and after Niebuhr's retirem~nt in . 
1960 he and Mrs. Ursula Niebuhr lived at 404 Riverside Drive. See Ursula Niebuhr, "Notes on a Fnendshlp: 
Abraham Joshua Heschel and Reinhold Niebuhr" in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.38. Crsula 
Niebuhr says (p.37), "For the last 12 years or so of his life, Abraham really was my husband's closest 
friend". 
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Announced as a two-volume work, Man Is not Alone was followed in 1955 by God ill 
Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism,109 with some overlapping (and indeed some 
recapitulation) with the earlier volume. The first volume deals with God and religion in 
general, and the second with God as known specifically in the biblical revelation, with 
Judaism as a specific response. 
In the meantime, Man's Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism had been 
published in 1954-the "philosophical book on the prayer" about which Heschel had 
written to Morgenstern from London in 1939. 110 The book was built around two addresses 
that Heschel gave in 1953, just two days apart, one to the (Conservative) Rabbinical 
Assembly of America, and the other to the (Refonn) Central Conference of American 
Rabbis.111 It is a penetrating discussion of prayer and religious symbolism, and a critique 
of the secularism of American Judaism. He "judged the practice of each audience in a 
manner each wanted the least to acknowledge",112 warning his Conservative colleagues 
about the emptiness of their orderly services, and urging his Refonn audience not to 
abandon Halacha, reassuring them, "I, too, have wrestled with the difficulties inherent in 
our faith as Jews".!!3 In a rare autobiographical sketch, Heschel illustrates in his own 
experience the Jewish journey to modernity: 
109 Abraham Joshua Heschel, God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism, The Jewish Publication 
Society of America, Philadelphia, and Fan-ar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1956. Paper back edition, 
Meridian Books, New York and the Jewish Publication Society of America, New York, 1959. Harper 
Torchbook edition, Harper and Row, New York, 1966. 
110 See above, p.23. 
III "The Spirit of Prayer", The Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly of America, Vol.17, 1953, pp.151-
215, and "Towards an understanding of Halacha", The Yearbook of the Central Conference of American 
Rabbis, Volume LXIII, 1953, pp.366-409. 
112 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.14. 
113 Heschel, "Towards an Understanding of Halacha", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and 
Spiritual A udacit)', p.127. 
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I did not come to the university [of Berlin] because I did not know the 
idea of the good, but to learn why the idea of the good is valid, why 
and whether values had meaning. Yet I discovered that values sweet 
to taste proved sour in analysis; the prototypes were firm, the models 
flabby. Must speculation and existence remain like two infinite 
parallel lines that never meet? ... 
In those months in Berlin I went through moments of profound 
bitterness. I felt very much alone with my own problems and 
anxieties. I walked alone in the evenings through the magnificent 
streets of Berlin. I admired the solidity of its architecture, the 
overwhelming drive and power of a dynamic civilisation. There were 
concerts, theatres, and lectures by famous scholars about the latest 
theories and inventions, and I was pondering whether to go to the new 
Max Reinhardt play or to a lecture about the theory of relativity. 
Suddenly I noticed the sun had gone down, evening had arrived. 
From what time may one recite the Shema in the evening?114 I had 
forgotten God-I had forgotten Sinai-I had forgotten that sunset is 
my business-that my task is "to restore the world to the kingship of 
the Lord". So I began to utter the words of the evening prayer. 
Blessed art thou, Lord our God, King of the universe, who by His 
word brings on the evenings . .. 
On that evening in the streets of Berlin, I was not in a mood to 
pray. My heart was heavy, my soul was sad. It was difficult for the 
lofty words of prayer to break through the dark clouds of my inner 
life. But how would I dare not to pray? How would I dare to miss an 
evening prayer? "Out of emah, out of fear of God do we read the 
Shema".115 
Man's Quest for God also contains the final English version of his 1938 Frankfurt address 
to the Quakers, "The Meaning of this Hour [or War]". 
114 These are the first words of the Mishnah about the evening prayer. 
115 Heschel, Mall's Quest for God, p.95-98. 
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Fritz A. Rothschild, who had heard Heschel speak in Frankfurt in 1938, had escaped to 
Southern Rhodesia via London, finally arriving in the United States in the early 1950s, a 
penniless immigrant without any academic qualifications. Heschel and Rothschild formed 
a life-long professional relationship. Heschel helped Rothschild enter the Jewish 
Theological Seminary of America, and, in 1959, Rothschild, now himself a member of the 
faculty, published an anthology of Heschel's writings: Between God and Man: an 
interpretation of Judaism from the writings of Abraham J Heschel. The anthology contains 
excerpts from the major publications then to date, material from Heschel's manuscript of 
the then unpublished book on the prophets, and other published and unpublished essays, 
articles and lectures. Rothschild's enduring contribution towards making Heschel more 
accessible to a wider readership was a twenty-five page "Introduction"-a lucid 
systematisation of Hesche I 's philosophy. 
Whilst Man Is Not Alone and God in Search of Man are regarded together as Heschel's 
major work as a creative philosopher and theologian, his magnum opus as an historical 
theologian in his massive Hebrew work, Torah min ha-shamayim be-ispaklaryah shel ha-
dorot (Torah from Heaven in the Light of the Generations), sometimes referred to in 
English as The Theology of Ancient Judaism, or as The Battle of the Book. I 16 It is being 
translated and is to be published in English as Heavenly Torah: The Theology of Classical 
Judaism. The book, which Jacob Neusner hailed as "absolutely essential for all future 
studies of Rabbinic theology",117 examines the major issues of revelation through the 
116 Rothschild (Ed,), Between God and Man, p.9. 
117 Jacob Neusner, review of Theology of Ancient Judaism, in Conservative Judaism, Vo1.20, No.3, Spring 
1966, p.71. 
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different strands of Rabbinic theology. Heschel demonstrates that his understanding of 
divine pathos has a long tradition, stemming not only from Hasidic and kabbalistic 
writings, but also found, in his reading of it, in the heart of Rabbinic Judaism. He shows 
how concepts assumed to have arisen in medieval Kabbalah actually originated in the 
Rabbinic writings that shaped halachic Judaism. Even in the Talmud Heschel found the 
belief that God needs human beings. 
Heschel had first expounded the doctrine of divine pathos in his 1936 dissertation, 
published as Die Prophetie. Almost twenty-five years later Samuel Dresner reported to 
Heschel that somebody had published, in English, a book on the prophets which 
plagiarised Die Prophetie, and which had received good reviews. Presumably the author 
had appropriated Heschel' s material on the assumption that he had been killed in the 
Warsaw ghetto or in the gas chambers. Although Heschel was reluctant to damage the 
scholar's reputation or threaten his position, the incident spurred him to translate, expand 
and prepare Die Prophetie for publication in English.118 The Prophets was published in 
two volumes in 1962,119 the first part being largely an interpretative survey and 
commentary on the writings of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, Habakkuk and 
Deutero-Isaiah, and the second incorporating most of Die Prophetie. 120 
118 Samuel H. Dresner, "Personal Reminiscences of Heschel", in Stampfer (Ed.), Prayer and Politics. p.50f. 
119 Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets, Volumes I & II, Harper and Row, New York, 1962. Harper 
Torchbooks edition, VoU, 1969, VoUI, 1971. 
120 In the second volume of The Prophets (p.88, note 1) Heschellists those writers who had adopted from 
Die Prophetie the interpretation of the prophetic personality in terms of sympathy: H. Wheeler Robinson, 
Redemption and Revelation, Nisbet, London, 1942, p.l50n., which refers to N. W. Porteous, "Prophecy", in 
H. Wheeler Robinson (Ed.), Record and Revelation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1938, p. 240; H. 
Wheeler Robinson, Two Hebrew Prophets: Studies in Hosea and Ezekiel, Lutterworth, London, 1948, 
p.21 fT.; C. R. North, The Old Testament Interpretation of History, Epworth, London, 1946, p.172f. He 
mentions Henry Corbin, who applied the categories of the theology of pathos and the religion of sympathy to 
Sufism, writing in French. And then he adds: "Cf. also H. Knight, The Hebrew Prophetic Consciousness, 
[Lutterworth], London [and Redhill], 1947", who refers (p.138) to Heschel's Das Profetische Bewusstsein, 
i.e. his dissertation in its pre-published form. 
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Here Heschel developed for his English-speaking readers his doctrine of divine pathos, 
contrasting biblical and Hellenistic concepts of God, together with the "religion of 
sympathy" corresponding with the former and the "religion of apathy" corresponding with 
the latter. Heschel claimed that writing The Prophets changed his life: 
Early in my life, my great love was for learning, studying. And the 
place where I preferred to live was my study and books and writing 
and thinking. I've learned from the prophets that I have to be 
involved in the affairs of man, in the affairs of suffering man.121 
As a result Heschel was to become the most prominent Jewish spokesman in the western 
world on civil rights and social justice. In 1960 he opened his address to the White House 
Conference on Children and Youth with the words: 
The problem of our youth is not youth. The problem is the spirit of 
our age: denial of transcendence, the vapidity of values, emptiness in 
the heart, the decreased sensitivity to the imponderable quality of the 
spirit, the collapse of communication between the realm of tradition 
and the inner world of the individual. .. There is no community of 
those who worry about integrity. 
The problem will not be solved by implanting in the youth a sense 
of belonging. Belonging to a society that fails in offering 
opportunities to satisfy authentic human needs will not soothe the 
sense of frustration and rebellion. 122 
121 Videotape, "A Conversation with Dr. Abraham Joshua Heschel", interview with Carl Stern, originally 
broadcast by NBC-TV on Sunday February 4th 1973, under the auspices of The Eternal Light (produced by 
the Jewish Theological Seminary of America). Transcript in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur, pp. 
935-412, as "Carl Stern's Interview with Dr. Heschel", Quotation, p.399. The interview was recorded ten 
days before Heschel's death. A condensed transcript in Response, Vo1.6, No.4, pp.23-33, the quotation being 
found on p.24. Susannah Heschel points out that although commentators have concluded that it was the 
prophets' concern with social justice that led to Heschel' s direct involvement with social justice, this is only a 
partial truth: Heschel concentrated not so much on the content of the prophet's message, but on prophetic 
consciousness. See Susannah Heschel, "Social Justice-the Theme of Heschel", in Stamp fer (Ed.), Prayer 
and Politics, p.44. 
122 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "Children and Youth", presented to the White House Conference on Children 
and Youth, March 28th 1960, printed in Law and Order, Vo1.8, No.5, May 1960. Quotation from reprinting 
in Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom, p.39. The White House Conferences on Youth and on Ageing were 
convened by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
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Less than a year later he addressed the White House Conference on Ageing,123 and in 
1963 (January 14th) gave the keynote address at the National Conference on Religion and 
Race, in Chicago, where he delivered a strongly anti-discrimination statement: 
At the first conference on religion and race, the main participants were 
Pharaoh and Moses. .. The outcome of that summit meeting has not 
come to an end. Pharaoh is not ready to capitulate. The exodus 
began, but is far from having been completed. In fact, it was easier 
for the children of Israel to cross the Red Sea than for a Negro to cross 
certain university campuses. 
Let us dodge no issues. Let us yield no inch to bigotry, let us make 
no compromise with callousness. 124 
Heschel was far from content to be a theorist on such issues: 
[He] felt that it was important not only that one protest against evil, 
but that one be seen to protest, even at the risk of misunderstanding. 
That he was seen to protest was in his mind a necessary part of his 
resolve not to be guilty of a compromising silence. .. He will be a 
noble and enduring Jewish presence in the history of the protest 
movements of our day.125 
123 "To Grow in Wisdom", presented to the White House Conference on Ageing, January 9th 1961. 
Published separately by The Synagogue Council of America. Most included in Morton Leeds and Herbert 
Shore (Eds.), Geriatric Institutional Management, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964. Reprinted in Heschel, 
Insecurity of Freedom, pp.70-84. 
124 "Religion and Race", the National Conference on Religion and Race, Chicago, January 14th 1963. 
Printed in Mathew Ahmann (Ed.), Race: Challenge to Religion, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1963. Part is 
incorporated in "Centenary of Emancipation Proclamation" in The Proceedings of the Golden Jubilee 
Convention, The United Synagogue Convention, November 17-21, 1963. Reprinted in Heschel, Insecurity of 
Freedom, pp.8S-100. Quotation from the latter, p.8S. 
125 W. D. Davies, "In Memoriam: Abraham Joshua Heschel 1907-1972", The Duke Divinity School Review, 
Vo1.38, No.2, Spring 1973, p.89. See also W. D. Davies, "Conscience, Scholar, Witness", America, Vo1.128, 
No.9, March 10th 1973, p.213. 
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A year later Heschel presented a paper to the American Medical Association's 113th 
Annual Convention in San Francisco. "The Patient as Person" begins by expressing his 
desire to widen the theme to include "the person as patient", going on to ask, "What is 
human about human being?"126 He reminded his audience that the word "cure" comes 
from the same root as "care", declaring that "America's problem number one" was "the 
systematic liquidation of man as person". 127 
Although Susannah Heschel accepts that "one looks hard to find discussion of political 
activism in [her] father's scholarly and theological writings of the 1940s and '50S",128 
prophetic protest was evident in the anti-Nazi lecture he delivered in Frankfurt in 1938,129 
and in his frustrating wartime attempt to persuade American Jewry to intercede on behalf 
of the Jews of Eastern Europe. 130 However, it was indeed only in the last ten years of his 
life that Heschel became prominent in social action. 
126 "The Patient as Person", The American Medical Association, 113th annual convention, San Francisco, 
June 21 st 1964. The Quotation is taken from Hesche1, Insecurity of Freedom, p.24. 
127 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p. 26f. 
128 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xxii. 
129 see above p.19. 
130 see above p.24f. 
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Social Action 
Heschel's long involvement with the Civil Rights movement began when he met Martin 
Luther King at the Chicago conference on Religion and Race, where they shared a 
platfonn. Heschel campaigned against Sheriff Jim Clark of Lownes County, Alabama, 131 
and was the one to gain entry to the FBI headquarters in Manhattan, when the police had 
blocked the entrance against the demonstrators, to present a petition protesting about police 
brutality against civil rights workers in Alabama. 132 In Dresner's opinion the photograph 
of Heschel and Martin Luther King ann in ann in the Selma to Montgomery Civil Rights 
march of 1965 should hang in both Black and Jewish homes. 133 A telegram from King had 
arrived on Friday afternoon, asking Heschel to join the demonstrators, and immediately the 
Sabbath ended he left for the South. His daughter wondered whether she would ever see 
him again: 
Demonstrations in the South at that time were fierce and dangerous. 
We used to see Sheriff Bull Conners of Binningham, Alabama, on the 
television news, unleashing dogs and aiming water hoses at 
demonstrators. My father was not young and not able to defend 
himself physically .134 
131 Brown, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: A Passion for Sincerity", p.257. 
132 Susannah Heschel, Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity. p.xxiii. Heschel alone was permitted to 
enter the FBI building, surrounded by sixty police officers, to present a petition to the regional FBI director. 
133 Dresner, "Heschel the Man" in Merkle (Ed.) Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.8 and Stampfer (Ed.), Prayer 
and Politics, p.7. 
134 Susannah Heschel, "My Father" in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.) No Religion is an Island, p.35, and 
"Heschel as Mensch" in Neusner and Neusner (Eds.) To Grow in Wisdom, p.205f. 
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Heschel found himself in the front row of marchers, along with Dr. King, The Revd Ralph 
Abernathy, and another white man, Dr. Ralph Bunche of the United Nations, but to be on 
the front row was no honour. Heschel and Bunche were in the front as human shields: the 
militia were less likely to shoot at a mixed-race line, especially when it included notable 
people from New York. 135 
After Heschel's death, Jacob Neusner accused him of social and political naivety, pointing 
out that his participation in the Selma march had resulted in increased anti-Semitism 
affecting the Jewish communities of Alabama and Mississippi. 136 Albert Friedlander had 
telephoned the Selma Rabbi, himself a refugee from Germany, at the beginning of the 
march, to find him anxious to keep a very low profile and not be associated in people's 
minds with "the Communists who have come down from the North in order to make 
trouble for us Southerners".137 Of course Heschel's social activism did not always bring 
him the support of the Jewish community, and he probably at times allowed himself to be 
manipulated by some of the more cynical activists, but his involvement was always a 
matter of principle. Later, on Vietnam, when the administration of President Lyndon B. 
Johnson threatened the Jewish community that unless Heschel "cooled it" they might find 
American military support for the State of Israel reduced, Heschel became even more 
135 Albert Friedlander, in conversation at Leo Baeck College, London, 19th May 1997. Friedlander and 
Heschel had arranged to meet in Selma, and Friedlander accompanied Heschel, who was unwell, back to 
New York from Montgomery. 
136 Jacob Neusner, "Faith in the Crucible of the Mind", America, Vol.128, No.9, March 10th 1973, p.207. 
See also Jacob Neusner, Israel in America: A Too-Comfortable Exile?, Beacon Press, Boston, 1985. p.165. 
137 Albert Friedlander, in conversation, Leo Baeck College, London, 19th May 1997. 
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isolated within the Jewish community. But Heschel "was more concerned to be faithful to 
the prophetic tradition than to court contemporary approval". 138 
Before the March began a service was held in a small chapel, and Heschel read Psalm 27: 
"The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear?" Martin Luther King preached 
on the Exodus from Egypt, describing three typologies among the children of Israel in the 
wilderness. 139 But whereas for King the march was the Exodus, for Heschel it was Sinai-
"declaring, proclaiming the commandments-the teaching, 'I am because I am 
commanded'."140 When Heschel, safely back in New York, related his experiences to his 
family, he said, "I felt my legs were praying". 141 For him it was a religious experience: "I 
thought of my having walked with Hasidic rabbis on various occasions. I felt a sense of 
the Holy in what I was doing". He regretted the fact that "the vast number of Jews 
participating in it are unaware of what the [civil rights] movement means in terms of the 
prophetic traditions". 142 
138 Robert McAfee Brown, "Some Are Guilty, All Are Responsible", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua 
Hesche!, p.134. See also Susannah Heschel, "Social Justice-the Theme of Heschel", in Stampfer (Ed.), 
Prayer and Politics, p.26. 
139 Susannah Heschel, Mora! Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xxiii. Heschel had intended to read Psalm 
15, "0 Lord, who shall sojourn in thy tent?", but changed his mind on arrival in Selma. 
140 Friedlander, in conversation, 19th May 1997. 
141 Susannah Heschel, "Heschel as Mensch", p.206, and in "My Father", p.35. See also Kenneth L. 
Woodward, "A Foretaste of Eternity", Newsweek, January 8th 1973, p.50. 
142 Susannah Heschel, Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xxiii, quoting from an unpublished 
memoir, written upon his return from Montgomery. Presumably Reuven Kimelman quotes from this 
document: "For many of us the march from Selma to Montgomery was both protest and prayer. Legs are not 
lips, and walking is not kneeling. And yet our legs uttered songs. Even without words, our march was 
worship. I felt my legs were praying"-quoted in Reuven Kimelman, "Our Generation's Teacher: In Honor 
of the Tenth Yahrzeit", Religion and Intellectual Life, Vol.2, No.2, Winter 1985, p.lO. 
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When the Conservative rabbis came together in January 1968 in celebration of Heschel's 
sixtieth birthday, Martin Luther King was welcomed as keynote speaker.143 Heschel 
invited King and his wife to join his family for the 1968 Passover Seder, to take place on 
April 16th. 144 King was assassinated on April 4th. 145 Mrs. Coretta King invited Heschel to 
speak at the funeral. 
143 Susannah Heschel, "God and Society in Heschel and King", A. 1. Hesche! in Memoriam, published on 
the Internet by the Jewish Communication Network (www.jcnI8.comlscripts/jcnI8/paper/) on the occasion 
of Heschel 's 25 th yahrzeit, Friday 16th January 1998, p.l. 
144 Heschel wrote to King: "The ritual and the celebration of that evening seek to make present to us the 
spirit and the wonder of the exodus from Egypt. It is my feeling that your participation at a Seder celebration 
would be of very great significance". Susannah Heschel, "God and Society in Heschel and King", p.4. 
145 Susannah Heschel says that on the day of King's assassination "my father came home from the office 
early. He heard the news and got into bed and turned out the lights. He never just stayed in bed, but that day 
and night he did". (Philadelphia EnqUirer, Wednesday January 14th 1998, Staff Writer Murray Durbin, "A 
Fruitful Friendship is Being Celebrated": internet: Philadelphia online). 
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Six months after the Selma March, Heschel helped found Clergy Concerned About 
Vietnam, and served as co-chairman of its National Executive. 146 Once again he saw his 
involvement as a direct consequence of his study of the prophets of Israel: 
The more deeply immersed I became in the thinking of the prophets, 
the more powerfully it became clear to me what the lives of the 
prophets sought to convey: that morally speaking there is no limit to 
the concern one must feel for the suffering of human beings. It also 
became clear to me that in regard to cruelties committed in the name 
of a free society, some are guilty, while all are responsible. 147 
146 The organisation's name was expanded to "Clergy and Laymen Concerned", which was later altered to 
"Clergy and Laity Concerned". The organisation described itself as "an interfaith group seeking to 
coordinate national efforts among the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish communities to bring about a change 
of policy in Vietnam". (Brown, Heschel, Novak, Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience, p.9). There is some 
confusion as to who were the three founding members: Susannah Heschel says they were her father, John 
Bennett (the President of Union Theological Seminary) and Richard Neuhaus. The latter, a Lutheran pastor, 
later became a Roman Catholic priest and, now known as John Neuhaus, currently edits a conservative 
political journal, First Things (Susannah Heschel (Ed.), introduction to Moral Grandeur and Spiritual 
Audacity, p.xx). Daniel Berrigan recollects: "Three of us came together, a minister, the rabbi [Hesche 1] and 
myself, ... [for] a press conference to express the revulsion of (at least a minority among) the religious 
community, in the face of Lyndon Johnson's war in Vietnam. The press arrived, we delivered our word. 
Then, the task of the moment done with, two of us prepared to depart. .. Suddenly as we rose in our places, a 
hand was laid firmly on the arm of the minister and myself. And a word was uttered with great urgency. ' Are 
we then finished, do we go home content, and the war goes on?' We should have known: the question was 
quintessential Hesche!. Which is to say, it contained its own answer. And awaited ours. We did not go 
home. We sat again, we three, and of that detaining word of the rabbi, an organization was born; it became 
known as 'Clergy Concerned About the War'." Daniel Berrigan, "My Friend" in Kasimow and Sherwin 
(Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.68f. In "The Reasons for My Involvement in the Peace Movement" , in 
Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, (originally published just after Heschel's 
death in The Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol.4, January 1973, pp.7-8), Heschel says that "the assembly" of 
Clergy Concerned About Vietnam elected Daniel Berrigan, Richard Neuhaus and himself as co-chairman. In 
"What We Might Do Together", (Religious Education, Vo!.62, No.2, March 1967, p.134) Heschel claimed 
that it was "not a coincidence that the three of us who participate in this evening's panel discussion also serve 
as co-chairmen of the National Committee of Clergy and Laymen concerned about Vietnam". The others 
were John Bennett, and Philip Scharper, Editor in Chief of Sheed and Ward, New York publishers and 
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Religious Education Association. 
147 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Reasons for My Involvement in the Peace Movement", in Susannah 
Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.22S. See also Susannah Heschel, "My Father" in 
Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.34, refelTing to (presumably) a version of the same 
essay, which she refers to as "Why I Oppose the War in Vietnam". 
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On February 1 st 1967 a group of the members of Clergy and Laity Concerned, including 
Heschel, William Sloane Coffin, Michael Novak and Robert McAfee Brown (the latter two 
being colleagues in Religious Studies at Stanford) were granted an hour's interview with 
Secretary for Defense Robert McNamara at the Pentagon. As Novak and Brown flew back 
to California they discussed the impression they had both gained from McNamara, that he 
considered the religious leaders to have an obligation to help create a climate of opinion 
that would make it politically feasible to reverse the trend towards escalation in the war in 
Vietnam. They decided to collaborate on a small book and considered that, since they 
were a Catholic and a Protestant, they needed a Jewish co-author. They had heard Heschel 
give a powerful address only the previous day, at the first Clergy and Laity Concerned 
mobilisation in Washington D.C., and wondered if they ("relatively unknown and 
youthful") would dare to approach Heschel to join them. Brown telephoned him the next 
morning, to outline their proposal, and asking his collaboration. "His reply was 
instantaneous: 'My friend, I am at your disposal' ."148 Heschel put aside his work on The 
Baal Shem Tov to write his contribution. 149 
148 Brown, "Abraham Heschel: A Passion for Sincerity", p. 256f. See also Robert McAfee Brown, "Some 
are Guilty, All and Responsible", p.l36. Dresner suggests, in "Hesche I the Man", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham 
Joshua Heschel, p.21 f, that a model can be found, in Albert Schweitzer and in Maimonides: "On the 
anniversary of the death of Albert Schweitzer, Heschel would recount the latter's life in class: How he 
forsook glory as a famed philosopher, organist and musicologist, to become a conunon doctor in a clinic in 
deepest Africa as atonement for the sins of the white race. In the last chapter of his book on Maimonides, 
Heschel proposes a solution to a paradox that has long puzzled scholars ... Why did he forsake his 
momentous unfinished scholarly works to heal the sick, which any doctor could have done? Heschel 
suggests an answer: 'This is Maimonides last metamorphosis: From metaphysics to medicine, from 
contemplation to practice, from speculation to the imitation of God. .. Preoccupation with the concrete man 
and the effort to aid him in his suffering is now the form of religious devotion. .. Personal achievement is 
abandoned for enhancing God's presence in human deeds'. (Hesche!., Insecurity 0/ Freedom, p.290). See 
also Heschel, Maimonides, p.243. What Heschel said of Maimonides, could be said of himself: "Despite the 
frailty of his health, the preciousness of each hour of his life, the books yet to be written that were laid out so 
clearly in his mind, he spent more and more time in the last years of his life on the social issues ... " 
149 See Dresner, introduction to The Circle o/the Baal Shem Tov, p.xxv: "Whatever the reasons, Heschel's 
book on the Besht was never written. Other works and projects, coming in quick succession, always 
postponed the book that must have been dearest to his heart. The closest he came was his investigation of R. 
Menahem Mendel of Kotzk, which was finished at the very end of his life, as if one major statement on 
Hasidism had to be made before death snatched him away". 
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After only three weeks the manuscripts were complete, and Vietnam.' Crisis of Conscience 
was published five weeks later. In it Heschel repeated the meditation on Ezekiel 34: 25-31 
that he had given at the worship service for the assembly in Washington on January 31 st, 
part of which reads: 
Must napalm stand in the way of our power to aid and inspire the 
world? . .. Our government seems to recognize the tragic error and 
futility of the escalation of our involvement but feels that we cannot 
extricate ourselves without public embarrassment of such dimension 
as to cause damage to America's prestige. But the mire in which we 
flounder threatens us with an even greater danger. It is the dilemma of 
either losing face or losing our soul. ... Vietnam is a personal 
problem. To speak about God and remain silent on Vietnam is 
blasphemous. 150 
There had been much debate as to whether Martin Luther King should also speak out 
against the War in Vietnam, or whether his participation would damage the Civil Rights 
movement. Heschel retorted, "Certainly, the winner of the Nobel Prize for peace has the 
right to speak out against war and for peace".151 King spoke out against the war publicly 
for the first time under the auspices of Clergy and Laity Concerned, at Riverside Church in 
Manhattan in April 1967, sharing the platform with John C. Bennett, President of Union 
Seminary, the historian Henry Steele Commager, and Heschel. Both Bennett and Heschel 
welcomed King's participation with the words, "There is no one who can speak to the 
conscience of the American people as powerfully as Martin Luther King" .152 
ISO Brown, Heschel & Novak, Vietnam, p.49. 
lSI Byron L. Shenvin, Abraham Joshua Heschel, (Makers of Contemporary Theology Series), John Knox 
Press, Atlanta, 1979, p. 6. 
152 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Dr. John Bennett, Dr. Henry Steele Commager. Rabbi Abraham Heschel 
Speak 01/ the War in /'ietnam (pamphlet), Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, New York, 1967, 
p.20. 
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Heschel and his colleagues were been branded subversives, but Heschel declared that the 
true subversives in this matter were the members of the American government: 
It is the duty of the citizen who after careful study becomes convinced 
that a war his country is involved in is both morally wrong and 
politically absurd to do his utmost to stop it. Except anguish and love 
of America we have no other feelings. Our thoughts on Vietnam are 
sores destroying our trust, ruining our most cherished commitments 
with bums of shame. We are pierced to the core with pain, and it is 
our duty as citizens to say "no" to the subversiveness of our 
government, which is ruining the values we cherish, the American 
promise to say "no" to a policy which moves from folly to madness. 153 
In the last few months of Heschel' s life, Richard Millhouse Nixon was seeking re-election 
as President of the United States. Although many Jewish leaders favoured Nixon because 
of his overt support for the State of Israel, Heschel strongly distrusted him, and openly 
supported George McGovern. A few weeks before the election Heschel wrote a letter to 
his Rabbinic colleagues, denouncing the corruption of the Nixon administration, and 
stating what most Americans would come to realise only after Heschel's death, when the 
Watergate scandal broke: 
If the prophets Isaiah and Amos were to appear in our midst, would 
they accept the corruption in high places, the indifferent way in which 
the sick, the poor and the old are treated? Would they condone the 
indifference to gun control legislation that has allowed some of the 
finest of our national leaders to be shot dead? Would not our prophets 
be standing with those who protest against the war in Vietnam, the 
decay of our cities, the hypocrisy and falsehood that surrounds our 
present administration, even at the highest level? ... By word and by 
deed, Senator McGovern is committed to the idea that "setting the 
moral tone of this nation is the most serious responsibility of the 
President". Regrettably, the same cannot be said ofMr. Nixon. 154 
153 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Dr. John Bennett, Dr. Henry Steele Com mager, Rabbi Abraham Hesche! 
Speak on the War in Vietnam, p. 20. 
154 Letter, October 20th 1972, quoted in Sherwin, Abraham Joshua Hesche!, p. 7f. See also Friedman, . 
Abraham Joshua Hesche! and Elie Wiese!, p. 15, in which Friedman suggests that the letter was published ill 
The New York Times: "I was never more proud of Heschel than when he wrote a truly prophetic letter to The 
New York Times asking what Amos would say about corruption in the very highest places ... " 
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Heschel's anguish over the Vietnam war ended only with his death. His daughter recalls 
how she often found him unable to sleep because of it. 155 Heschel's last words to John 
Coleman Bennett, two days before his death, were about the intensified bombing of North 
Vietnam "and of the shame of America and of the conflict in her sOUI".156 
Heschel described Daniel Berrigan as "a dear friend ... a genuine poet, a person of great 
charisma, who lacks what most of us have, namely the readiness to be indifferent, the 
readiness to compromise with evil".157 In the Spring of 1968 Daniel Berrigan travelled to 
Hanoi to negotiate the release of American prisoners of war, and on returning to New York 
had "had enough".158 Within months he and his brother Philip (also a Jesuit priest) with 
other direct-activists, had been arrested, tried and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, 
after breaking into government offices in Cotesville, Maryland, and burning draft files. 
Heschel himself did not approve of such direct action, and had distanced himself from 
proposals to bum the American flag. 159 
155 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xxv. 
156 John C. Bennett, "Agent of God's Compassion", America, Vol.l28, No.9, March 10th 1973, p.206. 
157 "Two Conversations with Abraham Joshua Heschel", Eternal Light, NBC Radio Network broadcast. 
Sunday May 9th 1971, Part 1, transcript, p.3. 
158 Daniel Berrigan, "My Friend", in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.71 
159 "I was sitting at the table of Clergy Concerned with the Berrigan Brothers and Hesche!. The Berrigans 
had just broken into a Draft Office and burned some draft cards, and then they proposed to bum an American 
flag. Heschel said, 'I will not be part of that.'. The American flag represented everything that was good 
about America as much as it represented everything that was oppressive about America, and he himself 
having been' a brand plucked from the fire' was not going to be part of anything that was going to denigrate 
or deprecate the value of the American flag. Even draft cards he was not particularly happy with. The man 
was not a pacifist: he certainly would have favoured participation in the Second World War. He just believed 
that what was going on in Vietnam was wrong. And that brought up the whole question of selective 
conscientious objection, which was highly debated in Jewish circles. Though legitimate in Christian circles, 
it was a very difficult position to defend in Jewish circles; but Heschel believed in it and defended It". 
Professor David Blumenthal, in conversation, Oxford, 17th June 1996. See also "Two Conversations with 
Abraham Joshua Heschel", p.Sf, Heschel (in conversation with Harold Flender): "Most Americans have 
forgotten what was vital to me as a youngster, namely America as the great hope in a dark world ... The 
word America was associated with freedom, with justice, with compassion for the poor. This great image 
was a source of inspiration to the world, to people all over the world, and certainly also to Americans. But 
the war in Vietnam has stained that image, which is an unbelievable loss to humanity and to the nation here. 
That is why concern about the war is the really most important religious concern at the moment." ~\NQIJ~ 
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However, in a television interview recorded just ten days before his death, Heschel 
vigorously defended religious involvement in socio-political issues: 
(Carl Stem) At this time, one year ago, I was covering a trial of priests 
and nuns-the Berrigan trial in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 
Prospective jurors, one after another, when being questioned by the 
judge and lawyers, said they thought it was wrong for clergymen to 
be involved in politics, that their job is to administer to spiritual 
needs. Why don't you stick to spiritual needs? 
(Heschel) That's a very good statement. In fact, it's such a good 
statement that if the prophets were alive, they would already be sent to 
jail by these jurors. Because the prophets mixed into social-political 
issues. And, frankly, I would say that God seems to be a non-religious 
person, because, if you read the words of God in the Bible, He always 
mixes in politics and in social issues. " The prophets are forgotten ... 
They have not touched the mind of America. And this is why such 
statements come out. What is the greatest concern in the Bible? 
Injustice to one's fellow men, bloodshed. 160 
Just before Christmas 1972 President Nixon announced the imminent release of Philip 
Berrigan, and Heschel particularly asked to be included in the party travelling to Danbury 
to welcome him out of prison. Daniel Berrigan possesses two photographs taken that 
morning, a week after the recording of the Stem interview: 
One was taken in the car en route. The lighting is bright and cold; 
perhaps the sun was just coming up. Heschel sits, his leonine profile, 
grave, recollected, is lit with the aura of dawn. Just out of the photo, 
one imagines that his book of devotions lies open. 
The second photo was taken just after Philip's release. A crowd 
presses close, the two stand face-to-face, tall man and short. Heschel 
grasps the taller man by his lapels and engages him fervently, even 
fiercely, eye to eye, head wildly aloft. Too bad the figures are frozen 
and speechless in time. One can imagine, if he cannot reconstruct 
(indeed my memory reconstructs) the passionate welcome and 
gratitude that welled from his tongue. 
All unknowing, and mercifully so, we were nearing the end. 
Heschel was to live only a few days.161 
160 Videotape, A Conversation with Dr. Abraham Joshua Heschel, February 4th 1973. T.r~nscript, "Carl 
Stem's Interview with Dr. Heschel", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur alld Spmtual Audacity. 
p.400. 
161 Berrigan, "My Friend", p.74. 
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When Nixon contrived to divide the religious opposition to the Vietnam War (by 
insinuating that support for the state of Israel was conditional upon support for the Vietnam 
War), Berrigan proposed a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, stating united 
religious opposition to the war. He and Heschel vainly sought financial help from the 
Jewish community, and were both confirmed in their sense of isolation within their own 
communities. 162 The friendship of the two men was sorely tested by the Six Days War in 
the Middle East (June 5-10). Berrigan recalled it as "an ambiguous period" in their 
relationship, at a time when he was teaching on the West Coast and they were not in close 
personal contact. 163 
After the Six Days War the Jewish community in America was confused by what it took to 
be insensitivity on the part of many Christian leaders to Jewish fear over the threat to the 
Jewish State. The Anti-Defamation League of B 'nai B'rith took it upon itself to remedy 
this lack of communication and explain to Christians what the State of Israel means to the 
Jewish People. l64 Heschel was approached with the request, and put aside his work on the 
Kotzker l65 in order to write Israel: An Echo of Eternity, which he dedicated to the 
162 See Berrigan, "My Friend", p.72f: "It perhaps goes without saying, no such help was forthcoming from 
Catholics. No help, no ad. The Jewish community, among many others, had decided. So had the majority of 
the Jewish Theological Seminary faculty and students-among many others. The decisions of New Yorkers 
coincided nicely with the electorate at large: Jews, Catholics, everyone. It was Nixon all the way ... Thus in 
his last days Heschel stood solid and tragic and alone, in the prophetic line he had so honoured and 
celebrated." And in conversation with me, 220 W. 98th Street, Manhattan, 12th June 1997. 
163 Berrigan, in conversation. 
164 Judith Herschlag Muffs, "A Reminiscence of Abraham Joshua Heschel", Conservative Judaism, Vo1.28, 
No.1, Fall 1973, p.53. Heschel had asked the Anti-Defamation League to provide an assistant for the project. 
An appreciation of the assistance of Miss Judith Herschlag can be found with the publication and copyright 
details of Abraham Joshua Heschel, Israel: An Echo o/Eternity, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1969. 
165 Ibid.: "When our office approached Dr. Heschel with a request that he write a paper on Israel for the 
Christian community, he readily agreed and put aside his work on Mendl of Kotzk. The Kotzker was dear to 
his heart, but Israel was paramount". 
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President of Israel, "Zalman Shazar, Poet, Scholar, President, Friend". The Heschel family 
had spent summers in Israel, including a two month period in 1965 as official guests of 
President Shazar who had been a childhood friend ofHeschel's. Heschel was to visit Israel 
often after 1967, to lecture and visit friends (including a few friends from Europe who had 
survived the Second World War), but the 1967 visit was unique, and he returned to New 
York "in a state of deep emotion" to write his love-song for the land of Israel. 166 
Although Heschel is often accused of ignoring the Holocaust,167 his consistent response is 
that Jewish spiritual vitality is the only enduring response. It is that message that lies at the 
heart of Israel: An Echo of Eternity, explaining to Christians the Jewish attachment to the 
State of Israel: 
What should have been our answer to Auschwitz? Should this people, 
called to be a witness to the God of mercy and compassion, persist in 
its witness and cling to Job's words: "Even if He slay me yet will I 
trust in Him" (Job 13: 15), or should this people follow the advice of 
Job's wife: "Curse God and die!" (Job 2:9), immerse itself into the 
anonymity of a hundred nations all over the world, and disappear once 
and for all? 
166 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xxv, and in the Introduction to the 
1997 (Jewish Lights reprint, Woodstock, Vennont) edition of Israel, p.xviii. 
167 W. D. Davies, "Conscience, Scholar, Witness", p.213: "He very seldom spoke about it ... he does not 
concentrate on it as an expressed primary concern, as do so many other recent Jewish writers. This 'silence' 
about the holocaust always puzzled me". See Dresner, "Heschel the Man", p.ll; Bernard W. Anderson, "Co-
existence with God: Heschel's Exposition of Biblical Theology" in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, 
p.61 f; Emil L. Fackenheim, To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, p.194f: "Before allowing the hallowed Jewish 
tradition to be threatened-and exposure to the Holocaust inevitably does threaten it-the' Jewish-Jewish' 
thinker is required to cherish it, to nurture it, to bring to life its wisdom, its faith, its God. And this must have 
been why Jewish thinkers of such unquestionable Jewish authenticity such as Martin Buber and Abraham J. 
Heschel said little about the Holocaust-and that little with great reticence. Yet, as much current Jewish 
opinion has it, little was said by Buber and Heschel because little needed to be said, because 'theologically' if 
not historically, the Holocaust 'poses no new problems': it is 'a chapter' in Jewish history, and nothing more. 
In this manner not a few current Jewish writers invoke two great Jewish thinkers, both no longer alive, in 
order to justify their own escapism." See also Michael Berenbaum, After Tragedy and Triumph: Essays in 
Modern Jewish Thought and the American Experience, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990, p . .f 7. 
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Our people's faith in God at this moment in history did not falter. 
At this moment in history Isaac was indeed sacrificed, his blood shed. 
We all died in Auschwitz, yet our faith survived. We knew that to 
repudiate God would be to continue the holocaust... 
What would be the face of Western history today if the end of 
twentieth-century Jewish life would have been Bergen-Belsen, 
Dachau, Auschwitz? The State of Israel is not an atonement. It would 
be blasphemy to regard it as a compensation. However, the existence 
of Israel reborn makes life in the West less unendurable. It is a slight 
hinderer of hindrances to believing in GOd. 168 
Berrigan had hoped that Heschel would "object to [the Six Days] war, as he had objected 
to American conduct throughout the Vietnam war",169 and so must be counted amongst 
those Christian leaders who failed to understand Jewish fears and hopes. Deeply disturbed 
by Heschel's new book, Berrigan wrote him a questioning letter, but decided not to post it: 
"He was already not very well, and I felt we could get beyond that: which we did." 
Heschel remained Berrigan's last link with the Jewish community "because of that 
business over the Palestinians" when Berrigan alienated many Jews by protesting against 
Israeli oppression, and the occupation of Palestinian land. 170 
168 Heschel, Israel, p.112f. Originally as part of an address, "Jewish-Christian Dialogue and the Meaning of 
the State of Israel", at the St. Louis Symposium on "Theology in the City of Man", October 1968, and 
published in Cross Currents, Vo1.19, No.4, Fall 1969, pp.409-425. 
169 Berrigan "My Friend", p.69 
170 Berrigan, in conversation. In the few years before his death Heschel did begin to speak o~t on beh~lf of 
Palestinians and to criticise certain actions of the Israeli government. See Susannah HescheL mtroductlOn to 
the 1997 Jewish Lights republication of Israel: An Echo of Eternity, p.xxviii. 
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Two months after the Six Days War, in August 1967, Heschel addressed the Catholic 
Congress on the Renewal of the Church (in Toronto), making an impassioned plea against 
the "desanctification of the Hebrew Bible" and the "dejudaization" of Christianity, and 
urging his listeners to accept a unified Jerusalem as "an event of high significance in the 
history of redemption". 171 
Heschel's isolation from his Christian friends in the Vietnam peace movement increased a 
few months before his death, when he approached them to sign a statement condemning 
the atrocity at the Munich Olympic Games, when eleven Israeli athletes and officials were 
murdered by Palestinian terrorists. One of Heschel's students, Marshall Meyers, had a 
wealthy brother who undertook to pay for a full-page advertisement in the New York 
Times-but only if Heschel could get the statement signed. There were so many refusals 
that the declaration was never published. The experience was an added sadness for the 
final three months ofHeschel's life. ln 
171 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Jewish Notion of God and Christian Renewal", in L. K. Shook (Ed.), 
Renewal of Religious Thought (Proceedings of the Congress on the Theology of the Church, CentellGl)' of 
Canada, 1867-1967), Palm Publishers, Montreal, 1968, pp. 105-129. Reprinted as "The God of Israel and 
Christian Renewal" (this being the original title Heschel had been given) in Susannah Heschel (Ed.) Moral 
Grandeur, pp. 268-285. "The Jewish people everywhere have entered a new era in history. Jerusalem, the 
city of David, has been restored to the state of Israel. .. How should Christians view this event? According 
to the Book of Acts, right at the very beginning, the disciples to whom Jesus presented himself alive after his 
Passion asked him: 'Lord, will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?' And he said to them: 'It is not 
for you to know times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own authority' (Acts I :6-7)." Moral 
Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.280. 
172 Rothschild (Ed.), Jewish Perspectives on Christianity, p.5, and in conversation with me, New York, 4th 
June 1997. 
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Most people find it daunting enough to take up one social issue or support one protest 
movement. Heschel not only championed the cause of the civil rights movement and gave 
passionate support to the anti-Vietnam war movement, but at the same time became the 
first major figure to speak out on behalf of the Jews of the Soviet Union. 173 He must surely 
have been haunted by the memory of his failure twenty years earlier to alert and motivate 
the 1943 American Jewish Conference to act to extinguish the flames that had engulfed 
East European Jewry, commenting that "we are busy [doing other things] in the nineteen-
sixties just as we were busy in the nineteen-forties". 174 This time, however, what started as 
a single-handed fight became a widespread movement. On September 4th 1963, at the 
Conference on the Moral Implications of the Rabbinate in New York, Heschel launched 
the campaign against what he called the "spiritual genocide" being waged against the 
Russian Jews. Urged on by his close friend Wolfe Kelman, he called the attention of his 
audience of two hundred rabbis to the plight of the Jews in the Soviet Union, his 
passionate plea receiving wide pUblicity in the press. 175 
The six million are no more. Now three million face spiritual 
extinction. We have been guilty more than once of failure to be 
concerned, of failure to cry out, and failure may have become our 
habit. Once a person has committed a sin once and repeated it, it 
appears to him to be no sin anymore ... 
173 See Reuven Kimelman, "Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907-1972)", Response, Vo1.6, NoA. Winter 1972-3, 
p.18, and Kimelman, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: Our Generation's Teacher", p.13 
174 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Jews in the Soviet Union", The Day-Jewish Journal, September 12, 13 
and October 12 1963, and as a broadside by the Synagogue Council of America. Reprinted in Insecurity of 
Freedom, p.262-273. Quotation is from p.267. 
175 Fritz A. Rothschild, "Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907-1972): Theologian and Scholar", American Jewish 
rear Book 1973, Vo1.74, New York, 1973, p.535. 
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This is the deeper meaning of our history: The destiny of all Jews 
is at stake in the destiny of every Jew; the destiny of all men is at stake 
in the destiny of every man. .. There is a dreadful moral trauma that 
haunts many of us: The failure of those of us who lived in free 
countries to do our utmost in order to save the Jews under Hitler. .. 
East European Jewry vanished. Russian Jewry is the last remnant of a 
people destroyed in extermination camps, the last remnant of a 
spiritual glory that is no more. 
We ask for no privilege, all we demand is an end to the massive 
and systematic liquidation of a religious and cultural heritage of an 
entire community and equality with all other cultural and religious 
minorities. Let the twentieth century not enter the annals of Jewish 
history as the century of physical and spiritual destruction! If I forget 
thee, 0 Russian Jewry ... 176 
It was as a result of reading Heschel on the Soviet Jews that Elie Wiesel travelled to the 
Soviet Union and later published The Jews of Silence-"Silence" because they were too 
fearful to speak in words, but "spoke" of their plight in other ways.l77 Wiesel's book 
brought the issue of Soviet Jewry to a wider audience, and led to much popular support for 
the American Conference on Soviet Jewry, which raised consciousness world-wide. "We 
must speak", said Heschel, "because the Jews of Russia have no voice. We must cry in 
public because they can only cry in secrecy".178 He asserted that "the Russian Jews will 
do more for us than we will ever do for them", recalling how they had survived for 
seventy-five years in a hostile social environment, without synagogues, religious schools 
or books. 179 
176 Heschel "The Jews in the Soviet Union", Insecurity of Freedom, p.272f. 
177 Elie Wiesel, The Jews of Silence: A Personal Report on Soviet Jewry (translated from Hebrew, Neal 
Kozodoy), Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966, and Signet Books, The New American Library, 
New York, 1967. See also Irving Abrahamson (Ed.), Against Silence: The Voice and Vision of Elie Wiesel, 
YoU, Holocaust Library, New York, 1985, p.23!. 
178 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "A Declaration of Conscience", a paper read to the New York Conference on 
Soviet Jewry, at Hunter College, New York, 28th October 1964. Printed in Insecurity of Freedom, pp. 274-
284. Quotation from p.283. 
179 Samuel Dresner, "Hesche I the Man" in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.12. 
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Heschel had already begun speaking out for the Jewish people in another context. He was 
to make a profound contribution to the discussion of the Second Vatican Council leading to 
a conciliar statement that would represent a radical change in Roman Catholicism's official 
attitude towards Judaism and the Jews. 180 In 1965 the leading Protestant seminary, Union 
Theological Seminary, changed its by-laws, which prescribed that only Christian teachers 
could become members of staff, to permit Heschel to be invited to become Harry Emerson 
Fosdick Visiting Professor. 181 His inaugural address, "No Religion is an Island", sets out 
his attitude towards religious pluralism. I 82 
In the last eventful years Heschel also accepted invitations to serve as visiting professor in 
departments of religious thought III several secular universities. In 1960 he was in 
Minnesota, in 1961 in Iowa, and III 1963 he gave the Raymond Fred West Memorial 
Lectures at Stanford, California, subsequently published as Who Is Man?183 
180 For a detailed discussion of Heschel's role in the Second Vatican Council, see below, p.307-322. 
lSI John C. Bennett, "Heschel's Significance for Protestants", in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion 
is an Island, p.124. 
IS2 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol.21, No.2, 
January 1966, pp.l17-13l. 
183 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Who Is Man?, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1965. 
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Dying with a Kiss 
Five days before his death l84 Heschel delivered his work on the Kotzker to the 
publishers-two volumes in Yiddish: Kotzk: In gerangl far emesdikeit l85 , and a shorter, 
popular version in English: A Passion for Truth. The latter had been described as 
"probably the best book on Hasidism to appear in the English language".186 In many ways 
it is Heschel's most disturbing book, because it reveals his personal struggle for integrity 
and paSSIOn for sincerityI87-"essentially spiritual autobiography, disguised as 
research". 188 
Heschel's work reached its climax in his study of mysticism and 
Hassidism [sic]. Although he left the centre of Hassidic life to go to 
Berlin, Hassidism never really left him. For some strange reason, 
which only his disciples sense, he put off making his major 
contribution to the understanding of Hassidism. Previously, he had 
written on specific Hassidic masters, and had described their world in 
The Earth is the Lord's. And yet, it was not until the last week of his 
life that he finished a full-length protrait [sic] of Rabbi Mendel of 
Kotsk [sic] whom he compared with the Baal Shem Tov. It was with 
this book that he repaid his debt to the world of Hassidism and was 
laid to rest. 189 
184 Rothschild, in conversation, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 4th June 1997. Riemer says it 
was the day before his death, see note 188 below. 
185 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Kotzk: In geranglfar emesdikeit, (Yiddish), 2 vols. Hamenora, Tel Aviv, 
1973. 
186 Leon Stitskin, review of Passion for Truth, p.2314. 
187 Kimelman, "Our Generation's Teacher", p.1 0: "Some people are like commas in the text of Jewish life; 
Heschel was an exclamation point. He was honest with his God and honest with his fellow men. He burned 
with sincerity. In the last week of his life he mentioned having just completed his work on the Kotzker 
Rebbe entitled A Passion for Sincerity. I asked him why he did not translate emes as truth or integrity. 'The 
word is sincerity', he replied. Ironically, the publisher entitled it A Passionfor Truth." 
188 Jack Riemer, review of Passion for Truth, in Commonweal, January 11 th 1974, p.373. On p.372: "Dr. 
Heschellived with this book in his heart and on his mind for a great many years. He wrote it in several 
languages, he gave parts of it as lectures before many audiences, he nurtured it, revised it, and returned to it 
at many different stages in his life, and fmally he finished it and sent it off to the publisher on the very day 
before he died. It is in many ways a summary of how he lived and what he stood for." 
189 Kimelman, "Our Generation's Teacher", p.IS. 
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Abraham Joshua Heschel died on the Sabbath, in his sleep, 23rd December 1972. In 
Jewish tradition a peaceful death in one's sleep is considered a sign of great piety.190 And 
to die on the Sabbath is to die "with a kiss" (from GOd).191 
At his bedside were two books: one a Hasidic classic, the other a work 
on the war in Vietnam. The combination was symbolic. The two 
books represented two different worlds-eternal spirit and mundane 
present, mysticism and diplomacy, heaven and earth. Most choose 
one or the other. Heschel refused to ignore either, preferring to live in 
the tension of that polarity. 192 
190 Susannah Heschel, (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xxix. See also ~al~our ~rickner, 
"Abraham Joshua Heschel, Chasid", in Sh 'rna, YoU, No.46, January 19th 1973, p.47: It IS said that the 
Holy One Blessed Be He arranges for a true chasid to die on the Shabbat". " . . 
191 Samuel Dresner "Abraham Joshua Heschel Ten Years after His Death, Conservatlve Judazsm, VOI..36, 
No.2, Winter 1982-3, p.5: "He died on the Sabbath eve, in his sleep, peacefully, with a 'kiss', as the anCient 
rabbis describe the death of those who die on that day". 
192 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POETRY, RHETORIC OR PHILOSOPHY? 
System and Poetics 
Within Jewish theology there has not been an expectation of systematisation as there has 
been in Christian theology.! In the history of Christian religious thought the truly great 
theological mind has produced a "system"-an all-encompassing, wide-ranging, rigorously 
argued and coherent "package". This has been pre-eminently the case from St. Thomas 
Aquinas (Summa Theologica) in the thirteenth century to Paul Tillich (Systematic 
Theology) in the twentieth. However, in the past few decades this grand enterprise-the 
ultimate endeavour of the most immodest of all the sciences, with its pretensions to scan 
everything (including the unscannable)-has fallen into disrepute and out of practice. 
There has come about a time of specialisation, in which the "expert" has been defined as 
"the person who knows more and more about less and less".2 
I For a discussion of systematic theology and Judaism, see Menachem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe 
Anything?, The Littmann Library of Jewish Civilization, Vallentine Mitchell, London, 1999, pp.44-51, and 
below, pp.123-141. 
2 Heschel' s principal exponents seem to have adopted this phrase in order not to apply it to him! See 
Samuel H. Dresner, "Remembering Abraham Heschel", America, Vo1.146, No.21, May 29th 1982, pAlS. 
and Dresner "Abraham Joshua Heschel Ten Years after His Death", p.6. See also Fritz A. Rothschild, 
"Architect a~d Herald of a New Theology", Conservative Judaism, Vol.28, No.1, Fall 1973, p.55: "In an age 
of extreme specialization, when 'scholarship' frequently means that one knows more and more about less 
and less, the range of[Heschel's] achievements is truly amazing". See also Pinhas Peli, (trans. Naphtali 
Greenwood), "Abraham Joshua Heschel: A Tribute", Immanuel, Vol. 16, Summer 1983, p.120. 
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Yet, in this same period, because Heschel's scholarship encompassed the whole range of 
Jewish experience and modem Western social concern, many looked to him to produce a 
systematic theology of Judaism.3 
All major topics of Judaism were grist to Heschel's mill, and he contributed significant 
works in the fields of Biblical Scholarship, Rabbinics, Hasidism, Theology and Ethics:~ 
"From Zionism to the Yiddishists and Hebraists,5 from Reform and Conservative to 
Orthodox and the Hasidim, the whole spectrum of Jewish life was his concern, and he 
remained on good terms with all these factions whilst not identifying with any ofthem".6 
3 Eugene B. Borowitz, "The Problem of Form in a Jewish Theology", Hebrew Union College Annual, 
Vo1.40, No.1, 1969, p.391, where Borowitz described Heschel as a "system builder". Jakob J. Petuchowski, 
"Faith as the Leap of Action: The Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel", Commentary, Vo1.25, No.5, May 
1958, p.390, complains that Heschel's lack of system "makes it difficult for those who are accustomed to 
looking for theological truth along the paths of customary rational discourse to appreciate his religious 
thought". Fritz A. Rothschild, who achieved a systematisation ofHeschel's thought in his introduction to 
Between God and Man, told me the following: "I once took the fIrst volume ofTillich's Systematic Theology 
and I held it up in front of Hesche 1 and said, 'Why don't you write like that?' And he looked at me with 
infinite sadness and said, 'You know Fritz, that's not my way of writing'." 
4 Neusner, "Faith in the Crucible of the Mind", p.208: "there is not a single record of Jewish religious 
experience, not a single moment in the unfolding of the Jewish spirit, which Heschel did not take into his 
own being and reshape through the crucible of his own mind and soul". See also Kimelman, "Abraham 
Joshua Heschel (1907 - 1972)", p.19: "[to encounter Heschel] was to witness a three-thousand year tradition 
rolled up in one soul". 
5 "Yiddishism" refers to the secular Jewish literature and theatre culture in the medium of Yiddish, the 
principle institution for the study of which is YIVO, New York. YIVO-the Yiddisher Visnshaftlekher 
lnsitut-was founded in Vilna and Berlin in 1925, and an American branch soon after. The international 
headquarters was relocated to New York City in 1940. Vilna had been a centre of Rabbinic study and of the 
Haskalah from the 18th century, was also a centre of Zionism, and the birthplace (1897) of the Jewish 
Socialist Party, The Bund. "Hebraism" similarly refers to the culture of Hebrew literature developed by the 
followers of Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment, which led to the adoption of Hebrew as the secular 
language of the modem State oflsrael (whereas more traditional Jews reserved Hebrew for use only as a 
religious language). Heschel wrote his poetry in Yiddish, and his Rabbinic theology in Hebrew. 
6 Samuel H. Dresner, "Hesche 1 as a Hasidic Scholar", introduction to (Dresner, Ed.), Heschel, The Circle of 
the Baal Shem Tov, p.viii. Also Dresner, "The Contribution of Abraham Joshua Heschel", Judaism, Vo1.32, 
No.1, Winter 1983, p.58. Heschel's widow Sylvia said that he supported the Conservative movement which 
"he thought ... necessary to Judaism", and he taught at the Conservati\'e Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America for the last twenty-seven years of his life. But when asked to classify himself he replied that he 
"was not a noun in search of an adjecti\'e": see Merkle, The Genesis of Faith, p.12 (ref. to p.268, note 154). 
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In the field of social ethics he wrote about and was active on issues of youth, ageing, war 
and civil rights. Yet no matter how wide-ranging and deep his field of expertise, any claim 
to being a serious philosopher was vigorously challenged, and he was variously dismissed 
as "mere rhetorician", labelled as "mystic", or classified as "poet", because of his style of 
writing, his use of language and his way of thinking.? Indeed, it has been claimed that 
Heschel, despite characterising himself primarily as a philosopher,8 failed to be taken 
seriously as a philosopher not only by his critics but also by some of his "adherents".9 His 
insistence on the limits of rational discourse (in that it is impossible to prove the 
fundamentals of faith) and his stress on the Ineffable, resulted in many questioning 
"whether he is in the realm of philosophy at all".lo Thus one reason for the dismissal of 
Heschel's claim to be a serious philosopher is an over-restrictive understanding of the 
nature of reason itself. Maurice Friedman, in a discussion of Heschel's thought, points out: 
Scientists and philosophers do not claim that "logic and the laboratory 
bring us nearer to the apprehension of ultimate truth". The scientist 
regards reason as a tool, not as a metaphysics. He is content if it 
"works" to solve the problems that he has set or to suggest hypotheses 
which may lead to new problems. He knows not only the limitations 
of this tool, but also the fact that it tells us nothing about the nature of 
the world as it is in itself apart from our meeting with it. The modern 
scientist would be the first to agree with Heschel's observation: "What 
is intelligible to our mind is but a thin surface of the profoundly 
undisclosed" .11 
7 Maurice Friedman, "The Thought of Abraham Heschel", Congress Weekly, Vol.22, No.31 (Nov. 14th 
1955), p.18. 
8 Heschel subtitled Man Is Not Alone "a philosophy of religion", and God is Search of Man "a philosophy 
of Judaism". 
9 Sol Tanenzapf, "Abraham Heschel and his Critics", Judaism, Vol.23, No.3, Summer 1974, p.276. 
10 Ibid. 
II Friedman, "The Thought of Heschel", p.19. 
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As well as Heschel' s epistemology, his literary style and his use of language ha\'e also 
made it difficult for some commentators to accept his work as serious philosophy. His 
style is "not discursive or argumentative, but aphoristic and epigrammatic, even lyrical", 
and there is an assumption amongst both critics and adherents that philosophy and poetry 
are mutually exclusive (the latter not being amenable to rational examination).12 Thus 
Jakob Petuchowski detects in Heschel's writings, not philosophy at all, but "a feeling, a 
mood, powerful enough to carry us with it and heighten our religious sensitivity"; 13 Arthur 
Cohen dismisses him as a "rhetorician of faith" whose eloquent descriptions of the life of 
faith are but a substitute for theology; 14 and Marvin Fox asserts that Heschel's aim is 
kerygmatic rather than philosophical.I 5 Indeed, some of Heschel's critics find it useful to 
dismiss his thought by maintaining that it does not represent a philosophy but is, rather, 
poetry. They can then acknowledge the brilliance of his style whilst conveniently avoiding 
the need to respond to his arguments. Thus Will Herberg observes in relation to Cohen's 
analysis of Heschel' s work: 
There seem always to be certain stereotyped ways of 
misunderstanding a thinker who has something to say. With Heschel 
the vulgar way of brushing him aside is to put him down as a "mystic" 
(which he assuredly is not), as though this were a final term of 
opprobrium in our enlightened age. Mr. Cohen does not descend to 
that: he merely sets Heschel up as a "rhetorician of faith": and, 
although he begins by giving high status to rhetoric, even that he takes 
away, so far as Heschel is concerned, towards the end of the essay. 
12 Friedman, "The Thought of Hesche 1", p.19. 
13 Petuchowski, "Faith as the Leap of Action", p.396. 
14 Arthur A. Cohen, The Natural and the Supernatural Jew: A Historical and Theological Introduction. 
Pantheon Books, New York, 1962, p.259. 
15 Marvin Fox, "Heschel's Theology of Man", Tradition, Vo1.8, No.3, Fall 1966, p.80f. 
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Rhetorical force there may be in Heschel's writing, but he is no 
"rhetorician": just as one may recognize a good deal of poetic 
imagination in Heschel's work without implying that he is writing 
poetry. Heschel is a thinker, a religious philosopher, a theologian: he 
must be understood and evaluated as SUCh. 16 
Heschel's critics, then, complain that he fails to produce cogent rational arguments for 
Judaism, but offers instead a lyrical and vivid description of Judaism from a committed 
faith-stance. Instead of providing reasoned philosophical argument for what he believes, 
they accuse him of merely celebrating and advocating it. Even some of Heschel's 
supporters come to the same kind of conclusion: Emil Fackenheim defends Heschel against 
his critics by asserting that Heschel's work is pre-philosophical, a kind of devotional 
writing, and that Heschel's critics are mistaken to assume him to be engaged in reflective 
thinking when he is actually expressing his religious commitment: they "look to him for 
the performance of one task, when he in fact performs another".17 The task of philosophy, 
Fackenheim asserts, is rather to examine the commitments themselves. Thus Fackenheim 
distinguishes between "religious thinking" and "reflective thinking about religion", the 
former being based on a faith-commitment and therefore to be expected neither to provide 
rational arguments for faith, nor to convince the sceptical non-believer, and the latter 
setting out to show the need for and the significance of religion in human life. Fackenheim 
then categorises God in Search of Man as "religious thinking", and so asserts that 
Heschel's critics were wrong to fault him for a perceived lack of persuasive argument for 
his case, so far as the non-believer is concerned. 
16 Will Herberg, "Jewish Theology in the Post-Modem World", a review essay on Arthur A. Cohen, The 
Natural and the Supernatural Jew: A Historical and Theological Introduction. (Pantheon Books, New York, 
1962), Judaism, Vo1.12, Summer 1963, p.365f. 
17 Emil L. Fackenheim, "God in Search of Man" (review), Consen'ativeJudaism, Vo1.15, Fall 1960, p.50. 
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Indeed, in an earlier review of Man Is Not Alone, Fackenheim accuses Heschel of failing to 
"understand the tragedy of unbelief'18-a view shared by Cohen,19 William Kaufman20 
and Eugene Borowitz.21 Fritz Rothschild, Heschel's most sympathetic interpreter, argues 
that Fackenheim's interpretation is based on "a serious misreading of Heschel's purpose", 
but at the same time accepts that Heschel himself "did not fully succeed in clarifying to his 
readers the exact nature and methodology of his approach".22 
Heschel's daughter Susannah draws on Richard Rorty's distinction between "systematic" 
and "edifying" philosophy in an attempt to characterise her father's writings: 23 whereas 
systematic philosophers "want to put their subject on the secure path of science", edifying 
philosophers 
... want to keep space open for the sense of wonder which poets can 
sometimes cause-wonder that there is something new under the sun, 
something which is not an accurate representation of what was already 
there, something which (at least for the moment) cannot be explained 
and can barely be described.24 
18 Emil L. Fackenheim, review of Man Is Not Alone, in Judaism, VoLl, January 1952, p.86. 
19 Cohen, Natural and Supernatural Jew, p.252. 
20 William Kaufman, Contemporary Jewish Philosophers, Reconstructionist Press, New York, 1976, p.161. 
21 Eugene Borowitz, A New Jewish Theology in the Making, Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1968, p.172f. 
22 Fritz A. Rothschild, "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.93. 
23 Susannah Heschel, "My Father", in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.39f. 
24 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, p.370. See also 
Friedman, "Thought of Heschel", p.19: "Wonder rather than doubt is the root of philosophy, fO.r t~e sen~~ of 
the ineffable alone leads us to meaning-meaning which can never be fully expressed but only mdlcated . 
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Rorty thus describes what Heschel calls "an intuition of the ineffable",25 and it is this, as 
well as Heschel's poetic style, that Petuchowski cites as evidence when he ranks Heschel 
with unnamed "Existentialists" who, he says, disparage human reason and who deny that 
any objective knowledge of God is possible. 26 
Heschel and the Existentialists 
Since Petuchowski draws attention to Heschel' s demand for a "leap of action" in parallel 
with "the Existentialists '" leap of faith, we may assume that he compares Heschel 
specifically with Kierkegaard, whom Heschel himself calls "the father of modem 
existentialism".27 And since Heschel, in his posthumous work A Passion for Truth, 
specifically spells out his own affinity with Kierkegaard,28 Petuchowski' s perception of 
Heschel appears to carry some weight. 29 
2S Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.98. 
26 Petuchowski, "Faith as the Leap of Action", p.391. Petuchowski does qualify what he takes to be 
Heschel's "general affinity" with Existentialism: "the affinity ... must be understood with specific Jewish 
reservations". See also E. LaB. Cherbonnier, "A. 1. Heschel and the Philosophy of the Bible: Mystic or 
Rationalist?", Commentary, Vo1.27, No.1, Jan. 1959, p.23. Friedman asserts that one reason for labelling 
Heschel an "existentialist" is "the (erroneous) implication that existentialism is really a Christian and not a 
Jewish phenomenon", which then enables the (Jewish) critic to reject Heschel's theology as being 
specifically Jewish. See Friedman, "Thought of Heschel", p.18. See also Gershon Scholem, On Jews and 
Judaism in Crisis, Schocken Books, New York, 1976, p.274, where Scholem labels Heschel "existentialist 
theologian" in order to dismiss him, along with Buber, on a charge of having evaded the real issues of 
revelation. 
27 Heschel, A Passion for Truth, p.85. 
28 Ibid. In this final work Heschel also answers Petuchowski' s criticism that "one feels a certain reluctance 
on [Hesche I 's] part to reveal himself completely, a shying away from sharing his soul's deepest secret ... 
[t]he result of [which] is that Heschel can only hint and allude". Petuchowski, "Leap of Action", p.391. 
29 Scholem (On Jews and Judaism in Crisis, p.274) also refers (in passing) to Heschel (and Buber) as 
"existentialist theologians". 
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S0ren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-55), rebelling against the fonnalities of Danish 
Lutheranism and Hegel's system-building, introduced the concept of "the leap" in 
Philosophical Fragments (1844) and Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846).30 He 
rejected the Hegelian System, seeing it as an attempt to put humankind in the place of God, 
and ignoring the partial, subjective and limited standpoint from which all human 
judgement is inevitably made. In contrast, Kierkegaard emphasised the primacy of the 
will, with free choice unconstrained by reason. Thus when he posited three "stages" of life 
through which a person hopefully moves towards authentic existence, from an aesthetic, 
through an ethical, to a religious way of life, the progression is not by growth or natural 
evolution (Hegel's "mediation") but by the exercise of free choice-i.e. by a responsible 
act of the will, exercised in freedom-a "leap" in which the previous "stage" is cast 
behind.3! 
Some of Kierkegaard's critics object to the use of the tenn "leap", because they suppose he 
disregards both force of circumstance and the possibility of growth.32 But "leap" is a 
reminder that when a someone moves from one "stage" (from one set of values) to another, 
they are not externally pushed into a new position, nor do they evolve, or slide, or 
30 Seren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, (Tr. David Swenson), Princeton University Press, Priceton 
NJ, 1936, chapter III, and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, (Tr. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie), 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1941, pp. 86 - 97. 
3! See Smen Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, (Tr. Walter Lowrie) Princeton University Press, Princeton 
NJ, 1940. In Kierkegaard's thinking each "stage" is not a different kind of experience, but a different 
philosophy of life. Thus the "stages" do not represent a comparative "scaling" of values. Therefore, he did 
not mean to imply that Christian existence as he understood it is literally a "stage" on life's way, since that 
would suggest a regular or even necessary movement through a series of steps. In Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript he conected the impression by using the term "spheres" rather than "stages" of existence (p.l-l-l 
etc). 
32 George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, George Allen and Unwin, 
London 1968, p. 7 5. 
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fall into it, but move to it by an act of will. Thus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript the 
"author" stands at the foot of the "ladder of heaven" asking how to climb: "How may I, 
Johannes Climacus, participate in the happiness promised by Christianity?"33 In contrast, 
then, to "the scholars" who assumed that what matters is one's comprehension (i.e. you are 
a Christian if you are able to learnedly define Christianity), Kierkegaard insists that only by 
a "leap" can one make "the qualitative transition from no belief to belief'.34 
Heschel explores Kierkegaard's concept of "the leap" in his final book, A Passion for 
Truth, in which he parallels the thinking of Kierkegaard with that of Rabbi Menahem 
Mendl of Kotzk (1787 - 1859), whilst acknowledging that the contemporaries could have 
had no awareness of each other, and "had they met, they would hardly have understood 
each other".35 According to Heschel: 
Kierkegaard considered as essentially irreligious any attempts to 
provide Christianity with a rational justification. For, since the object 
of faith is an absolute paradox and an offense to the mind, faith cannot 
be an act of understanding or belong to the intellectual sphere. It can 
only be an act of the will. The certainty of faith can never come from 
rational proofs, but only by making a "leap of faith". And this leaping 
venture cannot just be made once and for all; it must be renewed 
continually, because objections to it continue to arise. 
. .. Faith is attained, not by continuous or gradual approximations, 
but by a resolution of the will. 36 
JJ Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.20. 
34 Ibid., p.15. 
35 Hesche), Passion for Truth, p.85. 
36 Ibid., p.185. 
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Kierkegaard himself attributed the concept of "the leap of faith" to Gotthold Ephram 
Lessing (1729 - 81) and to Moses Mendelssohn. The former maintained that accidental 
historical truths could never serve as evidence for eternal truths, so that an intellectual 
"leap" is necessary to arrive at eternal truths.37 The latter, in Heschel' s translation, 
concludes: "To doubt whether there might not be something that not only transcends all 
concepts, but stands totally outside concept itself-I would call this a leap beyond 
oneself'.38 
Over against Kierkegaard's "leap of faith", Heschel maintains that Judaism demands a 
"leap of action":39 
... the willingness to learn by doing, to appreciate and to be enriched 
by an experience which touches the whole person and that goes 
beyond the mere analysis and reinterpretation of that which we already 
knew beforehand. In doing sacred deeds, we surpass ourselves and 
sense the presence of a spirit not our own, we become co-workers in 
the task of redeeming the world.4o 
Thus although mitsvot (sacred deeds) are usually understood as expressions of faith, 
Heschel contends that they may also be pathways to faith: "By living as Jews we may 
attain our faith as Jews. We do not have faith because of deeds; we may attain faith 
through sacred deeds".41 
37 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.86f. 
38 Ibid., p.95. Heschel's translation, Passion for Truth, p.187. 
39 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.282f., and Man's Quest for God. p.l 06. 
40 Rothschild "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", p.91. , 
41 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.282, Man's Quest for God, p.l 06. 
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Some of Heschel's commentators, both critics and supporters, are confused by such a 
statement from Heschel, who so often stresses the importance of kavanah (inwardness, 
inner devotion) in the performance of sacred deeds.42 Marvin Fox, for instance, maintains 
that faith must precede mitsvot, since "without the commitment of faith a man is most 
unlikely to undertake the performance of 'sacred deeds', and if he should they would be 
mere posturing without any spiritual effect". He asks how, "if a man performs deeds 
without any sense of their spiritual significance ... they can be effective in leading him to 
God?"43 Heschel does not suggest that they can. Rather, according to Heschel, actions in 
which people realise that "the wonder of doing is no less amazing than the marvel of 
being" may prompt them to discover "the divinity of deeds".44 In other words, someone 
doing mitsvah may begin to realise that there is more than himself in the doing-that there 
is indeed something divine in the doing- and this may be the beginning of faith.45 
42 Heschel, God in Search of Man, pp.341-346 etc. Heschel holds that love is the supreme principle of 
Jewish law, since "All observance is training in the art of love" (Ibid., p.307). And the law of love cannot be 
fulfilled by mere external compliance: "no religious act is properly fulfilled unless it is done with a willing 
heart and a craving soul" (Ibid., p.306). Heschel accuses those who reduce Torah and Judaism to Halacha-
"pan-halachism" he calls it-of advocating "religious behaviourism". "The outward perfo~ance", he . 
maintains, "is but an aspect of the totality of the deed" (Ibid., p.308); kavanah is a precondltlOn of g~nume 
religious behaviour, and the true mitsvah is more like an artistic act than a mechanical act: "The musIc m the 
score is open only to him who has music in his soul. It is not enough to play the notes; one must be what he 
plays. It is not enough to do the mitsvah; one must live what he does". (Ibid., p.315) 
43 Marvin Fox, "Hesche I, Intuition, and the Halakah", Tradition, YoU, No.1, Fall 1960, p.9. 
44 Heschel, God in Search of Man, pp.285, 288. 
45 See Merkle, The Genesis of Faith, p.267, n.132. 
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Harold Kasimow asks if it is conceivable that Heschel asks Jews to take this "leap of 
action" before attaining inner devotion, and answers his own question by asserting that 
Heschel "tells us to perform the mitsvot even if we do not feel the intention".46 He then 
raises Maurice Friedman's question: "if we who are not observant Jews do not now feel 
ourselves commanded by God to perform the law, how shall we perform it with integrity 
even on the strength of Heschel's assurance that we shall know this to be God's will for us 
through our observance?"47-the implication being that deed before devotion means action 
without integrity. But Heschel, rather, recognises that only those who suspect that there is 
value in the action, or those who seek faith through the action, are ready to take the leap. 
That "one must continue to observe the law even when one is not ready to fulfil it 'for the 
sake of God''',48 means that one may act with integrity before believing that the law is of 
God. Indeed, Heschel implies that yearning for faith is a matter of faith,49 which itself 
implies that the leap of action is the beginning of faith which may lead to the life of faith: 
"the way to faith is the way oJfaith".5o 
46 Harold Kasimow Divine-Human Encounter: A Study of Abraham Joshua Heschel, University Press of , 
America, Washington DC, 1979, p.56. 
47 Maurice Friedman, "Liberal Judaism and Contemporary Jewish Thought", Midstream, Autumn 1959, 
p.24. 
48 Heschel God in Search ot Man, pA03f. See also Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.140, "If an act to be 
,'J d h d?" good must be done exclusively for the sake of God, are we ever able to 0 t e goo . . . . . " 
49 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.66, and 199: "Faith is not a system but an ongomg stnvmg for faIth . 
50 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.137, and Insecurity of Freedom, p.199. 
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Heschel took the opportunity to explore some of these issues in 1953 when he received 
invitations from both the (Conservative) Rabbinic Assembly of America and the (Refonn) 
Central Conference of American Rabbis to their respective annual conventions. He 
challenged the former with an address on prayer in which he argued the case for theology51 
("the issue of prayer is not prayer; the issue of prayer is God"52), and he confronted the 
latter with the centrality of Halakhah in Judaism.53 Dresner paraphrases Heschel's dipolar 
understanding: "Judaism without halakah [is] a soul without a body ... Judaism without 
aggadah is like a body without a soul".54 Indeed, Heschel carries the dipolar expression of 
the relationship of Halacha and Agada almost to extremes: 
51 Heschel, "The Spirit of Prayer". 
52 Heschel, Man's Quest for God, pp.58, 87. . . 
53 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Meaning of Observance", in Neusner (Ed.), Understandmg JeWish 
Theology, 93 - 103. , 
54 Samuel H. Dresner, "Heschel and Halakhah: The Vital Centre", Conservati\'e Judaism, Vol.·B, ]'\04, 
Summer 1991, p.24. Heschel himself said several things like it: "Like ~ody and SOUl: [Halacha and Agada] 
are mutually dependent ... ", God in Search of Man, p.324; "Halacha Without Agada:s dead, Agada Without 
H I h · 'ld" Ib'd 337' "There is no Halacha without Agada, and no Agada Without Halacha ... The a ac a IS WI , I., p. , . ". .. . h 
body without the spirit is a corpse; the spirit without the body IS a ghost ,Ibid., p.341; Prayer Wit out . 
kavanah is like a body without a soul", Heschel, Man's Quest for God, p.12 (where Heschel deSCrIbes this 
expression as "the medieval saying") and p.84, 
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Halacha represents the strength to shape one's life according to a fixed 
pattern; it is a form-giving force. Agada is the expression of man's 
ceaseless striving which often defies all limitations. Halacha is the 
rationalization and schematization of living; it defines, specifies, sets 
measure and limit, placing life into an exact system. Agada deals with 
man's ineffable relations to God, to other men, and to the world. 
Halacha deals with details, with each commandment separately; 
Agada with the whole of life, with the totality of religious life. 
Halacha deals with the law; Agada with the meaning of the law. 
Halacha deals with subjects that can be expressed literally; Agada 
introduces us to a realm which lies beyond the range of expression. 
Halacha teaches us how to perform common acts; Agada tells us how 
to participate in the eternal drama. Halacha gives us knowledge; 
Agada gives us inspiration. 
Halacha gives us the norms for action; Agada, the vision of the 
ends of living. Halacha prescribes, Agada suggests; Halacha decrees, 
Agada inspires; Halacha is definite; Agada is allusive ... 
Halacha, by necessity, treats with the laws in the abstract, 
regardless of the totality of the person. It is Agada that keeps on 
reminding that the purpose of performance is to transform the 
performer, that the purpose of observance is to train us in achieving 
spiritual ends.55 
Heschel is aware of the "perpetual danger" in Judaism of "observance and worship 
becoming mere habit",56 and considers it a tragedy that "outward compliance with the 
externalities of the law took the place of the engagement of the whole person to the living 
God".57 
55 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.336f. Edward K. Kaplan points out ~at, strictly speaki~~, what 
Heschel "calls 'polarity'-the dynamic tension of opposites-is really a mIxture, an amalgam: Kaplan, 
Holiness in Words, p.8l. 
56 Heschel, God in Search, p.343. 
57 Ibid., p.326. 
76 
Samuel Dresner wrote up some of his notes of a semmar Hesche1 conducted on 
Soloveitchik's Halakhic Man when it first appeared (1944)58 which are very revealing in 
terms ofHeschel's understanding of the relationship between Halacha and Agada: 
Soloveitchik's study is brilliant, but is based upon the false notion that 
Judaism is a cold, logical affair with no room for piety. .. No, there 
never was such a typology in Judaism as the halakhic man. There 
was-and is-a [man of the Torah] who combines halakhah and 
aggadah, but that is another matter altogether. When I came to Berlin 
I was shocked to hear my fellow students talking about the problem of 
halakhah as a central issue. In Poland it had been a foreign expression 
to me. Halakhah is not an all-inclusive term, and to use it as such is to 
restrict Judaism. Torah is the more comprehensive word. Halakhah 
has very little to do with theology ... In the words of one Orthodox 
figure, assessing the damage done by an ox which gored a cow is our 
theology. 
We are living in one of the periods of Jewish history when 
aggadah has been devalued. For when you say halakhah you exclude 
aggadah. However, they are inseparable. The Maharshah composed 
two separate Talmud commentaries, one to the aggadah and one to the 
halakhah. But after completing them, in his introduction to the former 
he confesses to having erred, "for one must not separate but join them 
as two sisters ... for the halakhot and the aggadot comprise one Torah 
for us." ... True, without halakhah there can be no Judaism. But is 
halakhah everything? 
. . . The legalistic attitude has profoundly influenced Jewish 
observance, distorting ritual prescriptions over moral ones ... We are 
alert to the laws of milk and meat but lax about the laws against lying 
or taking revenge. Those halakhot have become "mere" aggadot, 
which is to say that they are not taken seriously. What would happen 
if we were to turn some of the aggadot into halakhot?59 
58 Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man, The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadephia, 1983. 
Originally published in Hebrew, "Ish ha-halakhah", Talpia!, YoU, Nos.3-4, New ~ork, 1944. _ 
59 Dresner "Heschel and Halakhah", p.25f. "The Maharshah" refers to Samuel Ehezer Edels (15.:>5 - 1631), 
, 
Polish talmudist. 
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Heschel is convinced that halakhah alone is not enough: 
Halakhah is an answer to a question, namely: What does God ask of 
me? The moment that question dies in the heart, the answer becomes 
meaningless. That question, however, is agadic, spontaneous, 
personal. It is an outburst of insight, longing, faith. It is not given; it 
must come about. The task of religious teaching is to be a midwife 
and bring about the birth of the question.6o 
Heschel demonstrates the importance of Agada in his massive work on Rabbinic theology, 
"Torah From Heaven ", showing that the agadic parts of the Talmud were included in the 
tradition "not because ancient academicians could not find a better entertainment for their 
idle hours". Indeed Heschel demonstrates that the Rabbis were "just as serious, just as 
penetrating, and just as self-consistent in theology as in law, for precisely the same reason, 
and in much the same manner."61 
In his later address to the (Refonn) Central Conference of American Rabbis, also in 1953, 
Heschel reverses his emphases and speaks instead of the dangers of Agada alone, and the 
centrality of Halacha to Judaism. Observant himself, he is aware of the problems of 
observance, and can sympathise with those who find the traditional Jewish emphasis on 
observance a problem. He is conscious that in modem society the level of observance 
established by the rabbis proves to be "not infrequently beyond the grasp of ordinary 
man".62 In one of his few autobiographical references, Heschel speaks of his experience 
of being a young student in Berlin, feeling very much alone with his problems and 
anxieties, and, walking through the streets one evening, being conscious of being 
60 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.339. 
61 Neusner, "review of Theology of Ancient Judaism", p.69. 
62 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.342. 
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surrounded by the splendour and cultural power of the city. "Suddenly I noticed that the 
sun had gone down, evening had arrived". 
I had forgotten God-I had forgotten Sinai-I had forgotten that 
sunset is my business-that my task is "to restore the world to the 
kingship of the Lord". 
So I began to utter the words of the evening prayer. .. 
How grateful I am to God that there is a duty to worship, a law to 
remind my distraught mind that it is time to think of God, time to 
disregard my ego for at least a moment! It is such happiness to belong 
to an order of the divine will. 
I am not always in a mood to pray. I do not always have the vision 
and the strength to say a word in the presence of God. But when I am 
weak, it is the law that gives me strength; when my vision is dim, it is 
duty that gives me insight.63 
Heschel relates this personal experience in response to the questions: Why take religious 
observance seriously? Why pray though not in the mood to pray? 
What I wanted to avoid was not only the failure to pray to God during 
a whole evening of my life but the loss of the whole, the loss of 
belonging to the spiritual order of Jewish living. .. It became 
increasingly clear to me that the order of Jewish living is meant to be, 
not a set of rituals, but an order of all man's existence, shaping all his 
traits, interests and dispositions; "not so much the performance of 
single acts, the taking of a step now and then, as the pursuit of a way, 
being on the way; not so much the acts of fulfilling as the state of 
being committed to the task, the belonging to an order in which single 
deeds, aggregates of religious feeling, sporadic sentiments, moral 
episodes become a part of a complete pattem."64 
He identifies "the problem of the meaning of Jewish observance", noting that "the modem 
Jew cannot accept the way of static obedience as a short-cut to the mystery of the divine 
will".65 
63 Heschel, Man's Quest for God, p.96f. 
64 Ibid., p.l 00. The integral quotation is from Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.270. 
65 Ibid.,p.103. 
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H~ ~s not .ready to sacrifice his liberty on the altar of loyalty to the 
spInt of hIS ancestors. He will only respond to a demonstration that 
there is meaning to be found in what we expect him to do. His 
primary difficulty is not in his inability to comprehend the Di"vine 
origin of the law; his essential difficulty is in his inability to sense the 
presence of Divine meaning in the fulfilment of the law.66 
Heschel maintains that Divine meaning can only be apprehended when in a state of 
spiritual preparedness, which is experienced in acts, not in speculation. The Jewish way to 
God is "not a way of ascending the ladder of speculation. .. [Instead,] understanding 
comes by the way of mitzvah . .. " 
By living as Jews we attain our faith as Jews. We do not have faith in 
deeds; we attain faith through deeds ... A Jew is asked to take a leap 
of action rather than a leap of thought: to surpass his needs, to do 
more than he understands in order to understand more than he does. 
In carrying out the word of the Torah he is ushered into the presence 
of spiritual meaning. Through the ecstasy of deeds he learns to be 
certain of the presence of God.67 
Rather than "a ladder of speculation", then, Heschel advises Jewish leaders to establish "a 
ladder of observance", where the Jew can be met on whatever level his circumstances place 
him, and then shown how to rise one rung at a time to whatever height he can attain-even 
"a bit further".68 Thus in parallel with Kierkegaard, whose Climacus could climb the 
"ladder of heaven" by taking a leap of faith, Heschel' s Jew might respond to the "pedagogy 
of return" by beginning mounting the ladder of observance by the leap of action. 
66 Heschel, Man's Quest for God, p.l 03f. 
67 Ibid., p.106. 
68 Dresner, "Heschel and Halakhah", p.23. 
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Heschel maintains that the misunderstanding of the essence of religion as "a state of the 
soul, an inwardness, as an absolute feeling" lies at the root of the problem of observance, 
when "to Judaism religion is not a feeling for something that is but an anSH'er to Him who 
is asking us to live in a certain kind of way".69 He therefore labells "heresy" the doctrine 
of salvation by faith alone.?o 
Faith does not come to an end with attaining certainty of God's 
existence. Faith is the beginning of intense craving to enter an active 
relationship with Him who is beyond the mystery. .. Judaism insists 
upon establishing a unity of faith and creed, of piety and Halacha 
(law), of devotion and deed . .. Judaism is lived in deeds, not only in 
thoughts.?1 
Not long after his address to the Central Conference of American Rabbis, Heschel was 
invited by the students at the Hebrew Union College, where he had been a member of the 
faculty until five years before, to address them. 
I am not an halakhist. My field is agada. .. But, remember, there is 
no agada without halakha. There can be no Jewish holiness without 
Jewish law, at least the essence of Jewish law. Jewish theology and 
tefillin go together. .. Why are you afraid of wearing Tallis and 
Tefillin every morning, my friends? There was a time when 
adjustment to Western Civilization was our supreme problem. .. By 
now we are well adjusted. .. Our task today is to adjust Western 
Civilization to Judaism ... What is wrong with spiritual discipline? It 
is only out of such spiritual discipline that a new manifestation of 
Jewish existence will emerge. I say human and not Jewish existence, 
because Judaism, which can be very concrete, answers universal 
problems. It is not a parochial matter to me. I am beset by the same 
problems that confront a Mohammedan, Christian or Buddhist. 
Judaism is an answer to the problems of human living. But it is an 
answer in a special way.?2 
69 Heschel, Man's Questfor God, p.108, quoting Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.175. 
70 Ibid., p.l 09. See also Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.293, and Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, 
p.174f. 
71 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.175f., quoted in Heschel, Man's Questfor God, p.IIO 
72 Quoted in Dresner, "Heschel and Halakhah", p.22. 
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Heschel, then, is not an existentialist, validating theology in terms of human consciousness, 
but builds his theology on the "rock of certainty that God has made known His will to His 
people",73 Indeed Heschel specifically makes his own the Kabbalistic doctrine of God's 
involvement, surpassing any claim of religious existentialism that human awareness is 
what bestows ontological validity: 
God's relation to the world is an actuality, an absolute implication of 
being, the ultimate in reality, obtaining even if at the moment it is not 
perceived or acknowledged by anybody; those who reject or betray it 
do not diminish its validity.74 
Thus Heschel's apparent affinities with "the Existentialists" are only apparent: unlike 
Tillich, for Heschel humanity's central fear is not that of non-being, but meaningless being; 
unlike Heidegger, he presses beyond the mystery of being to the mystery of what it means 
to be a human being: "Man is a fountain of immense meaning, not merely a drop in the 
ocean of being". 75 Petuchowski' s association of Heschel with existentialism because of his 
use of the term "leap" is premature. Petuchowski apparently sees no important difference 
between the existentialists' "leap of faith" and Heschel' s "leap of action",76 and accuses 
Heschel of subordinating philosophical speculation to the "leap",77 However, whereas 
existential theologians deny that religious knowledge can be communicated, or the "1-
Thou" relationship expressed in terms of "I-It",78 Heschel maintains that knowledge of 
73 Heschel, Man's Questfor God, p.131. See Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.76. 
74 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.225f. 
75 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.64. 
76 Cherbonnier, "Mystic or Rationalist?", p.26. 
77 Petuchowski, "Leap of Action", p.391. 
78 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God, Harper and Row, New York, 1957, p.68. 
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God can be communicated in the same way as knowledge of any other person. Whereas 
for Buber prophetic statements are simply symbolic gestures towards "the ineffable",79 for 
Heschel they convey the very pathos of God: "The prophet hears God's voice and feels His 
heart. He tries to impart the pathos of the message together with its logos".80 And whereas 
for the existentialists "Biblical theology, by definition, contradicts human reason, for 
Heschel, on the contrary, an irrational theology could not possibly be Biblical".81 
The sense of the ineffable is an intellectual endeavor out of the depth 
of reason; it is a source of cognitive insight. There is, therefore, no 
rivalry between religion and reason as long as we are aware of their 
respective tasks and areas. The employment of reason is indispensable 
to the understanding and worship of God, and religion withers without 
it. The insights of faith are general, vague, and stand in need of 
conceptualization in order to be communicated to the mind, integrated 
and brought to consistency. Without reason, faith becomes blind. 
Without reason we would not know how to apply the insights of faith 
to the concrete issues of living. The worship of reason is arrogance 
and betrays a lack of intelligence. The rejection of reason is 
cowardice and betrays a lack of faith.82 
79 Buber, Eclipse of God, p.74. 
80 Heschel, The Prophets, YoU, p.26. For a discussion of Heschel's use of the term "pathos", see below, 
Chapter 4. 
81 Cherbonnier, "Mystic or Rationalist?", p.23. 
82 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.20. 
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"Mystic" and "Poet" 
Petuchowski also categorises Heschel as a "mystic" in order to be able to dismiss him, and 
cites as evidence Heschel's "harping on" about "the ineffable".83 But this too has a non-
cognitive role, and is used neither to evade criticism nor to clinch an argument. 84 
Petuchowski relies on the fact that "ineffable" is a favourite word of those attempting to 
describe mysticism to conclude that Heschel is therefore a mystic, flying in the face of 
Heschel's stated main task in God in Search of Man: to contrast the Biblical and the 
mystical concepts of God. 85 Rather, in Heschel' s understanding, the God of the Bible is 
"Person", and as such can be "known" in a way analogous to the way in which other 
persons can be known. But what we come to know about another person is not entirely 
dependent upon empirical description or observable facts: "It is an understanding of 
another's will, his character, the orientation of his heart".86 And because inter-personal 
relationships are experiential, to "know God" it is necessary to align one's will with God's 
will. 87 
83 Petuckowski, "Leap of Action", p.391. 
84 Cherbonnier, "Mystic or Rationalist?", p.27. 
85 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.22S: "Unlike the mystic experience, the significance o~ prop?ecy lay 
not in those who perceived it but in those to whom the word was to be c~nveyed. Th~ exper~ence. Its~lf ~as a 
beginning, a means, rather than a goal. The purpose was not the perceptIOn of the vOice but III bnngmg It to 
bear upon the reality of people's life." 
86 Cherbonnier, "Mystic or Rationalist?", p.28. . . 
87 Heschel, God in Search, p.282. This is what Heschel called a "leap of a~tion", by which one discovers 
whether the God of the Bible is really the one to whom the prophets bear witness. 
84 
Cherbonnier, Heschel's principle defender against Petuchowski, suggests to those who 
dismissed Heschel as "mere poet", that Heschel's poetic expressions could be rendered into 
plain prose (thereby losing emotional force and aesthetic value, but gaining in clarity) and 
then re-examined. 88 He claims that because poetry appeals to the emotions, some 
philosophers,89 following Aristotle, have "resolutely eliminated every trace of graciousness 
from their writings", employing a prosaic style, whereas Heschel, following the pre-
Socratics and Plato, appeals to the whole person, to the emotions as well as to reason, 
recognising that philosophy is about "life as a whole". Of course, at the same time, 
Cherbonnier recognises that: 
... aesthetic charm is [no] guarantee of truth. No amount of 
eloquence can rectify a falsehood. For the purposes of testing its 
truth-claim, any poetic statement can and should be analysed into cut-
and-dried, logical propositions. Heschel attributes to his readers the 
maturity to do this. The logician alone, however, is not only half a 
man; he is, according to Heschel, half a philosopher as well. For the 
truth which the philosopher seeks is better served by beauty and 
reason together, than by reason alone. 9o 
88 Cherbonnier, "Mystic or Rationalist?", p.29. See also Tanenzapf, "Hesche 1 and his Crit~cs.", p.2~7. 
Heschel himself spells out the "loss": "By proceeding from awarenes~ to knowledge ~e gam m c~anty and 
lose in immediacy. What we gain in distinction by going from expenence to expressIon we lose m 
genuineness" (God in Search of Man, p.116). . . 
89 Ibid., p.27. Cherbonnier did not specify to whom.he was referring as "s?me philos~phers". m thIS context. 
However, the sweeping overgeneralisation is clearly mtended to make a pomt: Heschel s poetIc style actually 
carried philosophical purpose in the pursuit of "truth". 
90 Cherbonnier, "Mystic or Rationalist?", p.23. 
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Edward Kaplan, the principal interpreter of Heschel 's language and poetic style, in an early 
introduction Heschel's "poetics of faith", describes him as "a great religious philosopher 
and poet".91 Writing twenty-five years later he spells it out: 
What I call Heschel's "poetics of piety (or faith)" is a linguistic theory 
and practice-a rhetorical art in the service of the spirit. His analysis 
of language as metaphor of the ineffable enables readers to interpret 
traditional texts, and retrieve their sanctity, while his narrative helps 
readers emulate his own prayerful awareness. Theological and 
philosophical categories provide points of reference, not the goal.92 
Kaplan describes Heschel's work as "[placing] the VIscera back into philosophy and 
theology" by combining abstract categories with imagery and vivid comparisons, and 
demonstrates how Heschel's use of language follows an explicit theory, in which words, 
symbols, signs and concepts "negotiate the frontier between God's will and human 
categories",93 so that this "living encounter with reality takes place on a level that precedes 
conceptualisation, on the level that is responsive, immediate, preconceptual, and 
presymbolic".94 Thus it is true that Heschel's language and style are "both an entrance and 
a stumbling block" when it comes to an appreciation of his philosophy of religion, and for 
the avoidance of the latter Kaplan offers advice to Heschel's readers: 
91 Edward K. Kaplan, "Toward a Poetics of Faith", Response, Vol.S, No.1, Spring 1971, p.4S. See also 
Friedman, "Thought of Abraham Heschel", p.19: "For all its poetic quality, Heschel's style is always an 
instrument of his thought. The startling combinations of words bring new insights to light and force us 
beyond the hackneyed to something of that sense of wonder and awareness of the ineffable which is, to 
Heschel, the first major step in religious life and thought. His style also helps us retain this awareness; for, as 
he writes, 'Even when our thinking about the ultimate question takes place on a discursive level, our memory 
must remain moored to our perceptions of the ineffable'." (Final quotation is from Heschel, Man Is Not 
Alone, p.60). 
92 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.4S. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.IIS. Heschel considered the tension between expression and the . 
Ultimate to be the source of culture: "Music, poetry, religion-they all initiate in the soul's encounter With 
an aspect of reality for which reason has no concepts and language no names". (Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, 
p.36). 
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!feschel's multileveled discourse combines a literary style replete with 
Imagery and elegant aphorisms and lucid manipulation of basic 
metaphysical, aesthetic and ethical categories. He must be followed 
slowly and responsively, with patience, savouring words and phrases 
to appreciate the tonality as well as the ideas.95 
An Accusation of Literalism 
Eliezer Berkovits accuses Heschel of philosophical naivity, and characterises him as a 
biblical literalist who fails in his attempt to wrestle with the problem of 
anthropomorphism: 
It is not difficult to see that the boldness of Dr. Heschel's thought 
consists ... in taking literally all biblical expressions that ascribe to 
God emotions of love and hatred, joy and sorrow, suffering and 
pleasure . .. One may of course wonder what becomes now of the 
age-old problems of Jewish theology and philosophy. Most of them 
are ignored by Heschel's affirrnations.96 
However, the charge of literalism cannot be sustained: Heschel consistently maintains that 
biblical language is indicative rather than descriptive, indicative words having intimate 
meanings that cannot be fully articulated, whereas descriptive words have conventional, 
definite meanings.97 
95 Edward K. Kaplan, "Abraham Joshua Heschel", in Steven T. Katz (Ed.), Interpreters of Judaism in the 
Late Twentieth CentUl}" B'nai B'rith Books, Washington DC, 1993, p.142. 
96 Eliezer Berkovits, "Dr. A. 1. Heschel's Theology of Pathos", Tradition, Vo1.6, Spring-Summer 1964, 
p.70. 
97 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.180f. See also Tanenzapf, "Heschel and his Critics", p.2S!. See 
below, p.221. 
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What did the prophet mean by the phrase, "God spoke"? To 
under~tand !he statements of the prophet about his experience we must 
keep In mInd the following principles about the nature of these 
statements: (1) things and words have many meanings. (2) the 
prophet's. statements are understatements. (3) the language of the 
p~o~het.s IS the language of grandeur and mystery. (4) there is a 
dIstInctIOn between descriptive and indicative words. (5) the 
statements of the prophets must be taken responsively.98 
Thus biblical language in the mouths of the prophets is not always descriptive in terms of 
familiar meanings, but intends to lead us to view reality in new ways: it does not 
communicate information about God, but evokes a response to the divine presence; and 
indeed, "their words must not be taken literally, because a literal understanding would be a 
partial, shallow understanding ... a minimum ofmeaning".99 
Heschel argues that SInce the biblical authors were aware of the umqueness and 
transcendence of God, and were not attempting the impossible by describing God's nature 
but were rather speaking about God's relationships with the world and with humankind, it 
is simply illegitimate to take their words literally. The use of anthropomorphisms in the 
bible is not at all like their use in Greek religious literature, where the attempt was made to 
describe the nature of the gods, whose emotional outbursts were arbitrary and capricious. 
In the Bible, however, the divine "emotions" are "always morally conditioned and morally 
required". 100 Thus Heschel uses anthropomorphic terms "not ... literally, but more than 
literally: to suggest what is metaphysically real from God's perspective".IOI Indeed, 
"anthropomorphic language may be preferable to abstract language, for when you use 
98 Hesche!, God in Search of Man, p.178. 
99 Ibid., p.180. 
100 Heschel, The Prophets, YoUI, p.51. 
101 Kaplan, "Abraham Joshua Heschel", p.138f. 
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abstract language you may have the illusion of adequacy".102 Heschel's philosophy begins 
with "Wonder": 103 the world is always greater than we can understand, and any experience 
always holds more than our expression of it: 
All conceptualization is symbolization, an act of accommodation of 
reality to the human mind. The living encounter with reality takes 
place on a level that precedes conceptualization, on a level that is 
responsive, immediate, preconceptual, and presymbolic. l04 
Indeed, if our concepts cannot express our experience of the world, how short they must 
fall in any attempt to describe God: "our expressions of the ultimate are those of allusion 
and understatement".105 Heschel, then, recognising both the power and limitations of 
language, and religious language in particular, describes biblical accounts as being "more 
than literally true". 106 Indeed, 
The surest way of misunderstanding revelation is to take it literally, to 
imagine that God spoke to the prophet on a long-distance telephone. 
Yet most of us succumb to such fancy, forgetting that the cardinal sin 
in thinking about ultimate issues is literal mindedness. The error of 
literal mindedness is in assuming that things and words have only one 
meaning. I 07 
Thinking literally may become a form of faithlessness, or even idolatry. 
102 Heschel, reported in Maurice Friedman, "Abraham Heschel among Contemporary Philosophers", 
Philosophy Today, Vo1.l8, NoAI4, Winter 1974, p.296. 
103 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, Ch.2, God in Search of Man, ChAo 
104 Heschel, God in Search, p.115. See also Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.12: "No conceptual 
system can catch in its net the whole of reality without a remainder". 
lOS Aaron L. Mackler, "Symbols, Reality, and God: Heschel's Rejection ofa Tillichian Understanding of 
Religious Symbols", Judaism, Vo1.40, No.3, Summer 1991, p.291. Heschel consistently reminded his 
readers that all our statements about God are understatements: see, e.g., God in Search of Man, pp.116, 121, 
127,178,180. 
106 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.256. 
107 Ibid., p.178f. 
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However, Heschel's argument is not so much with literalism as with dogmatism l08-with 
the formulation of belief, which in the end may get in the way of faith by making it 
possible for the non-believer to disclaim, "But that I cannot believe", What Heschel calls 
"depth theology" sets out to subordinate formulae to the transcendent reality to which they 
allude, recognising that "it is precisely the challenge involved in using inadequate words 
that drives the mind beyond all words", 109 Yet at the same time there is a need to express 
and share the things of faith, to communicate the ineffable in "linguistic terms shared by 
society", I 10 Heschel's solution to this logical bind is poetic discourse, which can both 
"preserve the social cohesion of a common tongue" and [exploit] "the fluid relation of 
words to reality", 
Philosophy of religion must be an effort to recall and to keep alive the 
metasymbolic relevance of religious terms, Religious thinking is in 
perpetual danger of giving primacy to concepts and dogmas and to 
forfeit the immediacy of insights, to forget that the known is but a 
reminder of God, that the dogma is a token of His will, the expression 
the inexpressible at its minimum, Concepts, words must not become 
screens; they must be regarded as windows, I I I 
108 In many places Heschel spells out the relationship of faith and dogma, and insists "we must not, , . 
equate the act of faith with its expression". (Man Is Not Alone, p.87; God in Search of Man, p.138). "Man 
has often made a god out of a dogma, a graven image which he worshipped, to which he prayed. He would 
rather believe in dogmas than in God, serving them not for the sake of heaven but for the sake of creed, the 
diminutive of faith. Dogmas are the poor man's share in the divine", (Man Is Not Alone, p.169). See also 
"Dogmas are Not Enough", God in Search of Man, p.330f. 
109 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.56. 
110 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.49. 
III Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.116. 
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Thus what Heschel does is to use language to push his reader beyond the words themselves 
to "the Spirit within us that potentially understands", so that "both the believer and the 
person without faith can meet at the gates of poetic empathy with religious language". 1 12 
His poetics of faith accepts the challenge of "how ... one [rises] from saying the word 
'God' to sensing His realness",I13 and not only provides the believer with a means of 
spiritual development, but permits the unbeliever to experience "empathetically and 
imaginatively the emotions of faith".114 Thus he responds to agnosticism, atheism and 
even secularised religion from a position of dynamic faith, answering radical doubt with 
the radical challenge of faith. Indeed, if Heschel appears not to take doubt seriously, that is 
because doubt "cannot translate the biblical view of reality into modem terms", 115 and to 
accuse Heschel of "failing to understand the tragedy of unbelief' is to miss the point. He 
has little patience with both complementary kinds of resistance to faith-dogmatic belief 
and dogmatic scepticism-because both attempt to use the mind to surpass the mind, 
whereas his "passion for truth" repudiates unreflective cynicism and disbelief. Both Man 
Is Not Alone and God in Search of Man compare radical amazement (the foundation of 
"depth theology") and radical doubt, in a contrast that distinguishes two parallel directions 
of the mind: doubt, concerned with the self and personal beliefs, and "wonder" focusing 
on that which is beyond the self. 
112 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.47. 
113 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.54. 
114 Kaplan, "Toward a Poetics of Faith", p.4S. 
115 Edward K. Kaplan, "Mysticism and Despair in Abraham 1. Heschel's Religious Thought", The Journal 
of Religion, Vo1.57, January 1977, p.36. 
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There is no word in biblical Hebrew for doubt; there are many 
expressions of wonder. Just as in dealing with judgements our starting 
point is doubt, wonder is the biblical starting point in facing reality ... 
Doubt is an act in which the mind inspects its own ideas; wonder is 
an act in which the mind confronts the universe. Radical skepticism is 
the outgrowth of subtle conceit and self-reliance. Yet there was no 
conceit in the prophets and no self-reliance in the Psalmist. I 16 
There is a deliberate overemphasis in the comparison-a recurrent polemic device that here 
allows Heschel to subordinate secular philosophy to prophetic witness, in order to focus, as 
he intends, on ultimate questions. There may be disappointment that he does not take 
doubt as seriously as some would like him to, and in fact rejects doubt as a means to 
understanding, but Heschel believes that only when we rise above the arrogance of 
philosophical doubt can we become receptive to biblical faith: he considers doubt to be 
"incompatible with biblical thinking about reality". I I? 
116 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.98. 
II? Kaplan, "Mysticism and Despair", p.36. 
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Heschel and Philosophy of Religion 
The young Hasidic Jew arriving at the University of Berlin in 1927 found that the 
questions that dominated his life did not appear on the agenda of his teachers and 
contemporari es: 
[For them] philosophy had become an isolated, self-subsisting, self-
indulgent entity, a Ding an sich, encouraging suspicion instead of love 
of wisdom ... 
. . . it became clear to me that the most important philosophical 
problem of the twentieth century was to find a new set of 
presuppositions or premises, a different way of thinking. I 18 
Heschel finds this "different way of thinking" in the Hebrew prophets, and he develops a 
Jewishlbiblical philosophy based on the prophetic experience of divine concern. 
Since the term "religion" in "philosophy of religion" may be used either as an object or as 
a subject, 119 Heschel defines "philosophy of religion" in three ways: 
1. a radical self-understanding of religion in terms of its own spirit; 120 
2. a critical reassessment of religion from the point of view of philosophy; 121 and 
3. a critical reassessment of philosophy from the point of view of religion. 122 
The first of these definitions corresponds to what Heschel calls "Depth Theology", which 
aims "not to establish a doctrine but to lay bare some of the roots of our being, stirred by 
the Ultimate Question. Its theme is faith in status nascendi, the birth-pangs ofinsight".123 
118 Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets, YoU, p.xiv-xv. 
119 Patrick Granfield, Theologians at Work, Macmillan, New York, 1967, p.79. 
120 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.8. 
121 Ibid., p.lO. 
122 Ibid., p.18. 
123 Hesche!, Insecurity of Freedom, p.124. 
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He considers it a fundamental human obligation to strive for truth-specifically for the 
truth of what it means to be human. The task of philosophy of religion, then, is "to 
rediscover the questions to which religion is an answer", I 24 and the purpose of depth 
theology is "to explore the depth of faith, the substratum out of which belief arises",125 
in order to uncover "not only the truth of religion, but man's capacity to sense the truth of 
religion" .126 Indeed, Heschel believes that it is the lack of recognition of the validity and 
force of ultimate questions within religion that has led to the decline of religion in the 
modem world: 
It is customary to blame secular science and anti-religious philosophy 
for the eclipse of religion in modem society. It would be more honest 
to blame religion for its own defeats. Religion declined, not because it 
was refuted, but because it became irrelevant, dull, oppressive, insipid. 
When faith is completely replaced by creed, worship by discipline, 
love by habit; when the crisis of today is ignored because of the 
splendor of the past; when faith becomes an heirloom rather than a 
living fountain; when religion speaks only in the name of authority 
rather than with the voice of compassion-its message becomes 
meaningless. 127 
For Heschel, then, philosophy of religion is primarily the "radical self-understanding of 
religion in terms of its own spirit". Yet he remains open to criticism from outside, so that 
philosophy of religion also includes the philosophical critique of religion and the religious 
critique of philosophy. 
124 Ibid., p.116. See also Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.l O. 
125 Heschel, God in Search, p. 7. 
126 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.116. 
127 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.3, and Insecurity of Freedom, p.181. 
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Therefore Heschel' s second definition of philosophy of religion ("a critical reassessment of 
religion from the point of view of philosophy") makes room for the rationalist claim that 
religion must demonstrate its validity and be able to justify its claims. Although he 
maintains that "religion is not within but beyond the limits of mere reason", he insists that 
religion must neither suppress nor contradict reason. For Heschel this is an implication of 
monotheism: reason and revelation derive from the same source. 128 Nor is his attitude to 
reason neutral, in terms of "truth having nothing to fear from reason"; 129 rather, Heschel 
understands reason's role as the preservation or rescue of religion from distortion and 
corruption: 
Superstition, pride, self-righteousness, bias, and vulgarity may defile 
the finest tradition. Faith in its zeal tends to become bigotry. The 
criticism of reasoI4 the challenge, and the doubts of the unbeliever 
may, therefore, be more helpful to the integrity of faith than the simple 
reliance on one's own faith.130 
Thus for Heschel one task of philosophy of religion is to challenge the authenticity of 
religion. But since there are many different philosophies, each with its own perspective on 
reality, Heschel modifies this second definition to read: "a critical reassessment of religion 
from the perspective of a particular philosophical situation".131 Nevertheless, from the 
point of view of philosophy as "the human attempt to attain a synoptic view of things", 
Heschel concludes that "the task of philosophy of religion [is] to place religious 
understanding in relation to the entire range of human knowledge". 132 
128 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.19f. 
129 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.I72. 
130 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.l O. 
131 Ibid., p.12 (emphasis added). 
132 Ibid. 
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Heschel's third definition of philosophy of religion describes it as the "critical 
reassessment of philosophy from the perspective of religion". Just as religion can become 
distorted, so philosophy can become inflated and overreach itself, and therefore 
"philosophy of religion must keep in mind both the uniqueness and limitations of both 
philosophy and religion" .133 Heschel envisages philosophy of religion doing battle on two 
fronts: "trying to winnow false notions of the fundamentalist, and to dampen the over-
confidence of the rationalists" .134 Philosophy of religion in this third sense does not 
merely indicate the limits of philosophy, but enables the philosophical mind the reach new 
heights: 
The task of philosophy of religion is to lead the mind to the summit of 
thinking; to create in us the understanding of why the problems of 
religion cannot be apprehended in terms of science; to let us realize 
that religion has its own scope, perspective and goal; to expose us to 
the majesty and mystery, in the presence of which the mind is not deaf 
to that which transcends the mind. 135 
Heschel's understanding of philosophy of religion as having different functions which flow 
from his three definitions, thus provides a system of checks and balances that promotes the 
integrity and scope of both philosophy and religion, preventing the subjugation of either to 
the other. 
133 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.18. 
134 Ibid., p.272. 
135 Ibid., p.18. 
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Yet Heschel's principal approach to philosophy of religion is traditional in the sense that it 
is specifically a philosophy of Judaism and Jewish self-understanding-"a radical self-
understanding of Judaism in terms of its own spirit"-i.e. a clarification and an 
examination of the meaning of the events and ideas essential to Judaism: the Jewish 
understanding of God, humanity and the world, that has its roots in "the biblical view of 
reality". 136 Indeed, "Judaism is a confrontation with the Bible, and a philosophy of 
Judaism must be a confrontation with the thought of the Bible".137 
Heschel's methodology, a combination of phenomenology and apologetics, reveals his 
German-Jewish roots rather than his Polish-Hasidic roots. Yet his philosophy is not only 
an analysis and description of the phenomena of faith and the phenomena that spark faith, 
but is also a testing of the sources and antecedents of faith, and a philosophical defence of 
faith perceived to be true. For him "all philosophy is an apologia pro vita sua".138 
Moreover, 
He claims that the basic truths and insights revealed in the 
[phenomenological] depiction of the Jewish faith are not merely the 
idiosyncrasies of a particular religious outlook. He believes that if 
sympathetically presented, they will be found relevant to the problems 
of sensitive men beyond the circle of previously committed 
traditionalists. The endeavor to present this universal aspect of Jewish 
thought constitutes the main part of his philosophy of religion. 139 
136 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Biblical View of Reality", in Harold S. Basilius (Ed.), Contemporary 
Problems in Religion, Wayne University Press, Detroit, 1956, pp.57- 76. 
137 Heschel, God in Search o/Man, p.25. 
138 Ibid., p.6. 
139 Fritz Rothschild, "The Religious Thought of Abraham Heschel", Conservative Judaism, Vo1.23, No.1, 
Fall 1968, p.23. 
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Three Levels of Discourse 
Fritz Rothschild demonstrates that a careful reading of Heschel' s works discloses that he is 
a religious philosopher, and that critics fail to perceive Heschel's philosophy because they 
fail to discern that he operates on three different levels of discourse, and so overlook their 
logical force. 140 In fact, Rothschild blames much of the failure of Heschel's critics to 
appreciate his philosophical method on the fact that Heschel himself does not always make 
it clear on which level he is operating at any given point, and the three levels often overlap 
or run together. 141 Rothschild identified these three levels as "empirical description", 
"phenomenological analysis", and "philosophical approach". It is at the first level of 
"empirical description" that we find the particular passages that have 
... drawn warm praise from some readers and chilly rejection from 
others, because they do not argue logically, but present descriptively 
such subjects as the inner consciousness of the pious Jew at prayer, the 
experience of Sabbath sanctity, the attitude of wonder and awe In 
facing nature, and the consciousness of the prophets. 142 
It is in these passages that Heschel not only drew on the classical Jewish texts (Bible, 
Talmud, Midrash, medieval literature, Hasidic teachings and stories) but also used 
language in a way designed to evoke a personal response in the reader. Once it is 
appreciated that these descriptions do not lay claim to probative force, the question of their 
legitimacy in the context of religious philosophy becomes irrelevant. They are pre-
theological-they are source material for the historian and analyst of religion, as, for 
140 Rothschild, "Religious Thought of Heswchel", pp.l2-24, and Rothschild "Varieties of Heschelian 
Thought", p.94. 
141 Ibid., p.2l, and "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", p.93f. 
142 Ibid., p.2lf, and "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", p.94. 
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instance, are case-histories for the psychologist's research. They form the context for 
Heschel's religious philosophy, each of them being "a description of an experience that is 
at the foundation of philosophy", "the stuff from which philosophical arguments for the 
credibility of religious faith may be fashioned".143 
The second level is that of "phenomenological analysis", which includes some of 
Heschel's greatest achievements: the phenomenology of prophetic consciousness,144 the 
descriptions of the three-fold approach to the awareness of God (through nature, bible and 
mitzvot),145 the understanding of the Sabbath experience as sanctification of time,146 and 
his typology of prayer. 147 For the believer, such analysis clarifies and illuminates faith, and 
to the "objective" non-believer it presents the Jewish faith in categories that are 
authentically Jewish and not borrowed from some other categorical framework. Again, the 
discourse is pre-theological, paving the way for the development of a philosophy of 
religion. 148 
143 Rothschild, "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", p.96. 
144 Heschel, Die Prophetie and The Prophets. 
145 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.31. 
146 Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath: Its Meaningfor Modern Man, Farrar, Straus and Young, New 
York, 1951. . 
147 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Man's Questfor God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism, Charles Scnbner's 
Sons, Yew York, 1954. 
148 See below, "Phenomenology: A Consistent Basis", p.l0l-II O. 
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Heschel claims that the basic truths and insights revealed in the phenomenological 
description of Judaism would be found to be relevant to the human situation as perceived 
by sensitive people outside the circle of previously committed adherents of any particular 
religious outlook. It is this "level three" attempt to show the universality of basic Jewish 
(biblical) thought that principally fonns Heschel's philosophy of religion. He does not 
believe that the truth of Judaism can be empirically demonstrated, and denigrates any 
attempt to "prove" the existence of GOd. 149 Nor does he claim to prove the truth of 
Judaism even to the most sympathetic reader. But rather his philosophy of religion is 
infonned by 
... the conviction that the very ideas, values, and attitudes of Judaism 
which his phenomenological labors have disclosed are not merely the 
peculiar stance of the tradition of a peculiar people, but are in deepest 
accord with the values and attitudes of all intelligent and morally 
sensitive people, once they reflect on these matters and try to gain a 
perceptive understanding of themselves and the meaning of their lives 
in the light of insights gained from the study of the Jewish faith. 150 
Thus, if by "philosophy of religion" is meant a discipline serving the world of faith in 
tenns of examining its precepts, preserving its integrity, and offering an apologia to the 
seeker or the sceptic, then Heschel is a philosopher of religion to be taken seriously. 
Moreover, since the philosophy of great religious thinkers cannot take the place for their 
readers of a personal existential decision-a personal response of faith-Heschel's work 
enables such decisions to be made with deep insight, with openness to the received 
tradition, with an awareness of the things that are of real significance, and with heart and 
149 Heschel, Prophets, VoU, p.22: "There are no proofs for the existence of the God of Abraham. There 
are only witnesses". 
150 Rothschild, "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", p.99f. 
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mind. It is for such reasons that Kaplan proposes a double task for the interpreter of 
Heschel: not only to "systematise philosophical and theological insights dispersed amidst 
emotionally charged-and often baroque-poetic prose", but also somehow to enter into 
and "possess" intuitively Heschel's spiritual experience, since "Heschel's theory and use of 
poetic language brings [sic] us to the heart of his endeavour". The endeavour, therefore, is 
not to rationalise religion, or to offer "proofs" for the truth of religion, but to "open our 
minds to our hearts, to reconcile the rational and artistic dimensions of religious life, and 
thus to prepare us to meet God directly".151 What we do not find in Heschel's writings, 
therefore, is 
... a systematic discussion of the more strictly philosophical problems 
that inevitably accompany [religious phenomenology]-particularly 
the issue of subjectivity. He is palpably aware of the problems, and he 
is certainly fully capable of dealing with them, but he seems to view 
them as intrusive. 152 
Heschel, then, sets out not just to convince but to transfonn the way his readers perceive of 
reality. Finding traditional philosophy of religion unhelpful with its focus on the self as 
subject in search of its ultimate concern, his model is the Bible where God is the subject, 
and which itself was written "not more geometrico but in the language of poets".153 This 
"language of poets" Heschel describes as being written in "indicative words", which he 
differentiated from "descriptive words": 
151 Edward K. Kaplan, "Heschel's Poetics of Religious Thinking", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua 
Heschel, p.1 03. . ., . 
152 Neil Gillman, Sacred Fragments: Recovering Theology for the Modern Jew, JeWIsh PubhcatIon SOCIety, 
Philadelphia, 1990, p.133. 
153 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.37. 
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Descriptive words stand in a fixed relation to conventional and 
definite meanings, such as the concrete nouns chair, table, or the tenns 
of science; and indicative words stand in a fluid relation to ineffable 
meanings and, instead of describing, merely intimate something we 
cannot fully comprehend. The content of such words as God, time, 
beauty, eternity cannot be faithfully imagined or reproduced in our 
minds. Still they convey a wealth of meaning to our sense of the 
ineffable. Their function is not to call up a definition in our minds, 
but to introduce us to a reality which they signify. 154 
Thus Heschel writes in a distinctively poetic style because faith can only be alluded to, not 
described. Allegory and metaphor are the only tools capable of conveying the complexity 
of the faith experience. I 55 
Phenomenology: a consistent basis 
In addition to appreciating Heschel's literary accomplishments, it is necessary also to 
understand the phenomenological method that undergirds his work, with its fundamental 
analysis of consciousness. 
154 Heschel God in Search a/Man, p.180f. 
ISS Ch·· W' ·ner "Rabbi Dr. Abraham Joshua Heschel: A Personal View", Service International de 
aim el , r h Ed·' ) 3 Documentation Judeo-Chretienne (SIDIC), Vol.XXVII, No.3, 1994 (Eng IS ItlOn ,p .. 
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The tenn "phenomenology" first appeared in the writings of Johann Heinrich Lamberts 
(1728 - 77), and was adopted by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) to explain the distinction 
between things as they are in themselves and things as they are to us. Thus 
phenomenology is the description of consciousness and experience in abstraction from 
considerations of its "intentional" content. 156 In the twentieth century the term is 
associated with the Husserlian school: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), himself a student of 
phenomenology under Franz Brentano (1838-1917), was concerned to tum back the tide of 
the popular scientific view of the world, which he called "naturalism". Husserl's writings 
were "of decisive influence" on Heschel whilst he was a student in Berlin. 157 
Husserl argued that since "naturalism" proceeds without examining the conditions under 
which knowledge is possible, its categories are unsuited to an examination of conscious 
events, including the pursuit of scientific truth itself. Here, according to Husserl, the 
philosopher steps in, in order to distinguish within experience that which distinguishes 
from that which is experienced. Phenomenological analysis begins, therefore, by 
"bracketing" the questions of "reality" and "truth", in order to be able to examine, without 
prejudice, what appears in the consciousness. By provisionally setting aside any concern 
156 "Intentionality" is of central importance to Phenomenology, referring to consciousness as it is directed 
towards an object: consciousness is always consciousness of [any possible object of consciousness]. Thus 
intentionality overcomes the Cartesian dilemma, in which radical doubt ends by positing a res cogita with no 
guarantee that there is anything to think about. By extension, intentionality indicates the absurdity of 
dividing reality up into mutually exclusive categories: mind and body, subject and object, etc. Intentionality 
therefore shifts attention away from the question of the reality of the physical world, to the meaning of that 
which appears to consciousness, since consciousness is never empty and abstract, but concrete and tied to the 
world as experienced. Husserl introduced new terminology in order to avoid this dualism: the activity of 
consciousness he called noesis (Greek: mental perception; thought) and the object of consciousness noema 
(Greek: that which is perceived; a thought), the adjectival forms being "noetic" and "noematic". For a full 
discussion of Phenomenology see, for example, David Stewart and Algis Mickanus, Exploring 
Phenomenology: A Guide to the Field and its Literature, American Library Association, Chicago, 1974. 
157 Rothschild, "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", p.97. 
103 
with explanation, phenomenology thus pennits, for example, the study of religious 
consciousness, without the student becoming bogged down by the assumption that shelhe 
already knows what is or is not real. The aim, therefore, is to be able to describe 
"meanings" by disregarding for the time being the question of the reality of that to which 
they refer. 158 By definition, the method is restricted to the analysis and description of 
phenomena only as they appear to the consciousness, exploring the experiential 
relationship of people to the world around them. 
Among Heschel's Christian contemporaries Rudolph Bultmann and Paul Tillich, both of 
whom preceded him to the University of Berlin, also made abundant use of the 
phenomenological method, particularly in the fonn of the "existential analysis" associated 
with Heidegger. Whilst Heschel knew the work of Tillich, who was a near neighbour as a 
professor at Union Theological Seminary, I 59 each had independently adopted the 
phenomenological method as fundamental to his work before they became aware of each 
other, and each used the method to different ends. For Tillich the phenomenological 
method is a necessity in the effort of theology to persuade its critics to take its content 
seriously: 
158 See Edmund Husserl, Ideas, (trans. Boyce Gibson), Macmillan, New York, 1931. 
159 Tillich emigrated to the United States of America in 1933 and had thus been .a profe~sor at ~nion 
Theological Seminary for twelve years when Heschel joined the faculty at the neIghbounng JewIsh 
Theological Seminary of America. 
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In too many cases, especially in the realm of religion, an idea has been 
taken in its undistilled, vague, or popular sense and made the victim of 
an easy and unfair rejection. Theology must apply the 
phenomenological approach to all its basic concepts, forcing its critics 
first of all to see what the criticised concepts mean and also forcing 
itself to make careful descriptions of its concepts and to use them with 
logical consistency, thus avoiding the danger of trying to fill in logical 
gaps with devotional material. 160 
Heschel spells out his phenomenological programme by making a distinction between 
theology and what he calls "depth-theology", in the opening pages of God in Search of 
Man: 
The theme of theology is the content of believing. The theme of the 
present study is the act of believing. Its purpose is to explore the 
depth of faith, the substratum out of which belief arises, and its 
method may be called depth theology.161 
It is Heschel's intention to explore the act rather than the content of believing which gives 
the clue to his method, which can be traced back to his doctoral dissertation, Die 
Prophetie-a phenomenological analysis of biblical prophecy. In the revised and 
expanded English version (published as The Prophets in 1962) Heschel refers the reader 
back to the German edition's introduction for a specific explanation of his method. 162 
Heschel is concerned to distinguish his analysis of prophecy from the psychological, 
political, ethical and dogmatic explanations common at the time, laying the foundations for 
an understanding of the prophetic self and the prophetic consciousness. 
160 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, VaLl, James Nisbet and Co. Ltd., Welwyn, 1968, p.118. 
161 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.7. 
162 Heschel, Prophets, I, xii, note 2, referring to Die Prophetie, pp.1-6. 
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. . . the act of inspiration must also be adequately comprehended. 
Without the difficult problem of the limits of revelation ceasing to 
exist, the noetic character of the content of inspiration can be proven, 
that also inspiration itself leads into the general relation of 
consciousness, that also content, which is not original consciousness, 
that becomes a revelation to the enduring consciousness. The 
prophets had clear conceptions about the course of events of 
inspiration and a knowledge about the kind and structure of their 
experience. 163 
Thus according to Heschel, the meaning of prophecy can only be considered from the 
point of view of its noetic character, specifically in the consciousness of the prophet. 
However, he also identified a further phenomenological aspect of prophetic consciousness 
in the objective, noematic aspect of the prophetic consciousness, without which the 
prophetic experience lacks authenticity. 
To the consciousness of the prophet, the prophetic act is more than an 
experience; it is an objective event. This is its essential mode. 
Whatever be the mode in which inspiration is apprehended, there 
remains always its character as an event, not as a process. 164 
Thus Heschel's explanation of prophecy is specifically based on the noetic-noematic 
correlation, in order that his phenomenology should not result in the dead-end of 
consciousness analysed as if it had no obj ective reference. 
From a phenomenological point of view, we can do justice to the 
essence of the experience only when we include in our discussion the 
awareness of that which is given to experience. We must, therefore, 
examine the structure of inspiration in its objectivity, which is a given 
fact of experience, in order that we may be in a position to grasp the 
character of the experience which it initiates. 165 
163 Lawrence Perlman, Abraham Hesche/'s Idea of Revelation, Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1989, p.13, 
translating Heschel, Die Prophetie,(Gerrnan), p.13. 
164 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.2l!. 
165 Ibid., p.2l Of. 
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When Heschel expanded and prepared Die Prophetie for republication in English twenty 
six years after it had been published in Gennan, the change of title (from "Prophecy" to 
The Prophets) indicated how his emphasis had shifted "from a presentation of the Gestalt 
of the prophetic attitude, to a greater concern with the individual prophets and their 
particular message or teaching".166 Nevertheless, the same basic phenomenological 
method was used: 
Such an inquiry must suspend personal beliefs or even any attempt to 
inquire-e.g., whether the event happened in fact as it did to their 
minds. It is my claim that, regardless of whether or not their 
experience was of the real, it is possible to analyse the fonn and 
content of that experience. The process and result of such an inquiry 
represent the essential part of this book as composed a good many 
years ago. While I still maintain the soundness of the method 
described . . . which in important aspects reflects the method of 
phenomenology, I have long since become wary of impartiality, which 
is itself a way of being partial. 
The prophet's existence is either irrelevant or relevant. If 
irrelevant, I cannot truly be involved in it; if relevant, then my 
impartiality is but a pretense. Reflection may succeed in isolating an 
object; reflection itself cannot be isolated. Reflection is part of a 
situation. 167 
166 Nathan Rotensreich, "On Prophetic Consciousness", Journal of Religion, Vo1.54, No.3, July 1974, 
p.186. 
167 Heschel, Prophets, I, p.xii. Three years after the publication of The Prophets, and his subsequent 
adoption of the prophetic role in social action, Heschel played a significant advisory role in the Second 
Vatican Council's debate on the relation of the Roman Catholic Church to non-Christian religions, that 
resulted in the promulgation of Nostra Aetate. The pre- and post-conciliar Social Encyclicals (e.g. John 
XXIII's Mater et Magister (1961) and Pacem in Terris (1963), and Paul VI's Populorum Progressio (1967» 
prompted the emergence of Liberation Theology, originally in Latin America. Although there is no evidence 
that the Liberation Theologians were aware of HescheI' s work (the most influential of them studied in 
Europe in the 1960s and their theologising responds to Moltmann and Metz among others), their critique of 
"North Atlantic political theology" accords with Heschel's principles, e.g.: that the methodological starting 
point of "North Atlantic" theology is philosophical idealism, which hinders the use of socio-political 
analytical tools as a means of bridging the hermeneutical gap between past event and present reality; and that 
its proponents are not committed in practice to changing society, only to explaining and criticising it. See, 
e.g. 1. Andrew Kirk, Liberation Theology, Marshall, Morgan and Scott, London, 1979, pp.23-27. 
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Thus although Heschel, in the later version of his phenomenological analysis of the biblical 
prophets, may have altered his emphasis, he retains the method, and he uses the same ideas 
of form and content to express prophetic inspiration and event: 
The structure of prophetic consciousness as ascertained in the analysis 
was disclosed as consisting, on the transcendent level, of pathos 
(content of inspiration) and event (form), and on the personal level, of 
sympathy (content of inner experience) and the sense of being 
overpowered (form of inner experience). 168 
And the theology of the prophets and their relationship to God he places in the same 
phenomenological context, with the noetic-noematic correlation implicitly referred to: 
Pathos means: God is never neutral, never beyond good and evil. He 
is always partial to justice. It is not a name for a human experience, 
but the name for an object of human experience. It is something the 
prophets meet with, something eventful, current, present in history as 
well as in nature. 169 
Since Heschel makes such explicit methodological statements in the two versions of his 
analysis of classical Hebrew prophecy and not elsewhere, it might be assumed that his 
adoption of phenomenology was confined to this particular work. However, he made 
similar remarks in his books of philosophy of religion, and in God in Search of Man he 
described "his" kind of philosophy: 
Philosophy may be pursued as a process of thinking thought, of 
analyzing the content of thinking, such as principles, assumptions, 
doctrines. Or it may be pursued as thinking about thinking, as radical 
self-understanding, as a process of analyzing the act of thinking, as a 
process of introspection, of watching the intellectual self in action.170 
168 Heschel, Prophet, I, p.xv. 
169 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.11. 
170 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.6. 
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This "thinking about thinking" involves the phenomenological approach to human 
consciousness, and accords with Heschel's definition of his own theological task, to 
analyse the act of believing rather than the content of believing. This is the novelty of his 
approach, which phenomenologically separates creed and dogma (which he regards as the 
proper concern of what he defined as "theology") from the consciousness of religion (i.e. 
the acts, events and insights of believing) which is the concern of what he called "depth-
theology".!71 
Nor is Heschel a phenomenologist only when dealing with God's relationship with 
humankind, whether in his analysis of classical prophecy or in his philosophy of religion. 
In Who is Man? he states: 
The decisive form of human being is human living. Thus the proper 
theme for the study of man is the problem of living, of what to do with 
being. Living means putting being into shape, lending form to sheer 
being.!72 
Who Is Man? is the only one of Heschel's works in which he specifically names both 
Brentano and Husser!, and singles out the phenomenological idea of intentionality as the 
basis for his understanding of self-consciousness: 
17! Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom, pp.115-125. 
172 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.95. 
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The self is inescapably beset by the questions: What shall I do with 
my existence, with my being here and now? What does it mean to be 
alive? What does being alive imply for my will and intelligence? Its 
most characteristic condition is discontent with sheer being, generated 
by a challenge which is not to be derived from being around, being-
here-too; it questions and transcends human being. Just as 
consciousness always posits an idea, as Brentano and Husserl have 
shown, self-consciousness posits a challenge. Consciousness of the 
self comes about in being challenged, in being called upon, in the 
choice between refusal and response. 173 
Although Heschel appears to refer to Brentano and Husserl only in passing and only 
towards the end of his theological anthropology, throughout the volume he bases his 
exposition on the notion of intentionality. Indeed, the idea of consciousness presented here 
is deontological, being defined only by the task given to consciousness. Thus 
phenomenology is the basis of Heschel's view, not only of the prophetic consciousness, but 
of what it means to be truly human, which means, for him, being homo religioso. 
Rothschild tells us that when Heschel, as a young student in Berlin, 
... had established ... his phenomenology of religion, he laid the 
foundation of his mature philosophy of life and religion. For if 
revelation is "an act within the life of God", an event in which God 
takes the initiative to commune with human persons and to share the 
divine will and concern with them, then we have a new way of 
explaining life, ethics, religion, and the meaning of God. 174 
Heschel's consistent use of phenomenology helps locate his thinking in the history of 
Western philosophy. Whereas Kant desired to place "religion within the limits of reason 
alone", and concluded that the revelation of divine content by a personal God IS 
intellectually impossible and religiously irrelevant,175 Heschel argues for the opposite: 
173 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.l05. 
174 Rothschild "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", p.99. 
175 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason A/one, (Trans. T. Green and H. Hudson), Harper 
and Row, New York, 1960, p.142ff. 
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We must . . . not judge religion exclusively from the viewpoint of 
reason. Religion is not within but beyond the limits of mere reason. 
Its task is not to compete with reason but to aid us where reason gives 
only partial aid. Its meaning must be understood in tenns compatible 
with the sense of the ineffable. 176 
Heschel's purpose is to explain religious knowledge in tenns compatible with a sense of 
the ineffable. His philosophical works are based on the premise that experience, even that 
of the philosopher, is open to the divine. l77 The method he uses to open up the prophetic 
event (revelation) to the modem mind is phenomenology, and by adopting Husserl's 
method he opens up an area of knowledge that Spinoza and Kant had each in his own way 
tried to close. 
Heschel and the Historical Critical Method 
Since Heschel is neither literalist nor dogmatist, it is pertinent to enquire into his attitude 
towards the historical-critical method, which dominated biblical scholarship during his 
most productive years. He is clearly aware of the method, but makes few references to it, 
and at times appears to have a total lack of interest in its findings. In his phenomenological 
analysis of the prophets he aims "to attain an understanding of the prophet through an 
analysis and description of his consciousness"178_a project that would smack of 
obscurantism to a biblical scholar approaching the material from an historical-critical 
176 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.20. 
177 Heschel, Man /s Not Alone, p.3-34. 
178 Heschel, The Prophets, I, p.ix. 
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perspective. We must ask, therefore, if Heschel simply rejects the method, whether his 
reticence is out of regard for his position at the centre of Conservative Je\\"ish teaching, or 
if he finds the method irrelevant to his programme, i.e. that he set out to do something 
entirely different from the historical-critical scholar. 
That Heschel is aware of the historical-critical method and makes use of its findings is 
amply demonstrated in his analysis of biblical prophecy. He specifically identifies Isaiah's 
prophecy with only the first thirty-nine chapters of the book that is ascribed to the prophet 
in the Bible, and devotes a considerable amount of space to the description of Isaiah's 
historical context in Judah and in the wider context of Judah's relationships with 
neighbouring states. He is most careful in his dating, through the reigns of successive 
kings.179 "Second Isaiah" he designates as such, (acknowledging the prophet's 
anonymity), allocates him chapters 40-66, treats him as an entirely separate character from 
Isaiah, places him almost 200 years after Isaiah, locates him in Babylon, and again is 
careful in his dating, establishing him within the events of Middle Eastern political life in 
the sixth century BCE. However, Heschel appreciates Second Isaiah as a prophet who 
"lifted the meaning of ... events from the level of political history to the level of 
understanding world history as a drama of redemption", and therefore claims agelessness 
for his words: 
It is a prophecy tempered with human tears, mixed with a joy that 
heals all scars, clearing a way for understanding the future in spite of 
the present. No words have ever gone further in offering comfort 
when the sick world cries. 180 
179 Heschel The Prophets, I, pp 61-77. 
180 Ibid., p.145. 
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These words are themselves sufficient witness to the fact that Heschel works to a different 
agenda from that of the exponents of the historical-critical method. It is not that he is 
ignorant of their work, or does not find many of their conclusions helpful, but that his 
approach to the Bible is radically different from theirs. His high doctrine of revelation in 
terms of the "Torah from heaven" ("Revelation is not a chronological issue"ISI), necessary 
to his fundamental appreciation of the pathos of God, puts him at odds with those who rely 
on the data of biblical textual criticism to argue for the human origins of the prophetic 
texts: 
The Liberals may have made too little of God and too much of 
humankind. In all integrity they could not accept biblical text and the 
rabbinic tradition as God-given or God empowered ... Against those 
who have felt that modernity necessarily implied some version of 
liberal belief, Heschel carried through the central project of modern 
Jewish thought by providing a theology of classic Judaism.lS2 
And this leads us to enqUIre into the overall Jewish reaction to the application and 
conclusions of the historical-critical method. Louis Jacobs finds it "sobering" that Jews 
should still be fighting the battles fought by Christians in the last century over the divine 
inspiration of the Bible (overlooking the fact that many Christians do not regard that 
particular war as over, and that Conservative Evangelicals struggle on to maintain the 
inerrancy of the Bible as divine revelation, so essential to their theology). Nevertheless, he 
lSI Heschel discusses this in detail in Chapter 27, God in Search o/Man, pp.257ff. At t~e ?eginning of the 
notes Heschel states that he "intends to publish elsewhere a detailed study of what the pnn~lple of revelatIOn 
meant in Jewish tradition" (p.276). This refers to his Torah min ha-shamayim, the translation of which IS 
still awaited. 
182 Eugene B. Borowitz, Choices in Modern Jewish Thought: a Partisan Guide, Behnnan House, \\. est 
Orange NJ, (2nd edition) 1995, p.183f. 
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maintains that most non-Orthodox Jewish theologians do accept the conclusions of Biblical 
Criticism, and the scientific account of the age and structure of the cosmos which is at 
variance with the Biblical account, and have therefore reconsidered what revelation is. 
The general tendency has been to give a far greater acknowledgement 
to the human element in revelation-the Torah being seen as given not 
only to the people of Israel but also through them, though there is, 
naturally, much discussion on how such an idea affects the traditional 
doctrine of Torah min hashamayyim. 183 
When the Jewish Theological Seminary of America was founded in 1886, it was 
committed to traditional and Rabbinic Judaism, and to the restating of the tradition in 
modem terms. However, there were two modem movements it actively opposed: Reform 
Judaism, and Protestant Christian scholarship in the Bible and Rabbinics. The latter had 
gone on from textual criticism to "higher criticism", which was concerned with the 
authorship and historical origins of the biblical writings. This was unacceptable to 
Schechter and his colleagues, not so much because it challenged traditional views, but 
because it smacked of "higher anti-Semitism". Amongst other things, higher criticism 
proposes a late date for the development of Hebrew monotheism (i.e.it represents Second 
Temple Judaism as late Judaism), and surmises that this had become so corrupted by the 
ascendancy of priestly ritual over prophetic word by the time of the Second Temple that 
only the revolution brought about by Jesus and Paul could have restored it to its pristine 
expression. It was sensitivity to such perceptions that led the Seminary, in its early years, 
183 Louis Jacobs, "Jewish Theology Today" in Dan Cohn-Sherbok (Ed.), Problems in Contemporary Jewish 
Theology, The Edwin Mellen Press, LewistoniQueenstoniLampeter, 1991, p.7. 
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to omit higher criticism, especially of the Pentateuch, from its curriculum, and to tactfully 
encourage such sympathetic Christian scholars as George Foot Moore in efforts to correct 
the most blatant Christian distortions of the Jewish position.1 84 Howe\'er, as Kaufman 
Kohler of the Refonn school points out: 
The mere tabooing of Higher Biblical Criticism resorted to by the 
Conservative Schools seldom prevents the truth-seeking student from 
eating from the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge which will, 
sooner or later, open his eyes to the naked facts of the late origin of the 
Mosaic books and the Mosaic laws and so forth. I 85 
And indeed, nowadays most Refonn and Conservative Jewish scholars accept the results of 
biblical criticism, and the conclusion that traditional views must be revised in its light, but 
do not necessarily accept that it affects the view of the Bible as inspired. In other words, 
there is more to this than a simple choice between accepting the critical position en bloc (to 
the demise not only of the "Torah from Heaven" but also of traditional observance), or 
rejecting it entirely in the name of orthodoxy. A sound theology cannot fly in the face of 
the evidence: "to invoke faith in order to reject highly circumstantial evidence comes 
perilously close to a belief in a God who plants false clues. " To identify learning with 
heresy is to equate orthodoxy with obscurantism",186 But Louis Jacobs suggests that it is 
not the task of the theologian, but the task of the historian, philologist, literary critic and 
anthropologist to discover what actually happened in Jewish and world history. 187 In other 
words, the question is fundamentally a literary one, not a religious one. 188 
184 See Gershon D. Cohen, "Conservative Judaism" in Arthur A. Cohen & Paul Mendes-Flohr (Eds), 
Contemporary Jewish Religious Thought, The Free Press, New York, 1987, p.92f. See also Charlotte Klein, 
Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology, SPCK, London, 1978. 
185 Kaufman Kohler "The Scholar and the Preacher", in Simon Noveck (Ed.), Contempormy Jewish , 
Thought: A Reader, Vision Press, London, 1964, p.320. 
186 Louis Jacobs, "Faith" in Cohen & Mendes-Flohr (Eds.), Contemporary Jewish Religious Thought, p.236. 
187 fbid., p.237. 
188 Louis Jacobs, We Han! Reason to Belie\'e, Vallentine Mitchell, London, 1962, p.72. 
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Will Herberg, claiming to follow Rosenzweig, Buber, Niebuhr and Brunner, holds that this 
"third way" is not "between" modernism and fundamentalism, but beyond them and 
distinct from both: 
In this view, a shift in the very meaning of the tenn "revelation" is 
involved. Revelation is not the communication of infallible 
infonnation, as the fundamentalists claim, nor is it the outpouring of 
"inspired" sages and poets, as the modernists conceive it. Revelation 
is the self-disclosure of God in his dealings H'ith the world. Scripture 
is thus not itself revelation but a humanly mediated record of 
revelation. It is a story composed of many strands and fragments, 
each arising in its own time, place and circumstances, yet it is 
essentially one, for it is throughout the story of the encounter of God 
and man in the history of Israel. Scripture as revelation is not a 
compendium of recondite infonnation or metaphysical propositions; it 
is quite literally Heilsgeschichte, redemptive history. 189 
That is, the Bible, in this context, is not to be considered as simply the historical record of 
Israel's national literature, but rather as "a canon of authoritative religious statements", part 
of which, at least, is to be thought of as "the word of God", and the whole of which has 
been given authority by Judaism itself.190 Scholem suggests that this is why 
fundamentalism remained an apparently acceptable stance in Judaism long after it had been 
discredited amongst non-Jews-because historical criticism was irrelevant to the ongoing 
discussion about revelation, i.e. "the discussion moved on an entirely different level".191 It 
is to explore this "different level" that we tum to Heschel's writings, where the basic 
question in this area is that of our relationship to the Bible: 
189 Will Herberg, Judaism and Modern Man: An Interpretation of Jewish Religion, Jewish Lights. 
Woodstock VT, 1997, p.243f. 
190 Scholem, On Jews and Judaism in Crisis, p.263. 
191 Ibid., p.266. 
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Do we relate to it as one does to a work of art or a musical 
composition? Does our bringing of ourselves to it, so to speak, 
change the Bible? Is the Bible different for each individual, does it 
remain static while we become dynamic because of it; what happens 
when we relate to the Bible?192 
It all depends what we consider the Bible to be, and therefore how we approach it. Is it 
literature, history, prayer-book or theology? Do we go to it seeking entertainment, 
knowledge or awareness? Can we analyse it and still retain our love for it? Is not analysis 
a pedantic and uncreative approach to the beloved, destined to undermine or destroy the 
relationship? 
Heschel himself is quite clear that the Jewish approach to the Bible is one of confrontation: 
"Judaism is a confrontation with the Bible, and a philosophy of Judaism must be a 
confrontation with the thought of the Bible",193 Indeed, "unless we are confronted with the 
word, unless we continue our dialogue with the prophets, unless we respond, the Bible 
ceases to be Scripture" ,194 To approach the Bible with preconceptions derived from 
"Athens" when it is concerned with the ideas of "Jerusalem" is to miss the point: Heschel 
more than once tells of the cub reporter sent to cover a wedding who came back 
complaining that he had no story because the bridegroom had failed to tum Up,195 
192 Morton C. Fierman, Leap of Faith: Ideas in the Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel, University Press 
of America, Lanham, 1990, p.259. 
193 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.25. 
194 Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.243. 
195 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.25; Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.241f. 
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What then does the textual critic bring to his approach to the Bible? He brings his 
personality, his knowledge of the ancient Near East, his analytical ability, his historic 
sense, his commitment to truth, and his scepticism. This is why, according to Heschel, "we 
have so much to say about the Bible that we are not prepared to hear what the Bible has to 
say about us. We are not in love with the Bible; we are in love with our own critical 
acumen ... ".196 The sense of mystery and transcendence is lost in the analysis, in what 
Heschel characterises as "the desanctification of the Bible", which he diagnosed as a 
symptom of "the malaise of Protestantism". 197 It is the task of philosophy of religion, as 
Heschel understands it, to both "winnow the false notions of the fundamentalist" and to 
"dampen the overconfidence of the rationalist", so as to "lead us to a higher plane of 
know ledge and experience, to attachment through understanding" .198 
Although Heschel fully acknowledges that the historical-critical method has made a large 
contribution to historical and theological understanding, it has done so by approaching the 
Bible with objectivity and detachment, as if it were any other book. This is in itself 
ambiguous: "it claims to be value free; though the attitude of being value-free is itself a 
valuational attitude".199 For Heschel, rather, the Bible both is and is not like any other 
book (just as one's mother both is and is not like any other mother). To know the words of 
the Bible, "I must submit them to my judgement"; to understand them, "I must stand under 
their judgement".200 This is a direct result of his phenomenology: 
196 Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom, p.171. 
197 Ibid., p.171f. 
198 Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.243. 
199 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.I72. 
200 Ibid. 
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To comprehend what phenomena are, it is important to suspend 
judgement and think in detachment; to comprehend what phenomena 
mean, it is necessary to suspend indifference and be involved. To 
examine their essence requires a process of reflection. Such 
reflection, however, sets up a gulf between the phenomena and 
ourselves. Reducing them to dead objects of the mind, it deprives 
them of the power to affect us, to speak to us, to transcend our 
attitudes and conceptions.201 
Thus although the historical-critical method, thanks to its detachment, might well dispose 
of "a paper pope", it leave us with "a collection of ill-composed records on a mass of 
paper". Indeed, so far as Heschel is concerned, even to read the Bible "as literature", with 
no religious strings attached, is to miss the point: it is "an evasion of a challenge".202 The 
problem for Heschel, then, is how to engage in critical study and at the same time preserve 
an awareness of the holy: "the Bible is holiness in words", and its authority is not a matter 
of philology or chronology. What matters fundamentally is not date and authorship, but 
"openness to the presence o/God in the Bible".203 
It is frequently assumed that the authority and sanctity of the 
Pentateuch depend upon the fact that it was written down in its 
entirety in the time of Moses; that to assume that even a few passages 
were added to it after the death of Moses is to deny the principle of 
revelation. Does the sanctity of the Bible depend on the amount of 
time that elapsed between the moment of revelation and the moment 
of committing its content to parchment? .... Is it proper to treat the 
divine dignity of the Bible as if it were a chronological problem, as if 
its authenticity could be verified by a notary public?204 
201 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.xivf(emphases added). He says earlier, "I have long since become wary of 
impartiality, which is itself a way of being partial". 
202 Ibid., p.157. 
203 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.l72. 
204 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.257. 
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Yet at the same time Heschel is aware of the dangers of an over-deference to the Bible, as 
if the words are all that matter: "the prophetic words were given to us to be understood, 
not merely mechanically repeated".205 When the Bible is approached by way of a dogma 
of objective revelation, then the "profound and decisive share of man" is overlooked. 
Heschel is fond of the maxim that "Judaism is based on a minimum of revelation and a 
maximum of interpretation",206 for the Bible is understood only by "the spirit that grows 
with it, wrestles with it, prays with it". The Bible is not an "intellectual sinecure", and 
must not be approached as if neither mind nor conscience have a part to play in its 
understanding. 207 
For Heschel, revelation is to be understood in dramatic terms. "The Bible", he says, "is not 
a book to be read, but a drama in which to participate"208...-the drama of God's 
involvement with human beings. Since this drama is related in historic events, Heschel 
participated in the debate within biblical theology as to whether the biblical drama is a 
story which makes aesthetic appeal, or whether it is in some sense a history rooted in 
events that happened in the history of a people. 
205 Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.244. 
206 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.274, Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.248. 
207 Rothschild (Ed.), Betlveen God and Man, p.247. 
208 Heschel, God in Search of Man., p.254. 
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Heschel assumes a distinction between the Torah as witness to the mystery of God's 
presence in history and the Torah as witness to historical facts. Philosophy of religion, he 
says, is not concerned with whether the Pentateuch was written in its entirety during the 
forty years of Israel's wilderness wanderings, but seeks to understand "the meaning and the 
validity of the claim that the will of God reached the understanding of man", i.e. it deals 
with the Bible at the "grandeur and amazement" level. Theology's concern is to "define 
the dogma of revelation and offer an answer to historical questions".209 
Although Heschel is not unambiguous on this point, he affirms that God's revelation, 
expressed in the words of Scripture, is mediated through past events. Indeed, he denigrates 
religions and philosophies which have a "contempt for time" and which devalue the 
particular and the unique: "Jewish tradition claims that there is a hierarchy of moments 
within time, that all ages are not alike".210 Some times are unique, not just because of 
their historical concreteness, but because of their intimate relation to God, and it is these 
events that are to be remembered and celebrated in the faith of a worshipping 
community.2lt 
209 Heschel, God in Search of Alan, p.258. 
210 Ibid., p.205. Also in Heschel, The Sabbath, p.96. 
211 See Bernhard W. Anderson, "Coexistence With God: Heschel's Exposition of Biblical Theology", in 
Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.57. 
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Thus Heschel places great emphasis on the agadic dimension of the Bible. God's 
revelation is presented in story form, and this story prevents revelation from being reduced 
to ancient history: many events are dead and gone, and we are liberated from the past, but 
nevertheless, "there are events which never become past"-"some events of hoary 
antiquity may hold us in their spell to this very day".212 And it is in the biblical story that 
the meaning of such events is conveyed, and they are given dramatic contemporaneity: 
"sacred history may be described as an attempt to overcome the dividing line of the past 
and the present, as an attempt to see the past in the present tense".213 The Bible, read in 
faith, is a drama of the divine-human encounter, "the word of God and man".214 The 
biblical theme of what it means to be a human being is not concerned with humankind's 
self-understanding, but with humankind in relationship with God. And so for Heschel 
participation in the biblical drama is not about the re-enactment of the biblical past, but 
about seeking fresh understanding so as to be able to make a creative response to what God 
requires of us now. 
Without our continuous striving for understanding, the Bible is like 
paper money without security. Yet such understanding ... can only 
be achieved in attachment and dedication, in retaining and reliving the 
original understanding as expressed by the prophets and the ancient 
sages.215 
212 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.2l1. 
213 Ibid., p.2llf. 
214 Ibid., p.260. 
215 Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.248f. 
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Thus Heschel' s attitude towards biblical criticism is that of a scholar who found some of its 
conclusions to be useful in terms of clarification and contextualisation, yet found it largely 
irrelevant to his own programme. As he put it: 
The essence of our faith in the sanctity of the Bible is that its words 
contain that which God wants us to know and to fulfil. How these 
words were written down is not the fundamental problem. That is 
why the theme of Biblical criticism is not the theme of faith, just as 
the question of whether the thunder and lightning at Sinai were a 
natural phenomenon or not is irrelevant to our faith in revelation. The 
assumption of come commentators that the Decalogue was given on a 
rainy day does not affect our conception of the event.216 
216 Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.258. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TOWARDS A HESCHELIAN UNDERSTANDING 
OF "THEOLOGY" 
The "Jewish Theology" Debate 
A specifically Jewish theology would presumably have to consider such questions as: 
What is the Jewish concept of God?! What does Judaism teach about the nature of God? 
How, according to Judaism, does God reveal himself to humankind? Once such questions 
have been asked, the whole enterprise could be dismissed as absurd, since there is 
unanimity among religious thinkers that God is essentially unknowable. As Maimonides 
put it: 
... all people, both of past and present generations, declared that God 
cannot be the object of human comprehension, that none but Himself 
comprehends what He is, and that our know ledge consists in knowing 
that we are unable truly to comprehend Him. All philosophers say, 
"He has overpowered us by His grace, and is invisible to us through 
the intensity of His light," like the sun which cannot be perceived by 
eyes which are too weak to bear its rays.2 
Is the whole theological enterprise therefore futile? Maimonides himself got round the 
problem by proposing a negative theology, declaring what God is not rather than 
attempting to define what God is. 3 
! Heschel objected to such questions. In 1967 he was invited to address the (Roman Catholic) Congress on 
the Theology of the Church (in Montreal) on the subject "The God ofIsrael and Christian Renewal". Later 
the title had been changed to "The Jewish Notion of God and Christian Renewal", a change which he 
rejected: " 'The God of Israel' is a name, not a notion, and the difference between the two is perhaps the 
difference between Jerusalem and Athens. A notion applies to all objects of similar properties; a name 
applies to an individual. .. A notion describes; a name evokes. A notion is attained through generalization; 
a name is learned through acquaintance. A notion is conceived; a name is called. Indeed,the terms 'notion' 
and 'the God ofIsrael' are profoundly incompatible." (Abraham Joshua Heschel, .. The God ofIsrael and 
Christian Renewal", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.268. 
2 Moses Maimonides, The Guidefor the Perplexed, (Trans. M. Friedlander), Dover, ]\:ew York. 1956, p.85. 
3 Ibid., pp.87-89. See Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.300. 
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However, theologians draw a distinction between God as he is in himself, and God as he 
reveals himself to be, i.e. God in relationship with humankind.4 Unless God lets himself 
be known, theistic faith is a non-starter. And, anyway, the doctrine that God is essentially 
unknowable is itself a theological deduction about the nature of God. 
Bachya ibn Pakudah, an eleventh century Spanish Jewish philosopher, quoted with 
approval the saying of "the philosopher" that only the prophet (who knows God intuitively) 
and the master philosopher (whose ideas about God have been refined in the crucible of his 
mind) actually worship God. All others worship something other than God, "because they 
cannot conceive of a Being who is not a composite of different attributes".5 To give any 
consideration to Bachya's contention is, of course, to do theology. 
However, it is often asserted, even in modem times, that there is no such thing as Jewish 
theology-that there is simply no warrant for theology in the Jewish tradition. Louis 
Jacobs, one of the principal writers on the subject, notes that Jewish theology ("the 
systematic consideration of what adherents of the Jewish religion believe or are expected to 
believe") is "notoriously elusive, so much so that voices have been raised to question 
whether there really is any such thing".6 
4 The Kabbalah, the mystical, theosophical system developed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
culminating in the Zohar, and reworked by Isaac Luria in the sixteenth century, and ~hich may be 
understood in part as a distinctively Jewish way of doing theology, defined two aspects of DeIty: God as He 
is in himself (En Sot), and God as manifested via a process of emanation in the ten Sefirot, the powers and 
potencies in the Godhead, from which creation stems and through which God is worshipped. 
5 Bachya ibn Pakuda, The Duties a/the Heart (Tr. Yaakov Feldman), Aronson, Northnle NJ, 1996, p.17. 
6 Jacobs, "Jewish Theology Today", p.3. 
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Ce~ai?ly there is no department of Jewish theology, as there is of 
ChrIstIan, at any university. Even in the foremost higher institutions 
of s~ecifically Jewish learning, such as the Hebrew Union College, the 
JewI~h Theological Seminary and Yeshiv~ University in the USA, 
Jews College and Leo Baeck College III the UK, where Jewish 
theology can hardly be ignored, the subject is often treated with 
amused tolerance as peripheral to the major interests of both teachers 
and students. 7 
Indeed, according to Arthur Cohen, American Jewish life before 1945 was known for "its 
consistent, stubborn, and-given the intellectual revolutions of the twentieth century-
almost miraculous avoidance oftheology".8 
A number of explanations have been offered for the parlous state of American Jewish 
theology before 1945, which may be summarised into four: pragmatism, communal 
welfare, modernity, and tradition. 9 The argument from pragmatism asserts that practical 
considerations were urgent: the major concerns of first- and second-generation immigrant 
Jews in America were not the intellectual definition of Jewish existence. They were: 
philanthropy (through such organisations as B'nai B'rith), the "upbuilding of Zion", the 
struggle against anti-Semitism and for civil rights (through the Anti-Defamation League 
and others), and assimilation into the dominant community.IO In such a cultural 
environment theology was regarded as "at best a luxury, at worst, sheer drivel", II of no 
7 Jacobs, "Jewish Theology Today", p.3. 
8 Arthur A. Cohen, introduction to Milton Steinberg, Anatomy of Faith, (Ed. Arthur A. Cohen), Harcourt, 
Brace, New York, 1960, p.55. See Norman Frimer, "The A-theological Judaism of the American Jewish 
Community", Judaism, Vol.11, Spring 1962, pp.144-154. 
9 Goldy, Emergence of Jewish Theology, pp.9-16. 
10 Ibid., p.7. 
II Leon Silberman, "The Theologian's Task", Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook, Vol.73, 
1963, p.18l. 
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social value. In some Jewish theological seminaries not only was no theology taught, but 
there was antipathy and antagonism towards theology-"a sneering at the theological 
enterprise"-which resulted in a self-generating scarcity of Jewish theologians. 12 
The argument from communal welfare, on the other hand, assumes that theology does have 
a significant effect on the community, albeit a negative one, claiming that theologies have 
become "instruments of divisiveness rather than promoters of unity", \3 with the suggestion 
that Jewish theology should be deliberately neglected on the grounds that it has no 
survival-value. Some object to the theological enterprise itself, likening it to the building of 
the Tower of Babel: whereas the tower builders worked with bricks and mortar in their 
attempt to ascend to God, the theologians construct an edifice out of "syllogisms, 
arguments and biblical texts". The outcome is the same in each case: "confusion and 
frustration; and not one understands the speech of the other".14 Thus theology is seen as a 
threat, endangering interfaith relationships, jeopardising the greater security and decency in 
living that Jews have enjoyed in America than anywhere else, and stirring up anti-
Semitism. 
12 Hinunelfarb (Ed.), The Condition of Jel'·.'ish Belief, p.72. 
13 Solomon Goldman, Crisis and Decision, Harper & Bros., New York, 1938, p.88. 
14 Samuel S. Cohon Jewish Theology: A Historical and Systematic Interpretation of Judaism and its . 
Foundations, Royal'Vangorcum, Assen (Netherlands), 1971, p.1. Cohon's riposte is.that "the tower bUIlders 
assumed that God is remote and must be reached by superhuman effort, whereas He IS ever near us and 
within". 
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The argument from modernity perceIves theology as belonging to an essentially pre-
modern thought-world of dogmatism and supernaturalism. "Theology" sounds "too 
narrow and medieval when contrasted to more respectable and acceptable tenns as 
'religious philosophy' and 'religious thought' ."15 And the argument from tradition is the 
familiar statement that theology is essentially "un-Jewish", for a variety of reasons: that 
Judaism regards Halacha as more important than theology as such; that theology is 
perceived as being rigid and dogmatic, whereas Judaism is undogmatic; that Jewish ideas 
are derived, not by systematic theological thought, but by the study of classical texts, and 
expressed in the commentaries on them. Thus the argument from tradition asserts that 
what Jewish theology there is is to be found within traditional Rabbinic literature-in 
prayers and sermons, agadic stories and midrashic interpretations. 
Midrash is the method by which meanings other than literal meanings are discovered in the 
Bible, such interpretations often serving the needs of a particular time and community. It 
is a kind of commentary on the Hebrew Bible, and particularly on its legal portions-
halachic midrashim. There is also, however, the aggadic midrash, which expounds the 
non-legal parts of the Bible, which flourished from the third to the thirteenth centuries of 
the Common Era. Agada, then, consists of the non-legal contents of the Talmud and 
Midrash-ethical teaching, legends, folklore, prayers, historical infonnation, 
interpretations of dreams, expressions of messianic hope, and theological speculation-
15 Jakob Petuchowski, "The Question of Jewish Philosophy", Judaism, Yol.7, Winter 1958, p.55. 
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often by way of biblical exegesis. It is understood as complementing Halacha, without 
itself being binding on the Jewish people, and need not be derived from a recognised 
ancient source but recreated by every generation. Agada is not treated less seriously than 
Halacha, but is, rather, less precise. Agada, then, deals in an unsystematic way with ethical 
and theological problems. 16 
The question to be asked, then, is not "Is there Jewish theology?" (because there self-
evidently is such a thing and it obviously is being done) but rather, "What do people mean 
when they say there is no Jewish theology?" We must ask why people feel threatened by 
the theological enterprise, what it is that they are seeking to evade or deny, and what 
arguments they evoke in order to support their anti-theological assertion. 
16 See Hyman Maccoby, "Towards an Aggadic Theology", in Cohn-Sherbok (Ed.) Probl~"!s in . 
Contempora!), Jewish Theology, p.212: "It is quite correct to see the a?adda~ a~ the rabbm~c w.ay ofdomg 
theology, but it is a way that has not yet detached itse~f fro~ mythologIcal thmkmg, and WhICh IS therefore 
more rooted in the birth-experience than any purely dIscursIve theolo?y ca.n b~. Thus a theology of Judaism 
must be based both on the foundation-myth, and on its authentic contmuatI~n m the ~ggadah. A ~eology IS 
an attempt to translate a mythology into purely rational concepts, arranged m a conSIstent system. For 
Heschel on Halacha and Agada, see Rothschild (Ed), Between God and Man, p.175. 
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Nonnan Solomon, in an article about Jewish-Christian dialogue, sets out to explore the 
question of why there are Jews who say that there is no such thing as Jewish theology.17 
His particular investigation is into conditional support for interfaith dialogue so long as it 
does not involve "theology" (the "Soloveitchik line"),18 and takes as its starting point a 
definition of theology from Dietrich Ritschel: 
Theology is not identical with the totality of the thought and language 
of believers. It is only a small part of that-the part that claims to 
regulate, examine and stimulate this thought and language, and also 
the action of believers. Theology must receive from believers its right 
to exercise this regulative function. A wider content would also be 
conceivable, one which included, say, all responsible and coherent 
thought in the society of believers. 19 
Solomon argues that it could not have been the intention of "Soloveitchik or of the 
Rabbinical Council of America, or of the Conference of European Rabbis, or Lord 
Jakobovits" to deny that Judaism has means to regulate, examine and stimulate the thought, 
language and action of believers, and so we must ask why there is this apparent angst about 
the use of the term "theology". He then lists some of the fears he considers traditional 
Jews have in this field, and which, he supposes, Soloveitchik was attempting to rationalise 
-the fears that have led some to deny that theology is a proper Jewish activity: 
17 Norman Solomon, "The Soloveitchik Line on Dialogue", in Cohn-Sherbok (Ed.) Problems in 
ContemporGlY Jewish Theology, pp.227-240. 
18 Joseph B. Soloveitchik (1903-1993), head of the Talmud faculty at Yeshiva University, New York, read 
sections of his paper, "Confrontation" to the Rabbinical Council of Americ~ (1 ~64), ~,hich ~e? issued a 
policy statement on interfaith dialogue (generally referred to as the "Soloveltchik lme ). ThIS IS well 
summarised by the Conference of European Rabbis (Bournmouth, 1988): "The ~o~ference reconfirms the 
value of dialogue and co-operation between different religions on moral and SOCIal Issues but not on 
theological subjects" (Christian Jewish Relations, Vo1.20, No.2, London, 1988, pp.28f.) 
19 Dietrich Ritschel, The Logic of Theology: a brief account of the relationship between basic concepts in 
theology, SCM, London, 1986, p.1. 
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1) A deep fear arising from past centuries of Christian conversionism 
disputation and general brow-beating, always rooted in Christia~ 
theology and used to challenge and discredit Judaism. 
2) The fear that if theology is allowed to dominate the discussion a 
Christian agenda will be imposed. ' 
3) A fear that if certain Christian theological topics, for instance 
trinitarian and incamational theology, are addressed, there would be 
great unpleasantness, because Jews will be afraid to say what they 
really think, lest it cause deep offence. 2o 
4) A fear that what is seen by Jews as the Christian obsession with 
Jesus will result in futile and repetitive disputes, obstruct meaningful 
conversation, and divert people from the constructive work of 
dialogue. 
5) A fear that Christians, even when acknowledging our sources, will 
appropriate them to their own purposes, for instance reading the 
prophets as prefiguring Jesus. At worst this becomes a wholesale 
appropriation of Judaism, as in supercessionist theology, which, in 
effect, steals our traditions and denies them to us. 
6) A fear that since traditional Jewish teaching and rabbinic training 
focus on textual study and halakha, rather than on broad principles of 
faith, Jewish dialogue-participants would be at a disadvantage if the 
dialogue is conducted in theological tenns. 
7) The simple fear of not being able to make oneself understood, of 
not being able to do justice to the Torah itself.21 
20 See Rothschild (Ed.), Jewish Perspectives on Christianity, p.10f, where he records how Martin Buber's 
friend Werner Kraft accused him of softening his statements on Christianity in Two Types of Faith. Buber 
agreed, but added, "That would have been too much of an imposition on the Christians!" Rothschild adds, 
"My intention is ... to alert the reader to the complexity, occasional ambivalence, and social context in 
which a man like Buber tried to state his ideas without offending sensibilities and without distorting his own 
opinions, which are often as critical of traditional Judaism as they are of Pauline Christianity." 
21 Norman Solomon elaborated No.7 to me (Oxford, 10th April 1997): "Most people, in the Orthodox camp 
at least, who have studied Torah, have not studied it in an overtly theological context. They feel as though 
they are trying to present their viewpoint or their beliefs in a foreign language, which they cannot handle, 
and are not doing themse I ves justice." 
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If Arthur Cohen is right in his assertion that it was the Christian assault upon Judaism in 
the early centuries of the Common Era that "left its mark upon rabbinic Judaism 
principally in respect of the latter's increasing reluctance to engage in theological 
confrontation and debate",22 then these "fears" reflect long expenence of the Jewish 
encounter with Christianity. However, it is clear from the (Christian) reports of the few 
theological encounters that did occur in the early centuries, that the Jewish participant was 
credited with "an interest in organizing his confession of faith in both logical and 
systematic order, always grounding assertion ... upon scriptural warrant". And in those 
encounters with pagans recorded in the Midrash it is also clear that "the effort of 
theological crystallization and the offering of summations of Jewish belief and intention" is 
also firmly biblically based.23 
There have also been attempts to justify the apparent rejection of the theological enterprise 
on more rational grounds than "fear", with the assertion that Judaism is concerned with 
Halacha, i.e. with doing the will of God rather than defining it; and that Jewish thinking 
has traditionally been "organic" rather than systematic. 
22 Cohen, "Theology"" p.973. 
23 Ibid., p.974. 
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Thus some who declare theology to be an un-Jewish enterprise find support in the Midrash 
on the verse: They have forsaken Me and have not kept My Torah (Jeremiah 16:11).~4 
The Midrash considers it obvious that if the people have forsaken God they have not kept 
the Torah, and so is puzzled by the prophet's statement. In answer, it imagines God to be 
saying: Would that they hadforsaken Me ifonly they had kept my Torah, i.e. that God does 
not want Jews to think about him, but wants them, rather, to keep the Torah. However, 
The meaning is rather that God is prepared, as it were, to settle for 
uninformed, self-seeking observance of the Torah because such is the 
spiritual power of the Torah even where the motivation is unworthy, 
that its study and practice will eventually lead Israel to Him. As the 
Midrash concludes, "since by occupying themselves with the Torah, 
the light which it contains would have led them back to the right 
path." In the very next passage of the Midrash the saying is quoted: 
"Study the Torah even if it be not for its own sake, since even if not 
for its own sake at first it will eventually be for its own sake."25 
Thus this Midrash is actually a homily on the spiritual power of the Torah, and has nothing 
to do with the question of the validity of Jewish theology. Indeed, the Midrash and 
Rabbinic literature in general are full of thinking about God. Jewish religious practice 
depends on its theological basis, unless a religious behaviourism is an acceptable and 
authentic way of practising of Judaism. Heschel calls it pan-halachism2L-the idea that all 
that matters in Judaism is the observance of Halacha. The statement of the idea is 
tautologous (i.e. that all that matters is Halacha because all that matters is Halacha) unless 
it can be defended on theological grounds. Hesche! states unequivocally: 
24 Lamentations Rabbah, introduction, 2. 
25 Jacobs, The Jewish Religion, p.550. 
26 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.328. 
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Judaism is neither an experience nor a creed, neither the possession of 
psychic traits nor the acceptance of theological doctrine, but the living 
in a holy dimension, in a spiritual order, living in the covenant with 
God. It comes to expression in ideas and events, in deed and thoughts, 
in moments of prayer and insight, in the study of Torah, in doing the 
commandments.27 
But at the same time he asserts that "unless we learn how to think as Jews we will never be 
able to find meaning in the observance ofhalacha ... "28 
There is, however, some merit in the claim that Jewish thinking is "organic" rather than 
systematic, i.e., that it responds to particular concrete situations, rather than attempting a 
comprehensive account of what belief entails.29 This was certainly the case in the 
classical and formative periods of Jewish thinking-the Biblical and Rabbinic periods, as 
Max Kadushin notes: 
By "theology" we ordinarily mean the theory behind creeds or dogmas, a 
logical system of ideas or concepts having a hierarchical relation to one 
another, whereas organic thinking involves no such hierarchy but is 
rather a net-work of concepts. Rabbinic theology is not theology in the 
accepted sense but organic thinking.30 
27 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.212. 
28 Ibid., p.216 (emphasis added). 
29 See George Foot Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era, Vol. 1 , S~hoc~en B~oks, 
New York, 1971 (originally published in 1927), in which the autho~ claims to have "a~Olde~ Imp?smg on the 
matter a systematic disposition which is foreign to it and to the Jewish thought of the tImes. (p. VIU). 
30 Max Kadushin, Organic Thinking: A Study of Rabbinic Thought, Bloch, New York, 1938, p.185. 
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However, once Greek ways of thinking influenced Jewish teachers, a concern for 
systematic thinking about Judaism emerged, and where the influence was most strongly 
felt, sustained reflection on the nature of the Jewish faith in response to the dominant 
culture was seen as an imperative.3! Menachem Kellner suggests some "extrinsic reasons 
for the lack of systematic theology in Judaism"-that Judaism in the early centuries of the 
Common Era was not actively proselytising, nor considered itself under attack by 
adversaries it took seriously. Only when Judaism found itself under attack in the Middle 
Ages by a Christianity with a developed "full-blown" theology was there a need for 
Judaism to respond to Christianity in kind. 32 Thus Kellner pictures Maimonides 
responding, not to Christianity, but to "the rise of Islam from without and of Karaism from 
within", the former aggressively proselytising and the latter challenging the Jewish 
legitimacy of Rabbinic Judaism. 33 
The same period saw the "rediscovery" of Aristotle, whose works had been preserved in 
Arabic: these ideas had been imported, still bearing the marks of their "Graeco-Muslim 
origin",34 into Judaism by Sa'adia Gaon (882 - 942) and were now absorbed into Christian 
theology by Thomas Aquinas. Thus, although Maimonides' "Thirteen Principles" were 
largely ignored for two centuries, they came into their own in the 14th and 15th centuries 
as the Jews of the Iberian peninsula were compelled to defend Judaism with the weapons-
theological weapons-chosen by the Christian challenger. 
3! As seen in Philo, Sa' adia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakudah, Maimonides, Gersonides, Crescas and Albo, among 
ancient and medieval thinkers. 
32 Kellner Must a Jew Believe Anything?, pp.46-49, 105. 
33 The K~raites are a Jewish sect, influential from the 8th-12th centuries CE, which denies the Talmudic-
Rabbinic tradition, interprets the Bible literally, and claims to be the true form of Judaism. There.is a 
significant Karaite community in Israel (20,000+), and small groups in Turkey, France and Amenca. 
34 Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything?, p.7. 
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In a symposium in which the editors of Commentary explored "the conditions of Jewish 
belief', the editor of the resulting volume, reflecting on the Jewish theological experience, 
notes in his introduction: 
Historically, some Jewries were more theological than others. The 
more advanced the culture they lived in, and the more vigorous its 
philosophical life, the more they had to theologize. Medieval Spanish 
Judaism was more theological than Franco-German Judaism, 
Maimonides more than Rashi. In those terms, we live in Spanish and 
not in Franco-Gennan conditions, and we too need theology. How 
much? More, I would say, than we are getting.35 
Louis Jacobs finds it perfectly understandable when "secular Jewish nationalists" declare 
theology to be "un-Jewish", since their interest is in Jewish culture and ethics (so that 
objection is made to the theos rather than to the logos of theology), but finds it "extremely 
puzzling" when some Jewish religious teachers reject the logos of theology. 
Some of these first say that Judaism has no theology and then proceed 
to state in detail what it is that Judaism would have Jews believe-
generally, the acceptance as infallible truth of every traditional view. 
Perhaps a good case can be made out for reliance on tradition or 
experience rather than on reason for the basic issues of belief in God, 
but if such a position is argued for, it is theology that is being done.36 
If, on the other hand, the rejection of the notion of Jewish theology is merely the assertion 
that medieval Jewish thinkers were overly influenced by Greek thought, this might be 
conceded, and Heschel would have had a great deal of sympathy with such an assertion. 37 
35 Himmelfarb (Ed.), The Condition of Jewish Belief, p.6. . 
36 Jacobs, The Jewish Religion, p.550. Jacobs makes broad generalisations, not specifying whom he has In 
mind. 
37 See below, pp.165-173: "The Divine Pathos". See Heschel, "The ~eaning of Observance", p.94. and 
Heschel, The Prophets, II, passim. See also Kellner. Must a Jew Belreve Anything?, p.21 f. 
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Heschel blames Spinoza (1632-1677) ("in his emort to d· d·t J d· ") c: . h lscre I u alsm lor creatmg t e 
climate of opinion that made it possible to claim that "Judaism has no theology". He 
claims that Spinoza advanced the thesis that the Bible "had nothing to say to the 
intellect."38 But it is Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86) who is credited with the assertion that 
"Judaism has no dogma",39 the logic being that since theology is concerned with dogma, a 
religion without dogma is de facto a religion without theology. Mendelssohn was a 
pioneer in the Jewish effort to come to terms with modernity, attempting to combine 
enlightenment philosophy with traditional JUdaism, observance of the Jewish law with 
participation in European culture, and loyalty to the Jewish community with political 
emancipation.4o 
38 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.217. 
39 Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or On ReligiOUS Power and Judaism, (Tr. Allan Arkush), University 
Press of New England, Hanover, 1983, p.97: "Judaism boasts of no exclusive revelation of eternal truths that 
are indispensable to salvation, of no revealed religion in the sense in which that term is usually understood." 
See Allan Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment, State University of New York Press, Albany, 
1994,p.187. 
40 Moses Mendelssohn is often called "the father of the Haskalah", the Jewish enlightenment. Having 
received a thorough grounding in Bible, Talmud and the Codes of Law, he accompanied his teacher to 
Berlin in 1743, acquired a comprehensive knowledge of German culture, and became a leading figure among 
the intelligensia. Phaedon (1767) is a philosophical exposition, in universalistic terms, of the immortality of 
the soul, a concept which, like Kant, he believed to be based, not on dogma, but on reason. Together with 
other Maskilim (proponents of the Haskalah) he produced a commentary on the Pentateuch (the Biur, 
published in the early 1780s) in a modem idiom, interpreting scripture in its plain meaning, with a German 
translation. Jerusalem (1783) explains Judaism as a religion of reason, placing it far above Christianity in 
this aspect. According to his exponents, Mendelssohn undertood Judaism to be "revealed law", i.e. the 
practices required by revelation are what are significant for Judaism, the question of belief being largely left 
open. However, as his critics have noted, belief in a revealed law is itself a dogma. Mendelssohn's was the 
pioneering attempt to find a balance for the modem Jew between strong Jewish commitment and the 
accommodation necessary in order to be at home in Western culture. His detractors viewed his approach as 
dangerous to Judaism. See Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1973; Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment; David Sorkin, "The Case 
for Compassion: Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment" Modern Judaism, Vol.l4, :\0.2, 
1994, pp.121-138. 
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Emancipation confronted Jews with a radically secular understanding of reason in tenns of 
rationalism-the view that reason is the ultimate foundation of knowledge, and that faith 
and reason are antithetical. Mendelssohn maintained that ethical judgements can be 
perceived by reason, with geometric exactitude and certainty (cf Spinoza), and that, 
therefore, Judaism should be understood not as a system of ethical prescriptions but of 
legal commandments. He argued therefore that a Jew could be fully modern in thought and 
style but live as God's revelation required-and since every rational person had the 
capacity to participate in society as an equal, so did Jews.41 The "compartmentalisation" of 
the self required to do this was not acceptable to many: Steinheim characterises 
Mendelssohn's view as "one which leaves Judaism only a wig and a beard".42 Heschel 
calls it "religious behaviourism".43 
Everywhere Jews had lived under special, restrictive laws, until the American and French 
Revolutions in the late eighteenth century. Emancipation happened in the United States as 
a matter of course, whereas in France the "Jewish question" was debated for decades 
before the Revolution, when the demand for equality for all citizens under the law could no 
longer be resisted. And in the new French state emancipation was clearly dependent upon 
assimilation.44 
41 Eugene Borowitz, "Reason" in Cohen & Mendes-Flohr (Eds.), Contemporary Jewish Religious Thought. 
p.750. 
42 Quoted in Nathan Rotenstreich, Essays in Jewish Philosophy in the Modern Era, (Ed. Reinier Munk), 1. C. 
Gieben, Amsterdam, 1996, p.32. Kellner (Must a Jew Believe Anything?, p.46) says "its detractors" call 
Judaism understood simply as a system of obervances, "a religion of pots and pans". 
43 Heschel, God in Search, p.322ff. 
44 For the impact of emancipation and the enlightenment on European Judaism, see Arkush, Moses 
Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment; and Sorkin, "The Case for Compassion: Moses Mendelssohn and the 
Religious Enlightenment". Leopold Zunz the historian remarked that the Jewish Middle Ages dId not come 
to an end until the French Revolution. See Jacobs, Jewish Religion, p.223. 
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For Jews themselves, emancipation raised fundamental questions of self-understanding, as 
was shown in the controversy at the foundation of the Batavian republic in the 1770s. The 
conservative Jews desired only broader economic rights, and were willing to forgo the full 
rights of citizenship so long as they could retain the lesser right to govern their own 
communities in their own way. The liberals on the other hand wanted to become full , , 
citizens of Jewish faith, and they won the day. However, this internal Jewish struggle was 
secondary to the rising tide of opinion that discrimination against any class of citizen was 
contrary to the law of progress, and that no modern state should continue to impose 
medieval laws of exclusion on any minority. Thus during the nineteenth century 
emancipation was achieved everywhere in Europe-except in the Russian Empire, where 
Jews were not given full civil rights until the Revolution of 1917. 
Emancipation led to far-reaching changes in Jewish social and religious life, with the 
challenge of living in two worlds. Without the external pressures that had unified the 
Jewish community, secularisation and assimilation led to a significant number of Jews 
converting to Christianity, though not so much out of religious conviction as out of a desire 
to be part of the majority community. Reform Judaism arose to offer an alternative to Jews 
who found traditional Judaism incompatible with modernity; it saw in emancipation and 
liberalism signs of the messianic age. On the other hand, modern Orthodoxy45 defended 
the principle that traditional orthodoxy was entirely compatible with the exercise of full 
citizenship, and many Jews tried to maintain a distinction between belonging to the state 
and the "four cubits" of their existence-the kind of "compartmentalisation" proposed by 
45 The term "Orthodox Judaism" dates from this time, as a means of distinction from Reform Judaism. 
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Mendelssohn.46 Thus the traditional Jewish nonn was not as unambiguous as it had 
seemed to be. Rotenstreich comments: 
Here one can rightly note that not only do individual Jewish 
philosophical and theological systems have their basic motivation in 
this problematic political and historical situation but also trends of a 
communal character, e.g., the Jewish Refonn Movement, or the 
emergence of the Conservative Movement, are ultimately a product of 
this problematic situation and the atmosphere which surrounds it. 47 
Mendelssohn was anxIOUS to separate the propositions he considered to have been 
established by reason, from those that were grounded in revelation and tradition. He 
wanted to be able to draw a line between the binding laws of the state to which Jews were 
entitled to belong, and the Jewish legal system which he maintained was of a different 
order (being divinely ordained) from, though not in conflict with, the laws of the state 
(which are founded on a human covenant). His well-known statement has haunted the 
Jewish theological enterprise ever since: 
I believe that Judaism knows of no revealed religion in the sense in 
which Christians understand this tenn. The Israelites possess a divine 
legislation-laws, commandments, ordinances, rules of conduct, 
instruction in the will of God as to how they should conduct 
themselves in order to attain temporal and eternal felicity. 
Propositions of this kind were revealed to them by Moses in a 
miraculous and supernatural manner, but no doctrinal opinions, no 
saving truths, no universal propositions of reason. These the Eternal 
reveals to us and to all other men, at all times, through nature and 
things, but never through word and script.48 
46 As late as the mid-nineteenth century Judah Laib Gordon, a Russian Maskil, proclaimed as the Haskalah 
ideal, "Be a Jew in your home and a man outside it". Around the same time Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-
88) founded a neo-Orthodox community, open to general culture and strict in observance. He commented 
that it would have been better for the Jews not to have been emancipated if assimilation was the price they 
had to pay. See Jacobs, Jewish Religion, pp.223-6, 242-4, 370-2 
47 Rotenstreich, Essays in Jewish Philosophy, p.36. 
48 Mendelsohn, Jerusalem, pp.89f. 
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It was Solomon Schechter (1847-1915), in discussing Mendelssohn's argument, who 
coined the expression "the dogma of dogmalessness" in his essay "The Dogmas of 
Judaism".49 In speculating as to why the subject which "occupied the thoughts of the 
greatest and noblest Jewish minds for so many centuries" should have been long neglected, 
he points in the first place to Mendelssohn's assertion, which, he says, "has been accepted 
by the majority of modem Jewish theologians as the only dogma Judaism possesses".50 
Schechter also discusses other reasons for the neglect of theology in Judaism: that whereas 
"religious speculation" was once the favourite study of Jewish scholars, now it was history 
and philology; that historians tend to be hostile to "mere theological speculation", and 
suspect the theologian of shaping the universe after his system; that the historian detests 
the odium theologicum which has caused much misfortune; and that "the superficial, 
rationalistic way in which the theologian manages to explain everything which does not 
suit his system is most repulsive to the critical spirit". However, Schechter also regrets the 
neglect of theology, which "has caused much confusion", and has left Judaism "in danger 
of falling into gross materialism", since "we seek the foundation of Judaism in political 
economy, in hygiene, in everything except religion".51 Jacob Neusner caricatures the 
contemporary situation in the Heschel memorial issue of the Jesuit publication America: 
49 Solomon Schechter, Studies in Judaism, Meridian Books, World Publishing Company, Cleveland and 
New York, and the Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1958, p.74. 
50 Ibid., p.73. 
51 Ibid., p.75. 
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To the Jews "theology" is defined in the narrowest way, as "proofs for 
the existence of God" or, at most, discussion of the nature of God. For 
the many, larger religious questions subsumed, for Christians, under 
"theology", the Jews have different words. They speak of "Jewish 
thought" or "philosophy of Judaism", and very commonly of 
"ideology"-all of them highly secular words. Heschel insisted on 
calling his work theology and bravely did so in the midst of secular 
and highly positivistic scholars, who measured the world in terms of 
philological learning and thought of theology as something you do on 
Purim, when you're drunk. It is somehow not Torah-only philology 
and other safe, antiseptic subjects are Torah.52 
Jewish Theology and Christian Theology 
If Jewish theology is a discipline with a continuous history (if a discontinuous tradition), 
how then does it differ from Christian Theology, other than in subject matter-much of 
which is, if not identical, at least closely related? The Rabbis of the classical period 
patently did consider questions that were recognisably theological -the nature and person 
of God, revelation, the relation of God and history, evil and freedom, redemption and 
eschatology-but did not regard the acceptance of "right doctrine" as necessary for a "right 
relationship" with God. 
Kellner points out that in "a religion" (he means Christianity) that teaches that salvation 
depends on right thinking-the intellectual assent to a list of propositions-it is essential to 
know what the required beliefs are and what their status is. But "given that classical 
Judaism ... sees personal ... fulfilment as growing out of a life rightly lived as opposed to 
one rightly thought", it is not surprising that Judaism did not express itself as dogma. 53 
52 Neusner, "Faith in the Crucible of the Mind", p.207. 
53 Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything?, p.24. 
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The Rabbis, then, regarded theology as secondary to the elaboration of Halacha, and at the 
same time distinguished their theological method so radically from that of the Western 
Christian tradition (which was more aware of its Greek rather than its Hebrew roots) that 
the latter might not recognise the former as theology at all. 
Rabbinic theology might well be a unique genre that depends upon a 
different canon of evidence, even an original logic, surely a different 
arrangement of speculative priorities than was common among Greeks 
and their Christian legatees. It remains an ongoing predicament of 
historical interpretation whether to regard Agada as the literary form 
par excellence of classical Jewish theology. Clearly the Agada is the 
authentic mode of Jewish theologizing, but whether it yields an 
internally coherent theology is debatable.54 
For the Rabbis of the classical period the need for any theological clarification of belief 
hardly existed. The prevenience, presence and providence of God were the presuppositions 
out of which they lived, in a complex, interrelated structure of acts, beliefs, gestures and 
words. "It matters less that such a Jew understands the God who lies behind the law; rather 
more important is that the logic and implication of the law be explicit and clear."55 
Therefore theology came to the fore only when the bond between practice/obedience and 
the supposed divine justification for it was eroded, as happened when Christianity was 
formulated in the early centuries of the present era. The rabbis were all born into Judaism, 
but the overwhelming majority of Christian thinkers were converts, and were of necessity 
theologians, each "squaring [in] some way or another his former assumptions as a pagan 
thinker with his 'new birth' as a Christian".56 Therefore, if the Christian theological 
problem is about "becoming" (i.e. conversion, new birth; how does one become a 
54 Cohen, "Theology", p.972. 
55 Ibid, p.973. 
56 Monford Harris, "Interim Theology", Judaism. Vol.7, No.4, Fall 1958, p.304. 
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Christian?), Jewish theology is about recall, returning, being. Jewish theology, therefore, 
is not Christian theology without Jesus, but is fundamentally different because it speaks of 
a different kind of existence. 57 
Samuel Goldman describes Christianity as "an ethereal religion", since he understands it to 
be "a system of dogmas and ideals not rooted in the soil, blood, life-experience or memory 
of any particular people". Judaism, by contrast, is so rooted. Whilst agreeing with 
Schechter on the status of Mendelssohn's statement as to the dogmalessness of Judaism, 
Goldman went further in asserting that the dogmas of Judaism "were always intuitive, 
emotional, personal ... They were seldom vested with the proud, brilliant trappings of 
positive, authoritative, unalterable dogmas".58 
Kaufman Kohler distinguishes three specific points at which Jewish theology differs 
radically from Christian theology: Christian theology deals with articles of faith 
formulated as conditions of salvation, the blind acceptance of which is required, whereas 
Judaism's articles of faith are those adopted as expressions of religious consciousness; 
Christian theology depends on a creed, whereas Judaism has no such formula of 
confession; and the Christian, by disbelieving, can extricate the self from the Church, 
whereas the Jew is born a Jew, and cannot extricate the self, remaining at the very least "an 
apostate Jew".59 
57 Harris, "Interim Theology", p.304. 
58 Goldman, Crisis and Decision, p.81 f. 
59 Kaufman Kohler, Jewish Theology Systematically and Historically Considered, Ktav, New York, 1968, 
p.5f. See also Arthur A Cohen, The Tremendum: A Theological Interpretation of the Holocaust, Crossroads, 
New York, 1981, p.63: "The Christian begins and the Jew is born." 
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Although only the most conservative of evangelical Christian theologians would recognise 
themselves in Kohler's characterisation of Christian theology, his overdrawn distinction 
does help clarify the distinctive nature and task of Jewish theology. However, the 
historical and theological certainties on which he based his work are simply no longer 
available. Historical research has led to confused judgements about progressive 
development that once seemed clear and straightforward; contemporary philosophy does 
not provide a single, widely-accepted standard of truth; and the faith and practice of 
modem Jews is so diverse that they cannot provide an unambiguous basis for Jewish 
theology. "With history unclear, philosophy uncertain, and Judaism in men's lives so 
unsure of itself, Kohler's project [i.e. a presentation of Jewish belief in terms of its content 
and historical development] is today unthinkable."60 
Jacob Neusner argues that the statement "Judaism has no theology" can be taken to mean 
that the plurality of Jewish belief and interpretation over the centuries does not allow for 
the formulation of one, specific Jewish theology-as it were, the Jewish theology. 
However, he insists that every formulation of Jewish theology, "whether in the rational, or 
the mystical, or the legal modes of expression" must address at least three central issues 
(which he calls the "structures", or building blocks of Jewish thinking), i.e. the nature of 
God, the character of Torah, and the meaning of the life and history of Israe1.61 
60 Borowitz, A New Jewish Theology in the Making, p.218. 
61 Neusner (Ed.), Understanding Jewish Theology, p. 1. See also Jacob Neusner, Death and Birth of 
Judaism: The Impact of Christianity. Secularism and the Holocaust on Jewish Faith, Scholars Press, Atlanta, 
1992 and Judaism Transcends Catastrophe: God. Torah and Israel beyond the Holocaust, Vols.I-4, Mercer , 
University Press, Macon GA, 1994-6. 
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However, by contrast, Byron Sherwin uses a different metaphor-that of the meal-which 
may be the more appropriate metaphor, since edifices imply a degree of permanence not 
applicable to the table. There are, nevertheless, boundaries: 
Certain ideas, certain world-views, cannot legitimately appear on the 
menu of Jewish theology. Jewish theology embraces a broad but 
finite range. .. In order for a meal to be complete, certain courses 
must be eaten ... no theology of Judaism can be considered complete 
without the incorporation of certain ideas such as God, revelation, 
messiah, providence, afterlife, and so forth. 
As each person invited to partake of the offerings of an immense 
smorgasbord would emerge with a plate of food configured differently 
than another person, so each Jewish theologian would find his or her 
formulation of a theology of Judaism different from that of his or her 
fellow. .. Each Jewish theologian is free to compose a Jewish 
theology but no Jewish theologian can offer the Jewish theology.62 
So, Sherwin suggests, to be authentic a theology of Judaism must reflect both the resources 
of a shared tradition and the particularity of each theologian, and be expressed in its own 
categories. 
Samuel S. Cohen maintains: "Attempts to cram Judaism into categories derived from other 
religions and theologies can only lead to grotesque results."63 Characteristics of the 
Western philosophical tradition that have been assimilated by attempts to formulate a 
theology of Judaism are: the demand for a systematic formulation of ideas; the expectation 
that religious truth must be reconciled with philosophical truth; and the rational 
demonstration of theological assertions ("natural theology"). Yet since neither biblical nor 
Rabbinic literature considered such a systematic formulation of ideas to be necessary or 
62 Byron L. Sherwin, "The Incessantly Gushing Fountain: The Nature of Jewish Theology", in Cohn-
Sherbok (Ed.), Problems in Contemporary Jewish Theology, p.51. 
63 Cohon, Jewish Theology: Historical and Systematic, p.43. 
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desirable, "any attempt at an orderly and complete system of Rabbinic theology is an 
impossible task".64 Systematisation, then, might offer structure and shape to a theology, 
but not necessarily validity. Any expectation that a theology should demonstrate internal 
logical consistency would rule out of court the approach of classical Jewish thought that 
articulates ideas in terms of "the contradictory, the paradoxical, and the unresolved 
mystery".65 Indeed, as Heschel observes, the categories and presuppositions that make up 
the world-view of Judaism are so radically different from those of Western philosophy that 
any attempt to reconcile them must result in the distortion of one or other or both.66 
Schechter's maxim that the best theology is that which is not consistent67 serves as a 
warning against offering simple solutions to profound problems. However: 
If [Schechter's maxim] is taken as justifying loose and woolly 
thinking in the area of religion it can easily lead to a glorification of 
the absurd and to a tacit admission that religion has nothing to do with 
truth. Holy nonsense is still nonsense. Even if the religious believer 
is ready to admit-as he must-that there are limits to human 
reasoning about the divine he must be capable of defending his 
position as a reasonable one and he must try to sketch the boundaries 
of his reasoning ifhe is to remain intelligible. A theology of silence is 
also a theology.68 
64 Solomon Schechter, Aspects oj Rabbinic Theology, Schocken Books, New York, 1961, p.16. 
65 Heschel, Insecurity, p.136. 
66 Heschel, God in Search oj Man, p.14f. 
67 Schechter, Studies in Judaism, YoU, p.23!. 
68 Louis Jacobs, A Jewish Theology, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1973, p.5. 
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Thus theology need not be systematic; what matters is that it should "leave open to sacred 
history the possibility of new creation and new revelation". And this is itself a 
consequence of theology: "Since the God of theology is the God of revealed history, there 
can be no final determinations ... "69 Emil Fackenheim notes that Heschel's dictum , 
"Pluralism is the will of God",70 makes sense when modem theology discovers that it can 
no longer say honestly, "this is God's way", but at most say only, "I am committed to this, 
as being God's way".?! 
Theology after the Holocaust 
Jewish history (to take but one example) can be studied in a completely detached frame of 
mind. Indeed the historian of Jewish ideas, people or institutions need not be a Jew, and 
"some of the best work in the discovery of what the Jewish past was really like has been 
done by non-Jews". 72 Indeed, according to certain traditional models of history, 
detachment-lack of personal involvement-would be regarded as a positive attribute in 
such a study, enhancing objectivity. Similarly, philosophy of religion, whilst dealing with 
the same subject matter as theology, submits the beliefs and practices to an impartial 
investigation, without any foregone conclusions, "its main object being to ascertain how 
far the universal laws of human reason agree or disagree with the assertions of faith".?3 
69 Cohen, The Natural and Supernatural JeH', p.305. 
70 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", in Kasimow & Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.14: "In 
this aeon diversity of religions is the will of God." 
7! Emil Fackenheim, What is Judaism?, Summit Books, New York, 1987, p.248. 
72 Jacobs, A Jewish Theology, p.l. 
73 Kohler, Jewish Theology Systematically and Historically Considered, p.2. Kohler asserted that a 
specifically Jewish philosophy of religion has no more right to exist than has Jewish mathematics. 
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However, if Jewish theology is to provide the means by which the Jew can comprehend his 
own religious truths in the light of modem thought, then commitment is a prerequisite to 
the study of theology. 
Robert Seltzer speculates as to why theology has become "a conspICUOUS and self-
conscious concern" among American Jews in the past fifty years. He identifies several 
historical factors: the need to raise awareness of a specifically Jewish way of living among 
those who have lost touch with their roots; the greater recognition of Judaism in America, 
and the wider participation of Jewish thinkers in social concern and in interreligious 
dialogue; contemporary academic philosophy is not so amenable to correlation with 
religion as was 19th century idealism; and liberal religious thought has been criticised as 
inadequate, so that "theology has been ... a symbolic term for sweeping away the previous 
identification of modem Judaism with rationalism",74 Yet Seltzer himself ignores the 
historical factor that has dominated much Jewish thinking in the past fifty years and which 
again raises the question of the possibility of Jewish theology by asking: Can there be 
theology after Auschwitz? Some post-war Jewish theologians saw the Holocaust as "an 
historical ovum from which we may derive moral imperatives and messianic hopes but 
hardly theological c1arity";75 others saw it as such a great mystery that no theology could 
speak to it, and the only possible response is silence. There is a story that Elie Wiesel 
asked Alfred Kazin, a literary critic, "Is there an explanation for the Holocaust?" Kazin 
74 Robert M.Seltzer, Jewish People. Jewish Thought: the Jewish Experience in History, Macmillan, t\ew 
York, 1980, p.759f. 
75 Cohen, "Theology", p.976. 
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replied, "I hope not. "76 If there is to be any theology after Auschwitz, then it must be 
prepared to deal with the question of what is known now of the creator God in \\'hose 
creation such horror is permitted, i.e. the vexed question of theodicy. The classical reply is 
that nothing can be asked about God's nature and that we are obliged only to serve him, 
which prompts the question: Why, after Auschwitz, go on serving such a God? A 
generation ago such questions led some theologians to assert, "God is dead", which, as 
Richard Rubenstein points out, actually reveals a good deal about the theologian whilst 
saying nothing about God: 
The statement "God is dead" is only significant in what it reveals about 
its maker. .. I should like to suggest that, since this information has 
strictly phenomenological import, we ought to formulate it from the 
viewpoint of the observer. It is more precise to assert that we live ill the 
time of the death of God than to declare "God is dead". The death of God 
is a cultural fact. .. Though theology purports to make statements about 
God, its significance rests on what it reveals about the theologian and his 
culture. All theologies are inherently SUbjective. They are statements 
about the way in which the theologian experiences his world,?7 
The way Heschel experienced his world included witnessing at first hand the Nazi rise to 
power. He had a thorough knowledge and experience of Jewish culture and assimilation in 
Poland and Germany, and of the various attempts, religious and secular, at Jewish self-
definition. In his early years in America he was constantly aware of the ongoing 
annihilation of the Jews of Eastern Europe, including his own family, and was constantly 
reminded of his own powerlessness to affect the situation,?8 Heschel made no attempt to 
rationalise the Holocaust theologically, but instead saw the recovery of Jewish spiritual 
76 Anderson, "Coexistence With God", p.62. 
77 Richard Rubenstein, After Ausclmif:: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism (1st edition), Bobbs-
Merrill, Indianapolis, 1966, p.246. 
78 See above, p.24f. 
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vitality as the only enduring response, warning his contemporaries, "We are either the last 
Jews or those who will hand over the entire past to generations to come".79 Twenty years 
after becoming a United States citizen, he still defined himself as a survivor: 
I am a brand plucked from the fire in which my people was burned to 
death. I am a brand plucked from the fire of an altar to Satan on 
which millions of human lives were extenninated to evil's greater 
glory, and on which so much else was consumed: the divine image of 
so many human beings, many people's faith in the God of justice and 
compassion, and much of the secret and power of attachment to the 
Bible bred and cherished in the hearts of man for nearly two thousand 
years. 80 
Having recognised that he could have an impact only through his writings, he did not 
publicise his personal anguish. Dresner, a student of Hesche!, was constantly with him 
during the war years: 
[R]arely did he discuss what must have grieved him most, the end of 
the thousand-year period of East European Jewry, which he called 
"The golden era of Jewish history."81 Instead of describing the 
horror-the "Holocaust"-he preferred to write about what was most 
enduring from that golden era-its beauty, its meaning, its holiness.82 
79 Heschel, Earth is the Lord's, p.l 07. See also Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.421: "What is at stake in 
our lives is more than the fate of one generation. In this moment we, the living, are Israel. The tasks begun 
by the patriarchs and prophets, and carried out by countless Jews of the past, are now entrusted to us. No 
other group has superseded them. We are the only channel of Jewish tradition, those who must save Judaism 
from oblivion, those who must hand over the entire past to the generations to come. We are either the last, 
the dying, Jews, or else we are those who will give new life to our tradition." 
80 Heschel, "No Religion Is An Island", in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.3. 
81 Dresner gives the reference as The Earth Is the Lord's, p.IO, where the expression is "the golden period 
in Jewish history". 
82 Samuel H. Dresner, "Heschel the Man", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.ll. 
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Richard Rubenstein must surely be thinking of Heschel when he expresses regret that 
"most attempts at fonnulating a Jewish theology since World War II seem to have been 
written as if two of the most decisive events of our time for Jews, the death camps and the 
birth of the State of Israel, had not taken place". 83 Yet Auschwitz is "a silent but as yet 
unnamed presence" in Heschel's writings,84 colouring his understanding of the world, 
humanity and the nature of God. Indeed, under the spell of Menachem Mendle of Kotzk, 
Heschel wonders if "distress at God's predicament may be a more powerful witness than 
tacit acceptance of evil as inevitable". 85 Yet even in this late and atypical text, Heschel 
quickly retracted his criticism of God, returning to the position adopted in his first major 
book of modem theology, Man Is Not Alone, maintaining that "the major folly of this view 
seems to lie in its shifting responsibility for man's plight from man to God, in accusing the 
Invisible though iniquity is ours".86 Heschel does not perceive of the Holocaust as unique, 
nor as God's responsibility, nor as the responsibility of the Nazis alone. He judges, rather, 
that all humankind is responsible: "a historical-and not a transcendent-process was at 
work".87 
83 Richard Rubenstein, After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism (1 st edition), Bobbs-
Merrill, Indianapolis, 1966, p.x. 
84 Braitman, (God) after Auschwitz, 1998, p.7. 
85 Heschel, Passion for Truth, p.269. 
86 Heschel, Man Is Not A lone, p.lS!. 
87 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.120. 
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Our world seems not unlike a pit of snakes. We did not sink into the 
pit in 1939, or even in 1933. We had descended into it generations 
ago, and the snakes have sent their venom into the bloodstream of 
humanity, gradually paralyzing us, numbing nerve after nerve, dulling 
our minds, darkening our vision. Good and evil, that were once as 
real as day and night, have become a blurred mist. In our everyday 
life we worshiped force, despised compassion, and obeyed no law but 
our unappeased appetite. The vision of the sacred has all but died in 
the soul of man. 88 
Heschel's mIssIon, then, was to preserve the essential principles of biblical religion, 
defying genocide and the moral callousness that pennitted it by asserting biblical values, 
including the divine image in each and every person. He defines the problem: 
How to share the certainty of Israel that the Bible contains what God 
wants us to know and to hearken to; how to attain a collective sense 
for the presence of God in the Biblical words. In this problem lies the 
dilemma of our fate, and in the answer lies the dawn or the doom. 89 
Therefore Heschel's attempts to define and respond to the spiritual consequences of the 
Holocaust-the peril of humankind's diminishing image of itself-is illustrated in a rare 
autobiographical comment when, in response to a question about the responsibilities of a 
citizen (this time during the Vietnam War), he defends his protest against government 
policies he judges immoral: 
88 Heschel, Man's Quest for God, p.149. This final chapter, "The Meaning of This Hour", is a translation of 
a speech Heschel gave to a Quaker group in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1938. 
89 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.246. He judged American Jews to be in the throes of a second 
Holocaust, suffering from what he termed "Spiritual absenteeism" (Heschel, Man 's Quest for God, p.Sl f.) 
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I am really a person who lives in anguish. I cannot forget what I have 
seen and have been through. Auschwitz and Hiroshima never leave 
my mind. Nothing can be the same after that. After all, we are 
convinced that we must take history seriously and that in history signs 
of the future are given to us. I see signs of a deterioration that has 
already begun. The war in Vietnam is a sign that we don't know how 
to live or how to respond. God is trying us very seriously. I wonder if 
we will pass the test? I am not a pessimist, because I believe that God 
loves us. But I also believe that we should not rely on God alone; we 
have to respond.9o 
How, then, is Heschel ("not a pessimist, because ... God loves us") to reconcile that belief 
with all the evidence of God's indifference?91 But Heschel is no sunny optimist either: he 
acknowledges his personal anguish, and his phenomenology requires despair as a 
prerequisite to revelation: "We must first peer into the darkness, feel strangled and 
entombed in the hopelessness of living without God, before we are ready to feel the 
presence of his living light."92 
In 1955, before "Holocaust Theology" developed into a discrete discipline, Heschel had 
suggested that there are only two possible responses to "the dreadful danger"-either 
despair or the question: "God, where art Thou? 'Where is the God of Justice?' (Malachi 
2: 17)".93 But rather than engage in the debate about God's role in the Holocaust, Heschel 
90 Granfield, Theologians at Work, 1967, p.81. 
91 E.g. "The essential predicament of man has assumed a peculiar urgency in our time, living as we ~o in a 
civilization where factories were established in order to exterminate millions of men, women, and chIldren; 
where soap was made of human flesh. What have we done to make such crimes poss~ble? What are we 
doing to make such crimes impossible?" (Heschel, God in Searc~ of Man, p.369). I~ IS now generally agreed 
that the use of corpses for soap-fats did not actually occur (see Llpstadt, Beyond Belief, p.180). 
92 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.140. 
93 Ibid., p.369. 
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places the responsibility finnly with humankind.94 However, Heschel's position is not 
fairly represented by this dichotomy: "his exposition l'S btl 
. . . more su e, more 
. t " 95 compasslOna e . . . . Heschel writes more than a kaddish for the destroyed world of 
Eastern European Judaism in The Earth is the Lord's: he issues a call to action. He recalls 
the evil that had afflicted Jews in the 17th and 18th centuries, in an echo of his 1938 
address to the Quakers of Frankfurt: 
Man's good deeds are single acts in the long drama of redemption, and 
not only the people of Israel, but the whole universe must be 
redeemed. Even the Shekhinah itself, the Divine indwelling, is in 
exile. God is involved, so to speak, in the tragic state of this world; 
the Shekhinah "lies in the dust." The feeling of the presence of the 
Shekhinah in human suffering became indelibly engraved in the 
consciousness of the East European Jews. To bring about the 
restitution of the universe was the goal of all efforts.96 
In other words, humankind is responsible for God's exile. And, as Kaplan points out, this 
is not to be understood as a metaphor of human conception, like "the eclipse of God", but 
as a theological insight from God's perspective,97 entirely in accordance with Heschel's 
principle of the pathos of God. 
94 "Does not history look like a stage for the dance of might and evil-with man's wits too fee~le. to. separate 
the two and God either directing the play or indifferent? The major folly of this view seems t? ~le ~n l~S 
shifting the responsibility of man's plight from man to God, in accusing the invisible though 11l1qUlty is o~rs. 
Rather than admit our own guilt, we seek, like Adam, to shift the blame upon someone else. For generatlOns 
we have been investing life with ugliness and now we wonder why we do not succeed." Heschel, Man Is Sot 
Alone, p.151. 
95 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.116. 
96 Heschel, The Earth Is the Lord's, p.72. 
97 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.I22. 
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Thus in Man Is Not Alone Heschel responds theologically to the Holocaust, outlining in 
Chapter 16 ("The Hiding God") a post-Holocaust theology he was never to attempt to 
elaborate. "The Hiding God" is a prose poem; "a text of depth theology evoking ineffable 
insights and refusing to devise conclusions. [It] summarizes, in miniature, a pious 
thinker's challenge to the living God-Whom, at the same time, he embraces with 
prayerful intimacy."98 Here Heschel, responding implicitly to "Death of God" theology, 
insists that it was human beings who chose to annihilate European Jewry, and that we do 
not and cannot understand the nature of God sufficiently to be able to accuse God of 
malicious neglect. Indeed, if God is to blame for anything at all, it can only be for giving 
humankind freedom. 
God is not silent. He has been silenced. .. God did not depart of His 
own volition; He was expelled. God is in exile. .. God is less rare 
than we think; when we long for Him, His distance crumbles away. 
The prophets do not speak of the hidden God but of the hiding 
God. 99 
Thus it is the absence of the "hiding God" that for Heschel points to the "meaning beyond 
the mystery": 
Our task is to open our souls to Him, to let Him again enter our deeds. 
We have been taught the grammar of contact with God; we have been 
taught by the Baal Shem that His remoteness is an illusion capable of 
being dispelled by our faith. There are many doors through which we 
have to pass in order to enter the palace, and none of them is locked .. 
As the hiding of man is known to God and seen through, so IS 
God's hiding seen through. In sensing the fact of His hiding we have 
disclosed Him. Life is a hiding place for God. Weare never asunder 
from Him who is in need of us. Nations roam and rave-but all this is 
only ruffling the deep, unnoticed and uncherished stillness. 100 
98 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.l23. For "depth theology" see below pp.157-163. 
99 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.152f. 
J 00 Ibid., p.154. 
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For Heschel, then, the only enduring answer to the Holocaust is Jewish spiritual vitality. 
This is the core message of Israel: An Echo of Eternity, which he wrote after the June 1967 
War when the State of Israel was isolated and in fear of annihilation. 
What should have been our answer to Auschwitz? Should this people, 
called to be a witness to the God of mercy and compassion, persist in 
its witness and cling to Job's words: "Even if he slay me yet will I 
trust in Him" (Job 13:15), or should this people follow the advice of 
Job's wife, "Curse God and die!" (Job 2:9), immerse itself into the 
anonymity of a hundred nations all over the world, and disappear once 
and for all? 
Our people's faith in God at this moment in history did not falter. 
At this moment in history Isaac was indeed sacrificed. We all died in 
Auschwitz, yet our faith survived. We knew that to repudiate God 
would be to continue the holocaust ... 
What would be the face of Western history today if the end of 
twentieth century Jewish life would have been Bergen-Belsen, 
Dachau, Auschwitz? The State of Israel is not an atonement. It would 
be blasphemy to regard it as a compensation. However, the existence 
of Israel reborn makes life in the West less unendurable. It is a slight 
hinderer of hindrances to believing in God. IOI 
Heschel, then, does not rationalise the Holocaust theologically: "there is no answer to 
Auschwitz." What he offers is a task: 
Even faith cannot untie the Gordian knot. Only piety can: truly 
religious action. Depth theology keeps unanswerable questions alive, 
and in such a way that our courage in the face of God's remoteness is 
strengthened. Whatever we believe, Heschel calls us to repudiate evil 
(wi thin us and outside) and to redeem the world. \02 
101 Heschel, Israel, p.IIS. 
\02 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.13l. 
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Heschel, Theology and Depth Theology 
In his attempt to articulate a specifically Jewish theology, Heschel's concern, then, is not 
with the content of believing, but with the act of believing. He draws a rather crude picture 
of Christian theology as being "essentially descriptive, normative, historical",103 
concentrating on the content and articles of faith-"the content of believing"104 or "the 
I' f f: . h" 105 . conc us IOns 0 alt. He does so, typIcally, to make a point by making a contrast, 
claiming that this kind of thinking is un-Jewish, starting as it does with dogma (i.e. "given" 
answers), and warning that it provides a platform for the fundamentalist for whom "all 
ultimate questions have been answered". 106 Instead, he sets out "to explore the depth of 
faith, the substratum out of which belief arises" by means of "depth theology". 107 
103 Heschel, God in Search of Man, pA. 
104 Ibid., p. 7, and Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.117. 
105 Heschel, "The Jewish Notion of God", p.116. 
106 Heschel, God in Search of Man, pA. 
107 Ibid., p.7. Heschel coined the term "depth theology", a designation that has been adopted by others who 
have come to rely on his theology of pathos, particularly Jiirgen Moltmann: see The Crucified God, SCM, 
London, 1974, p.270ff, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic Ecc/esiology, 
SCM, London, 1977, pp.61-65, The Future of Creation, SCM, London, 1979, p.68ff, The Trinity and the 
Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God, SCM, London, 1981, pp.25-30, The Spirit of Life: A Universal 
Affirmation, SCM, London, 1992, p.274ff. See also Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann, 
T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1995, pp.2, 66. There is clear evidence that at least the majority of Christian 
theologians who acknowledge Heschel as a source for their own work came upon him via Moltmann, 
particularly in The Crucified God. See Warren McWilliams, "Divine Suffering in Contemporary Theology", 
Scottish Journal o/Theology, Yol.33, No.1, 1980, pp.35-53, where he discusses Moltmann, James Cone, 
Kazoh Kitamori and Geddes MacGregor. See also Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, and The Turnings of Darkness and Light: Essays in Philosophical and Systematic 
Theology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp.57-90, A. T. Hanson, The Image of the 
Invisible God, SCM, London, 1982,p.136-139, Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1988, pp.21, 62, 111 f. 
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Jacob Neusner suggests that there is Jewish theology of the type Heschel characterises as 
"descriptive, nonnative, historical", and that it is of two types. The first is scholarly 
accounts of the mind of the rabbis ("a historical account of what some interesting Jews 
have thought in the past") on the assumption that their statements are statements of what a 
Jewish believer is required to affinn.l08 The second is done "primarily by people trained in 
philosophy, primarily philosophy of religion, sometimes also social thought", and consists 
in positing "a static, concrete, one-dimensional 'thing' called 'Judaism', ... [and 
producing] a set of propositions, 'Judaism and -' statements."109 Against these, he 
identifies Heschel's theological enterprise as the attempt "to create a 'natural theology' for 
Judaism"; 
... a theology which would begin where people actually are, in all 
their secularity and ignorance, and carry them forward to Sinai ... He 
did not announce "his" position. .. He did not evade the theological 
task by announcing his "definition of the God-concept", as if by 
defining matters you solve something. .. What theology did not dare 
to do was to join natural theology to Torah. This is what Heschel 
proposed to accomplish ... 110 
This "natural theology" is what Heschel calls "depth theology", in which Judaism shares 
with other religions the insights disclosed in the attempt to describe what happens in the 
inner life of the religious person in their encounter with God, in their life in the world, and 
108 See Neusner "Faith in the Crucible of the Mind", p.208, where he asserts that "this is why, in Heschel's 
days at Jewish Theological Seminary, the course in 'theology' consisted in Louis Finkelst~in 's comments on 
The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan . .. while Heschel was ... not allowed to teach hIS own theology 10 
the Rabbinical School." Also in Neusner, Israel in America, p.167. 
109 Ibid., and Neusner, Israel in America, p.161. 
lID Ibid., p.208f. 
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m their quest for meamng. Heschel believes that in describing the Jewish religious 
experience in particular, he uncovers truths about religion in general.!!! 
Heschel finds it "preposterous" that religion should be regarded as "an isolated, self-
subsisting entity, a Ding an sich". 
Religion has often suffered from the tendency to become an end in 
itself, to seclude the holy, to become parochial, self-indulgent, self-
seeking; as if the task were not to ennoble human nature, but to 
enhance the power and beauty of its institutions or to enlarge the body 
of doctrines. It has often done more to canonize prejudices than to 
wrestle for truth; to petrify the sacred than to sanctify the secular. Yet 
the task of religion is to be a challenge to the stabilization of values. I 12 
To reverse this trend, it is necessary to get beneath the surface and to delve into the depths 
of religious experience, to "rediscover the questions to which religion is an answer". I I3 
Thus "the primary issue of theology is pretheologicaf': 114 it is the whole human situation, 
the "presymbolic depth of existence", 1!5 the human being's confrontation with God, which 
cannot be adequately expounded in propositions or expressed in philosophical 
III "Theologies divide us; depth theology unites us" (Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.119). Depth 
theology is therefore Heschel's unique contribution, not only to Judaism, but to the religious world in 
general, since "the first and most importantprerequisil ofinterfaith isfaith" (Heschel, "No Religion is an 
Island", p.1 0). It is the insight that "God is greater than religion, that faith is deeper than dogma, that 
theology has its roots in depth theology" (Hesche 1, Insecurity of Freedom, p.181) that is the basis for mutual 
respect between different religions. See Emilio Baccarini, "Religious Diversity as the Will of God in the 
Thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel", Service International de Documentation Judeo-Chretienne (SIDIC), 
VoI.XXVII, No.3, 1994 (English Edition), p.ll, and Chapter 6 below, "Heschel and the Christians". 
112 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.IIS. 
113 Heschel, God in Search of Man , p.3. 
114 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.116. 
115Ibid,p.IIS. 
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d· 116" h . . h h Iscourse - t e mSlg ts t at no language can declare" 117--concerning "faith, 
inwardness, the direction of one's heart, the intimacy of religion, the dimension of 
privacy". I 18 It is "the act of believing; the questions, What happens within a person to 
bring about faith? What does it mean to believe?-all this is the concern of a special type 
of enquiry which may be called 'depth theology' ."119 
Heschel, then, understands theology and depth theology to be different ways of 
approaching "issues of religious existence", 120 theology being concerned with the content 
of believing and depth theology with the act of believing. To be concerned with the act of 
believing means that "ideas of faith must not be studied in total separation from the 
moments of faith", 121 i.e. faith is not a "datum", but an event that touches the very depth of 
a person. 122 
116 Fritz A. Rothschild, "Abraham Joshua Heschel", in Thomas E. Bird (Ed.), Modern Theologians: 
Christians and Jews, University of Notre Dame Press, Nortre Dame, Indiana, 1967, p.170. 
117 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p. 7. 
118 Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom, p.117. See also Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p.8. 
119 Ibid., p.117. 
120 Ibid.,p.1l8. 
121 Heschel, God in Search of Man , p.8. 
122 Baccarini, "Religious Diversity", p. 7. 
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Heschel compares and contrasts theology and depth theology at great length: 
Theology declares: depth theology evokes; theology demands 
believing and obedience: depth theology hopes for responding and 
appreciation. 
Theology deals with permanent facts; depth theology deals with 
moments. Dogma and ritual are permanent possessions of religion; 
moments come and go. Theology abstracts and generalizes ... 
Theology speaks for the people; depth theology speaks for the 
individual. Theology strives for communication, for universality; 
depth theology strives for insight, for uniqueness. 
Theology is like sculpture, depth theology like music. Theology is 
in the books; depth theology is in the hearts. The former is doctrine, 
the latter an event. Theologies divide us; depth theology unites us ... 
. . . the theme of theology is the content of believing; the theme of 
depth theology is the act of believing. The first we call faith, the 
second creed or dogma [sic]. Creed and faith, theology and depth 
theology depend upon each other. 123 
It is this interdependence that is summed up in Heschel' s assertion that "the primary issue 
of theology is pretheologicaf': "theology needs depth theology to supply it with the 
insights from which to yield its concepts; depth theology needs theology to provide it with 
the concepts in which to preserve its insights." 124 The task of depth theology is therefore: 
to recall the questions which religious doctrines are trying to answer, 
the antecedents of religious commitment, the presuppositions of faith .. 
. The enquiry must proceed both by delving into the consciousness of 
man and by delving into the teachings and attitudes of the religious 
tradition. 125 
123 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.118ff. N.B. In the penultimate sentence "first" and "second" are 
misapplied in the literature and should be transposed! 
124 Merkle, The Genesis of Faith, p.SO. 
125 Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.116. 
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Depth theology is thus a two-fold enquiry, both into the memory of tradition and into 
personal insight-an enquiry which Heschel himself personified as he "explored the depth 
of the Jewish tradition and wrestled with the insights that brought it forth".126 He calls for 
the sympathetic study of religion, not in the sense of sympathy for a preconceived idea, but 
sympathy for the phenomenon being studied, the principle being "to know what we see 
rather than to see what we know". 127 The detachment required for the sake of objectivity is 
the detachment from preconceived ideas, and from the desire to demonstrate the validity of 
preconceived ideas. Without such detachment there is no true analysis of the object of 
study. Yet after detached involvement has yielded its results, the meaning of the 
phenomenon cannot be understood without involvement, without coming upon insight-"a 
way of seeing the phenomenon from within".128 In other words, "To comprehend what 
phenomena are, it is important to suspend judgement and think in detachment; to 
comprehend what phenomena mean, it is necessary to suspend indifference and be 
involved."129 
This second step, "to suspend indifference and be involved", is to engage in "situational 
thinking" as opposed to "conceptual thinking". Heschel's starting point is "situational 
involvement, not only conceptual interest": 130 
126 Merkle, Genesis of Faith, p.31. 
127 Heschel, The Prophets, I, p.xi. 
128 Ibid., p.xii. (For Heschel's phenomenological approach see above, pp.lOl-llO) 
129 d . Ibi ., p.Xl. 
130 Merkle, Genesis of Faith, p.34. 
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No genuine problem comes into being out of sheer inquisitiveness. A 
problem is the outcome of a situation. It comes to pass in moments of 
being in straits, of intellectual embarrassment, in experiencing tension, 
conflict, contradiction. To understand the meaning of the problem and 
to appreciate its urgency, we must keep alive in our reflection the 
situation of stress and strain in which it came to pass, genesis and birth 
pangs, motivation, the face of perplexity, the varieties of experiencing 
it, the necessity of confronting and being preoccupied with it. 131 
Such a preoccupation is characteristically Jewish. Just as "situation thinking" focuses on 
"the human situation" and its "original problems", 1 32 rather than on concepts or speculation 
about human nature, so depth theology as a particular instance of situational thinking, 
focuses on "the religious situation" and its "ultimate questions" rather than on doctrine or 
speculation about the nature of religion. 133 Thus depth theology is "an effort at self-
clarification and self-examination".134 "Self-clarification" is the clarification of what one's 
religious tradition perceives and teaches, so that we genuinely examine our own religious 
experiences and insights in the light of that tradition: 
By self-clarification we mean the effort to remind ourselves of what 
we stand for, to analyze the experiences, insights, attitudes and 
principles of religion; to uncover its guiding features, its ultimate 
claims; to determine the meaning of its teachings; to distinguish 
between principles and opinions. 135 
131 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.l. 
132 Ibid., pp.12-14. 
133 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.130. 
134 Ibid., p.8. 
135 Ibid., p.8-9. 
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"Self-examination" means "the effort to scrutinize the authenticity of our position" so as to 
confront the human tendency to self-deceit. 136 Heschel quotes with approval a teaching of 
the hasidic rabbi Bunam of Przyscha: 
According to medieval sources, a hasid is he who does more than the 
law requires. Now, this is the law: Thou shalt not deceive thy fellow-
man (Leviticus 25: 1 7). A hasid goes beyond the law; he will not even 
deceive his own self. 13? 
136 Heschel., God in Search of Man, p.9. . . 
137 Ibid., p.ll. Heschel calls him R. Si~ah Buni~ ~fPrzysuche, m Dresner (Ed), The CIrcle of the Baal 
Shem Tov, p.163f, referring to RamataYlm Tzojim. Ehyahu Zuta. 
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PART II 
CHAPTER 4 
THE DIVINE PATHOS 
A Different Way of Thinking 
Heschel first developed his central concept of the Divine Pathos in his doctoral dissertation 
for the University of Berlin.! There he distinguishes between the biblical "God of Pathos" 
and the Hellenistic "Absolute", and between the human responses to these in terms of the 
"religion of sympathy" and the "religion of apathy", found in Hebrew and Greek thought 
respectively. He asserts that the biblical view of God has been distorted both in Jewish and 
in Christian traditional theology by interpreting God in the categories of Greek philosophy, 
thereby isolating God from humankind and from the world. Heschel's concept of the 
Divine Pathos therefore depends upon a contrast being established between "Hebrew" and 
"Greek" thought. 
When Heschel introduced the translated and expanded version of his seminal work on the 
prophets to an English-speaking readership in 1962, he explained how the understanding of 
philosophy which dominated the University of Berlin had driven him, thirty years earlier, 
to study the biblical prophets: 
I A. 1. Heschel, Die Prophetie, Polish Academy of Sciences, Cracow, 1936. Much of Die Prophetie was 
reworked and translated, with additional material, and published in two volumes as The Prophets in 1962. 
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In the academic environment In which I spent my student years 
philosophy had become an isolated, self-subsisting, self-indulgent 
entity, a Ding an sich, encouraging suspicion instead of love of 
wisdom. The answers offered were unrelated to the problems, 
indifferent to the travail of a person who became aware of man's 
suspended sensitivity in the face of stupendous challenge, indifferent 
to a situation in which good and evil became irrelevant, in which man 
became increasingly callous to catastrophe and ready to suspend the 
principle of truth. I was slowly led to the realization that some of the 
terms, motivations and concerns which dominate our thinking may 
prove destructive of the roots of human responsibility and treasonable 
to the ultimate ground of human solidarity. The challenge we are all 
exposed to, and the dreadful shame that shatters our capacity for inner 
peace, defy the ways and patterns of our thinking. One is forced to 
admit that some of the causes and motives of our thinking have led 
our existence astray, that speculative prosperity is no answer to 
spiritual bankruptcy. It was the realisation that the right coins were 
not available in the common currency that drove me to study the 
thought of the prophets. 
Every mind operates with presuppositions or premises as well as 
within a particular way of thinking. In the face of the tragic failure of 
the modem mind, incapable of preventing its own destruction, it 
became clear to me that the most important philosophical problem of 
the twentieth century was to find a new set of presuppositions or 
premises, a different way of thinking. 2 
This "different way of thinking" became Heschel's "major effort", as he was to explain to 
a group of Jewish educators towards the end of his life: 
Weare essentially trained in a non-Jewish world. .. Weare inclined 
to think in non-Jewish terms ... I am not discouraging exposure to the 
non-Jewish world. I am merely indicating that it is not Biblical 
thinking. It is not Rabbinic thinking. It is not Hassidic thinking. It is 
non-Jewish thinking. A non-Jewish philosophy is fine. But we would 
also like to have in our thinking a Jewish view of things ... 
2 Heschel, The Prophets, I, p.xivf. 
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If you take Biblical passages, or Biblical documents or Rabbinic 
statements, and submit them to a Greek mind, they often are absurd. 
They make no sense. But we do want to educate Jews. We wish to 
maintain Judaism. What can we do about it? May I say to you 
personally that this has been my major challenge, ever since I have 
begun working on my dissertation, that is: How to think in a Jewish 
way of thinking? This was the major concern and the major thesis of 
my dissertation Die Prophetie. Since that day I consider this to be my 
major effort. It is not an easy enterprise.3 
Amongst Heschel's contemporaries in Christian theology there was a habit of contrasting 
Greek and Hebrew modes of thought,4 a rather extreme statement of the contrast being that 
of Norman Snaith who claimed that "the distinctive ideas of Old Testament Religion ... 
are different from the ideas of any other religion whatever. In particular they are quite 
distinct from the ideas of the Greek thinker".5 This emphasis on a distinction between 
Greek and Hebrew ways of thinking is based on the belief that traditional Christian thought 
has been the mistaken attempt to bring about a synthesis between "Jerusalem" and 
"Athens" as the twin roots of modem Western civilisation, and that the solution to the 
problems of modem Christian thinking lies in a successful separation of the two.6 
The contrast between Greek and Hebrew thought is commonly presented as a series of 
simple distinctions: 
3 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "Teaching Jewish Theology in the Solomon Schecter Day School", The 
Synagogue School, Vo1.28, Fall 1969, p. 7 . 
.j James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p.20. 
5 Nonnan H. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, Epworth, London, 19"+"+. p.9. 
6 Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, p.20 
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The Greek mind is abstract, contemplative, static or harmonic, 
impersonal: it is dominated by certain distinctions-matter and form, 
one and many, individual and collective, time and timelessness, 
appearance and reality. 
The Hebrew mind is active, concrete, dynamic, intensely personal, 
formed upon wholeness and not upon distinctions. Thus it is able to 
rise above or to escape the great distinctions which lie across Greek 
thought. 
Greek thought is unhistorical, timeless, based on logic and system. 
Hebrew thought is historical, centred in time and movement, based in 
life. 7 
James Barr claims that whilst this contrast may have afunction in modern theology, it is 
not a true description of the ancient world of thought. Its function is to assist in the 
analysis of different elements within modem culture-"a kind of cultural map to guide [the 
student] in the modem world".8 The actual outcome, however, is that "almost all 
academic communities presuppose that the Greeks and the Romans have an exclusive 
monopoly on the intellectual-cultural life of the university".9 Yet only a century earlier, 
Matthew Arnold had argued the exact opposite: "the nations of the modem world ... are 
inevitably prone to take Hebraism as the law of human development".lo Indeed, he 
claimed, "Hebraism rules the world".!! Thus Barr criticises the supposed contrast between 
Greek and Hebrew ways of thinking as being "over-historical to a point where it becomes 
unhistorical, ... seeing the ancient cultures not as they were ... but as their influence feeds 
into more modem streams".!2 What is usually presented as "Greek thought" makes the 
Greeks into "a people of fourth-rate Platonists, whilst the over-emphasis of the contrast 
also tries to assimilate Hebrew thought into a "philosophical type".!3 
7 James Barr, Old and New in Interpretation, SCM, London, 1966, p.34. 
8 Ibid., p.35. 
9 H. R. Harcourt, "The Hebraic Void in the University", Theology Today, Vol.XX, 1963, p.136. 
10 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p.l38. 
II Ibid., p.136. 
12 Barr, Old and New in Interpretation, p.37f. 
13 Ibid., p.39. 
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Heschel is an exponent of what Barr identifies as the function of the Greek-Hebrew 
contrast in theology, typically over-emphasising the contrast in order the more clearly to 
distinguish Biblical thinking from the world views into which it has been assimilated. He 
himself traces the Hellenisation of Jewish theology back to Philo: 
To oversimplify the matter: this approach would have Plato and 
Moses, for example, say the same thing. Only, Plato would say it in 
Greek and Moses in Hebrew. Consequently, you can say that Moses 
was a sort of Hebrew Plato. This view has had a great impact on 
much of Jewish medieval philosophy. They talk about God in the 
language of the Greeks. 14 
Heschel asserts that this theological endeavour (to show how Biblical thought is identical 
with current philosophical fashion) rests on a fundamental mistake, since Biblical thought 
is radically different from "the Greek-German way of thinking".15 For example, the 
Aristotelian God is "thought thinking itself', whereas the God of the prophets is 
characterised by transitive concern about humanity. The ideal of the philosophers was to 
be "like God-sterile, static thought", whereas the ideal for biblical man is to be "like 
God-active, dynamic concern for the human condition".16 Since classical theological 
speCUlation, despite its great intellectual contribution, fails in Heschel's estimate to 
understand Biblical thought and imposes on it a foreign system of categories, much of 
14 Heschel, "Jewish Theology", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.155-
156. 
15 Heschel, "The Meaning of Observance", in Neusner (Ed.), Understanding Jewish Theology, p.94. 
16 Sherwin, Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.14. See also Byron L. Sherwin, "Journey ofa Soul: Abraham 
Joshua Heschel's Quest for Self-Understanding", Religion in Life, Vol.45, Autumn 197?, p.274, where 
Sherwin cites Heschel, The Prophets, Chapters 12 - 16, 18 (i.e. Vol.lI, Chapters 1-5,7 In the two volume 
Harper Torchbook edition of 1971). 
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Western theology is a mishmash. Heschel insists that, rather than impose external 
categories on the sources of religious speCUlation, theology must understand those sources 
on their own tenns-"in tenns of their intrinsic categories, in terms of their own spirit"Y' 
According to Barr, two circumstances led to this emphasis on the contrast between Greek 
and Hebrew patterns of thought: the analytical approach of literary criticism has tended to 
fragmentise the biblical traditions, so that the Greek-Hebrew contrast emphasises "the 
critic's ... failure to escape from modem European categories and to perceive the unitary 
though paradoxical Hebrew mind"; and, secondly, there has been a reaction against 
"Hellenistic" interpretation, specifically of the New Testament, with its emphasis on the 
Greek environment and language, and the influence of the mystery religions on the Gentile 
Church, Greek philosophy and Hellenised Judaism. 18 Heschel agrees: not only is he 
critical of his teachers whom he found to be "prisoners of a Greek-German way of 
thinking",19 but he also, perhaps surprisingly, points to the problem of the interpretation of 
the New Testament in the Gentile Church.2o Indeed, Heschel makes extensive use of the 
contrast between Greek and Hebrew modes of thought, and not only does his version 
answer at least some of Barr's criticisms, but the contrast is essential to the central motif of 
his theology-the Divine Pathos-with its implications for traditional theology's concept 
17 Sherwin, Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.l5. 
18 Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, p.9. 
19 Heschel, "The Meaning of Observance", p.94. 
20 See Abraham Joshua Heschel, "Protestant Renewal: A Jewish View", in Heschel, The Insecurity of 
Freedom, p.168ff, where Heschel comments on the "the situation resulting from the converge~ce o~ two 
trends: the age-old process of dejudaization of Christianity, and the modern process ~f desa~ctIficatlOn of the 
Hebrew Bible": "The vital issue for the church is to decide whether to look for roots m Judaism and conSider 
itself an extension of Judaism or to look for roots in pagan Hellenism and consider itself as an antithesis to 
Judaism. '" [T]he powerful fascination with the world of Hellenism has led many minds to look for origins 
of the Christian message in the world derived from Hellas. How odd of God not to have placed the cradle of 
Jesus in Delphi, or at least in Athens!" 
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of the impassibility of God. The contrast is therefore also essential to his theological 
anthropology. For Heschel, the significance of the Greek-Hebrew contrast arises from his 
experience as a student arriving in Berlin from the world of Eastern European Judaism: 
I had come with a sense of anxiety: how can I rationally find a way 
where ultimate meaning lies, a way of living where one could never 
miss a reference to supreme significance? Why am I here at all, and 
what is my purpose? . . . But to my teachers that was a question 
unworthy of philosophical analysis. 
I realised: my teachers were prisoners of a Greek-German way of 
thinking. They were fettered in categories which presupposed certain 
metaphysical assumptions which could never be proved ... 
To them, religion was a feeling. To me, religion included the 
insights of the Torah which is a vision of man from the point of view 
of God. They spoke of God from the point of view of man. They 
granted him the status of being a logical possibility ... 21 
Thus Heschel comes upon the distinction between Greek thought and Hebrew thought 
through what he believes to be an innate human question, "the most crying, urgent 
question: What is the secret of existence? Wherefore and for whose sake do we live?"22 
He attacks the "Greek-German way of thinking" for its wide-sweeping emphasis on the 
power and ability of human reason,23 and its analytic approach to the questions of 
humanity and God, which resulted in the dehumanisation of humanity and the 
depersonalisation of God. He sees this attitude stemming from ancient Greek speculative 
philosophy, re-emerging at the Enlightenment to inform modem analytical and process 
theology. Indeed, Heschel is so dissatisfied with philosophical rationalism that he seems to 
be reluctant to acknowledge any distinction between philosophy as understood by the 
Greeks and the attitudes of modem western scientific empiricism.24 Thus his presentation 
21 Heschel, "The Meaning of Observance", p.94. 
22 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.40. 
23 "The worship of reason", in Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.18. 
24 Ibid., p.19. 
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of the polarity between the two patterns of thinking, rather than dealing with the specifics 
of a distinction between Greek and Hebrew thought patterns, is more concerned \X/ith the 
"disinterested" thinking of "popular science" and modem philosophy25 as over against 
biblical thought patterns that project humanity into a universe of existential risk and 
involvement. Heschel, then, asserts that many of modem society's cultural assumptions 
are antithetical or irrelevant to Biblical thinking; indeed religious thinking provides a place 
from which to evaluate those cultural assumptions. He dismisses attempts to reduce 
religion to a sub-section of philosophy, psychology or sociology, or to rationalise it. Such 
reductionism is "an intellectual evasion" of the profound difficulties of faith and 
observance. Since what is deemed reasonable in one age may be unreasonable in another, 
a perception of what is reasonable is an inadequate tool for the apprehension oftruth.26 
Heschel appreciates scientific method as a means of solving scientific problems, but "God 
is not a scientific problem, and scientific methods are not capable of solving it".27 
Whereas Western philosophy and scientific thinking seeks to define and categorise 
everything, God cannot be defined, only experienced. 
25 I e the result of man's self-arrogating hubris-his assumption of the self-sufficiency ~f huma~ reason-
yieldi~g a knowledge that is confmed to the limits ofthe.huma~ .intellect within "modernIty's socIety of 
technical abstractions". Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, (FlfSt EdItIon), p.188. 
26 See Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.18. See also Sherwin, Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.16. 
27 Ibid., p.l 02 
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"The God of Israel" is a name, not a notion, and the difference 
between the two is perhaps the difference between Jerusalem and 
Ath~ns. A notion applies to all objects of similar properties; a name 
apphes to an individual. " A notion describes; a name evokes. A 
notion is attained through generalization; a name is learned through 
acquaintance. A notion is conceived; a name is called ... 
A notion is definitive, finished, final, while understanding is an act, 
the intention of which is to receive, register, record, reflect and 
reiterate; an act that goes on for ever. Having a notion of friendship is 
not the same as having a friend . .. The process of forming an idea is 
one of generalization and abstraction ... 
The prophets of Israel had no theory or "notion" of God. What 
they had was an understanding. Their God-understanding was not the 
result of a theoretical inquiry, of a groping in the midst of alternatives. 
To the prophets, God was overwhelmingly real and shatteringly 
present. .. To them the attributes of God were drives, challenges, 
commandments, rather than timeless notions detached from His 
Being. They did not offer an exposition of the nature of God, but 
rather an exposition of God's insight into man and His concern for 
man. They disclosed attitudes o/God rather than notions about God. 28 
It is the fundamental attitude of God towards humankind, as understood by the prophets, 
that Heschel characterises as "pathos", and which he claims to be "the central idea of 
prophetic theology-an explication of the idea of God in search of man", which is itself 
"the summary of Jewish theology".29 It is the Heschelian phrase "God in search of man" 
that principally conveys his sense of God's concern for human beings, and since, for 
Heschel, concern for others ("transitive concern") implies pathos (i.e. being moved or 
affected by others), then "God, whose transitive concern is infinite, is intimately affected 
by objects of divine concern, particularly by human beings".30 
28 Heschel, "The God of Israel and Christian Renewal", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and 
Spiritual Audacity, p.268f. Heschel had been invited to address the (Roman Catholic) Congress on the 
Theology of the Church held in Montreal (1967) on the subject "The God oflsrael and ~hristian. R~newal':. 
However, "on the way to the printer, the power of the title was emasculated. The magmficent blbhcal saymg 
'the God oflsrael' was replaced by a scholastic mis-saying, 'the Jewish notion of God.' Realism was 
replaced by notionalism". 
29 Heschel, "Jewish Theology", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.158-
159. 
30 John C. Merkle, "Heschel's Theology of Divine Pathos", in Merkle (Ed), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.67. 
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To the prophet ... God does not reveal himself in an abstract 
absoluteness, but in a personal and intimate relation to the world. He 
does not simply command and expect obedience; He is also moved 
and affected by what happens in the world, and reacts accordingly. 
Events and human actions arouse in Him joy or sorrow, pleasure or 
wrath. He is not conceived as jUdging the world in detachment. He 
reacts in an intimate and subjective manner, and thus determines the 
value of events. Quite obviously in the biblical view, man's deeds 
may move Him, affect Him, grieve Him or, on the other hand, gladden 
and please Him. This notion that God can be intimately affected, that 
He possesses not merely intelligence and will, but also pathos, 
basically defines the prophetic consciousness of God. 31 
To be sure, being concerned for somebody's welfare does not necessarily involve "a 
personal and intimate relation" with them. Such a relation requires "a feeling of intimate 
concern" and this, for Heschel, is the concern God has for human beings: 
He is a lover engaged to His people, not only a king. God stands in a 
passionate relationship to man. His love or anger, His mercy or 
disappointment, is an expression of His profound participation in the 
history of Israel and all men. 
Prophecy, then, consists in the proclamation of the divine pathos, 
expressed in the language of the prophets as love, mercy or anger. 
Behind the various manifestations of His pathos is one motive, one 
need: The divine need for human righteousness. 32 
Thus, being passionately involved with human beings, God is intimately concerned to the 
extent of being stirred by their plight, even to involvement in their suffering. 33 
31 Heschel, The Prophets. II, p.3f. 
32 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.244f. 
33 Heschel, The Prophets II, p.39. 
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Undercutting Philosophy 
When Abraham Goldberg reviewed The Prophets he grossly understated the case in 
commenting that in Heschel's work "pathos is almost a technical term".34 Since it was 
Heschel who first introduced the term "pathos", now frequently used by other theologians, 
into the discussion concerning the passibility of God, it is important to ask what he intends 
it to convey. As he does not borrow it from English, its interpretation is not dependent 
upon any dictionary definition. He borrows it, rather, from the Greek,35 and interprets it in 
a completely novel way. 
In Heschel's work "pathos" refers to God's involvement in history, "his participation in the 
predicament of man".36 It means that "God is never neutral, never beyond good and 
evil".37 It means that human sin "is more than a failure of man: it is a frustration to 
God",38 and that by sinning a human being occasions the pathos of God, i.e. the intentional 
and supremely moral act by which God summons the sinner to justice.39 Therefore 
The idea of divine pathos has also anthropological significance. It is 
man's being relevant to God. To the biblical mind the denial of man's 
relevance to God is as inconceivable as the denial of God's relevance 
to man. This principle leads to the basic affirmation of God's 
participation in human history, to the certainty that the events of the 
world concern Him and arouse his reaction. It finds its deepest 
expression in the fact that God can actually suffer.40 
34 Abraham Goldberg, review of The Prophets, in Bibliotheca Orientalis, Vo1.22, 1965, p.5l. See also 
Marcel Sarot, God, Passibility and Corporeality, Kok Pharos, Kampen, 1992, p.173. 
35 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.269: "Appendix: A Note on the Meaning of Pathos." 
36 Ibid., p.6. 
37 Ibid., p.l1. 
38 Ibid., p.6. 
39 Ibid., p.4f. 
40 Ibid., p.39. 
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Heschel explicitly states that he does not use "pathos" in its psychological sense-where 
others talk about "feelings", "emotions" and "suffering"-but with a new, specifically 
theological connotation.41 "Pathos" for Heschel is a comprehensive tenn that includes all 
that is meant by passibility and more. 
Heschel's concept of the divine pathos brings him into direct opposition to classical Jewish 
and Christian metaphysics. The God of the Bible is not the Perfect Being who, being self-
sufficient, needs nothing beyond himself, nor the Unmoved Mover "upon whom the world 
depends, but who contemplates himself in perfect unconcern for the world".42 The God 
whose existence is demonstrable by speCUlative "proofs" neither compels a response nor an 
attachment. "Why should we, poor creatures, be concerned about Him, the most perfect? 
We may, indeed, accept the idea that there is a supreme designer and still say 'So what?""u 
The so-called "proofs" of God's existence, even if their validity as arguments were beyond 
dispute, prove too little, telling us what God is, not who God is. They may be stated thus: 
"given certain facts of experience, such as the rational order of the universe, God is the 
necessary hypothesis to explain them".44 But since deductive logic demands that 
conclusions cannot contain more than the premises imply, the existence of God could 
never be more than a hypothesis, and therefore subject to refutation or redundancy by a 
different or a greater understanding of the universe. 
41 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.50-52. 
42 George F. Thomas, "Philosophy and Theology: A Tribute to Abraham J. Heschel", The?/ogy Today, 
Vo1.30, No.3, 1973, p.276. It was Fritz Rothschild (Between God and Man, p.24.) who co~ed the phrase 
"the Most Moved Mover" for Heschel' s understanding of God, a phrase often wrongly ascnbed to Heschel 
himself, or even by other commentators to themselves. (See Merkle, The Genesis of Faith, p.253, n.13!') 
43 Heschel, Man Is Not A/one, p.54. 
44 Ibid. 
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However, when the reality of God is asserted within Judaism or Christianity, it IS not 
argued for on the basis of the traditional "proofs".45 The God put forward by the 
Argument from Design, for example, is derived from the world, and although that does not 
necessarily make him dependent upon the world, he cannot transcend the world infinitely. 
So, as Tillich points out, the "arguments for the existence of God" are neither arguments 
for nor proofs of the existence of God, but rather, 
They are expressions of the question of God which is implied in 
human finitude . .. The arguments for the existence of God analyse 
the ~uman situation in such a way that the question of God appears 
pOSSIble and necessary. The question of God is possible because an 
awareness of God is present in the question of God. This awareness 
of God precedes the question. It is not the result of the argument, but 
its presupposition.46 
Similarly, Heschel speaks of the "ontological presupposition" of Hebrew thought: "Our 
belief in the reality of God is not a case of first possessing an idea and then postulating the 
ontal counterpart of it". 47 
45 "There are no proofs for the existence of the God of Israel. There are only witnesses" (Heschel, "The God 
of Israel", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual AudaCity, p.269). 
46 Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.228. Aquinas asserts that "what is fIrst in itself may be last for our 
knowledge", but if God is the end of the causal regression in answer to the question, "Where from?", then 
God is part of that from which he is derived, and cannot be that which transcends the world infInitely. 
Anselm's statement that God is necessary thought, and that therefore the idea of God must have objective as 
well as subjective reality, is valid so far as thinking implies as unconditional element which transcends 
subjectivity and objectivity, but this unconditional element is not of necessity a "highest being called God". 
See pages 228-230. The classic "Proofs for the Existence of God" are The Ontological Argument, which 
assumes that we have the concept of a perfect being and that existence is an essential constituent of this 
concept, so that the idea of such a being implies the being's reality (Anselm, Proslogium, II - IV, Descartes, 
Meditations, V, etc); The Cosmological Argument, which argues back from the fmite and dependent status of 
everything that exists to a self-subsistent Ground from which everything proceeds, and The Teleological 
Argument, which argues from order in the world to a wise and purposeful creative Intelligence (Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la, 2, 3). Since Hume and Kant the defects in the traditional arguments have 
been exposed: that existence is not a predicate, and (in the a posteriori arguments) that the evidence is 
ambiguous and the logic suspect. 
47 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.84. 
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This, then, is the order of our thinking and existence: the ultimate or 
God comes first and our reasoning about Him second. Metaphysical 
speculation has reversed the order: reasoning comes first and the 
question about His reality second: either he is proved or he is not real. 
However, just as there is no thinking about the world without the 
premise of the reality of the world, there can be no thinking about God 
without the premise of the realness of God.48 
Thus whilst philosophy deals with humankind's questions about the world, and its 
conclusions invite an intellectual assent to its propositions, "religion begins with God's 
question and man's answer".49 And so Heschel's emphasis that "faith is not so much an 
assent to a proposition but rather an attitude of the whole person, an engagement and 
attachment to God's demands",50 together with his interpretation of God as personal 
concern, leads to his criticism of the main trends of philosophical theology that have gone 
down the road of assimilating the Living God of the Bible to the impersonal categories of 
Greek ontology. 
At a memorial servIce for Heschel held at Park Avenue Synagogue, New York City, 
January 21st 1973, W. D. Davies spoke of Heschel's attitude to "philosophy", not as one 
of "opposition to", but as one of "distance from": 
48 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.12l f. 
49 Heschel Man /s Not Alone, p.76. 
50 Rothschild, "Abraham Joshua Heschel", in Bird (Ed.), Modern Theologians, p.178. 
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Informed as he was in Talmud and Philosophy, and open as he was to 
recent technical scholarship, his experience had also created a certain 
distance from, and even dissatisfaction with, the kind of objective 
detachment which is so often, if wrongly, thought to characterise 
genuine academic pursuits. Abraham Heschel emphasised not 
conceptual thinking in itself, but the situational thinking that is born of 
commitment and involvement: he emphasised understanding more 
than knowledge, wisdom more than information. .. Usually, though 
not always, he did not confront philosophy so much as he undercut 
it. 51 
Heschel is not opposed to philosophy per se, but rather to the uses to which theologians 
have put philosophy. In order to make his point he caricatures philosophy as producing a 
list of the divine attributes, and then seeking a God to fit them. Theology has then adopted 
the "God of the philosophers"-the "ground of being", the "unmoved mover", the 
"unconditioned", etc. Heschel rejects this approach, not because he scorns philosophy, but 
because the approach "thwarted the philosophical enterprise" by engaging in a circular 
argument. 52 
Logically, the divine attributes depend upon who God is, and not vice 
versa. To brandish a list of attributes before establishing God's 
identity is to beg the question. Until the prior question is settled, the 
philosopher has no right to assume that the abstract is "more divine" 
than the concrete, the universal than the particular, the impersonal 
than the personal. 53 
51 Davies "In Memoriam: Abraham Joshua Heschel", p.90f. 
52 Cherb~nnier, "A. 1. Heschel and the Philosophy of the Bible", p.24. 
53 E. LaB. Cherbonnier, "Heschel as a Religious Thinker", Conservative Judaism, Vol.23, No.1, 1968, p.31. 
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There are, as Heschel points out, two ways to think of God: "in terms of a free and 
spontaneous being or in terms of inanimate being: either He is alive or devoid of life".54 
Cherbonnier depicts Heschel's challenge to the philosophers as like that if Elijah on Mount 
Carmel: "If the Ground of Being be God, then follow him; but if the Lord be God, then 
follow him".55 Heschel states it baldly: "Knowledge of God is knowledge of living with 
God".56 God is not "the ground of being", but "the transcendent care for being", which is 
what really matters to US. 57 
The supreme issue is not the question whether in the infinite darkness 
there is a ground of being which is an object of man's ultimate 
concern, but whether the reality of God confronts us with a pathos-
God's ultimate concern with good and evil; whether God is 
mysteriously present in the events of history; whether being is 
transcended by creation; whether creation is transcended by care; 
whether my life is dependent on God's care; whether in the course of 
my life I come upon a trace of His guidance. 58 
Heschel perhaps provides us with a key to why pathos was central to his approach to God, 
when he writes that, although God's concern is one of the most baffling mysteries, for the 
person "whose life is open to God, His care and love are a constant experience".59 Pathos 
is central to Heschel' s understanding of God because God's love and concern are to him a 
constant experience. 60 
54 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.126. 
55 Cherbonnier, "Heschel as a Religious Thinker", p.31 
56 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.281. 
57 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.91. 
58 Heschel, "The God of Israel and Christian Renewal", p.270. 
59 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.144. See also Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.21: "To the Jewish mind, 
the understanding of God is not achieved by referring in a Greek way to timeless qualities of a Supre.me 
Being, to ideas of goodness and perfection, but rather by sensing the living acts o~ His conce.m, to HIS 
dynamic attentiveness to man. We speak not of His goodness in general but of HIS compassIOn for the 
individual man in a particular situation". 
60 Donald 1. Moore, S. J., The Human and the Holy, Fordham University Press, New York, 1989, p.77. 
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In Heschel's opinion the "tragic defeat" of Western philosophy came about because of its 
preoccupation with the problem of cognition: 
Guided by the assumption that he who knows how to think will know 
how to live, philosophy has, since the days of Socrates, been primarily 
a quest for right thinking. Particularly since the time of Descartes, it 
concentrated its attention on the problem of cognition, becoming less 
and less aware of the problem ofliving.61 
However, the single-minded search of modem philosophy for conceptualisation is only 
part of a cultural attitude that wants to reduce all the reality of the world to immediacy and 
fact. To break with such an approach involves questioning the basic presuppositions of 
such a culture, investigating the premises on which it is based, and going beyond 
proximate questions to ultimate questions, to the point at which we begin to stumble into 
the sublime.62 What Heschel attacks, then, is not legitimate conceptualisation, but a 
conceptual tyranny: "Truth has nothing to fear from reason. What we abhor is 
presumptuousness that often goes with super-rationalism, reason conditioned by conceit, 
reason subservient to passion."63 Thus Heschel seeks to put "reason" into perspective as 
an instrument of human awareness, and to undermine its dominance over human life: 
Man is more than reason. Man is life. In facing the all-embracing 
question, he faces that which is more than a principle, more than a 
theoretical problem . .. In facing the ultimate question man finds 
himself challenged beyond words to the depth of his existence.64 
61 Heschel, "The Meaning of Observance", p.93. 
62 see Alfred McBride, Hesche!: Religious Educator, New Dimension Books, Denville NJ, 1973, pA4. 
63 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.I72. 
64 Ibid., p.106. 
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Yet at the same time he argues that "Reason is a necessary coefficient to faith, lending 
fonn to what often becomes violent, blind, and exaggerated by imagination. Faith without 
reason is mute; reason without faith is deaf'.65 
Under his "Greek-Gennan" umbrella Heschel covers philosophy in such various fonns as 
Stoicism, intellectualism, and the disparagement of feeling-i.e. philosophy that acts as a 
barrier to knowledge of the God of the Bible. He is detennined to keep his distance from 
an uncompromising analysis that would reject inexpressible reality, and reduce God to a 
mere object of cognition. Rothschild sums it up: 
If God is merely a thing among others, even though the most powerful 
one, he is not truly God. If he is a general principle or power, he is an 
abstraction lacking religious availability. Therefore Heschel develops 
his doctrine of the divine pathos.66 
In the face of what he takes to be "the tragic failure of the modem mind, incapable of 
preventing its own destruction", Heschel seeks "a new set of presuppositions ... a 
different way of thinking". What he finds are the biblical prophets: "the prophet was an 
individual who said No to his society, condemning its habits and assumptions, its 
complacency, waywardness and syncretism".67 
65 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.I73. 
66 Fritz A. Rothschild, "Heschel, Abraham Joshua", Encyclopaedia Hebraica, Vol.IS, Keter, Jerusalem 
1971, p.178f. 
67 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.xvi. 
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The God of the Prophets 
Heschel does not set out to analyse the prophetic subconscious,68 nor does he assume that 
the prophets are merely the mouthpieces of God, playing no active part in prophecy,69 nor 
that they are merely insightful people, skilled political observers,70 who happened to be 
able to express their awareness with poetic sensitivity.71 Instead, he begins, 
characteristically, from both sides of the divine-human encounter to describe 
phenomenologically the nature both of God's initiative and the prophet's response.72 
The prophet is a man who feels fiercely. God has thrust a burden 
upon his soul, and he is bowed and stunned at man's fierce greed. 
Frightful is the agony of man; no human voice can convey its full 
terror. Prophecy is the voice that God has lent to the silent agony, a 
voice to the plundered poor, to the profaned riches of the world. It is a 
fonn of living, a crossing point of God and man. God is raging in the 
prophet's words.73 
68 Ibid., II, pp.I70-I72, "Prophecy and Psychosis". 
69 Ibid., pp.II5-II7. Heschel quotes Philo of Alexandria: "a prophet possessed by God will suddenly appear 
and give prophetic oracles. Nothing of what he says will be his own, for he that is truly under the control of 
divine inspiration has no power of apprehension when he speaks, but serves as a channel for the insistent 
words of Another's promptings. For prophets are the interpreters of God, Who makes full use of their organs 
to set forth what he wills". (Philo, De Specia/ibus Legibus, I, 11, 65). 
70 Ibid., pp. 1 9 Off, "Explanations of Prophetic Inspiration". 
71 Ibid., pp.I47ff, "Prophecy and Prophetic Inspiration": "The enigma is solved. The prophet is a p.o~t. His 
experience is one known to the poets. What the poets know as poetic inspiration, the prophets call dIVIne 
revelation", p.147. 
72 lb'd . 1.,p.X!. 
73 Ibid., VoU, p.5. 
184 
A clue to the way Heschel was thinking as he researched the prophets for his dissertation is 
provided by his biographical interpretation of Maimonides, written at the same time, where 
he tells how Maimonides, in The Guide for the Perplexed, set out to achieve a working 
harmony between reason and faith. Maimonides proposed two perfections for which 
humankind must strive: the physical, moral and economic advancement necessary for 
attaining the serenity of mind that is a prerequisite to the attainment of the second and 
ultimate perfection-"knowing all things that a person perfectly developed is capable of 
knowing" (i.e. intellectual perfection),74 
This second perfection certainly does not include any action or good 
conduct, but only knowledge, which is arrived at by speculation, or 
established by research . .. [T]he second perfection, which is 
undoubtedly of a superior kind, ... is alone the source of eternal life. 75 
It would seem, therefore, that Maimonides' philosophical and theological approach must 
put him into the category of philosophers opposed by Heschel, since his Aristotelianism 
produced a depersonalised, "static" God, reduced to an abstract idea-Aristotle's 
"unmoved mover". Yet Hesche! gets inspiration from Maimonides for a dynamic view of 
God, because towards the end of The Guide Maimonides concludes that "the true human 
perfection consists in the acquisition of rational virtues-I refer to the possession of 
notions which teach true opinions concerning divine matters",76 
74 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Last Days of Maimonides", in The Insecurity of Freedom, p.291. 
75 Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, p.313. 
76 Heschel, "Last Days of Maimonides", p.291. 
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This radical change in Maimonides' philosophy came about through his study of the Bible 
as is demonstrated by his explanation of some words of Jeremiah: 
"Thus saith the Lord: Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, 
neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man 
glory in his riches; but let him who glorieth glory in this, that he 
understandeth and knoweth me" (Jer. ix. 22,23) ... 
The prophet does not content himself with explaining that the 
knowledge of God is the highest kind of perfection; for if this only 
had been his intention, he would have said, "But in this let him who 
glorieth glory, that he understandeth and knoweth me," and would 
have stopped there; or he would have said, "that he understandeth and 
knoweth me that I am One," ... or a similar phrase. He says, 
however, that man can only glory in the knowledge of God and in the 
knowledge of His ways and attributes, which are His actions, as we 
have shown ... in expounding the passage, "Show me now thy ways" 
(Exod. xxxviii. 13). We are thus told in this passage that the divine 
acts that ought to be known, and ought to serve as a guide to our 
actions, are hesed, "loving-kindness," Mishpat, ')udgement," and 
zedakah, "righteousness." ... The prophet thus, in conclusion, says, 
"For in these things I delight, saith the Lord," i.e., My object [in 
saying this] is that you shall practise loving-kindness, judgement, and 
righteousness in the earth ... and thus to imitate the ways of God. 77 
Maimonides continued to maintain that it was knowledge and contemplation that led 
people to love God (since "one cannot love God except through the knowledge with which 
one knows Him, and the love is in proportion with the knowledge"78), and yet he was 
compelled to admit that: 
All we understand is the fact that He exists, that He is a Being to 
whom none of His creatures is similar, who has nothing in common 
with them, who does not include plurality, who is never too feeble to 
produce other beings, and whose relation to the universe is that of a 
steersman to a boat; and even this is not a real relation, a real simile, 
but serves only to convey to us the idea that God rules the universe; 
that is, that He gives it duration, and preserves its necessary 
arrangement. 79 
77 Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, p.396f. 
78 Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Teshubah, X, 6, as quoted in Heschel, "Last Days of Maimonides", 
p.292. 
79 Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, p.83. 
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Thus, according to Maimonides, though the human mind cannot comprehend God's 
essence, it can comprehend his presence, and he finally defined man's ultimate end as the 
imitation of God's ways and actions, in terms of kindness, justice and righteousness. 
According to Heschel, it is for this reason that Maimonides, philosopher, theologian, 
natural scientist, mathematician and jurist, devoted his "last days" (i.e. the last ten years of 
his life) to serving humanity as a physician. It was his last metamorphosis. 
From metaphysics to medicine, from contemplation to practice, from 
speculation to the imitation of God. God is not only the object of 
knowledge; He is the example one is to follow. Human beings whom 
He seeks to guide in this providence take the place of abstract 
concepts which constitute the means of the intellectual perception of 
God. Preoccupation with the concrete man and the effort to aid him in 
his suffering is now the form of religious devotion. 80 
This same "preoccupation with concrete man" which Heschel sees as characteristic of the 
prophets, also characterised his own "last days". The great insight of the prophets is that 
God himself is thus concerned. If the prophet is deeply moved by the condition of 
humanity, it is God himself who, in the first instance, is so moved. Prophetic religion is 
therefore a "religion of sympathy", which is the true response to the divine pathos. In the 
prophetic event something happens, not only to the prophet, but also to God: 
Prophecy is a personal event. It happens to the divine Person Who 
does not merely send forth words, but becomes involved and engaged 
in the encounter with man. 
Thus, to the prophetic consciousness, inspiration is more than an 
emotional experience, a consciousness of inner receptivity. It is 
experienced as a divine act which takes place not within but beyond, 
as an event which happens in one's view rather than in one's heart. 
The prophet does not merely feel it, he faces it. 8! 
80 Heschel, "The Last Days of Maimonides", p.289f. 
81 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.2l3. 
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The prophet's task as directed towards the people is two-fold: to make them realise that 
God is holy and transcendent, and also to bring to their attention the state of the God-
human relationship. What the prophet discloses is not the essence of God, but God's 
response to human life with "a specific pathos signified in the language of the prophets, in 
love, mercy and anger". 82 If God's pathos were identical to his essence, then prophecy 
would be impossible: 
If the structure of the pathos were immutable and remained unchanged 
even after the people had "turned", prophecy would lose it's function, 
which is precisely so to influence man as to bring about a change in 
the divine pathos of rejection and affliction.83 
Traditional theology avoids the conclusion that a loving God must be personal and 
sympathetic and therefore passible, by asserting in various ways that "affects are effects" 
for God: that he is not affected in his "feelings" by human suffering, but that he effects 
relief from those sufferings. Thus Anselm suggests that whilst God cannot be 
compassionate (in the sense of suffering sorrow with us), when we experience his mercy it 
is for us as if God were compassionate.84 Such arguments can only ever be satisfactory in 
a theological climate that regards life-after-death as more real than this-worldly mortal 
existence, and an eternal recompense for temporal suffering. When people of faith look to 
a loving, personal God who is intimately related to their this-worldly daily experience, then 
82 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Mystical Element in Judaism", in Louis Finkelstein (Ed.), The Jews' 
Their History. Culture and Religion, Peter Owen, London, 1961, YoU, p.950. 
83 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.ll. Also Heschel, "The Mystical Element in Judaism", p.95l: "The life of 
the prophet revolved around the life of God. The prophets were not indifferent to whether God was in a state 
of anger or a state of mercy. They were mosr sensitive to what was going on in God". 
84 See Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p.17. 
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there are times when "only a suffering God can help".85 And then we must take on board 
the insight of the classical theologians that to be affected by others is to be changed by 
them (which is why they found it necessary to deny compassion in God) and (since in the 
face of modem understandings of personality "there does not . . . seem to be much 
meaning in the statement that God expresses his love to all, if this love is to be restricted to 
creative beneficence")86 accept the consequences from which they shrank. 
Indeed, in the light of the contemporary expenence there does not seem to be much 
meaning in the statement that God expresses his love in some overarching non-personal 
way, "for all". James Cone, for instance, concludes that it is only a faith that believes that 
God suffers with black people that makes nonsense of the question, "Is God a white 
racist?"87 Similarly, Dorothee SolIe points out that proponents of theodicy are attempting 
to reconcile three "qualities" of God: omnipotence, love and intelligibility, only two of 
which are conceivable at anyone time. If God is omnipotent and intelligible, then he must 
be the sadist "white racist". If God is omnipotent and all-loving, then he is unintelligible, 
and no one can hold fast to an unintelligible God for long. If God is love and intelligible, 
he is not omnipotent: "Between victors and victims God is credible only if he is on the 
side of the victims, if God is capable of suffering". 88 Thus Heschel does not conceive of 
85 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, Collins (Fontana), London, 1969, p.l22. 
86 Fiddes, Creative Suffering of God, p.18. 
87 James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed, SPCK, London, 1967, pp.163, 166f, 184-8. "So the suffering God 
is an active presence, making it possible to struggle for liberation" (p.192f.). 
88 Dorothee Solle, "God's Pain, Our Pain", in Helen P. Fry, (Ed.), Christian-Jewish Dialogue: A Reader, 
The University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1996, pp.59-61. 
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the divine pathos as an essential, objective attribute of God with which humanity IS 
confronted, but as an expression of God's will: 
It is a functional rather than a substantial reality: not an attribute, not 
an unchangeable quality, not an absolute content of divine Being, but 
rather a situation or the personal implication in His acts ... signifying 
God as involved in history, as intimately affected by events in history, 
as living care.89 
The pathos of God, then, is always expressed in a dynamic relationship with humankind. It 
is not reflexive-not a self-centred, self-contained state-but is always, in prophetic 
thinking, directed outwards, not as unreasoned emotion but as "an act fonned with 
intention, depending on free will, the result of decision and detennination".90 So God's 
"change of reaction" is not mechanistically caused by a "change of conduct" on the part of 
Israel: God's "anger" ceases after the people repent, not because people's deeds 
necessitate a change in the divine pathos, but because they occasion it. It is God's will that 
his anger should not be executed, but instead annulled by repentance. 
Pathos, then, is not an attitude taken arbitrarily. Its inner law is the 
moral law: ethos is inherent in pathos. God is concerned about the 
world, and shares in its fate. Indeed, this is the essence of God's 
moral nature: His willingness to be intimately involved in the history 
ofman.91 
89 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.ll. 
90 Ibid., p.4. 
91 Ibid., p.5 
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In this way the theology of pathos changes humankind's perception of its ultimate 
problems, since the human situation cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, "the 
predicament of man is a predicament of God Who has a stake in the human situation".92 
The God of the prophets is "One who is involved, near and concerned". 93 
Having established that the God of the prophets is the God of pathos, Heschel seeks to 
demonstrate the uniqueness of such a God. He cannot be the self-sufficient "First Cause" 
or "Idea of the Good" proposed by Plato and Epicurus. 94 Nor can the strivings of his 
creatures be towards their own self-sufficiency, as if "man's fate ... depended solely on 
the development of his social awareness and the utilisation of his own power" (i.e. the 
"Doctrine of Progress"). Rather, "God is in need of man. A Supreme Being, apathetic and 
indifferent to man, may denote an idea, but not the living God ofIsrael".95 Thus, when the 
theological fashion of the western world proclaimed "Death of God Theology" in the 
1960s, Heschel responded by proclaiming "Living God Theology".96 
92 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.6. 
93 Ibid., p.7. 
94 Ibid., p.12. 
95 Ibid., p.15. 
96 Heschel, "On Prayer", in S. Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.267: "This is an 
age of spiritual blackout, a blackout of God. We have entered not only the dark night of the soul, but also the 
dark night of society. We must seek out ways of preserving the strong and deep truths of a living God 
theology in the midst of the blackout." And in Heschel, Israel, p.112: "[After Auschwitz] our people did not 
sally forth in flight from God. On the contrary, at that moment in history we saw the beginning of a new 
awakening, the emergence of a new concern for a Living God theology. Escape from Judaism giving place 
increasingly to a new attachment, to a rediscovery of our legacy". In an earlier reference to the "Death of 
God Theologians" in his inaugural address as visiting professor at Union Seminary, the evening after a 
widespread electrical power failure had blacked out most of New York City (No.9th 1965), Heschel 
remarked, "Some of us are like patients in the fmal state of agony-who scream in delirium: The doctor is 
dead, the doctor is dead" (Kasimow and Sherwin, No Religion is an Island, p.4). See also Heschel, God in 
Search of Man, p.127. See also Heschel, "The God ofIsrael and Christian Renewal", Susannah Heschel 
(Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.275, where Heschel criticises trends in Christian theology: 
"It is significant that quite a number of theologians today consider it possible to say, 'We can do without God 
and hold to Jesus of Nazareth'," and refers to Thomas Altizer and William Hamilton, Radical Theology and 
the Death of God, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1966, p.33. The reference is on p.45 of the Pelican edition, 
published in Great Britain by Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968. 
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In the same way, according to Heschel the God of the prophets can have no relation to the 
eternal silence of the Tao, the impersonal, eternal moral order of the universe postulated by 
the Chinese teacher Lao-Tzu. 
The God of Israel ... is not a Law, but the Lawgiver. The order He 
established is not a rigid unchangeable structure, but a historic-
dynamic reality, a drama. What the prophets proclaim is not His 
silence, but His pathos. To understand His ways, one must obey His 
wil1.97 
Prophetic thinking is also in profound contrast to the Hindu doctrine of karma, where 
retribution is the blind, mechanical operation of moral forces. For Israel, between the act 
and the punishment stands "the Lord . . . merciful and gracious, slow to anger and 
abounding in steadfast love" (Psalm 103: 8).98 Each person remains responsible for 
his/her actions, but may tum in repentance to God "whose loving kindness is ever extended 
to the returning sinner". 99 
And the divine pathos IS III sharp antithesis to the (classical) Greek belief in destiny 
(moira). 
The ultimate power is not an inscrutable, blind, and hostile power, to 
which man must submit in resignation, but a God of justice and 
mercy, to Whom man is called upon to return, and by returning he 
may effect a change in what is decreed. 100 
97 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.16. 
98 Ibid., p.17. 
99 Ibid.,p.18. 
100 Ibid., p.20f. 
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Heschel also contrasts the God of the prophets with the God of Islam who is "unqualified 
omnipotence". What the prophets experienced was not the power of God, or his utter 
transcendence, but "the divine Mind whose obiect of attention l'S man S "t t J • •. pIn, no 
power, is the ultimate reality for the prophetic consciousness". 101 
The final contrast Heschel offers in demonstration of the uniqueness of the God of pathos 
is with the picture found in some classical Greek thought and in some traditional African 
religions, where the gods are malevolent towards and envious of human beings, arbitrarily 
"punishing" them. For Heschel, "God is not unjustifiably jealous; and the defiance of God 
is not the tragic prerequisite of man's creativity".102 
That Heschel makes no attempt to contrast the God of the prophets with the God of 
Christianity, implies that he sees no such contrast, i.e. that the God Christians worship is 
the God of the prophets. 103 However, this is not to say that the biblical view of God has not 
been distorted in traditional Christian theology as well as in Jewish theology. 
101 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.21 
102 Ibid., p.26. 
103 Heschel, "No Religion Is An Island", in Kasimow and Sherwin(Eds.), No Religion Is an Island, p.9: "We 
[Jews and Christians] disagree in law and creed, in corrunitments which lie at the very heart of our religious 
existence. We say 'No' to one another in some doctrines essential and sacred to us. What unites us? Our 
being accountable to God, our being objects of God's concern, precious in His eyes ... Above all, while 
dogmas and forms of worship are divergent, God is the same. What unites us? A corrunitment to the Hebrew 
Bible as Holy Scripture. Faith in the Creator, the God of Abraham, corrunitment to many of His 
corrunandments, a sense of contrition, sensitivity to the sanctity of life and to the involvement of God in 
history, the conviction that without the holy the good will be defeated, prayer that history may not end before 
the end of days, and so much more". 
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Rabbinic Sources of the Concept of the Divine Pathos 
Heschel's sources for his concept of the Divine Pathos appear on the face of it to be 
entirely biblical: 
There are no words in the world [other than in the Bible] more 
knowing, more disclosing and more indispensable, words both stem 
and graceful, heart-rending and healing. A truth so universal: God is 
One. A thought so consoling: He is with us in distress. A 
responsibility so overwhelming: His name can be desecrated. A map 
of time: from creation to redemption. Guideposts along the way: the 
Seventh Day. An offering: contrition of the heart. A utopia: would 
that all people were prophets. The insight: man lives by his 
faithfulness; his home is in time and his substance in deeds. A 
standard so bold: ye shall be holy. A commandment so daring: love 
thy neighbour as thyself. A fact so sublime: human and divine pathos 
can be in accord. And a gift so undeserved: the ability to repent. The 
Bible is mankind's greatest privilege. 104 
Indeed, "the presence of God is found in many ways, but above all God is found in the 
words of the Bible".105 Thus for Heschel responsiveness to the Bible is an antecedent to 
faith in God: not that a sense of the presence of God in the Bible induces a response to the 
Bible, but that in responding to the Bible one may discern therein God's presence. 106 
Yet "the Bible is not primarily man's vision of God, but God's vision of man". 107 Not that 
God is the Bible's sole author and its human writers no more than amanuenses, but that 
"the Bible reflects its divine as well as human authorship": 108 "God has a vision. The 
Bible is the interpretation of the vision" .109 
104 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.239. 
lOS Heschel in Granfield, Theologians at Work, p.77. 
106 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.252f, and "Protestant Renewal: A Jewish View", in The Insecurity of 
Freedom, p.l72. 
107 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.129. 
108 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.265. 
109 Heschel, Israel, p.48. 
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But "Judaism is not only a Biblical religion": 110 "The concern for God continued 
throughout the ages, and in order to understand Judaism we must inquire about the way 
and the spirit of that concern in post-Biblical Jewish History as well".111 This "way and 
spirit" are to be found in the writings of Israel's sages. 
Since the Bible is "a report about revelation", the Bible is itself a midrash, I 12 and since 
"the full meaning of the Biblical words was not disclosed once and for all", 113 this midrash 
is itself in need of midrashim. Thus, says Heschel, "Judaism is based on a minimum of 
revelation and a maximum of interpretation, upon the will of God and upon the 
understanding of Israel". I 14 
We approach the laws of the Bible through the interpretation and the 
wisdom of the Rabbis. .. The prophets' inspirations and the sages' 
interpretations are equally important. .. At Sinai we received both the 
word and the spirit to understand the word. The savants are heirs to 
the prophets; they determine and interpret the meaning of the word. I 15 
Thus we should expect to find not only Biblical but also Rabbinic sources for Heschel's 
concept of the Divine Pathos, or otherwise "his idea would be little more than a private 
suggestion about how the Bible ought to have been interpreted", and "would have no 
consequence for a people and its civilization which have played an integral role in the 
exegesis of the text and events which have created and sustained them as a religious 
entity" .116 
110 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.274. 
1II/bid.,p.27. 
112 Ibid., p.185. 
113 Ibid., p.273. 
114 Ibid., p.274. 
115 Ibid., p.274f. 
116 Lawrence Perlman, Abraham Hesche/'s Idea of Revelation, Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1989, p.120. 
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Eliezer Berkovits, one of Heschel' s principal critics,117 points out that the talmudic and 
midrashic tradition speaks of the Galut ha'Shekhinah (Megilla, 29a), the exile of the 
Shekhinah, and that there is a passage in the Talmud (Sanhedrin, 46a) that appears to offer 
an midrashic base for the expression tza 'ar ha 'Shekhinah, the sorrow of the Shekhinah. 
He suggests, however, that the fact that "Shekhinah" is used rather than "God" IS an 
indication of how firmly God's impassibility is rooted in Jewish consciousness. I 18 
In the Talmud many substitutions and circumlocutions are employed in order to avoid 
pronouncing the ineffable name, and at first sight Shekhinah might be considered simply as 
one of these. In which case it might be questioned why Berkovits would assume that the 
use of "Shekhinah" rather than "God" must indicate a reference to a manifestation of God 
that is distinct from God in himself. However, closer analysis indicates that the rabbis used 
the term more specifically, to indicate "the manifestation of the divine presence in the life 
of man or to express the principle of divine immanence in creation" .119 As this is in 
complete accord with Heschel's premise that "Man is Not Alone", and that indeed "God 
[is] in Search of Man", it is not clear why, in his discussion of Heschel, Berkovits would 
seek to capitalise on any distinction between the Shekhinah and God as known through 
revelation. 
117 See below, pp.218-231. 
118 Eliezer Berkovits, Major Themes in the Modern Philosophies of Judaism, Ktav, New York, 1974, p.2l8. 
119 Werblowsky and Wigoder (Eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion, p.629. 
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Berkovits also points out that in other places where the Shekhinah is not explicitly 
mentioned, anthropopathic expressions are introduced by the Rabbis with the term 
keveyahkol-"as it were" .120 Although that is not always the case,121 even so "the text 
does use specific anthropomorphic and anthropopathic expressions even if it uses them as 
it were 'keveyakhol '''.122 Heschel is himself clear that this kind of language is not intended 
to be "descriptive", but is rather "indicative". 123 
Lawrence Perlman notes that although Heschel's theological works incorporate Rabbinic 
views and insights, he does not attempt to construct a Rabbinic viewpoint for his particular 
ideas about revelation, including the Divine Pathos. On the other hand, Heschel's major 
work on Rabbinics, Torah min ha-shamayim, fails to indicate how it relates to his 
distinctive theological ideas. "Heschel seems to exclude the principles of Rabbinic 
theology from philosophical works and conversely, he seems to exclude the principles of 
depth-theology from his major work on Rabbinic ludaism".124 
120 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.218. He gives as examples: the quotation from 
Eikha Rabbati in Tosa/ot, Megillah 45a, Ani ve 'Hu; see also Yalkut Shimoni on Jeremiah ch.40. 
121 For example, the practice of rising during the night to perform the midnight service (tikun hazot) is 
justified in the sources by reference to a Talmudic passage which describes, without the disclaimer, God's 
anger and grief at the destruction of the Temple (Berakhot) (Tanenzapf, "Abraham Heschel and his Critics", 
p.285). 
122 Steven T. Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues: Critical Studies in Modern Jewish Thought, New York 
University Press, New York, 1983, p.13!. 
123 See below, p.22!. 
124 Perlman, Heschel's Idea o/Revelation, p.120. 
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Perlman believes that Heschel's thesis in Torah min ha-shamayim is the basis and origin of 
Heschel's distinctive theological ideas. But since the publication post-dates that of God in 
Search of Man, he begins a search for the Rabbinic sources of Heschel's ideas with 
Heschel's implicit comments about Rabbinic theology in his theology, with this "enigmatic 
statement": 
We have never been the same since the day on which the voice of God 
overwhelmed us at Sinai. It is for ever impossible for us to retreat into 
an age that predates the Sinai tic event. Something unprecedented 
happened. God revealed his name to us, and we are named after 
him.I25 
Perlman notes that, with the exception of this reference, Heschel never refers in specific 
terms to the content of revelation. 126 Heschel's phenomenological method systematically 
leads him to circumscribe the content of revelation, since it cannot be described, only 
indicated. I27 Yet in this lone example of Heschel giving specific content to revelation, it is 
an ineffable content, consistent with his principle of indicating the positive content of 
revelation without negating the ineffable origin of the revelatory event, 1 28 and has 
"decidedly rabbinic overtones".129 Perlman points to a discussion in the Talmud (Makkot 
23b, 24a, Horayoth 8a) that concludes that the direct revelation of God at Sinai consisted 
only of the first and second of the Ten Commandments, which are ineffable, referring 
125 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.167. 
126 Perlman, Heschel's Idea of Revelation, p.121. 
127 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.181 f. Heschel, on every other occasion, relies on a negative 
description of revelation: "Revelation can only be described via negation is; we can only say what it is not. 
Perhaps the oldest example of negative theology was applied to the understanding of revelation." [quotation: 
I Kings 19: 11 - 12, Elijah at Horeb ]:God in Search of Man, p.I86. 
128 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.22. 
129 Perlman, Heschel's Idea of Revelation, p.I21. 
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directly to God who cannot be objectively conceived. Thus Perlman claims that although 
Heschel, in the above quotation, does not quote the Rabbinic sources directly, he does 
paraphrase them, and that the content of these two ineffable commandments "motivates 
and guarantees the validity of the entire relationship between God and Israel in Heschel' s 
theology". 130 
Perlman believes the fact that Heschel wrote Torah min ha-shamayim, which catalogues 
Rabbinic understandings of revelation, after the completion of his own theological works, 
is an indication of "the seriousness of the question of authenticity faced by Heschel": 
Torah Min Hashamayim, which basically catalogues two attitudes 
towards revelation, is a response to the problem of authenticity. It is 
not merely a restatement of rabbinic ideas but of the integrity of the 
midrashic process itself. The radical character of depth-theology, 
which refuses to identify the content of revelation with the text of the 
Bible, has its precedent in rabbinic theology according to Heschel. 131 
According to Heschel's analysis, the school of Rabbi Ishmael was concerned to explain the 
plain sense of the biblical text, whilst that of Rabbi Akiva was astonished at the words, 
perceiving their esoteric meaning rather than their logical character. That Heschel limits 
the content of revelation to "the ineffable and its ideal correlations" is a reflection of Rabbi 
Ishmael's strategy, yet he explains the nature of the idea with an illustration from Rabbi 
Akiva: 
130 Perlman, Heschel's Idea of Revelation, p.122. 
131Ibid.,p.123. 
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In the teaching of R. Akiva, who dealt with the story of the chariot and 
entered the 'garden', a relation of feeling is joined with God. Not 
only did he redeem Israel from Egypt, 'As it were, He also redeemed 
Himself. He teaches that the participation of The Holy One, Blessed 
Be He, with the life of Israel is not simply a matter of paying attention 
to them, not simply the quality of mercy which emanates from the 
relation of mercy to His people. The suffering of compassion is a type 
of suffering from afar, the suffering of an onlooker, however the 
participation of the Holy One, Blessed Be He, is an identification, a 
matter that is part of His very nature, of His glory and essence, as it 
were He suffers with the suffering of His people. 'In every place 
Israel is exiled the Presence is with them . . . and in the future when 
they return the Presence will be with them' .132 God is a participant in 
the suffering of His creatures, He is joined in a common destiny with 
His people, pained by its suffering, and redeemed in its redemption. 
In consequence of this method, that serves as a new form for the 
teaching of the prophets concerning THE DIVINE PATHOS, a 
profound revolution in religious thinking begins. 133 
Perlman is in no doubt that here is the origin of Heschel's concept of the Divine Pathos as 
the object of revelation in depth-theology.134 Nor does Heschel's dependence on Rabbi 
Akiva's idea of pathos prevent his use of an idea of Rabbi Ishmael's that determines the 
content of pathos: 
132 "Presence" = Shekinah: "The Bible refers to God's dwelling in the midst of the children oflsrael 
(Exodus 13: 21 - 2; 40: 34 - 8). Later the concept of the Shekinah embodied God's presence in the world 
with the people as a whole and with individuals sharing in Israel's suffering and exile". (Dan Cohn-Sherbock 
(Ed.), The Blackwell Dictionary of Judaica, Blackwells, Oxford, 1992, p.497). 
133 Heschel, Torah min ha-shamayim, YoU, p.XLIV, quoted in Perlman, Heschel's Idea of Revelation, 
p.124f. 
134 Perlman, Heschel's Idea of Revelation, p.l25. 
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In the teaching of R. Ishmael there is a distant intellectual relationship 
to God. He [R. Ishmael] never speaks of the essence of the Holy One 
Blessed Be He, but only of his relationship to Israel. He, who tried to 
explain away the expressions that are inappropriate to the glory [of 
God], certainly would not maintain the idea of the salvation of God, 
neither in its content nor in its language. In his spirit these words of 
astonishment are said: 'And does He need the help of others?!' 'And 
does he need assistance?!' 'We need His glory'. The sages who did 
not accept the teaching of R. Akiva understood the relationship of The 
Holy One Blessed Be He, to Israel, as a moral relation; as it were, 
forced by the word and promise to our forefathers, and faithful to the 
covenant He made with them. This relationship is based on will and 
moves to the outside. The first view stresses the divine pathos, a 
relationship which is a dynamic view of occurrences. The second 
view stresses the covenant, a static relationship. The one is a matter 
of the soul, and the other is a matter of the will. The one stresses the 
spirit of the relationship of God to Israel in its own merit; the other 
one stresses the relationship of God to Israel in the merits of the 
forefathers. 135 
Thus the position of Rabbi Ishmael, according to Heschel, is based on moral intention 
which never posits any meaning about the divine essence, but only sees meaning through 
the moral relationship of God and Israel itself. This is also central to Heschel' s 
understanding of revelation: that it is a transitive concern, based on God's moral 
intention, 136 never on his self-existence. 137 
135 Heschel, Torah min ha-shamayim, YoU, p.xUY, quoted in Perlman, Heschel's Idea o/Revelation, 
p.12S. 
136 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.144. 
137 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.26S. 
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Thus, although it is Heschel's expressed purpose in Torah min ha-shamayim to deal 
impartially with how the schools of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael understood revelation 
and how this affected their commentators, Heschel himself clearly and consistently follows 
Rabbi Ishmael on the most crucial point. Rabbi Ishmael's approach to the content of 
revelation is the basis of Heschel's, and authenticates it in the light of the Rabbinic 
tradition. 
The Embarrassment of the Divine Pathos 
Having established the unique position of the theology of the divine pathos, Heschel asks 
why it is that Jewish and Christian theologians have been embarrassed by it and opposed to 
it. In his opinion their opposition is due to "a combination of philosophical 
presuppositions which have their origin in classical Greek thinking".138 In The Prophets he 
examines the validity of these presuppositions, and therefore the validity of the opposition 
to the theology of pathos. He quotes E. R. Dodds: "the Greek had always felt the 
experience of passion as something mysterious and frightening, the experience of a force 
that was in him, possessing him, rather than possessed by him".139 And since, 
etymologically, the word "pathos" suggests that the "victim" is just that-a passive 
recipient of pain, pleasure and passions, dependent upon an agent or cause-it was 
assumed that God could never be so affected. 
138 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.27. 
139 E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, University of California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1951, p. 185, quoted in Heschel, The Prophets II, p. 27. 
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The Deity, the Supreme Cause, could not possibly suffer from, or be 
affected by, something which is effected by Himself. Passivity was 
held to be incompatible with the dignity of the divine. It was on these 
grounds-the conception of a First Cause and its dignity-that pathos 
was rej ected. 140 
One aspect of Plato's concept of the duality of the soul (i.e. reason and emotion sharply 
contrasted, with emotion belonging to humankind's animal nature and reason to the divine 
in humanity)141 was developed by Stoicism and became the prevalent view. The Stoics 
considered the emotions to be unreasonable and the source of evil, and therefore morality 
demanded the domination of the emotions by reason, so that all action was of the will. 
"Apathy" was the supreme moral task, the goal of Aristotle's virtuous, self-sufficient 
man.142 By extension, the perfect example of the impassible deity is the God of Aristotle: 
by identifying God with the First Cause, the Unmoved Mover, Aristotle's God has no 
pathos, no needs. As Heschel describes it: "Ever resting in itself, its only activity is 
thinking about thinking. Indifferent to all things it contemplates nothing but itself. Things 
long for it, and are thereby set in motion, but they are left to themselves".143 No virtues, 
not even acts of justice, can be ascribed to God, and whereas Greek philosophy ascribed 
thought and contemplation to the deity, it ascribed neither emotion nor virtue. 144 
140 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.28. 
141 Plato, Phaedo, 94DE (www.plato.evansville.edultexts/jowettlphaedo.htrn); Republic, 441BC 
(www. plato .evansville . edultexts/jowettlrepublic .htrn). 
142 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, (Tr. David Ross), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp.36, 99, 
105, 127, 270f, etc. 
143 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.3!. 
144 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.31f. Not emotion, since "He is above joy and sorrow", and "the assumption 
of feelings in God is incompatible with the idea of divinity", nor virtue-not even acts of justice-since "the 
circumstances of action are trivial and unworthy of God". 
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Thus when Judaism and Christianity encountered the Greek intellectual world Biblical , 
statements ascribing "emotions" to God were dismissed as mere metaphors, and this 
method became generally accepted both in traditional Jewish and traditional Christian 
thinking. 
Christianity, in its encounter with the Greek intellectual world, gave rise to the "two 
natures" concept of Christo logy which enabled the acceptance of the impassibility of God 
and the passibility of Christ, in opposition to monophysite and Nestorian heresies. The 
former, in maintaining the one nature of "God the Lord incarnate", rejected the true 
manhood of Christ; the latter, in concern for the biblical witness to the real humanity of 
Christ, postulated two separate natures in Christ, the divine remaining completely separate 
from the human, which alone was capable of suffering. The Church rejected both 
monophysitism and Nestorianism, since the former resulted in an expression of the identity 
of God and humanity, and the latter in a dualism that made it impossible to maintain the 
doctrine of the incarnation. Thus the Chalcedonian Definition (451 CE) maintained, 
against both heresies: "One and the same Christ, made known in two natures without 
confusion, without change, without division and without separation".145 This gave rise to 
the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum, in which the attributes of each of the two natures 
of Christ may be predicated of the other in view of their union in the one Person of 
Christ. 146 Thus early Christian theologians resorted to a complex Christology and to 
Trinitarianism so as to be able to hold together the doctrine of the Incarnation and the 
145 1. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1965, p.340. 
146 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christology, Collins, London, 1966, p.88-91. 
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reality of the sufferings of Christ, in response to heresy from patripassianism to the 
Theopaschites. A clear defence of impassibility seemed necessary to protect the faith from 
error, and the "two natures" doctrine of the person of Christ permitted a duality of the 
Godhead as being both impassible and passible. 
Judaism, however, had neither Christianity'S need (or ability) to allow God both passibility 
and impassibility, but the Oneness and "Godness" of God seemed best protected by 
maintaining the impassibility of God against Christian controversy. Medieval Jewish 
scholars were also writing in a controversial context, in defence against both Christianity 
and Islam. Judah Halevi, the 12th century Spanish poet and religious philosopher, 
maintains that mercy and compassion are signs of "a weakness of the soul and irritability 
of nature, and cannot therefore be applied to God".147 Maimonides, as paraphrased by 
Heschel, asserts that no predicate implying passibility could be ascribed to God: 
For all passibility implies change: the agent producing that change 
cannot be the same as the one who is affected by the change, and if 
God could be affected in any way whatever, this would imply that 
another being beside Him would act on Him and cause change in 
Him.148 
147 Judah Halevi, Kuzari, II, 2, quoted in Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.32. In addition to his poetry, Halevi is 
renowned for his treatise, the Kuzari, originally written in Arabic and later translated into Hebrew. It is a 
work of Jewish apologetics, defending Judaism against Greek philosophy, Christianity and Islam, and against 
the Karaite heresy. 
148 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.32. 
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Maimonides interprets the Biblical references that refer to qualities of God, not as 
describing God's essence, but simply as human ways of understanding God's action; e.g. if 
God is called "compassionate" he does not feel compassion, but what he does is similar to 
how a human being would act out of a feeling of compassion. 149 
In Christian theology, at least until the Reformation, mainstream tradition maintained the 
freedom of the divine nature from all suffering. Augustine maintained that the Hebrew 
Bible predicated passions in God either because of the peculiarities of the Hebrew 
language or, mistakenly, in trying to speak intelligently to human beings. He felt it "to be 
a desecration and blasphemy" for anyone to suppose God to be passible. 150 More than 
eight centuries later, Aquinas continued to affirm that the very notion of passibility is 
inconsistent with the perfection of pure being that "God" denotes. I 51 Indeed, the influence 
of classical Greek thought was such that the dualistic concept of the soul prevailed in 
Western thought down the ages, and since "what is postulated for man must be fulfilled in 
God", the absolute of all perfections, apathes to theion became axiomatic for Jewish and 
Christian theology. 
149 Maimonides, The Guide/or the Perplexed, p.75-78. See Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.32. 
ISO H. Wheeler Robinson, Suffering Human and Divine, SCM, London, 1940, p.165. 
151 Knight, The Hebrew Prophetic Consciousness, p.141. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 
Quest IX, Article 1. 
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In Paul Fiddes' recent discussion of divine suffering, he suggests that one reason for the 
present "change of mind" over traditional belief in the impassibility and immutability of 
God is the modem exploration of what "the love of God" might mean in the light of our 
understanding of what it means to be personal, 152 i.e. that true personal love must invol\'e 
the suffering of the one who loves, since true love is both costly and sacrificial. Since 
sympatheia means "suffering with", then the "concrete awareness of another's suffering 
can ... only consist in participation in that suffering".153 Similarly, love means "a self-
expression of one to another", and this must also involve suffering, since suffering for and 
with another is a form of communication which "penetrates more deeply than words", and 
indeed may be "the only kind of language that can restore communities". 154 The argument, 
then, is that if God is personal, and if "God is love" refers in any sense to our normal 
experience of love, a loving God must be a sympathetic and suffering God. 
Traditional theology, however, has considered love to be an attitude and action of goodwill 
towards another (so that to love truly is to will and achieve the good of the other) having 
nothing to do with feelings. Thus Augustine distinguished between emotions and moral 
actions so far as the perfect love of God is concerned, so that "affects are effects": "His 
152 Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988, pp.16-25. 
153 Charles Hartshorn, A Natural Theology for Our Time, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1967, p.105. 
154 Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, p.17. 
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pity is not the wretched heart of a fellow sufferer ... [but] the goodness of his help ... 
When God pities, he does not grieve and he liberates".155 Similarly, Thomas Aquinas 
asserted that love, like joy but unlike sadness or anger, can be simply an act of the will and 
the intellect, so that love can be ascribed to God as a purely intellectual appetite. 156 
The classical theologians were anxious to deny compassion in God and to exclude feelings 
from God because of the insight that to be affected by others is to be changed by others. 
Indeed, to affirm compassion in God has consequences from which they shrank,157 and 
from which Heschel cannot shrink if his fundamental concept of the pathos of God is to 
hold water, e.g. what can "perfection" possibly mean when referring to God who suffers 
change. 158 
Heschel therefore questions the contrasting of reason and emotion in matters of religion: 
Is religious thinking ever to be completely separated from the stream 
of emotion that surges beneath it? Religious reason is more than just 
thinking, and religious emotion is more than just feeling. .. Emotion 
can be reasonable just as reason can be emotional ... 
In order to conceive of God not as onlooker but as a participant, to 
conceive of man not as an idea in the mind of God but as a concern, 
the category of divine pathos is an indispensable implication. To the 
biblical mind the conception of God as detached and unemotional is 
totally alien. 159 
ISS Augustine, Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum, I. 40. 
156 Thomas Aquinas, Summa The%giae, la. 20, I:, Blackfriars edition, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 
1964, Vo1.5, p.57: "Loving, enjoying and delighting are emotions when they signify activities of the 
sensitive appetite; not so, however, when they signify activities of intelligent appetite. It is in this last sense 
that they are attributed to God ... he loves without passion". 
157 Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, p.18. 
158 David Blumenthal, in conversation, Yamton (Oxford), 17th June 1996: "When people ask me, 'Isn't God 
supposed to be perfect?' I always answer, 'Well, who says so?'" 
159 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.36f. 
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Heschel insists that the Bible knows nothing of the ideas that dominate the Greek 
understanding of humankind's emotions, or the dichotomy of body and soul, or 
compartmentalisation within the soul. Instead "the heart . . . is the seat of all inner 
functions, of knowledge as well as of emotion". 160 Nor is there any suggestion that "the 
desires and passions" are to be negated. Rather than holding up the ascetic as the ideal, the 
biblical writers frequently regard emotions to be inspired, as "reflections of a higher 
power". 161 Thus there is in the Bible neither disparagement of emotion, nor celebration of 
apathy. 
The ideal state of the Stoic sage is apathy, the ideal state of the 
prophet is sympathy. The Greeks attributed to the gods the state of 
happiness and serenity; the prophets thought of God's relation to the 
world as one of concern and compassion. 162 
The dominant element in the Hebrew understanding of God in relationship to the world, 
i.e. his transcendence, found a powerful ally in one current of Greek thought, which 
contrasted the One Deity to the many in tenns of his aloofness from the world. Such a 
belief in God's real independence from the world is incompatible with any suggestion that 
suffering and sin could impair the blessedness of the divine life. Thus Von Hugel: 
Religion itself requires the Transcendence of God in a fonn and a 
degree which exclude Suffering in Him . .. Religion, at its deepest 
and in the long run, is not and never will be satisfied short of pressing 
on to, short of intimations from, the really Ultimate. 163 
160 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.37. 
161 Ibid., p.38. 
162 Ibid., p.38. 
163 Friedrich Von Hugel, Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion, (2nd Series), J. M. Dent, 
London, 1926, p.204. 
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It is in contrast to such a theological outlook that Heschel champions the prophetic 
theology of pathos. Indeed, he asks, why should "He Who created All be affected by what 
a tiny particle of his creation does or fails to do?"I64 But if God is "a Being of absolute 
self-sufficiency", then God has no need of the world, and "Religion is a monologue".165 
Yet, to the prophets, "the relationship of the world to the transcendent is signified by the 
participation of God (pathos) in the world. Not self-sufficiency, but concern and 
involvement characterize His relation to the world."166 
However, it is now more widely admitted that the biblical analogies of divine emotion are 
more than mere metaphors, being in fact "the best expression of a truth about [God] which 
has sound philosophical grounds".167 Edwin Bevan suggests that "it is felt that modes of 
speech which attribute to God characteristics of the human mind and spirit are, if not 
literally true, at any rate much nearer the reality".168 Indeed, Bevan insists that since the 
Christian Church rejected Marcion's suggestion that Christianity should separate itself 
from the Hebrew Bible, and maintained in particular the understanding of ira dei in the 
face of adverse pagan criticism, then it would be wrong to assume that the writings of 
Philo of Alexandria and some of the Church Fathers, associating Judeo-Christian thought 
forms with Greek philosophical axioms, represent the true Jewish and Christian (i.e. 
biblical) view. 169 
164 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.12. 
165 Ibid., p.13. 
166 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.15. 
167 Robinson, Suffering Human and Divine, p.159. 
168 Edwin Bevan, Symbolism and Belief, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1938, p.206. 
169 Ibid., p.2l0f. 
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One line of argument suggests that God feels suffering, but is not changed by it. Whilst 
H. P. Owen accepts that "God is incapable of suffering change from either an external or 
an internal cause", he also thinks that God must suffer for his world, feeling "sorrow, 
sadness, and pain", since he is a loving and incarnate God. 170 So he suggests that God's 
experience of suffering must be entirely vicarious, "an imaginative response"171-i.e. that 
God responds to the needs of the world without being changed by his response. Similarly 
E. L. Mascall, whilst holding that God is essentially changeless, asserts that "the intensity 
with which our actions as personal beings affect God is infinitely greater than that with 
which they affect our fellow beings". 172 
Richard Creel also proposes that God can both respond and remain immutable, suggesting 
that an immutable God responds by making eternal resolves about how to deal with all the 
possible choices that human beings might make (and Creel coins the term "presponse").173 
The problem with these arguments is that they require us to call a non-sympathetic 
involvement "love". In summing up the arguments for God's immutability and 
impassibility, Creel "defines" God as "an absolutely perfect being (an "APB").174 
Although the nature of an APB must be both impassible and immutable, he argues that it 
does not follow that God is immutable and impassible in knowledge, and that God's 
knowledge of actualities must change as the actualities do, and his knowledge of temporal 
possibilities must change as they come into existence. 
170 H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, Macmillan, London, 1971, p.23. 
171 Ibid., p.24. 
172 E. L. Mascall, He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1945, p.111, 
cf. pp.95f. 
173 Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp.17, 23, 30. 
174 Richard E. Creel, "Immutability and Impassibility", in Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (Eds.), A 
Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., 1997, p.314ff. 
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However, "God does not have to wait on history in order to decide his will".175 What 
changes is not the will of God, but how we experience it, i.e. how we change in relation to 
God's unchanging will. 
Some critics object that this is an impersonal conception of God. But 
what could be more intimate than to think of oneself or to feel oneself 
as wrapped in the eternal, exhaustive, providential will of a loving 
God who wants the best for us, who is and always has been willing the 
best for us, and who continually accompanies, surrounds, and feels for 
us in our actuality, somewhat like an omniscient loving mother would 
feel the developing foetus in her womb?176 
In a development from his earlier "hard-line impassibilist" position, Creel offers a middle 
way through the impassibilist/passibilist conflict by suggesting that God can be 
"emotionally touched" but not "emotionally crushed". The God who IS "perfectly, 
imperturbably happy through enjoyment of his own perfection, through knowledge of the 
goodness of his creation, through enjoyment of his creation, and through knowledge of his 
ultimate control over history, may be 'touched' by the joys and sufferings, good and evil 
actions of his creatures". 177 However, for Heschel, "Pathos includes love, but goes beyond 
it. God's relation to man is not an indiscriminate outpouring of goodness, oblivious to the 
condition and merit of the recipient ... "178 
175 Creel, "Immutability and Impassibility", p.316. 
176 Ibid., p.317. 
177 Ibid.. p.318. 
178 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.63. 
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Creel's "warm fuzzy" view of the love of God ignores the extent of human suffering in a 
world after Auschwitz, when it is clear that the experience of many people of faith is not 
that of being "wrapped in the eternal, exhaustive, providential will of a loving God who 
wants the best for us". Richard Rubenstein reached his "theological point of no return" 
when he visited Heinrich Gruber, Dean of the Evangelical Church in Berlin, who 
demonstrated the logical consequences of accepting the normative Judaeo-Christian 
theology of history in the light of the death camps: 
If I believed in God as the omnipotent author of the historical drama 
and Israel as His Chosen People, I had to accept Dean Gruber's 
conclusion that it was God's will that Hitler committed six million 
Jews to slaughter. I could not possibly believe in such a God nor 
could I believe in Israel as the chosen people of God after 
Auschwitz. 179 
Yet Rubenstein's rejection of God is illogical in the face of the God of Pathos, who is, in 
Heschel's terms, "the quintessential Job ... God needs not only sympathy and comfort but 
partners, silent warriors". It is one of Heschel's remarkably few direct references to the 
Holocaust: 
Life in our time has been a nightmare for many of us, tranquillity an 
interlude, happiness a fake. Who could breathe at a time when man 
was engaged in murdering the holy witness to God six million times? 
And yet God does not need those who praise Him when in a state 
of euphoria. He needs those who are in love with Him when in 
distress, both He and ourselves. This is the task: in the darkest night 
to be certain of the dawn, certain of the power to tum a curse into a 
blessing, agony into a song. To know the monster's rage and, in spite 
of it, proclaim to its face (even a monster will be transfigured into a 
angel); to go through Hell and to continue to trust in the goodness of 
God-this is the challenge and the way. 180 
179 Rubenstein, After A uschwitz, (First Edition), p.46. 
180 Heschel, A Passion for Truth, p.30 1. 
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Fiddes notes that Christian theologians, in focusing on the Cross, have overlooked the 
witness of the Hebrew Bible to a God who suffers because of his covenant-love for people, 
especially in terms of unrequited love. This suffering of God "is characterized by the 
prophets as a blend of love and wrath. This is presented as a pathos which is God's own 
pathos". lSI 
In the first place we notice that the prophet does not simply find that 
God is sharing in the suffering of his people: he finds that he, the 
prophet, is called to share in the suffering of God who is grieved for 
his people. That is, the prophet finds himself caught up into the 
situation of a God who is in pain, and only thus does he discover the 
true plight of his fellow men. lS2 
I suspect that here Fiddes is following Jiirgen Moltmann, who specifically cites Heschel's 
theology of pathos in The Crucified God and in later books of trinitarian theology.IS3 
Fiddes acknowledges Heschel as speaking of the prophet as someone who is in sympathy 
with the pathos of God, so that "it is as if God says 'My pathos is not your pathos"'.IS4 
Fiddes also draws attention to the work of the Japanese theologian Kazoh Kitamori, who 
speaks of God's own particular suffering as God's "transcendent pain" (to be distinguished 
from his "immanent pain" of suffering in fellowship with the world), so that man's 
vocation is to make human pain "serve the pain of God".lS5 
lSI Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, p.19f. 
IS2 Ibid., p.20f. 
IS3 Jiirgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, SCM, London, 1974, pp.270-2. See also Moltmann, The Church 
in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic Ecclesiology, SCM, London, 1977, p.370 n.108; 
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God, SCM, London, 1981, pp.25 - 30; 
Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation, SCM, London, 1992, p.273f. 
IS4 Fiddes, Creative Suffering of God, p.20f. See Hesche1, Prophets, II, pp.3ff, 56. 
ISS Ibid., p.21. See Kazoh Kitamori, Theology of the Pain of God (Trans. M. E. Bratcher), SCM, London, 
1966, pp. 50, 53ff., 100ff. 
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Fiddes suggests it is no accident that both Kitamori and Heschel were writing against a 
background of suffering, the former in the shadow of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
and the latter in the shadow of the Holocaust. 
Despite this widespread adoption of Heschel's theology of pathos in the modem literature 
of the suffering of God, Richard Creel offers three arguments for the maintenance of divine 
impassibility: divine infinitude; that God is pure act (causally prior to everything else); and 
that God must be perfectly blissful. 186 
Biblical theology is anthropomorphic in the sense that it uses language to describe a 
personal God which speaks as if God were a human being. Yet at the same time it is 
consistent in reminding us that God is infinitely more than humankind. 187 Thus Heschel 
describes "two poles of prophetic thinking": 
The idea that God is one, holy, different and apart from all that exists, 
and the idea of the inexhaustible concern of God for man, at times 
brightened by His mercy, at times darkened by his anger. He is both 
transcendent, beyond human understanding, and full of love, 
compassion, grief and anger. 188 
186 Creel, "Immutability and Impassibility", p.314f. 
187 Robinson, Suffering Human and Divine, p.159. 
188 Heschel, "The Concept of Man in Jewish Thought", Neusner and Neusner (Eds.), To Grow in Wisdom, 
p.113. Italics added. See also Heschel, "Mystical Element", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur 
and Spiritual Audacity, p.182. 
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Thus Heschel insists that to maintain that God is a God of pathos is not to reduce Him to 
the level of humankind. God who is truly present, is ontologically and ethically 
transcendent. He is transcendent ontologically, since his being is not exhausted by his 
presence. It is to protect God's transcendence that Heschel rejects Tillich's description of 
God as "the ground of being",189 preferring to speak of God as "being in and beyond all 
beings",190 or, more concretely, as "One Who brings others into being, as One Who cares 
for other beings" .191 And God is transcendent ethically by virtue of his holiness. 192 
Heschel and Process Theology 
There are obvious parallels between Heschel's thought and that of the process 
philosophers, principally Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, although 
Heschel never draws attention to his affinity with them. Heschel would clearly have 
agreed with Whitehead that "God is the great companion-the fellow sufferer who 
understands",193 and concurred with one of Whitehead's central affirmations, that "God is 
not be to treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their 
collapse. He is their chief exemplification". 194 
189 Tillich, Systematic Theology, YoU, p.124, and passim. 
190 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.78. 
191 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.92. 
192 Sherman, Promise of Heschel, p.30f. 
193 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Macmillan, New York, 1929, 
p.532. 
194 Ibid., p.521. 
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Indeed, Fritz Rothschild seeks to encourage "future researchers . . . to probe the 
connections and parallels between Heschel's biblical philosophy and process 
philosophers" .195 
Process philosophy, which originated in Whitehead's work, has created a theology of 
nature, in which each participant in the life of the world is bound up with all others in a 
network of mutual influences. Process theologians have therefore been able to conceive of 
God creating from inside rather than outside the community of the world, so that divine 
suffering is central to divine action: since the world is a living society growing towards the 
aims God sets for it, through the network of mutual influences, God himself shares in the 
conditions of its becoming, in which each entity has freedom in the way it forms its own 
"subjective aim" or sense of purpose. 196 According to Whitehead, God "keeps the rules" 
of the universe and is not exempt from suffering, whilst remaining other from the world as 
the Supreme Mind which the process of creativity demands. In what Whitehead calls 
God's "consequent nature" and Hartshorne God's "concrete state", God is influenced by 
195 Fritz A. Rothschild, "Varieties of Heschelian Thought", in John C. Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua 
Heschel: Exploring His Life and Thought, Macmillan, New York, 1985, p.89. Earlier Sol Tanenzapf, 
("Heschel and his Critics", p.278) had pointed to process philosophy as supportive to Heschel: "[Heschel] did 
not consider whether there are metaphysical systems that would pennit him to fonnulate, without distortion, 
his understanding of the Biblical vision of reality and, in tum, provide some evidential support for it. It is my 
opinion that Whitehead's philosophy, as developed by Charles Hartshorne and others, would allow him to do 
just that. Harold M. Schulweis, "Charles Hartshorne and the Defenders of Heschel", Judaism, Vo1.24, 
Winter 1975, p.58, responding to Tanenzapf, argues that "the proposed relationship of Biblical and process 
categories can be only surface accommodation. The moral connotation of goodness in HescheI's Biblical 
view and in Hartshorne's process view are radically different. Hartshorne transmutes the Biblical 
understanding of moral values into metaphysical values. His metaphysical understanding of God's goodness, 
love, suffering and concern is incompatible with HescheI's Biblical appreciation of those devine [sic] 
predicates" . 
196 Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp.130-4, 373fT. 
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the world. Indeed, "he is caused by the world in a supreme manner, and as the archetypal 
sufferer he grows and develops in response to the world as we do".197 
But in what Whitehead calls God's "primordial nature" and Hartshorne his "abstract 
essence", God is "the uncaused cause, impassible, immutable and all the rest of it".198 
Thus, according to process theology, in his world-related aspect God is dependent upon 
creation, but in his transcendent aspect the world is dependent upon him as the ground of 
all possibility. Similarly Heschel believes that God's pathos belongs to God's outward 
relationship with humankind, to God's self-involvement of sharing in the history of his 
people, not to God's being-it is "modal", not "essential".199 There are also considerable 
similarities in the thought of Heschel and Hartshorne because both are engaged in the 
struggle to make biblical theology consistent with a modem understanding of what it 
means to be human in terms of individuality, personhood and belonging.2oo 
Thus it would appear that process philosophy could lend metaphysical weight to Heschel's 
concept of the divine pathos, and help to overcome the charge of anthropomorphism. 
Indeed it has been suggested that biblical theology as a whole might find it useful to adopt 
Hartshorne's approach.201 However, the proposed relationship between biblical and 
process categories is not in itself substantial enough to carry the weight of argument 
197 Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, p.124. See Whitehead, Process and Reality, p.522-533, and 
Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, and the Logic of Theism, Archon Books, Hamden, 1964, p.230-40, 
321f. 
198 Charles Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1967, p.44; 
Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp.134, 524. 
199 HescheL The Prophets, II, 5f, 9. 
200 S. Daniel Breslauer, "Modernizing Biblical Religion: Abraham Heschel and Charles Hartshorne", 
Encounter (Indianapolis), Vo1.38, No.4, Autumn 1977, p.337ff. 
201 Schulweis, "Charles Hartshorne and the Defenders of Hesche I", p.58. 
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intended. Although Hartshorne's categories do allow for the logic of a God who develops 
in knowledge and relationship and yet remains absolute and unsurpassed, they fail the 
moral test of Heschel's biblical theology: they do not reflect the divine pathos which 
"reveals the extreme pertinence of man to God, His world-directness, attentiveness and 
concern"-the God who '''looks at' the world and is affected by what happens in it", and 
to whom "man is the object of His care and judgement".202 The question is, How is 
Hartshorne's God "an all-loving, efficacious friend"?203 
In Hartshorne's panentheism, God is the Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, knowing and 
including the world, whose goodness is expressed in his total concern for all-the God 
who literally loves all and "appreciates the qualities of all things-period".204 Thus, for 
example, God cannot care about the sick child without caring about the bacterium, but 
grieves in all griefs, and having "other values to consider also"205 cannot destroy the 
bacterium in order to save the child. In such a context Heschel's fundamental tenet of 
biblical theology that humankind is, specifically, God's "significant other", and that God's 
goodness is known in benevolence towards humankind, smacks of nothing less than 
chauvinism. For Hartshorne divine justice and love are impersonal functions of being, and 
his God stands aside from the humanistic bias of the God of the Bible who "delivers the 
needy when he calls, the poor and him who has no helper. He has pity on the weak and the 
202 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.263. 
203 Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, p.93. 
204 Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, Open Court, LaSalle, Illinois, 1962, p.142. 
205 Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, p.l05. 
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needy, and saves the lives of the needy. From oppression and violence he redeems their 
life~ and precious is their blood in his sight".206 Thus Heschel's perception of prophetic 
theology makes moral demands on God which process philosophy, whose concept of 
providence extends equally to non-rational and rational beings, is unable to satisfy. 
A Critical Response 
Since Heschel sets out "a truly revolutionary doctrine, challenging the whole venerable 
tradition of Jewish and Christian metaphysical theology from Philo, Maimonides, and 
Thomas Aquinas, to Hennan Cohen, Etienne Gilson, and Paul Tillich", 207 it should be 
expected that his Theology of Pathos would attract criticism. Rothschild is therefore not 
surprised that there has been much opposition to Heschel's theology, though he is 
disappointed that there has not been "more detailed and searching criticism of his various 
doctrines": 
Surely a thinker who has thrown down the gauntlet to the whole 
venerable tradition of Jewish and Christian metaphysical theology 
which includes Plato, Sa'adia Gaon and Maimonides, and who 
proclaims that Greek categories such as "being" are inadequate to 
Judaism, and must be replaced by a new set of categories derived from 
biblical thinking, must expect brickbats from many directions. To 
replace Aristotle's Unmoved Mover with the Bible's Most Moved 
Mover and to argue for an anthropopathic God against the Rambam's 
austerely de-mythologized Deity is no minor matter.208 
206 Psalm 72: 12-14 (RSV). 
207 Rothschild, "Architect and Herald of a New Theology", p.2II. 
208 Rothschild, "The Religious Thought of Abraham Heschel", p.19f. 
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The most outspoken criticism of Heschel's position on the Divine Pathos is Eliezer 
Berkovits' 1964 article "Dr. A. J. Heschel's Theology of Pathos", which he included ten 
years later in his Major Themes in Modern Philosophies of Judaism,209 although it is 
neither an extended treatment of Heschel' s work, nor an exploration of Heschel' s 
treatment of "major themes", but a review essay written in direct response to the 
publication of The Prophets. 
Berkovits sums up Heschel's analysis of prophetic religion in terms of divine pathos and 
prophetic sympathy thus: "God is passible; He is affected by what man does and He reacts 
according to His affection. He is a God of pathos. He is 'emotionally affected' by the 
conduct of man". In support of this summary, Berkovits quotes Heschel: "This notion that 
God can be intimately affected, that He possesses not merely intelligence and will, but also 
pathos, basically defined the prophetic consciousness of God".210 
Berkovits claims that Heschel takes literally all Biblical ascriptions of emotion to God, and 
in allowing the prophets to share these emotions, feeling them as God's feelings, ignores 
all the "age-old problems of Jewish theology and philosophy" except one: 
anthropomorphism (or, specifically in this discussion, anthropopathy): "The question of 
course is: by ascribing emotions to God, by allowing Him to be affected by man, by 
conceiving Him as capable of joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, don't we form Him in the 
image ofman?"211 
209 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, pp.192-224. 
210 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.13, cited by Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.193. 
211 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.194 
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Heschel anticipated the accusation of creeping anthropomorphism in his fonnulation of the 
divine pathos, since "regarded as a fonn of humanization of God, the profound 
significance of this fundamental category is lost ... "212 To speak of God as if he were a 
person does not necessarily mean to personify him: "there is a difference between 
anthropomorphic conceptions and anthropomorphic expressions".213 Thus to speak of 
pathos as feeling and concern in God, experienced in relationship with Him, is not to deal 
in conceptual equations. Rather, it is the attempt of poetic utterance to express what is 
essentially beyond human grasp and yet experienced. 
The language the prophets employed to describe [God's] supreme 
concern [for justice] was an anthropomorphism to end all 
anthropomorphisms. 
Prophecy is essentially a proclamation that God's ways are not 
man's ways ... The belief that ultimately there is a God of justice, a 
God whose concern is for justice, is anthropomorphic in the sense in 
which the idea of transcendence or eternity is anthropomorphic. 214 
The problem is that of finding an adequate language to speak about God. Heschel and 
Berkovits are both conscious that religious language is "full of enigmas and confusions".215 
Heschel is as aware as Berkovits of the problem of anthropomorphism, but as a person of 
profound faith Heschel needs to maintain the intelligibility of some kind of religious 
language and hence biblical revelation. Although Berkovits even cites Heschel's 
disclaimers that the language of the prophets is not to be taken literally-that it is 
indicative and not descriptive-he yet accuses him of being a biblical literalist "who has 
212 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.50. 
213 Ibid., p.51. See Friedman, "Abraham Heschel among Contemporary Philosophers", p.296: 
"Anthropomorphic language may be preferable to abstract language", Heschel said to me, "for when you use 
abstract language you may have the illusion of adequacy." 
214 Ibid., p.52. 
215 Katz Post-Holocaust Dialogues, p.126. , 
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ignored the long history of Jewish philosophy and its wrestling with the problems of divine 
attributes and Biblical anthropomorphism".216 
Heschel consistently argues that biblical language is not descriptive but indicative, where 
"descriptive" words have conventional, definite meanings, and "indicative" words have 
"intimate meanings" that cannot be fully articulated. Biblical language, Heschel maintains, 
does not convey information about God, but evokes in humankind the capacity to respond 
to God. Further, the prophets' statements about God are always understatements: 
It is usually assumed that the Biblical writers had a bent for lofty, 
swelling language, a preference for extravagant exaggeration of 
statement. However, pondering about the substance of what they were 
trying to express, it dawns upon us that what sounds to us as grand 
eloquence is understatement and modesty of expression. Indeed, their 
words must not be taken literally, because a literal understanding 
would be a partial, shallow understanding; because the literal meaning 
is but a minimum of meaning. 217 
Berkovits maintains, however, that Heschel does not succeed in solving the problem, since 
the distinction between God and man is an absolute one, and therefore no matter how much 
we "magnify or purify" concepts from human experience to apply them to God, we must 
either associate a positive meaning to them and thereby describe something that is not God, 
or else we must be using words "without any meaningful positive contents".218 He insists 
that just how unsuccessful Heschel is demonstrated by the fact that the "religion of 
sympathy" only makes sense on the basis of anthropopathy. "Can man grasp the thoughts 
of God, can he make God's ways his own?"219 If God's pathos were as different 
216 Tanenzapf, "Heschel and his Critics", p.280. 
217 Heschel, God in Search, p.180. Heschel adds a footnote: "The prophets adjusted their words to the 
capacity of human understanding; see Mechilta to Exodus 19: 18; compare The Mishnah of Rabbi Eliezer, 
rule 14, ed. Enelow, New York, 1933, p.2S." 
218 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.196. 
219 Ibid., p.197. 
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from human pathos as God is from humankind, then the divine pathos would remam 
morally and emotionally incomprehensible to any human being. Since it does not remain 
incomprehensible, "the difference is only one of degree-that is why the prophet may feel 
it as his own-and not one of kind. It is exactly what is meant by anthropomorphism and 
anthropopathy". 220 
Yet for Heschel the divine pathos is understood, not in essential terms, but in relational 
terms: "The idea of the divine pathos is not a personification of God but an 
exemplification of divine reality, an illustration or illumination of His concern. It does not 
represent a substance but an act or a relationship".221 
Thus Berkovits and Heschel are working from different premises: the former from the 
preconception that "it is inconceivable that the Supreme Being should be passible";222 the 
latter from the observation that "it is the greatness of God according to the Bible that man 
is not an abstraction to Him, nor is His judgement a generalization".223 Berkovits begins 
from the presupposition that God is "totally other", Heschel from the divine-human 
relationship which assumes, according to a biblical perspective, that God is supreme, but 
220 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.198. 
221 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.53. 
222 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.205. 
223 Heschel, Prophets, II, p.37. 
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not the absolute antithesis of humanity.224 Berkovits declares the analogy between the 
divine and the human and the consequent belief in God's pathos to be "from the Jewish 
point of view ... alien and objectionable ... ".225 Heschel states the opposite: "the Wholly 
Other is the sharp antithesis to the consciousness of man. .. Absolute antithesis is alien to 
the Hebrew mind".226 Berkovits suggests that the God of pathos is "a God shaped in the 
image of man", but for Heschel an analogy between the divine and the human means, 
rather, that human beings are shaped in the image of God. 227 Heschel, beginning from 
biblical faith rather than from a preconceived philosophical notion, does not have to face 
Berkovits' dilemma: "how to reconcile the notion of God's absolute otherness with the 
biblical testimony of God's relationship to historical human beings".228 Heschel merely 
needs to point to the lack of incongruity between being the supreme Lord of creation and 
history whilst being intimately related to created beings immersed in history. Indeed, from 
Heschel's perspective, "a being unrelated to historical creatures could not qualify as the 
supreme Lord of creation and history."229 
224 Merkle, "Heschel's Theology of Divine Pathos", p.77. 
225 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.224. 
226 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.7. 
227 Merkle, "Heschel's Theology of Divine Pathos", p.77. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. Similarly, speaking of Heschel's contribution to the making of 'a new .Jewish theology', Eu~ene. 
Borowitz reminds his readers: "God is described by the prophets as a God who IS known by man, not ill hiS 
essence but in his action and reaction to man. God is best described as a God of pathos, as one who, though 
there is 'an unbridgeable gap between him and man, is a God of feelings. The happin~ss, the sadn~ss, the 
outrage, the determination the prophets ascribe to God are not only ~eal but the most ~~portant thl,?gs men 
need to know about God. Not essence, not even existence, but God s concerns are cntIcal to men . 
Borowitz, A New Jewish Theology in the Making, p.155. 
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The relational aspect of the divine pathos is of greater importance to humankind than the 
awareness of God in his essence, because the prophetic sympathy with the divine pathos is 
in its very nature precisely opposite to the aim of mystical union with God. "We are to 
speak in terms of unity of will and feeling with the divine, not of a union of being; of a 
unio sympathetica not a unio mystica".230 Thus "the prophetic consciousness clearly 
implies the passibility of the divine being".231 
Heschel works out in detail one particular form of the divine pathos-the wrath of God-
because of its particular difficulties,232 and because of the history of the concept of ira dei 
in Christian theology.233 Berkovits also takes up this specific example in his criticism, 
under the heading: "The Dilemma of the Divine Wrath", insisting that Heschel deals 
differently with the divine wrath than with other manifestations of the divine pathos, 
which, he claims, Heschel accepts literally.234 
230 North, The Old Testament Interpretation of History, p.174. See Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.99: "There 
is no fusion of being, unio mystica, but an intimate harmony in will and feeling, a state that may be called 
unio sympathetica". 
231 Knight, Hebrew Prophetic Consciousness, p.138. It should be noted that Heschel claimed that his ideas 
of the divine pathos and prophetic sympathy as developed in Die Prophetie were adopted by H. Wheeler 
Robinson (Redemption and Revelation, London,1942, and Two Hebrew Prophets, London, 1948), by C. R. 
North (The Old Testament Interpretation of History, London, 1946) and by H. Knight (Hebrew Prophetic 
Consciousness, London, 1947) among others. Heschel, Prophets, II, p.88n. 
232 He also selects the specific form of the divine justice, "because of its overwhelming importance". 
233 Heschel, The Prophets, II, pp.59-86. 
234 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.198. 
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Heschel proceeds by showing that God's anger must be treated as only one aspect of the 
divine pathos, "one of the modes of God's responsiveness to man". And since Heschel 
understands that the basic premise of biblical thinking is that "the Lord is good to all, and 
his compassion is over all that he has made" CPs. 145:9), then God's anger, too, must be an 
expression of his concern for humankind,235 and therefore contingent upon the response of 
the people, and transient-"suspended love"-since love or mercy is "the normal and 
original pathos". 236 Thus the anger of God is not a petulant tantrum, or a synonym for 
punishment,237 but love for the unjustly treated-love for justice-at its best. 
Berkovits finds that here, at least, Heschel has become a "rationalist", explaining the 
pathos of anger in terms of "the absoluteness of the divine being", and so 
One cannot help wondering . . . what would become of the entire 
theology of pathos and the religion of sympathy if one would apply 
the same method of interpretation to the other emotions of God. What 
if one applied it to the principle of God's absolute difference from 
man?238 
235 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.63. 
236 Ibid., p.77. 
237 Ibid., p.60. 
238 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.199f. 
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Thus Berkovits accuses Heschel of inconsistency: 
[Heschel] says with great emphasis: "God is all-personal, all-subject", 
and with even greater conviction he insists: " ... it is because God is 
absolutely personal-devoid of anything impersonal-that His ethos 
is full of pathos" ... 
When he is on the defensive, Dr. Heschel maintains that pathos 
has nothing to do with divine substance; it is an act, it is not an 
attribute. 239 
And since, for Berkovits, Heschel becomes a "rationalist" when he explains the wrath of 
God in tenns of "the absolute greatness of the divine being", it follows that he accuses 
Heschel of inconsistency in his main argument. However, whilst it is true that at times 
Heschel appears to be led by his distinctive style and approach to go beyond the limits of 
pathos that he sets himself, and to describe the essence of God, nevertheless his work 
should be evaluated on the evident central thesis.240 Although Heschel's style does create 
problems for anyone expecting a logical and systematic presentation of the material,241 he 
has already spelled out the theological presupposition of the doctrine of divine pathos: 
We are inclined to question the legitimacy of applying the tenn 
anthropopathy to the prophetic statements. .. Biblical man's 
imagination knows nothing about God, how He lives, and what 
occupies Him. He is God and not man (Hos.II :9, Isaiah 31 :3).242 
239 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.213. 
240 E. LaB. Cherbonnier, "Heschel and the Philosophy of the Bible", p.29. 
241 Maurice Friedman, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: Towards a Philosophy of Judaism", Conservative 
Judaism, VoLl 0, No.2, Winter 1956, p.9f. Borowitz fmds the style "intriguing but frustrating", New Jewish 
Theology in the Making, p.157. 
242 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.50. 
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Heschel's approach is not irrational: indeed, for him "an irrational theology could not 
possibly be Biblical".243 He is not at all hostile to reason, but he is hostile to rational 
systems that lead to an idolatrous, "intellectual" God. Heschel "charges that traditional 
theology, precisely because it is not sufficiently Biblical, proves upon analysis to be far 
less rational than it claims".244 He makes the point that the "anaesthetization" of God is 
just as dangerous a pitfall as the undue "humanization" of God. 245 
Berkovits has one final accusation to lay against Heschel: that of being overly influenced 
by Christianity. He concludes his discussion of Heschel's treatment of the divine wrath: 
"One can see that Dr. Heschel does not relish the idea of an angry God but-at least 
intellectually-he rather appreciates the thought of a suffering God".246 And so Berkovits 
concludes his critique by describing Heschel's position as "most original ... in the context 
of Jewish thought and religious sensitivity", but asserts that "it does not take much 
perspicuity to realise that one has encountered these concepts in one's reading-in 
Christian theology".247 Tanenzapf, in his discussion of Berkovits' critique of Heschel, is 
inclined to "dismiss [this argument] out of hand": 
243 Cherbonnier, "Hesche I and the Philosophy of the Bible", p.23. 
244 Ibid., p.24. 
245 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.55. 
246 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.200. 
247 Ibid., p.220. 
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[Berkovits says that] to talk of God feeling sorrow and of suffering 
with man, and of prophetic religion as empathy with God's suffering, 
is Christian and an outrage to Jewish sensibilities. This looks like an 
ad hominem argument, but, on reflection, there seemed to me a valid 
point to the argument. The life of Jewish piety is, after all, part of the 
data with which a Jewish theologian must work; his job is to give an 
account of not only the thinking of the Jew, but of the religious 
experience of the Jew. If this is not part of the religious experience of 
the Jew, then there is a problem here for Heschel. But simply to say, 
as Berkovits does, that Heschel's conception of a religion of sympathy 
is Christian, that it humanizes God, that a man-like God inevitably 
leads to a God-like man is not enough. That Heschel's formulation 
has parallels in Christian thought is obvious. But it is hoped that 
Jewish thinkers are secure enough in their commitments to Judaism 
that they can re-examine those aspects of Judaism which have been 
given special emphasis in Christianity.248 
Berkovits responds directly to Tanenzapfs point in a letter addressed to the editor of 
Judaism: 
As if I had criticized Heschel for being "too" Christian. The truth is 
that I was showing that what makes sense within the framework of 
reference of Christianity is utterly meaningless in the context of 
Judaism. . .. [I]t makes excellent sense to demand of a good Christian 
that he feels the suffering of the "very man" his God was on earth. 
But to say that the prophets of Israel felt the sorrow of the God of 
Israel as their own ... is to use words that have no meaning for me. 249 
Indeed, Berkovits' assertion that "what makes sense [in] Christianity is utterly meaningless 
in .... Judaism" is reflected in his utter rejection elsewhere of the whole idea of Jewish-
Christian dialogue: 
248 Tanenzapf, "Heschel and his Critics", p.284. 
249 Eliezer Berkovits, "A Reaction to Tanenzapf', Judaism, Vo1.24, Winter 1975, p.115f. 
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As to dialogue in the purely theological sense, nothing could be less 
fruitful and more pointless. What is usually referred to as the Judeo-
Christian tradition exists only in Christian or secularist fantasy. As far 
as Jews are concerned, Judaism is fully sufficient. There is nothing in 
Christianity for them. Whatever in Christian teaching is acceptable to 
them is borrowed from Judaism ... 
All we want of Christians is that they keep their hands off us and 
our children!250 
Berkovits seems unaware of the history of Heschel's thinking about the divine pathos, 
describing The Prophets as Heschel's "latest English work", without any reference to its 
origins in the Berlin dissertation of 1936.251 Yet Heschel first came to a recognition of the 
divine pathos as revealed by the prophets at a time when Christian influence on his 
thinking was negligible. His view developed entirely from a study, not of Christian writers 
but of Hebrew prophets-a study to which he was driven by the academic environment in 
which he found himself. He sensed a "spiritual bankruptcy", and it was the realisation that 
"the right coins were not available in the common currency" that impelled him to study the 
thought of the prophets.252 Indeed, given Berkovits' accusation that Heschel imported the 
concept of the divine pathos from Christian theology, it is ironic that Heschel has a 
considerable impact on later Christian "suffering God" theology. 
Whilst Heschel was developing the theology of pathos, he was also writing a number of 
articles and papers on medieval Jewish scholars, including a biography of Maimonides, 
and works on Sa'adia and Ibn Gabriol, none of whom were strangers to the problem of 
anthropomorphism, yet Berkovits cites Maimonides in particular as an authority to counter 
Hesche!. 
250 Eliezer Berkovits, Faith after the Holocaust, Ktav, New York, 1973, pp.44, 47. 
251 Ibid., p.67. 
252 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.xvif. 
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[W]e might say that the fundamental challenge to Jewish theology 
through the ages has been how to reconcile the awareness of God's 
transcendence with the awareness of God's livingness and concern, 
which are one in the Jewish concept of God. It is this challenge that 
gave no rest to the outstanding Jewish philosophers and theologians in 
the Middle Ages; it is this challenge that is completely ignored by Dr. 
Heschel. Until he is able to render the presence of pathos in the 
Absolute meaningful or sensible he cannot speak a theology of 
pathos.253 
Steven Katz, whilst pointing out that "the argument from authority is not a philosophical 
argument",254 also argues that Heschel is "consciously philosophizing against the 
medievals, aware of their position and trying to do something different".255 When 
Berkovits calls on the rest of Jewish classical literature-Bible, Talmud and Kabbalah-in 
his attempt to discredit Heschel's theology, declaring that even kabbalists would not go as 
far as Heschel in imputing passibility to God,256 Katz suspects that 
... it is just these kabbalistic texts that are at the root of Heschel's 
thinking, imbibed deeply in the rich Hasidic world of his youth. There 
is certainly as much Divine passibility in classical kabbalah as there is 
in Heschel; and at the same time what the kabbalists try to protect 
through their postulation of the ineffable Ein So! is precisely what 
Heschel wants to protect when he eschews talk of God's essence; 
indeed he could well have written the very phrases (and comes close 
in places) that Berkovits cites from the kabbalistic classics. The same 
may also be said about the Biblical and rabbinic compositions.257 
253 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.203. 
254 Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues, p.l27. 
255 Ibid., p.l29. 
256 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.2l7. 
257 Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues, p.l29. 
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Berkovits in fact admits that there are "innumerable anthropopathic passages in the Aggada 
and Midrash" and that to deal with them "theology demands meaningful interpretation".258 
However, he asserts that his judgement is dictated by "the theological climate [that] is 
determined by a long tradition of affirmation of Divine impassibility in face of numerous 
Biblical texts to the contrary". 259 Heschel, however, asserts that in the biblical 
understanding of the divine pathos, "pathos" implies not subjugation by passion, but a will 
acting towards humankind. "An apathetic and ascetic God would have struck biblical man 
with a sense, not of dignity and grandeur, but rather of poverty and emptiness".26o 
Whereas perfection and immutability are the major categories of Greek thinking about 
God, the major category of Jewish thinking, according to Heschel, is God's oneness. The 
affirmation that God is one means, amongst much else, that God is unique and supreme, 
unlike anything else, and alone worthy of our worship. Because God is incomparable, we 
are filled with wonder, amazement and a sense of mystery in his presence. 261 If the 
medieval Jewish philosophers used the concepts of perfection, absoluteness, infinity and 
immutability to account for why the pious Jew believed that only God deserved whole-
hearted devotion, the question today is whether we can uphold God's worshipfulness, 
uniqueness and supremacy without resorting to non-Biblical concepts of perfection and 
immutability.262 
258 Berkovits, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies, p.218. 
259 Ibid., 224. 
~60 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p.38f. 
261 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, pp.l11-123. 
262 Tanenzapf, "Hesche 1 and his Critics", p.285. 
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Thus the question posed by Heschel may be expressed: 
Can we, modem men, in an age when Western culture is witnessing a 
groundswell of atheism, finally recognize our existence not as the 
accidental outcome of a fortuitous concourse of atoms, but as 
grounded in the pathos-that was his favourite word-of God, who 
suffers with and for us? The answer to this question was the ultimate 
concern of Abraham Heschel, and it is a question, not simply Jewish, 
but human.263 
263 Davies, "Conscience, Scholar, Witness", p.215. 
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CHAPTERS 
BEING HUMAN 
Divine Concern 
If "the divine pathos" is an expression of the conviction that God cannot be known in tenns 
of a list of perfections, but only in tenns of God's relatedness-his concern for and 
dynamic attentiveness towards humanityl-then the question of what it means to be human 
is the religious question. Just who is "the passionate object of [God's] interest"?2 Thus 
although religion is commonly assumed to be based on the human perception of divine 
power or sovereignty, Heschel shows that divine concern is the basic awareness of biblical 
religion.3 As Rothschild observes, Berkeley's assertion, "esse est percipi" could be a 
summary of Heschel's ontology, if percipi was broad enough to include any type of 
directed activity.4 Indeed, for Heschel, "There is only one way to define Jewish religion. 
It is the awareness o/God's interest in man . .. ".5 Convinced, therefore, that any adequate 
theology must avoid a bifurcation between God and humankind, Heschel begins his 
theological anthropology with the human being's awareness of being the object of divine 
concern: "The religious man realizes that to be means to stand for a divine concern, and 
that being only signifies existence in a physical world because it implies participation in a 
divine world ofmeaning".6 
1 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.21. 
2 Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.23. 
3 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.258. 
4 Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.22. 
S Heschel, Man /s Not Alone, p.241. 
6 Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and Man, p.22. See Heschel, Man /s Not Alone, p.145. 
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That is, truly human being not only exhibits reflexive concern-a concern for self-
preservation, in common with every living organism-but also transitive concern-a 
regard for others, in common with God.7 
Human is he who is concerned with other selves. Man is a being that 
can never be self-sufficient, not only by what he must take in but also 
by what he must give out. A stone is self-sufficient, man is self-
surpassing. Always in need of other beings to give himself to, man 
cannot even be in accord with his own self unless he serves something 
beyond himself. The peace of mind attainable in solitude is not the 
result of ignoring that which is not the self or escaping from it, but of 
reconciliation with it.8 
Thus the subject matter of human experience and thought is not God in isolation, but God 
and creation in relation. Strictly speaking, then, there is no "theology" (logos of God), and 
Heschel refers to the Bible as "God's anthropology" rather than "man's theology", since its 
business is not the divine nature and essence, but humanity in relation to God and under his 
command.9 It is this perception of the essential relatedness of God and humankind that 
underlies Heschel's understanding of what it means to be a human being. 
Heschel's first published work, a collection of poems in Yiddish entitled Der Shem 
Hameforash: Mentsh ("God's Ineffable Name: Man")IO set the tone of religious 
humanism that is characteristic of all his writings. His understanding of what it means to 
7 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.143. 
8 Ibid, p.138. 
9 Ibid., p.129. See also Heschel, God in Search of Man , pp.l6, 412) 
10 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Der Shem Hameforash: Mentsh (Yiddish), Farlag Indzl, Warsaw, 1933. A free 
translation by Zalman M. Schachter, Winnipeg, was distributed privately, and then published in the Heschel 
memorial issue of Sh 'ma: A Journal of Jewish Responsibility, Vol.3, No.46, January 19, 1973, pp.45-47. A 
translation and introduction, "from Der Shem Hameforash: Mensch", by Morton leifman, appears in the 
Heschel25th vahrzeit issue of Conservati1'e Judaism, Vol.l, No.2-3, Winter/Spring 1998. 
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be human is revealed in all his great theological classics, written in English in the United 
States of America (Man Is Not Alone, 1951; Man's Quest for God, 1953; and God in 
Search of Man, 1956). However, not until he was invited to give the 1963 Raymond Fred 
West Memorial Lectures at Stanford University (later published as Who Is Man?) did 
Heschel specifically set out his ideas on "being human". He promised in the preface of 
Who Is Man? that there was more to come on the theme: 
Many important aspects of the problem of man have not been 
discussed in this volume, while others have been dealt with too 
briefly. But the volume will serve as a prolegomena to a more 
comprehensive study in which I have been engaged for some time. I I 
The more comprehensive study never materialised, and Who Is Man? remains Heschel's 
fundamental work setting out his understanding of what it means to be human, to which 
must be added gleanings from his other major publications, articles, essays and lectures. 
Heschel's aim is to inquire, from his Jewish perspective, into what is meant by "being 
human". Is a person's humanity as intrinsic to them as walking on two legs?12 Or is it a 
psychological derivative? Does "being human" belong to human nature of necessity? 
Heschel concludes that a person's being human is constituted by the responses they make 
to the realities of which they are aware, i.e. themselves, other people, their immediate 
surroundings, and God. 13 
II Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.vii. The Raymond Fred West Memorial Lectures (which Heschel had delivered 
at Stanford University in May 1963) on which the book is based, were established in 1910, their subject 
matter being prescribed as "Immortality, Human Conduct, and Human Destiny". 
12 In Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, Origins Reconsidered: In Search o/What Makes Us Human, Little, 
Browen & Co., London, 1992, p.18, Leakey suggests that human beings should be understood as "bipedal 
apes who happened to develop all [the] other qualities we usually associate with being human". 
13 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.16, where he refers to God as "the being that transcends me", or "that which is 
but is not immediately given". 
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Who is man? A being in travail with God's dreams and designs,14 
with God's dream of a world redeemed, of reconciliation of heaven 
and earth, of a mankind which is truly His image, reflecting His 
wisdom, justice and compassion. God's dream is not to be alone, to 
have mankind as a partner in the drama of continuous creation. 15 
But Heschel begins with a problem. 
The Problem 
"Man is the problem. His physical and mental reality is beyond dispute; his meaning, his 
spiritual relevance, is a question that cries for an answer". 16 Since "man [of all creatures] 
does not take his existence for granted",17 the question of humankind is not merely an 
intellectual exercise. To ask the question is to be aware of a problem, and no problem 
arises in a vacuum but always within a specific context: 
The impulse to reflect on the humanity of man comes from the 
conscience as well as from intellectual curiosity. It is motivated by 
anxiety ... 
We are concerned with the problem of man because he is a being 
afflicted with contradictions and perplexities, because he is not 
completely part of his environment. .. Man is a problem intrinsically 
and under all circumstances. To be human is to be a problem, and the 
problem expresses itself in anguish . .. The problem of man is 
occasioned by our coming upon a conflict or contradiction between 
existence and expectation, between what man is and what is expected 
fh ' 18 o 1m ... 
14 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.253. 
15 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.119. 
16 Heschel, God in Search o/Man, pp.II9, 131. 
17 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.I3. 
18 Ibid., p.2f. 
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Heschel believes that the desire to know oneself is an intrinsic part of being human,19 and 
that the awareness of the self as a problem is fundamental to self-understanding.2o 
Therefore it simply will not do to consider the human being to be merely an animal 
distinguished from other animals by some kind of specialism, be it bipedalism, tool-
making, clothing, language or thinking. We can only do justice to human beings by 
considering them in specifically human terms-and even then the task is more than one of 
description or definition: something is meant by human being which is more than "just 
being". 
It is critique as well as description, disclosure of possibilities as well 
as exposition of actualities of human being. .. We question what we 
are in the light of an intuitive expectation or a vision of what man 
ought to be.21 
"Ignorance about man is not lack of knowledge but false knowledge",22 because in 
attempting to interpret our own being we are not only describing the nature of humankind, 
but actually fashioning it. If we get it wrong we shall adopt a false identity as human 
beings. "We become what we think of ourselves".23 In Heschel's understanding, then, the 
principal problem is not the nature of humankind, but what humankind has done with it. 
There is no such thing as pristine human nature, for "man as we encounter him is already 
stamped by an image, an artefact",24 and the image we adopt determines what our human 
being means in practice. 
19 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.4. 
20 Ibid., p.12. 
21 Ibid., p.5. 
22 Ibid., p.6. 
23 Ibid., p.7. 
24 Ibid. 
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Heschel's aim, then, is not to derive an "image of man" from human nature (since that can 
"only result in extracting an image originally injected in it"25), but to 
. . . ascertain ends and directions, asking questions and raising issues 
which are implied in description. The task ... is to explore modes of 
being which characterise the uniqueness of being human. What 
constitutes human existence?26 
He does not expect to come up with a "once and for all" solution. The question of being 
human is a universal problem to which everybody must face up for herlhimself. "Just as I 
had to go through childhood, adolescence and maturity, so must I go through the crises, 
embarrassments, heartaches, and wrestlings with this basic issue".27 
Because the question of being human can only arise in a specific context, "to understand 
the problem we must explore the situation".28 Heschel therefore sets out to identify what 
factors there are in the contemporary situation that had not been part of the question's 
context in previous generations, (like the possibility of human annihilation by nuclear war, 
which would have been considered absurd by earlier generations), and to determine which 
of them, if any, make the question itself more urgent.29 
25 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.8. 
26 Ibid., p.ll. 
27 Ibid., p.l3. 
28 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.5. 
29 Ibid., p.369. 
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He identifies an unparalleled contemporary awareness of the senousness of the 
contemporary human situation because "philosophy cannot be the same after [nor "the 
world ... the same since"30] Auschwitz and Hiroshima".3! In this specific context, and 
within the new conceptual environment it engenders, Heschel believes that the question of 
what it means to be human has become urgent. What was once assumed to be "given" has 
proved to be merely "a mass of bubbles bursting at the slightest increase in temperature".32 
And he insists that this is no academic question, but one that must be asked in the concrete 
situation-"not only in the halls of learning, but also in the presence of inmates of 
extermination camps, and in the sight of the mushroom of a nuclear explosion".33 He 
denounces the moral poverty of the modem West: "With a capacity to hurt boundlessly and 
unchecked; with the immense expansion of power and the rapid decay of compassion, life 
has, indeed, become a synonym for peril".34 He considers people to be "selfish, callous, 
and above all vicious".35 In the 1944 version of his address to the Quakers in Frankfurt he 
laments: "There has never been more reason for man to be ashamed than now".36 
30 Brown, Heschel and Novak, Vietnam: Crisis o/Conscience, p.56. 
3! Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.13. 
32 Ibid., p.15. 
33 Ibid.p.14, and in Brown, Heschel and Novak, Vietnam, p.56. 
34 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.185. 
35 Zachary Braitman, (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1998, p.69. 
36 Heschel, Man's Quest/or God, p.148. 
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Heschel sees the contemporary age as one in which, rather than be astonished at the 
achievements of humankind, it is impossible to consider the human situation "without 
shame, anguish and disgust", when joy is always tempered with grief and heartache, and 
personal triumph merely an embarrassment. 
All we have is a sense of horror. Weare afraid of man. Weare 
terrified at our own power. Our proud Western civilization has not 
withstood the stream of cruelty and crime that burst forth out of the 
undercurrents of evil in the human soul. We nearly drown in the 
stream of guilt and misery that leaves no conscience clean. .. The 
flood of wretchedness is sweeping away our monstrous conceit. 37 
Heschel identifies the world of the early 1960s as a time of dramatic failures, crises and 
self-disillusionment-and yet he believes these to be the very conditions that would pennit, 
even demand, radical reflection.38 "Ultimate questions have become our immediate 
questions".39 
Heschel finds all the many definitions offered in the attempt to shed light on the question 
of humankind to fall short-none of them reveals the whole truth about being human. For 
instance, the tendency to think of a human being as "only an animal" dates from ancient 
times, and yet Heschel insists: 
37 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.36. see also Abraham Joshua Heschel, "What is Man?", address to the 
Religious Education Association, Chicago, November 1957, reprinted in Rothschild (Ed.), Between God and 
Man. p.240, "One is ashamed to be human ... We see the writing on the wall but are too illiterate to 
understand what it says. .. All we can honestly preach is a theology of dismay. . . There is darkness in the 
East, and smugness in the West. What of the night? . .. Should not all hope be abandoned?" See also 
Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Moral Challenge to America", Proceedings of the Fifty-third Annual 
Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, April 22-24, 1960, p.62. 
38 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.14. 
39 Ibid., p.20 
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In asking the question about man our problem is not the undeniable 
fact of his animality but the enigma of what he does, because and in 
spite of, with and apart from, his animality. The question about man 
is not provoked by what we have in common with the animal 
kingdom, nor is it a function derived from what is animal in man.40 
Thus all reductionist definitions are, in the end, answers to the wrong question, and serve 
only to obscure the problem. 
[Man's] search, his being puzzled at himself, is above all an act of 
disassociation and disengagement from sheer being, animal or 
otherwise. The search for self-understanding is a search for 
authenticity of essence, a search for genuineness ... What he seeks to 
understand is not his animality but his humanity. He is not in search 
of his origin, he is in search of his destiny.41 
Heschel sees it as symptomatic of the problem of being human that people are willing to 
consider self-definitions that are zoomorphic or even mechanistic. Indeed, he speculates 
that mechanistic definitions might have become even more acceptable than zoomorphic 
definitions, because they offer a more radical way of evading the question of being human: 
"an animal stands before us as a mystery, a machine is an invention".42 
A further stage in the reductionist process describes a human being not as a whole, but as a 
list of constituent parts, or as a collection of chemical elements. Heschel quotes a common 
description from pre-Nazi Gennany: 
40 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.2l. 
4\ Ibid., p.22. 
42 Ibid., p.24. See also Heschel, "What is Man?", p.233, and Heschel, "Moral Challenge to America", p.67. 
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The human body contains a sufficient amount of fat to make seven 
cakes of soap, enough iron to make a medium-sized nail, a sufficient 
amount of phosphorus to equip two thousand match-heads, enough 
sulphur to rid oneself of one's fleas. 43 
It was this kind of description, Heschel suggests, that helped create a conceptual 
environment in which it was possible for the Nazis, in the extennination camps, to actually 
make soap from human flesh.44 
All such reductionist definitions fall short as responses to the question of what it means to 
be a human being, because at best they describe various aspects of the nature of 
humankind, whilst "what we seek to know about man is not only his disposition, the facts 
oflife, but also his meaning and vocation, the goals oflife".45 
Heschel also suggests that there has been "an eclipse of humanity" because the tenn 
"human" has become ambiguous. It carries connotations of weakness ("He is only 
human") as well as magnanimity ("To step aside is human") and charity (especially in the 
guise of "humane"). And this ambiguity has become one-sided in the modem world. 
43 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.24. See also Heschel, "What is Man", p.233. 
44 Ibid., p.25. There is now consensus that this is a myth of the holocaust, and that this particular atrocity 
did not happen: see Lipstadt, Beyond Belief, p.180, and Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The 
Growing Assault on Truth and Memory, Plume, New York, 1994, p.188. 
45 Ibid., p.27. 
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The ambiguity of Homo sapiens is an old triviality. Both praise and 
derision have been heaped profusely upon him. To some he is 
"heaven's masterpiece"; to others, "Nature's sole mistake". Yet a 
note of compassion vibrates in the older discourses about him. Today 
we are fiercely articulate in deprecation and disdain. He who would 
write a book in the praise of man would be regarded as a half-wit or a 
liar. Man is being excessively denounced and condemned by artists, 
philosophers, and theologians.46 
Indeed, in the light of the attitudes towards humankind in the contemporary literature, 
Heschel, for rhetorical purposes, suggests that "the Lord in heaven may prove to be 
[man's] last friend on earth".47 He considers that even the way the question of what it 
means to be human has been asked betrays our condition. 
We ask: What is man? Yet the true question should be: Who is man? 
As a thing man is explicable; as a person he is both a mystery and a 
surprise. As a thing he is finite; as a person he is inexhaustible. The 
popular definitions . . . offer an answer to the question, "What is 
man?" in terms of his facticity, as a thing of space. The question 
"Who is man?" is a question of worth, a question of position and 
status within the order ofbeings.48 
Thus Heschel' s fundamental assumption is that "human" is not merely an attribute but the 
essence of human being. Therefore in order for us to remain human beings, it is essential 
that we know what "human being" means. To this end, Heschel describes some modes of 
being human which, he believes, every human being would "recognise and accept as 
essential"-the fundamentals of human existence without which a person's humanity is 
diminished. 
46 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.26. Heschel cites Tennessee Williams as an example, quoting from Robert E. 
Fitch, "Secular Images of Man in Contemporary Literature", Religious Education, Vol.LIII, p.87, and in the 
same author's What Is the Nature of Man?, Philadelphia, 1959, p.60. 
47 Ibid., p.27. 
48 Ibid., p.28. See also Heschel, "Moral Challenge to America", p.68. Heschel had himself used the 
traditional biblical form of the question, "What is man?" (Psalm 8: 4) in his 1957 address to the Religious 
Education Association, but reviewed and rejected this form in his Raymond Fred West Memorial lectures at 
Stanford University, 1963. 
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They are not simply given in man's consciousness, nor are they 
properties derived from his biological nature. His sheer being does 
not guarantee them. However, they may be claimed of him, expected 
of him. They emerge as manifestly true when a person begins to 
ponder the latent substance of his self-understanding.49 
Some Modes of Being Human: Preciousness 
Heschel identifies preciousness as the first of these modes of being human. Preciousness is 
the sense that human being, alone of all being, is supremely valuable, because human life is 
the only type of being we consider to be intrinsically sacred.50 And because he considers 
this preciousness to be "not an object of analysis but a cause of wonder", it is something 
everyone has to find for herlhimself. 51 Basically, we look at a person differently from the 
way we look at a thing: "a thing we perceive, a person we meet".52 And in so doing, in a 
sense we meet ourselves, since "there is only one way of comprehending [another's] being-
there, and that is by inspecting my own being".53 And I cannot comprehend my own being 
as pure ontology, because I cannot be indifferent to my own being as I can be indifferent to 
another's being. However "average" I might be by any standard, "I regard myself as 
unique, as exceedingly precious, not to be exchanged for anything else". And since "I 
would not like my existence to be a total waste, an utter absurdity", the challenge for 
each individual person is "how to actualize, how to 
49 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.32. 
50 Ibid., p.33. 
51 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.22. 
52 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.33. 
53 Ibid., p.34. 
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concretize the quiet eminence of [one's] being". Even when life becomes a burden, it is 
"cherished deeply, valued supremely, accepted in its reality".54 
However, unless there is a God who cares, "a God to whom the life of every individual is 
an event-and not only a part of an infinite process", to claim preciousness (unique and 
eternal value) for each person is an absurdity.55 
To our common sense, one human being is less than two human 
beings. Jewish tradition tries to teach us that for him who has caused 
a single soul to perish, it is as though he had caused a whole world to 
perish; and that for him who has saved a single soul, it is as though he 
has saved the whole world. 56 
Therefore, "man is obliged to say: It is for my sake that the world was created".57 In other 
words, there is a task unique to each individual: each individual's life is, for them, "the 
task, the problem and the challenge". This implied to Heschel that the fundamental ethical 
question is not, "What am I to do?" but rather, "How should I live the life that I am?"58 
54 Heschel, Who Is Man?, pp.34f. 
55 Heschel, "What is Man?", p.237. 
56 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man" (an expanded form of "What is Man?", including 
material from his essay "The Concept of Man in Jewish Thought", in S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju 
(Eds.), The Concept of Man, Allen and Unwin, London, 1960) in Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom, p.154. 
57 Mishnah Sanhedrin, IV, 5, quoted in Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man", p.155, and in Heschel, Who Is 
Man?, p.36. See also Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.109. 
58 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.36. 
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Uniqueness 
The second mode of being human is therefore uniqueness. Again, Heschel assumes that 
humankind alone, of all beings, occupies a unique status. 
As a natural being [man] is determined by natural laws. As a human 
being he must frequently choose; confined in his existence, he is 
unrestrained in his will. His acts do not emanate from him like rays of 
energy from matter. Placed in the parting of the ways, he must time 
and again decide which direction to take. The course of his life is, 
accordingly, unpredictable; no person can write his autobiography in 
advance.59 
Indeed, Heschel believes that it is the denial of each person's umqueness, and the 
consequent attempts to generalise about human situations, that accounts for much human 
failure. The "average man" he declares to be "the homunculus of statistics"-there is no 
"ordinary man" without spiritual suicide.6o 
Opportunity 
Heschel's third mode of being human is therefore opportunity. Whereas being as such 
passes along an inevitable path from birth to death, human being passes through the maze 
of an inner life that is not determined, but rather "a state of constantly increasing, 
indefinitely spreading complexity", for which guidance is needed. Indeed, "the necessity 
for guidance is [itself] a mode of being human".61 Thus "the enigma of human being is 
59 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.37. 
60 Ibid., p.38f. 
61 Ibid., p.39. 
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not in what he is, but in what he is able to be".62 "The outstanding mark of man is the 
superiority of the possibilities of his being over the actuality of his being. .. Man must be 
understood as a complex of opportunities ... " 63 So when and where do we come across 
the "real person"? Never and nowhere, since the person is always changing: "finality and 
humanity seem to be mutually exc1usive".64 
Non-Finality 
So Non-finality is Heschel's fourth mode of human being. To be human is not to have 
arrived, but to be "on the way, striving, waiting, hoping".65 Not that being human is a 
process-it is, rather, a sequence of acts and events. "What is unique about man is in the 
way he relates himself to what is not in him. His existence is not a thing replete with 
energy but an interplay of a process and events".66 "A process is regular, an event 
extraordinary; a process continuous, an event occasional; processes are typical, events 
umque; a process follows a law, but an event creates a precedent".67 
Being human is not . . . a string of predictable facts, but an 
incalculable series of moments and acts. As a process man may be 
described biologically; as an event he can only be understood 
creatively, dramatically.68 
62 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.39. Heschel indicates that he is quoting from Man Is Not Alone, p.209, where 
the expression is "the essence of man is not in what he is, but in what he is able to be". 
63 Ibid., p.40. 
64 Ibid., p.4l. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., p.42. 
67 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.209. 
68 Ibid., p.43. Heschel refers in a footnote to God in Search of Man, p.209f. 
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Solitude, Solidarity and Reciprocity 
The next two modes of being human are solitude and solidarity, which Heschel links 
directly since "there is no dignity without the ability to stand alone", and yet the human 
being is never alone69-human existence is co-existence. "[Man] can never attain 
fulfillment, or sense meaning, unless it is shared, unless it pertains to other human 
beings."70 Indeed, "the dignity of human existence is in the power of reciprocity", i.e. 
offering in return for what one receives'?! Reciprocity is thus a further mode of human 
being. "The degree to which one is sensitive to other people's ... humanity is the index of 
one's own humanity". The reverse of humanity is brutality, defined by Heschel as the 
failure to recognise others' needs. Therefore "the degree of our being human stands in 
direct proportion to the degree in which we care for others",?2 And this is, in itself, an 
expression of the dimension of the holy: "The self, the fellow-man and the dimension of 
the holy are the three dimensions of a mature human concern. True love of man is 
clandestine love of God".73 
Heschel identifies the central problem, biblically speaking, as "how to be and how not to 
be", i.e., "not what a man is but how he is, not human being but being human, which is the 
sum of the many relationships in which a human being is involved",74 including the 
dimension of the holy. 
69 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p,44. 
70 Ibid., p,45. 
7! Ibid., p.46. 
72 Ibid., p,47. 
73 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.139. 
74 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p,4 7. 
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The Final Mode of Human Being: Sanctity 
Thus, according to Heschel, the sanctity of human life (the final mode of human being he 
spells out) is "an underived insight". When we ponder the mystery of another person's 
life, we realise that our own life is not "ours"-"Life is something I am . " Life is not my 
property".?5 For Heschel, therefore, being human involves a sensitivity to the sacred, a 
sense which he believes to be universa1.76 All degrees of sanctity share one aspect, that of 
"ultimate preciousness", i.e. to sense the sacred is to sense what matters to God. Heschel 
therefore regards the sacred/secular dichotomy as false. For him "reality embraces the 
actually sacred and the potentially sacred".?7 
Meaning and Purpose 
"Human being is never sheer being; it is always involved in meaning."78 Heschel believes 
the search for meaning (i.e. the attempt to understand the self, and indeed all humanity) to 
be a "given" in human life, even when people are unaware of it. "The quest for ultimate 
relevance of being is a response to a requiredness of existence: not something derived from 
human nature, but something that constitutes the nature of being human". 79 He does not, 
however, regard the aim of the search, i.e. for significant meaning (which he also calls 
75 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.48. 
76 See John Bowker, The Sense o/God: Sociological, Anthropological and Psychological Apporaches to the 
Origin o/the Sense o/God, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973. See also Leakey & Lewin, Origins 
Reconsidered, p.349: a quotation from Edward O. Wilson, "The predisposition to religious belief is the most 
complex and powerful force in the human mind and in all probability an iradicable part of human nature". 
77 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.49. 
78 Ibid., p.50. 
79 Ibid., p.65. This search for meaning is not the modem quest for "finding oneself' (in the sense of 
appreciating oneself as an individual as over against others, with particular attributes, and becoming 
comfortable with the self-image) but a search for significant being-"for self-understanding as well as for 
belonging and attachment to a transcendent order of meaning"(Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.51). 
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"spiritual identity") to be in any sense "given", but something "we must strive for, come 
upon, acquire, enhance, and live by".80 
What I look for is not how to gain a firm hold on myself and on life, 
but primarily how to live a life that would deserve and evoke an 
eternal Amen. It is not simply a search for certitude (though that is 
implied in it), but for personal relevance, for a degree of compatibility 
... I want to know who I am, and in relation to whom I live. It is not 
enough for me to ask questions; I want to know how to answer the 
one question that seems to encompass everything I face: What am I 
here for?81 
Could it be, Heschel asks, that someone's purpose is to serve society, their ultimate worth 
being determined by their usefulness to others?82 But then, each individual expects to be 
treated as valuable in herihimself, and there is more to each one than can be shared with or 
given to others, more than others are willing or able to accept. 
There are alleys in the soul where man walks alone, ways that do not 
lead to society, a world of privacy that shrinks from the public eye. 
Life comprises not only arable, productive land, but also mountains of 
dreams, an underground of sorrow, towers of yearning, which can 
hardly be utilized to the last for the good of society, unless man be 
converted into a machine in which every screw must serve a function 
or be removed. It is a profiteering state which, trying to exploit the 
individual, asks all of man for itself.83 
Besides, society itself is in need of meaning! "Mankind", which in biological terms means 
the human species ("an abstract concept stripped of its concrete reality"), is in ethical and 
religious terms "an abundance of specific individuals ... a community of persons rather 
than ... a herd ofnondescripts".84 
80 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.51. 
81 Ibid., p.52f. 
82 Ibid., p.58. See also Heschel, Man Is Not A/one, p.195. 
83 Ibid., p.59. 
84 Ibid., p.59f. See also Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.196. 
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Nor, Heschel asserts, does the natural order need the human species.85 Rather, "Man is a 
being in search ... of ultimate meaning of existence". 
Ultimate meaning implies not only that man is part of a whole, an 
adjunct to greatness, but an answer to the question, the satisfaction of 
a need; not only that man is tolerated but also that he is needed, 
precious, indispensable. Life is precious to man. Is it precious to man 
alone?86 
Is there transcendent meaning? Heschel believes each human being to be "a manifestation 
of transcendent meaning",87 and in consequence, that "man's secret lies in openness to 
transcendence".88 In other words, a human being cannot be fully understood in hislher 
own terms, but only in a larger context: to be human is to be involved, even in ignorance, 
in a cosmic drama89 in which one cannot be an innocent bystander.9o Therefore, whereas 
ontology sets out to explore the relationship of the human being to being as such, biblical 
theology explores the relationship of the human being with the living God: 
Man is man not because of what he has in common with the earth, but 
because of what he has in common with God. The Greek thinkers 
sought to understand man as a part of the universe: the prophets 
sought to understand man as a partner of God. 91 
85 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.60. See also Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.213. 
86 Ibid., p.63. See also Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.l92. 
87 Ibid., p.65. 
88 Ibid., p.66. 
89 Ibid., p.68. 
90 Heschel, "What is Man?", p.236, "Sacred Image of Man", pp.160, Man Is Not Alone, p.215. 
91 Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man", p.152. 
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Heschel once again cites the Greeklbiblical antithesis in order to identify as a cardinal error 
the taking for granted of being as ultimate, since it "mistakes a problem for a solution".92 
However, "the supreme and ultimate issue is not being but the mystery of being. Why is 
there being at all, instead ofnothing?"93 "We are amazed at seeing anything at all; amazed 
not only at particular values and things, but at the unexpectedness of being as such, at the 
fact that there is being at all".94 Therefore, whereas ontology asks about being as being, 
theology asks about being as creation-going behind being to ask about the source of 
being:95 
[God] does not have to be concerned about Himself, since there is no 
need of His being on guard against danger to His existence. The only 
concern that may be ascribed to Him is a transitive concern, one which 
is implied in the very concept of creation. For if creation is conceived 
as a voluntary activity of the Supreme Being, it implies a concern with 
that which is coming into being.96 
Heschel therefore proposed to rephrase the question of human meaning: not "What is the 
meaning of human being?", but "Who is man's meaning?" 
The cry for meaning is a cry for ultimate relationship, for ultimate 
belonging ... Is there a Presence to live by? A Presence worth living 
for, worth dying for? Is there a way of living in the Presence? Is there 
a way of living compatible with the Presence?97 
92 Heschel, The Prophets, II, p,43. Specifically Heschel responded to the speculation ofParmeni~es ofEle~ 
(515 - 449 BeE). "For Parmenides and his successors in the Eleatic school, the concept of God dlsappears m 
the concept of being". (Prophets, II, p,42.) 
93 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.70. 
94 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.l2. 
95 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.7l. 
96 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.143. 
97 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.73. 
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Since it is fundamental to Heschel's theology that "God is in search of man", then "man's 
anxiety about meaning is not a question, an impulse, but an answer, a response to a 
challenge". 98 In other words, "the question we ask is a question we are being asked: ... 
man's question about God is God's question about man".99 The biblical assertion, then, is 
that God takes humankind seriously, initiating and entering into covenant. IOO Indeed, God 
is in need of humankind: 
Our task is to concur with [God's] interest, to carry out His vision of 
our task. God is in need of man for the attainment of His ends, and 
religion, as biblical tradition understands it, is a way of serving these 
ends, of which we are in need, even though we may not be aware of 
them, ends which we must learn to feel the need of. 101 
How can a human being be aware of transcendent meaning? The awareness comes with 
the sense of the ineffable, itself sensed as something immediately given: 102 "there is no 
insight into transcendent meaning without the premise of wonder and the premise of 
awe".103 
The sense of wonder is not the mist in our eyes or the fog in our 
words. Wonder, or radical amazement, is a way of going beyond what 
is given in thing and thought, refusing to take anything for granted, to 
regard anything as final. It is our honest response to the grandeur and 
mystery of reality, our confrontation with that which transcends the 
given. 104 
98 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.74. 
99 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.132. 
100 Heschel "What is Man?", p.236. See also Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.242. 
101 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.75. See Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.241. 
102 Ibid., p.77. For the sense of the ineffable as "an ability with which all men are endowed", see Hes~hel, 
Man Is Not Alone, p.19. Heschel acknowledged the influence of Rudolph Otto's The Idea of the Holy, m The 
Prophets, II, p.22n, 76n. 
103 Ibid., p.78. 
104 Ibid., p.79. 
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So ultimate meaning is not something simply given, nor something that can be possessed 
or acquired once and for all. Rather, "it comes upon us as an intimation that comes and 
goes". 105 Meaning, then, is to be found by way of the cultivation of the sense of wonder 
and the sense of the ineffable. It comes by an encounter with the created order which goes 
beyond the data of sense-perception, and by an encounter with God enabled by disciplined 
living: 
... the order of Jewish living is meant to be, not a set of rituals, but an 
order of all of man's existence, shaping all his traits, interests and 
dispositions; not so much the performance of single acts, the taking of 
a step now and then, as the pursuit of a way, being on the way; not so 
much the acts of fulfilling as the state of being committed to the task, 
the belonging to an order in which single deeds, aggregates of feeling, 
sporadic sentiments, mere episodes become part of a complete 
pattern. 106 
Why pray when one is not in the mood? Why not wait for inspired moments to perform 
mitzvah? Because "in abrogating regularity we deplete spontaneity".107 If moments of 
inspiration are rare, they would be rarer still outside of an environment that facilitates 
them: 
Routine holds us in readiness for the moments in which the soul enters 
into accord with the spirit. While love is hibernating, our loyal deeds 
speak. .. A good person is not he who does the right thing, but he 
who is in the habit of going the right thing. 108 
105 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.79. 
106 Heschel, Man's Quest for God, p.l 00. 
107 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.343. 
108 Ibid., p.344f. 
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Indeed, in times of spiritual dryness, when the mind is "dull, bare and vapid", it is the only 
option: "This may be the vocation of man: to say 'Amen' to being and to the Author of 
being; to live in defiance of absurdity, notwithstanding futility and defeat; to attain faith 
in God even in spite of God."109 
Thus a sense of meaning is not easily gained. Human being is both "being in the world and 
living in the world",110 the latter involving one's relationships with all other beings. It is a 
matter of perspective: a person is related in two principal ways, which Heschel 
characterises as manipulation and appreciation. Either a person sees the world as things to 
be used for personal ends, or as things to be acknowledged, understood, valued and 
admired. Fellowship, says Heschel, depends on appreciation; manipUlation results in 
alienation. "Mankind will not die for lack of information; it may perish for lack of 
appreciation". 1 1 1 He claims that until humankind discovered how submissive nature was, 
people did not regard nature as belonging to them; but when nature is regarded as 
something to be used and exploited, then the world is nothing more than resources-"what 
is available". "In our technological age man could never conceive of this world as 
anything but material for his own fulfilment". 1 12 
109 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.80 
110 Ibid., p.81. 
111 Ibid., p.83. Also in Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.37, and in Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.46. 
112 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.77. 
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Heschel identifies three "aspects of nature" to which humankind must respond: its power, 
its beauty, and its grandeur. In response "we may exploit it, we may enjoy it, we may 
accept it in awe". 
Our age is one in which usefulness is thought to be the chief merit of 
nature; in which the attainment of power, the utilization of its 
resources is taken to be the chief purpose of man in God's creation. 
Man has indeed become primarily a tool-making animal, and the 
world is now a gigantic tool box for the satisfaction of his needs. I 13 
And since, Heschel argues, "my view of the world and my understanding of the self 
determine each other", then "the complete manipulation of the world results in the 
complete instrumentalization of the self' .114 Indeed, 
Exclusive manipulation results in the dissolution of awareness of all 
transcendence. Promise becomes a pretext, God becomes a symbol, 
truth a fiction, loyalty tentative, the holy a mere convention. Man's 
very existence devours all transcendence. I 15 
But, Heschel asserts, this denial of transcendence "contradicts the essential truth of being 
human",II6 and "man's true fulfillment depends on communion with that which transcends 
him" .117 And awe is humankind's primary response in this communion: 
113 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.34. 
114 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.88. 
115 Ibid., p.84. 
116 Ibid., p.86. 
117 Ibid., p.87. 
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Awe is more than emotion; it is a way of understanding, insight into a 
meaning greater than ourselves. The beginning of awe is wonder, and 
the beginning of wisdom is awe. 
Awe is ... a realization that things not only are what they are but 
also stand, however remotely, for something supreme. Awe ... 
enables us to perceive in the world intimations of the divine, to sense 
in small things the beginning of infinite significance, to sense the 
ultimate in the common and the simple; to feel in the rush of the 
passing the stillness of the etemal. 118 
Responsive Living 
Humankind's problem, therefore, is not a problem of knowing the answers, but a problem 
of human living, which Heschel calls "the distinctive form of human being".119 That is, 
meaning is not to be found in being itself, but in what humankind does with it. Creativity 
itself is a measure of humankind's discontent with mere being, for living is not just "being 
there"-"living means putting being into shape, lending form to sheer being". "Man 
encounters himself ... in the words he utters, in the deeds he does, and above all in living 
as an answer". 120 
118 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.88f. 
119 Ibid., p.95. 
120 Ibid., p.94. 
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It was Heschel' s appreciation of the central message of the prophets that convinced him 
that humankind's being created "in the image of God" should be understood "not as an 
analogy of being, but as an analogy of doing".121 Human beings are to act in the likeness 
of GOd. 122 So the question becomes: How to live (when mere being is insufficient and 
when humankind's driving quest is for supreme meaning)? 
If man's quest for supreme being is valid and required by the truth of 
being human, and if that quest can only go on by relating oneself to 
transcendent meaning, then we must affirm the validity and 
requiredness of man's relating himself to transcendent meaning. 123 
Therefore, Heschel contends, what propels humankind in its quest for meaning is not the 
sense of being a problem, but the sense of "being an answer", i.e. being required to respond 
to the command, "Let there be!", which stands over all creation. For "to be is to obey the 
commandment of creation ... the 'ought' precedes the 'is'''.124 And since being created 
implies being given meaning, the failure to hear the commandment of being results in the 
loss of the sense of significant being. "Being is obedience, a response". 125 
121 Heschel, "What is Man?", p.237. 
122 Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man", p.160. 
123 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.95f. 
124 Ibid., p.97. 
125 Ibid., p.98. 
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Thus people are responsible not only for what they do or fail to do, but for what they are; 
it is for the totality of one's life that one seeks meaning, not just for particular deeds. 
Indeed, living involves continuity, so that "we cannot ... analyze man as a being only here 
and now". Rather, each individual life is lived in a context, and each person is a link 
between the ages. Indeed, "only he who is an heir is qualified to be a pioneer". 126 
So being human, says Heschel, involves the imposition of human being onto human nature. 
"Man stands somewhere between God and the beasts. Unable to live alone, he must 
commune with either of the two".127 If one is not to be less than human, one must be more 
than human. 
Man is more than what he is to himself. In his reason he may be 
limited, in his will he may be wicked, yet he stands in a relation to 
God which he may betray but not sever and which constitutes the 
essential meaning of his life. He is the knot in which heaven and earth 
are interlaced. 128 
Therefore, to live significantly is to attempt to live one's life as a response to what is 
required, i.e. to live responsively and responsibly. Indeed, "responsibility is ... the 
essence of being human" .129 
126 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.99. Heschel elsewhere reverses this expression: "In the realm of the spirit, only 
he who is a pioneer is able to be an heir" (Man Is Not A lone, p.164). 
127 Ibid., p.102. See Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.2I0. 
128 Ibid., p.103. See Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.211. 
129 Brown Heschel & Novak, Vietnam, p.59. , 
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The qualities that constitute personhood, such as love, the passion for 
meaning, the capacity to praise, etc., can hardly be regarded as 
demands of reason, though reason must offer direction as to what is 
worthy of being loved or praised. Their justification is in their being 
required for being human. 130 
Yet again Heschel distinguishes between Greek and Hebrew concepts: that in the fonner a 
human being is a rational being who is related to the cosmos by way of his rationality; in 
the latter the human being is a commanded being. "The central problem is not: What is 
being? but rather: What is required of me?"131 It is in being asked and in responding that 
I am related to the transcendent. It is "indebtedness" that, according to Heschel, prompts 
the response to the demand. 
To the sense of indebtedness the meaning of existence lies not in 
acquisitiveness but in the awareness that something is asked of man. 
Man is called upon to reciprocate, to answer, to think and to act in a 
way which is compatible with the grandeur and mystery of living. 132 
Heschel describes indebtedness as "the pathos of being human, self-awareness of the self 
as committed". Indebtedness is not merely a feeling, but a feature of being human, so that 
"to eradicate it would be to destroy what is human in man". 133 To whom then is every 
human being indebted? Heschel suggests that a sense of personal indebtedness lies at the 
very root of religion: "there is no hope for man without a sense of indebtedness to God, 
without an awareness of a point where man must transcend the self, his interests, his 
needs".134 Thus, for Heschel, religious living consists in "serving ends that are in need of 
130 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.107. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Heschel, "Moral Challenge to America", p.n. 
133 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.108. 
134 Heschel, "Moral Challenge to America", p.n. 
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us. Man is a divine need, God is in need of man. .. What gives birth to religion is not 
intellectual curiosity but the fact and experience of our being asked."135 And although this 
sense of being asked is all too easily repressed, we cannot survive as human beings unless 
we know what is expected of us. Heschel misquotes Descartes to claim, "I am 
commanded-therefore I am".136 Heschel consistently asserts that Judaism is more than 
"belief' but is, rather, living in covenant with God, i.e. observant living. I37 It is a quest, 
not for right thinking, but for right living, on the understanding that what is done here and 
now is a reminder that there is something of divine significance in each person. For 
Heschel at least part of Judaism's universal relevance lies in its role in "humankind's 
struggle to maintain its humanness by conveying the taste of eternity in its daily living".138 
Thus one of the goals of human life, according to Heschel, is "to experience common-place 
deeds as spiritual adventures".139 
135 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.llO. See Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.76. 
136 Ibid., p.lll. 
137 Heschel, God in Search of Man , p.28lff., p.330. 
138 Donald l Moore, S.l, The Human and the Holy: The Spirituality of Abraham Joshua Heschel, Fordham 
University Press, New York, 1989, p.13l. 
139 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.49. See Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.27l: "Judaism is a theology of 
the conunon deed, dealing not so much with the training for the exceptional as with the management of the 
trivial. .. The purpose seems to be to ennoble with conunon, to endow worldly things with hieratic b~auty; 
to attune the comparative to the absolute, to associate the detail with the whole, to adapt our whole bemg 
with its plurality, conflicts and contradictions, to the all-transcending unity, to the holy". See also Heschel, 
Israel, p.145: "We must seek to endow the material with the radiance of the spirit, to sanctify the conunon, to 
sense the marvelous in everydayness". 
263 
Heschel identifies three aspects of a person's relatedness to God as being at the centre of 
Jewish living: one's relationship with the living God (expressed in interior "acts of the 
soul"); one's relation to Torah (in which God's word is discerned); and in one's 
commitment to God's concern, which is expressed in mitsvot (commandments).140 How 
should human beings actually live, if a person's way of living is to be compatible with their 
being created in the image of God? If God is, in Heschel's words, "in search of man", then 
God "is waiting to enter our deeds", and God and humankind have a shared task, which is 
the achievement of human existence (and indeed the meaning of the whole of creation). A 
mitsvah, then, is both a command and the deed that fulfils it, an act which God and the 
faithful person have in common, and through which the person enters into union with 
God's will and with God himself. 141 
Therefore, again, humankind being "in the image and likeness of God" is not only an 
analogy of being but also an analogy of doing. 142 Heschel repeatedly declares that God 
needs human beings for the accomplishment of his purposes: not only are we in need of 
justice-justice is in need of US. 143 Judaism converts ideas into deeds, insights into actions, 
ethical principles into patterns of conduct, so that in someone's daily living they can 
perceive both the presence of the divine, and their kinship with the divine. 144 The world 
140 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.281. 
141 Ibid., p.283-287. 
142 Ibid., p.289. 
143 Ibid., p.291. 
144 Ibid., p.296. 
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needs more than people's devotion and holiness and good intentions: it needs their deeds 
and their lives. The mitsvot are "the vehicles by which we advance on the road to spiritual 
ds" 145 en . 
However, observance is not merely external compliance: a sacred deed consists not only in 
what a person does, but in how they do it. 146 The deed may have relevance if it benefits 
others, but be irrelevant for the personal life of the doer. Heschel is critical of what he 
called "religious behaviourism".147 Halacha, the science of deeds, must be balanced by 
Agada, the art of being. Torah contains both love and law; it is vision and demand; it is 
both Halacha and Agada. 148 Heschel therefore stresses kavanah, "inwardness", I.e. 
attentiveness to God when performing a mitsvah, so that one lives what one does. 149 
Yet Heschel also sees that reducing Judaism to Agada is equally destructive of its essence 
and meaning. "The purest intentions, the finest sense of devotion, the noblest spiritual 
aspirations, are fatuous when not realized in action".150 Through Halacha the Jew belongs 
to God, not occasionally or intermittently, but essentially and continually, as Heschel 
witnesses: 
145 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.295. 
146 Ibid., p.307. 
147 Ibid., p.320f. 
148 Ibid., p.323f. 
149 Ibid., p.31Of. 
150 Ibid., p.340. 
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How grateful I am to God that there is a duty to worship, a law to 
remind my distraught mind that it is time to think of God, time to 
disregard my ego for a moment! It is such happiness to belong to an 
order of the divine will. I am not always in a mood to pray. I do not 
always have the vision and the strength to say a word in the presence 
of God. But when I am weak, it is the law that gives me strength; 
when my vision is dim, it is duty that gives me insight. 151 
Mitsvot, then, are a response to the question of how human living may be "compatible with 
our sense of the ineffable".ls2 They are a recognition that human living is not a personal, 
private affair; it is what a person does with God's time and with God's world. It is in the 
performance of mitsvot, then, that a person realises that God is indeed concerned with 
humankind's fulfilment of his will.IS3 
"Ultimate Embarrassment" 
Indebted and commanded humanity also has, according to Heschel, a sense of "ultimate 
embarrassment", which is itself a protection against any temptation to arrogance, pride or 
self-deification. Embarrassment is the awareness that before God "we all stand naked". 154 
What is the truth about being human? The lack of pretension, the 
acknowledgement of opaqueness, shortsightedness, inadequacy. But 
truth also demands rising, striving, for the goal is both within and 
beyond us. The truth of being human is gratitude; its secret is 
appreciation. I 55 
lSI Heschel, Man's Questfor God, p.68. See also p.97. 
152 Heschel, God in Search of Man, p.350 (Heschel's emphasis). 
153 Heschel, Man's Quest for God, p.114. 
154 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.l13. See Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.78. 
155 Ibid., p.114. 
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And indeed "to be human involves the ability to appreciate as well as the ability to give 
expression to appreciation", i.e. to celebrate. Such celebration is not a diversion, mere 
entertainment, but 
... a confrontation giving attention to the transcendent meaning of 
one's actions ... 
. . . inward appreciation, lending spiritual form to everyday acts. 
Its essence is to call attention to the sublime or solemn aspects of 
living, to rise above the confines of consumption. I 56 
Heschel took this capacity for "quiet exaltation, capability for celebration" to be one of the 
rewards of being human: 157 
The greatest problem is not how to continue but how to exalt our 
existence ... 
This is the meaning of existence: To reconcile liberty with service, 
the passing with the lasting, to weave the threads of temporality into 
the fabric of eternity. 158 
Thus, from Heschel's perspective the Bible is "not man's vision of God but God's vision 
of man ... not man's theology but God's anthropology".159 From the Biblical point of 
view a human being is "a being in travail with God's dreams and designs": 160 
... with God's dream of a world redeemed, of reconciliation of 
heaven and earth, of a mankind which is truly His image, reflecting 
His wisdom, justice, and compassion. God's dream is not to be alone, 
to have mankind as a partner in the drama of continuous creation. By 
whatever we do, by every act we carry out, we either advance or 
obstruct the drama of redemption; we either reduce or enhance the 
power of evil. 161 
156 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.117. 
157Ibid.,p.118. 
158 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.295f. 
159 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.129. See Heschel, God in Search o/Man, p.412. 
160 Heschel, "Moral Challenge to America", p.71. See Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.253. 
161 Heschel, Who Is Man?, p.119. In "Moral Challenge to America" Heschel expressed it: ':For man to exist 
is either to assist God or to desist from assisting God." (p.77). In Man Is Not Alone: "There IS no neutralIty 
before God. To ignore means to defy him". (p.236). 
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Thus for Heschel, human history cannot be a blind alley, for human beings can always 
repent from obstructing the drama of redemption. "What saved the prophets from despair 
was their messianic vision and the idea of man's capacity for repentance. That vision and 
that idea affected their understanding ofhistory."162 
Heschel's characteristic dialectical style reveals that he sawall existence as a polarity, and 
not least human existence. 163 Indeed, "it is part of the human condition to live in 
polarities".164 The human being is the creature fonned "of the most inferior stuff [the dust 
of the earth] in the most significant image [the image and likeness of God]". 165 And whilst 
the polarity in man may not imply an eternal contradiction, it does imply a "duality of 
grandeur and insignificance, a relatedness to earth and an affinity with God".166 But this 
duality is not the body/soul duality of Greek thinking. Instead, 
... the contradiction is in what man does with his body and soul. The 
contradiction lies in his acts rather than in his substance. As nature is 
not the counterwork of God but His creation and instrument, dust is 
not the contradiction of the image but its foil and complement. Man's 
sin is the failure to live what he is. Being the master of the earth, man 
forgets that he is servant of GOd. 167 
162 Heschel, The Prophets, I, p.185. See Heschel, "What is Man?", p.240, and "Sacred Image of Man", 
p.165. 
163 Morton C. Fiennan, Leap of Action: Ideas in the Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel, University 
Press of America, Lanham, 1990, p.145. 
164 Hesche!, God in Search of Man , p.19. 
165 Hesche!, "Sacred Image of Man", p.156. In "What is Man?", Hesche! ide?tifies th:~e aspects of human 
existence: man as created in the image of God, man as dust, and man as an object ofDlvme concern. (p.234.) 
166 Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man", p.157. 
167 Ibid. 
268 
Biblically, then, the human being is never seen in isolation, and the human problem is 
never the problem of the human being in isolation. The human being is always seen in 
relation to GOd. 168 
Man is man because something divine is at stake in his existence. He 
is not an innocent partner in the cosmic drama. There is in us more 
kinship with the divine than we are able to believe. The souls of men 
are candles of the Lord, lit on the cosmic way, rather than fireworks 
produced by the combustion of nature's explosive compositions, and 
every soul is indispensable to Him. Man is needed, he is a need of 
God. 169 
The Image of God: Conclusion and Consequences 
"The basic dignity" of human being is therefore summed up in the biblical words "image 
and likeness of God"-words that may be absurd (even blasphemous) if taken literally, for 
"is there anything about man that may be compared with God?" What they signify, 
however, is that "Man is man not because of what he has in common with the earth, but 
because of what he has in common with God", and what humankind has in common with 
God is "a concern and a task" .170 So "image and likeness" does not refer to a quality or an 
attribute, "the divine spark" or "an immortal element", but is inherent in humankind's very 
being: 
168 Heschel, God in Search alMan, p.412. 
169 Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man", p.l60. See also Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.215. "Life is a 
partnership of God and man ... " (Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man", p.160, and Hesche!, Man Is Not Alone, 
p.242). 
170 Hesche!, "Sacred Image of Man", p.151 f. 
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I~ is the whole man and every man who was made in the image and 
hkeness of God. It is both body and soul, sage and fool, saint and 
sinner, man in his joy and in his grief, in his righteousness and 
wickedness. The image is not in man: it is man. 171 
Thus the commandment "Love your neighbour as yourself' calls upon us to love what God 
loves-an unconditional act of sympathy, regardless of the merits of the beloved. 
To meet a human being is a major challenge to mind and heart. I must 
recall what I nonnally forget. A person is not just a specimen of the 
species called homo sapiens. He is all of humanity in one, and 
whenever one man is hurt we are all injured. The human is a 
disclosure of the divine, and all men are one in God's care for man. 
Many things on earth are precious, some are holy, humanity is holy of 
holies. 
To meet a human being is an opportunity to sense the image of 
God, the presence of God. According to a rabbinical interpretation, 
the Lord said to Moses: "Wherever you see the trace of man there I 
stand before you ... "172 
Heschel concludes, therefore, that humanity'S very future depends on reverence for each 
individual human being, which itself depends upon faith in God's pathos-his concern for 
humankind. From the perspective of the cosmos, it is absurd to claim unique and eternal 
value for the life of an individual human being: 
Only if there is a God who cares, a God to whom the life of every 
individual is an event-and not only a part of an infinite process-
then our sense for the sanctity and preciousness of the individual man 
may be maintained. 173 
171 Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man", p.l52. 
172 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p.7f. 
173 Heschel, "Sacred Image of Man", p.161, and Heschel, "What Is Man", p.237. 
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It is more than a quarter of a century since Heschel's death, and many of the social and 
political situations that so exercised him have been resolved or changed beyond 
recognition. The world is a different place, with new moral struggles and cultural shifts, 
and people's understanding of themselves and their humanity continues to be challenged 
by what they often perceive to be threats rather than opportunities. We must ask, therefore, 
how Heschel's theological anthropology addresses some of the "new" issues that confront 
human society at the beginning of the third millennium of the Common Era: pluralism and 
fundamentalism; feminism and inclusive language (together with sexual equality and 
homosexuality); unemployment and poverty; postmodemism; and an "old" issue-war 
and genocide. 
Pluralism and Fundamentalism 
We live today in a pluralistic society. The "melting-pot" theory of the assimilation of 
immigrants into American society and culture has failed, Spanish is the lingua franca of 
some parts of the United States, and Americans identify themselves by their historical and 
cultural origins, e.g. as "African-American". Immigration policies are universally less 
liberal than in a previous generation. Yet in Britain economic migration from the New 
Commonweath, the aftermath of ethnic expulsion in East Africa, the acceptance of 
refugees from various war zones, and the granting of asylum to those fleeing political, 
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ethnic or religious persecution, had resulted in a religious and ethnically heterogeneous 
society, so that in Britain, for instance, there are many more Muslims than Methodists. 174 
At the same time there has been a theological swing to the right, away from the liberal 
attitudes and interpretations of the nineteen sixties and seventies. The more liberal "main 
stream" Christian churches in Britain appear to be in long term decline, whereas there is 
sometimes spectacular growth in the authoritarian, biblically fundamentalist churches. 
On a world perspective, we see just how narrow the boundary between religious 
fundamentalism and terrorism can be: American Christian fundamentalists murder 
workers at abortion clinics, Kashmiri Muslim fundamentalists murder skyjacked air 
travellers, an Israeli Jewish fundamentalist murders the Prime Minister of Israel. It is an 
historical irony that the "Peoples of the Book"-the Bible which provided Heschel with the 
basis of his theological anthropology-should engage in vicious conflict amongst each 
other, and between different traditions within the compass of each faith. 
The Old and New Testaments-and the Koran-seem to have 
engendered viciously self-righteous progeny, poised to devour each 
other. Universal justice and compassion have too often been 
forgotten, as we have silenced the One God speaking in those 
pages. 175 
174 The 2001 Official UK Census will ask the people of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (but not 
Scotland) to categorise themselves by religion for the first time in ISO years. (The Methodist Recorder, Jan 
20, 2000, p.S). 
175 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.112. 
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In a Jewish context, Heschel's universal application of biblical ethics alerts to the danger of 
confusing religious responsibilities and political rights, when the struggle for nationhood 
and ethnic autonomy in Israel deny the same human aspirations in others. "The alternative 
to peace is disaster. The choice is to love together or perish together. Let the love of life 
have the final word" .176 
It has to be possible, then, for people of different religious commitments to meet one 
another, not from a basis of stereotypical suspicion, but in an entirely positive way: 
First and foremost we meet as human beings who have so much in 
common: a heart, a face, a voice, the presence of a soul, fears, hope, 
the ability to trust, a capacity for compassion and understanding, the 
kinship of being human. My first task in every encounter is to 
comprehend the personhood of the human being I face, to sense the 
kinship of being human, solidarity ofbeing. l77 
Thus respect for each other's religious position is, for Heschel, more than a social or 
political necessity, but is "born of the insight that God is greater than religion, that faith is 
deeper than dogma, that theology has its roots in depth theology".178 Heschel's depth 
theology is concerned with laying bare "some of the roots of our being, stirred by the 
Ultimate Question".179 It is by means of depth theology that he comes to the conclusion 
that what unites people of different faiths is greater than what divides them: 
176 Heschel, Israel, p.l86. 
177 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p. 7. 
178 Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom, p.l8l. 
179 Ibid., p.l24. 
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Our being accountable to God, our being objects of God's concern, 
precious in His eyes. Our conceptions of what ails us may be 
different; but the anxiety is the same. The language, the imagination, 
the concretization of our hopes are different, but the embarrassment is 
the same, and so is the sign, the sorrow, and the necessity to obey. 
We may disagree about the ways of achieving fear and trembling, 
but the fear and trembling are the same. The demands are different, 
but the conscience is the same, and so is arrogance, iniquity. The 
proclamations are different, the callousness is the same, and so is the 
challenge we face in many moments of spiritual agony. 
Above all, while dogmas and forms of worship are divergent, God 
is the same. ISO 
Heschel's part in Jewish-Christian dialogue forms the substance of the next and final 
chapter of this work. His assertions of the appropriateness of religious pluralism have 
caught the imagination of Muslim scholars, as well as Jews and Christians: Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr acknowledges that "Heschel's contribution to interreligious dialogue is of 
great importance"; lSI Riffat Hassan feels that the spirit of Heschel "can still irradiate the 
dark and difficult passages that we must traverse before we can be where the light of God 
envelops us all" .IS2 
ISO Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p.9. .., . 
lSI Letter to Harold Kasimow, August 27,1985, quoted in Kasimow and Sherwm (Eds.), No ReligIOn IS an 
Island, p.80. 
182 Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.15!. 
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Not long before his death, and against the advice of his doctor, Heschel attended a 
conference in Rome, arranged in order to "explore the religious dynamics of the Jerusalem 
problem by attempting to define the spiritual necessities embedded in each of the three 
religions involved with the city". He commented, "I have prayed from my heart for the 
Muslims all my life, I have never prayed with them before, or been face-to-face with them 
to talk about God. This is so important. We must go further." At the close of the final 
session two Kahdis approached him: one squeezed his hand and left; the other took his 
hand and said, "I have read all that you have written. God bless your work".183 
Gender Issues 
We can only speculate how Heschel would have responded to social changes that have 
occured since his time, but there is ample evidence from his daughter Susannah's writings 
of his openness to gender issues, and remarkably so for one of his time and background. 
Since "image and likeness of God" is not gender specific, despite a long and depressing 
history of discrimination against women, Heschel must be committed to the basic equality 
of the sexes, culturally, politically and religiously. 
183 Samuel Dresner, "Heschel the Man", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.6-8. 
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Susannah Heschel recalls how her father was pleased when she challenged her parents and 
her teachers with questions like "Why can't a woman read from the Torah?"184 
From my youngest years I was aware of discrimination against 
women, particularly in religious circles, and complained about it to 
my father. He always agreed with me, supporting me when I wanted a 
Bat Mitzvah and an aliyah for my sixteenth birthday, and agreeing 
that aspects of Jewish observance that were unfair to women had to be 
changed. He even suggested I apply to the rabbinical school at the 
Jewish Theological Seminary, confident that one day women would 
be accepted there as students.18S 
Knowing that she had his support encouraged her when she began writing about Jewish 
feminism. 186 "His responsiveness," she writes, "grew out of his deep commitment to 
justice" .187 
Twenty-five years after Heschel's death, his Christian friend, William Sloan Coffin, asks 
Heschel's question in Heschel's memory: "Where does God dwell in America today?", and 
notes that theologies change with contexts. Today there is liberation theology, black 
theology, feminist theology, gay and lesbian theology, "all of them theologies in praise of a 
God of justice, a God of the oppressed". However, he also notes that all of these theologies 
are opposed by the Promise Keepers, and implies that Heschel would reject the Promise 
Keeper's agenda: 
184 Susannah Heschel, "Heschel as Mensch" , Neusner and Neusner (Eds.), To Grow in Wisdom, p.203, and 
"My Father", in Kasimow and Sherwin, No Religion is an Island, p.31. 
185 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xxviii. In more recent years women 
have been enrolled as rabbinic students at the Seminary. 
186 Susannah Heschel (Ed.), On Being a Jewish Feminist, Schocken Books, New York, 198311995. 
187 Susannah Heschel, "Abraham Joshua Heschel", Tikkun, VoLl3, No.1, January/February 1998, p.34. 
276 
They prefer to give their male followers an identity and security, not 
by moving forward toward a promised land of greater justice, but 
rather by retreating to and recapturing a biblical past favoring male 
dominance over gender equality. Hence their opposition to an eighth 
plank proposed by NOW-a plank that would uphold equal rights for 
women. 188 
Heschel wrote all his books in English between 1942 and 1972, and therefore followed the 
convention of using the term "man" and its derivatives to refer to all human beings, both 
male and female. Similarly his use of "He" to refer to God makes no anthropomorphic or 
gender claims. But now that "man" is considered gender distinctive, so that women feel 
excluded, Heschel would, I believe, have been sensitive to these concerns. Edward K. 
Kaplan, exploring Heschel's use of language, expresses the hope that, by becoming aware 
that all language is metaphorical, we will "open ourselves to the reality beyond words, 
beyond concepts, systems, ideologies. Even images of patriarchy give way before the Holy 
Spirit". 189 
Heschel does not seem to have commented directly upon the sexual mores of the "free 
love" era of the sixties, although it is clear from his theological anthropology that he would 
have reacted strongly against any trend of behaviour that treated others as sex-objects, and 
would have been saddened by the tendency of some to plunge into uncommitted sex as a 
188 William Sloan Coffin, "Where Does God Dwell in America Today?", Conservative ~udaism, Vol.L, 
Number 2-3, Winter/Spring 1998, p.152. NOW, the National Organization for Women, IS the largest 
women's rights group in the United States of America. 
189 Kaplan, Holiness in Words, p.5. 
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means of self-expression, the search for personal significance having eluded them 
elsewhere. However, in the generation since Heschel the sexual climate has changed 
beyond recognition: a high proportion of sexually active couples are living together 
without the commitment of marriage, and those marrying do so significantly later in life; 
the incidence of teenage pregnancy has increased, particularly in Britain; HIV / Aids has 
profoundly affected sexual mores; issues of infertility are addressed and overcome through 
technological intervention; and homosexuality is recognised as a condition rather than a 
deviation. 
Male homosexual relations are specifically forbidden in the Bible, to the extent of being 
punishable by death as "an abomination" (Lev. 18:22,20:13). However, the incidence of 
homosexual practice was considered so rare among Jews, that they were simply not 
suspected of it, 190 and comment has only been made when sexual licence has characterised 
the dominant culture within which Jews were living. 191 However, in the present climate, 
when homosexuality is recognised as a human condition, the traditional stance has been 
challenged. The Orthodox have continued to denounce homosexual practice, although 
accepting the homosexual as a "full, but sinning" Jew. The Reform movement, in 1977, 
agreed to "encourage legislation which decriminalizes homosexual acts between 
consenting adults and prohibits discrimination against them as persons". The Conservative 
movement, with which Heschel identified himself, passed similar resolutions in 199112.192 
190 Second century CE Mishnah, Kiddushin 4:14. 
191 16th century CE, Shulhan 'Arukh. Even ha- 'Ezer 24: 1. 
192 Werblowsky and Wigoder (Eds), Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion, p.335. 
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However, although the Refonn movement has endorsed same-sex civil "marriages", has 
accepted active homosexuals into rabbinical and cantorial schools, and granted affiliation 
to "gay synagogues", the Conservative movement has not done so. 
What would Heschel' s attitude be? As he opposed discrimination against any human being 
on the grounds of colour, ethnicity, religion or gender,193 he would surely have supported 
the struggle for "gay rights", and endorsed the decriminalisation of homosexual activity 
amongst consenting adults in private. Even though he was not decisively constrained in his 
attitudes by his Hasidic background, and was in many ways ahead of his time, I do not 
think there is sufficient evidence to argue that he would have pressed at this stage for the 
full participation of gay people in leadership roles in Jewish religious life. I suspect he 
would have considered it more important to first win the battle to grant integrity, full 
humanity, and civil rights to homosexuals. 
Unemployment and Poverty 
In Heschel's time in America full employment, or something approaching it, at least for the 
white man, was the nonn. Fears about automation-the replacement of human beings by 
machines in the repetitive tasks of manufacturing-were growing, and social prophets were 
predicting "future shock" as the pace of technological change accelerated. 194 
193 "In referring to the Negro in this paper, we must, ofcourse,.alw~y~, keep equal~: in.~ind the pligh,~ of all 
individuals belonging to a racial, religious, ethnic, or cultural nunonty . Heschel, RelIgIOn and Race , 
p.87. ' 
194 See Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, Random House, New York, 1970. 
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Technology is transforming our society continuously, industry is 
recklessly dynamic, yet our thinking is static. Prosperity and comfort 
have made us listless, smug, indifferent. We enjoy our privileges, we 
detest any dislocation in our intellectual habits. But automation is 
wi th us, and so is poverty, and unemployment. 195 
In 1965, the year of the pUblication of Who Is Man?, Kurt Vonnegut Jr. published his 
social criticism in the form of a novel, God Bless You Mr. Rosewater, in which the 
acuteness of the human problem is expressed in the words of the anti-hero Kilgour Trout: 
In time, almost all men and women will become worthless as 
producers of goods, food, services, and more machines, as sources of 
practical ideas in the areas of economics, engineering, and probably 
medicine too. So-if we can't find reasons and methods for 
treasuring human beings because they are human beings, then we 
might as well, as has so often been suggested, rub them out. 196 
Heschel was in the business of "treasuring human beings because they are human beings". 
At the 1963 conference on "Religion and Race", Heschel identified for his audience that, 
although it is generally accepted that "equality is a good thing, a fine goal", what is lacking 
is "a sense of the monstrosity ofinequality".197 But Heschel's concern was wider than the 
issue of racial inequality: "underneath the struggle for civil rights is a call for social 
change, automation, the crisis and failure of education, the abuse of freedom, callousness, 
and a massive sense of absurdity". 198 Heschel would, then, ask the question of "the sense 
of the monstrosity of inequality" of economic equality, in a world divided by wealth and 
poverty. 
195 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The White Man on Trial", in Heschel, Insecurity of Freedom, p.I09. 
196 Kurt Vonnegut Jr., God Bless You Mr Rosewater, Delta Books, New York, 1965, p.2IO. 
197 Heschel, "Religion and Race", p.93. 
198 Heschel "The White Man on Trial", p.l09. , 
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I do not doubt that he would have campaigned for the Jubilee 2000 Campaign to write off 
the unpayable debts that have crippled the social economies of the poorest countries in the 
world. He would respond strongly to the increasing inequalities in society. 
He'd be appalled at the excess of both our wealth and our poverty. 
He'd be appalled at the absence of affordable housing that he would 
consider a moral imperative. He'd be appalled at the way our 
eceonomy flourishes, not by providing necessities, but by providing 
luxuries. Finally, he would certainly be appalled by the way our 
national goal is "to eliminate welfare as we know it", when decent 
religious people should be seeking to eliminate poverty as we know 
it. 199 
Postmodernism 
We live in a post-modem age, though postmodemism is notoriously difficult to define, 
(since one mark of it is to defy definition).200 Indeed, postmodemism is more an 
experience than a concept. Some people see it as the ongoing collapse of the Western 
tradition, a descent into nihilism, a state without values, "open to everything, committed to 
nothing". It is marked by a loss of optimism, because there is mistrust of reason, either to 
reveal the "truth" or to build a better world. Some proponents understand their role merely 
to be critical of what is: they deny that anything can be "immediately present", i.e. 
independent of signs, language, interpretation or disagreement; they deny that it is possible 
199 Coffin "Where Does God Dwell in America Today?", p.152. 
200 For a ~seful discussion of post-modem ism, see the introduction to Lawrence E. Cahoon, From 
Modernism to Postmodernism: an Anthology, Blackwell, Cambridge MA, 1996, pp.1-23. 
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to get back to origins or to perceive a deeper reality behind phenomena; they perceive no 
sense of "unity", but sense that everything is relative; they deny transcendence-that there 
is anything beyond perceived reality-so that truth, goodness, beauty, and justice are 
reduced to social constructs. 
Yet it seems that Heschel, for all his "out-dated" transcendent-monotheism, can dialogue 
with a post-modernity in which people are open to listen to one another's stories, eager to 
explore the spiritual dimension in life, and are no longer certain that humanity has all the 
answers. Indeed, Heschel is a model "dialoguer": he penetrates behind doctrine and 
definition into "the insulated Christian enclaves of the fifties and early sixties",201 warning 
that the only alternative to "interfaith" is ''inter-nihilism''.202 He stands for mutual respect 
among different faiths, at a time when Jewish-Christian dialogue has gone off the boil, and 
hard-line fundamentalism in all faiths is seeking to drive the religious agenda. His 
language is poetic, captivating, painting images with words, in contrast to the abstract, 
rational categories of modernism: for him, "poetry is to religion what analysis is to 
science".203 
201 Gary Michael Banks, "Rabbi Heschel Through Christian Eyes", C?nser.vativeJudaism, V~l.L, ~o.2-3, 
Winter/Spring 1998 (the twenty-fifth yahrzeit tribute issue), p.l 03. ThIS artIcle suggests ways In whIch 
Heschel might bridge modernity and postmodernism. ., . 
202 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No ReizglOn IS an Island, p.6. 
203 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.37. 
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However, his images are vivid, inciting a response, whereas postmodern images are often 
vague, inciting a sense of impotence. For Heschel "truth" may be found and a better world 
built through the insights of faith, and by taking a "leap of action". In a world of utilitarian 
knowledge, he focusses on appreciation,204 and for him the goal of knowledge is not "right 
thoughts", but "righteous deeds". He sees the universe as full of wonder, intuiting the 
presence of the Creator-God, and his theology is "earthed". Yet at the same time he is a 
rigorous thinker, pushing concepts and perceptions to their rational conclusions. Heschel 
stood for personal religion, for spirituality, in an age that regarded it with cynicism or 
dismissal, whereas one aspect of post-modernism has been a new wave of interest in 
spirituality, known as "New Age". But whereas New Age spirituality is "pick-and-mix", 
eclectic, and about personal choice, Heschel finds the source of spirituality in the God of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 
Heschel recounts an Hasidic story: 
A young man once wanted to become a blacksmith. So he became an 
apprentice to a blacksmith, and he learned all the necessary techniques 
of the trade: how to hold the tongs, how to lift the sledge, how to 
smite the anvil, even how to blow the fire with bellows. Having 
finished his apprenticeship, he was chosen to be employed at the 
smithy of the royal palace. However, the young man's delight soon 
came to an end, when he discovered that he had failed to learn how to 
kindle a spark. All his skill and knowledge in handling the tools were 
of no avai1. 205 
Heschel has helped kindle the spark of personal spiritual awareness in many who already 
"know facts and ... know techniques''.206 
204 "Mankind will not die for lack of information; it may perish for lack of appreciation", Abraham Joshua 
Heschel, "The Patient as Person", The Insecurity of Freedom, p.26. Variations on this statement can be 
found throughout Heschel's work. 
205 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "Idols in the Temple", The Insecurity of Freedom, p.68f. 
206 Ibid., p.69. 
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War and Genocide 
The War in Vietnam, which Heschel implacably opposed, ended, not with the "dignified 
withdrawal" that the American government declared to be its goal, but in a shambles in 
which many of those who had believed in and worked for an American victory were 
abandoned to their fate. Heschel did not live to see it. The Cold War that threatened a 
nuclear holocaust to destroy all humankind has also ended, and the USSR superpower has 
fragmented. Yet the years since Heschel' s death have been marked by war and the threat 
of war, in Afghanistan (the USSR's "Vietnam"), in the South Atlantic, in East and Central 
Africa, in the Gulf, in the former Yugoslavian states, and in Chechnya. 
Heschel's understanding of what it means to be human underlies his involvement in the 
Peace Movement, which was prompted by his study of the prophets, in which he 
discovered "that morally speaking there is no limit to the concern one must feel for the 
suffering of human beings".207 
The encounter of man and God is an encounter within the world. We 
meet within a situation of shared suffering, of shared responsibility. 
This is implied in believing in One God in whose eyes there is no 
dichotomy of here and there, of me and them. They and I are one; 
here is there, and there is here. What goes on over there happens even 
here. Oceans divide us, God's presence unites us, and God is present 
wherever man is afflicted, and all of humanity is embroiled in every 
agony wherever it may be. 
Though not a native of Vietnam, ignorant of its language and 
traditions, I am involved in the plight of the Vietnamese. To be 
human means not to be immune to other people's suffering. People in 
Vietman, North and South, have suffered, and all of us are hurt. 208 
207 Abraham Joshua Hesche1, "The Reasons for My Involvement in the Peace Movement", in Susannah 
Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.225. 
208 Brown, Heschel and Novak, Vietnam: Crisis a/Conscience, p.52f. 
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For Heschel Vietnam was a personal problem: "To speak about God and remain silent on 
Vietnam is blasphemous''.209 Therefore, we can assume he would not have remained 
silent over the Rwandan genocide, over the attempt to resolve the hiatus in Iraq following 
the the Gulf War by sanctions that deprive civilians of medical resources, over the 
bombing of Serbian civilians in order to secure a withdrawal of Serbian forces from 
Kosovo. He would ask why NATO intenvened militarily in the former Yugoslav 
republics, but not in Rwanda, nor in the Russian assault on Grozny in the second Chechen 
War. He would have detected racism. When I raised this question with David Blumenthal, 
in a discussion about Heschel, he spelled it out: 
I think that white folks in Europe and America really and truly believe 
that black folks in Africa ought to be taking care of themselves, and 
that there is something about Africans that make them genocidal to 
one another. Yugoslavia is Europe in the 20th century, and it is a kind 
of intersection-a reliving of the Crusades in reverse. Europeans have 
a way of thinking about Islam taking over the continent.210 
Heschel told one of his stories at the founding meeting of what became Clergy and Laity 
Concerned Against Vietnam to express the urgency of the exercise of personal integrity 
and civil responsibility in the face of the injustice of war. He introduced it as the story of 
"a child of seven", but it quickly became autobiographical with the introduction of the first 
person singular: 
209 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "A Prayer for Peace", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral G~andeur and 
Spiritual Audacity, p.231. See also Brown, Heschel and Novak, Vietnam: Crisis o/Consclence, p.49. 
210 David Blumenthal, in conversation, Yamton, Oxford, 17th June 1996. 
285 
Here is the experience of a child of seven who was reading in school 
the chapter which tells of the sacrifice of Isaac: 
Isaac was on the way to Mount Moriah with his father; then he lay 
on the altar, bound, waiting to be sacrificed. My heart began to beat 
even faster; it actually sobbed with pity for Isaac. Behold, Abraham 
now lifted the knife. And now my heart froze within me with fright. 
Suddenly, the voice of the angel was heard: "Abraham, lay not thine 
hand upon the lad, for now I know that thou fearest God." And here I 
broke out in tears and wept aloud. "Why are you crying?" asked the 
Rabbi. "You know that Isaac was not killed." 
And I said to him, still weeping, "But, Rabbi, supposing the angel 
had come a second too late?" 
The Rabbi comforted me and calmed me by telling me that an 
angel cannot come late. 
An angel cannot be late, but man, made of flesh and blood, may 
be. 211 
For Heschel, the question of what it means to be human was an urgent one. He even feared 
that it might already be too late. The question remains urgent, and Heschel's analysis and 
solution remain current. 
211 Brown, Heschel and Novak, Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience, p.51f. 
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CHAPTER 6 
HESCHEL AND THE CHRISTIANS 
Heschel's Influence on Christians 
Heschel's profound effect on the Jewish community is confinned by the Yiddish writer 
and historian Moshe Starkman: 
It soon became evident that American Jewry had long awaited such a 
figure as Abraham Joshua Heschel. .. Every new book by Heschel 
intrigued Jews searching for roads back toward Judaism. More than 
anyone else in our time, he helped the seeking Jews gain vision to see 
the maor she 'yahadut, the bright and the brilliant within Judaism, the 
humanism and universalism within Yiddishkeit. 1 
Yet the principle source of HescheI's influence on Christians is also his writings about 
Judaism for Jews. His Jewish philosophy of religion, expounded in Man Is Not Alone 
(1951) and God in Search of Man (1956) first brought him to the attention of Christians, 
and his writings, still being reissued, republished and, indeed, translated a generation after 
his death, continue to infonn Christian theology and to make a particular contribution to 
the development of Jewish-Christian relations. 
1 Moshe Starkman, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Jewish Writer and Thinker", Conservative Judaism, 
Yol.28, No.1, Fall 1973, p.75. (This issue of Conservative Judaism was published as a yahrzeit tribute for 
the fIrst anniversary of Heschel' s death). 
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When Man Is Not Alone was published in 1951, Heschel was Professor of Ethics and 
Mysticism at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, and Reinhold Niebuhr was 
Professor of Christian Ethics at Union Theological Seminary. The two seminaries occupy 
diagonally opposite comers at Broadway and 122nd Street, Manhattan. Reviewing Man Is 
Not Alone for The New York Herald-Tribune Book Review, Niebuhr predicted that its 
author would become "a commanding and authoritative voice not only in the Jewish 
Community but in the religious life of America".2 Before the pUblication of Man Is Not 
Alone Heschel was hardly known outside the world of Jewish scholarship.3 By the time 
Niebuhr reviewed God in Search of Man almost exactly five years later, he was able to 
assert that HescheI's books "have had an increasing hearing among both Jews and 
Christians".4 He also affirmed that God in Search of Man is 
... not merely an exposition of the "philosophy of Judaism", but a 
treatise which will be found illuminating to all who regard Biblical 
thought as the source of one of the main streams of Western religious 
life. .. Naturally, much of what he writes has equal relevance for 
Christians as well as Jews. 5 
2 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Masterly Analysis of Faith", The New York Herald-Tribune Book Review, April 1, 
1951, p.12. 
3 John C. Merkle, "Introduction" to section V, "Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907-1972)", in Fritz A. 
Rothschild (Ed.), Jewish Perspectives on Christianity, Continuum, New York, 1996, p.268. 
4 Niebuhr specifically mentions The Earth is the Lord's (1949) and The Sabbath (1951) as well as Man Is 
Not Alone. 
S Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Mysteries of Faith", Saturday Review, April 21, 1956, p.18. 
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Indeed, like Buber, Heschel was sometimes accused of "being more appreciated In 
Christian than in Jewish Circles".6 Certainly he became increasingly important to 
Christians, although this was "not because he was looked upon as a crypto-Christian but 
because he was so incurably Jewish",? 1. A. Sanders, Professor of Biblical Studies at 
Union Theological Seminary from 1965, was to write after Heschel's death: 
... in all his Jewishness, Heschel was a shaliah la-goyim, an apostle 
to the gentiles .. , His influence on Christianity, especially since the 
publication in 1951 of The Sabbath and Man Is Not Alone, has been 
remarkable. In fact, my own private thesis is that Karl Barth's 
penetrating single essay, The Humanity of God, which appeared in 
1956, was influenced by Heschel's God in Search of Man, which 
appeared the year before.8 Heschel' s greatest influence upon 
Christian thinking in the post-war period was God in Search of Man. 
For the first time, many Christian thinkers learned that God already 
was, and had been for a long time, what traditional Christian dogma 
taught was revealed only in Christ. .. In Christian idiom, Heschel had 
an incarnational faith without the Incarnation.9 
John C. Bennett, President of Union Theological Seminary at the time Heschel was elected 
as the first non-Christian Visiting Professor in 1965,10 first became aware of Heschel in 
1951 when, at Niebuhr's suggestion, he read Man Is Not Alone, and "discovered that his 
writings were devotional reading for Christians as well as for Jews".ll Why did Heschel's 
6 Robert McAfee Brown, "Abraham Heschel: A Passion for Sincerity", Christianity and Crisis, Vol.33, 
No.21, December 10, 1973, p.256. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Barth's essay, ("The Humanity of God", in Karl Barth, The Humanity o/God, Collins, London, 1961, 
pp.37-65) which represented "a change in direction in the thinking of evangelical theology", sets out to 
"derive the knowledge of the humanity of God from the knowledge of His deity". There are many echoes of 
Heschel's thinking. The lecture was delivered at a meeting of the Swiss Reformed Ministers' Association, 
Arau, 25 th September 1956. 
9 1. A. Sanders, "An Apostle to the Gentiles", Conservative Judaism, Vol.28, No.1, Fall 1973, p.61. 
10 "Union, without dissent changed its bylaws, which had prevented the seminary from having a professor 
Who was not a Christian." (John C. Bennett, "Heschel's Significance for Protestants", in Kasimow and 
Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion Is an Island, p.124). 
11 John C. Bennett, "A Prophet for Our Day", Jewish Heritage, VoU3, No.3, Fall 1971, p.43. 
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written works "became the devotional reading of myn' ads of non-Jews"? W D Dav'e 
.. 1 s, 
speaking at the Memorial Service held at Park Avenue Synagogue, New York City, 21 
January 1973, explains: 
Through his faith in the God beyond all mystery, he ministered to our 
ultimate human need and, therefore, to us all. In his books and 
speeches, in which the cadences and rhythms and patterns of ancient 
synagogal prayers and sermons reverberate, his very prose is instinct 
with poetry which strangely calls us to primordial certainties. In all 
these he called into being the emotions which he described, and 
summoned not only Jews, but non-Jews also, to the depth of awe, 
wonder and mystery which life should evoke in all men. 12 
Jacob Neusner, in his contribution to the Heschel memorial issue of the Jesuit journal 
America, is concerned that the Christian world's knowledge of Heschel was "chiefly in his 
roles of holy man and politician", a side of Heschel that Neusner considered to be both 
"superficial and unimportant . .. The Heschel that will last is in his books".13 For 
Neusner, then, Heschel's authentic existence focused, not on his "public role as shaman for 
the left", but on his theological and scholarly enterprise, which Neusner asserts was not 
appreciated amongst Heschel' s colleagues. 
12 W. D. Davies, "In Memoriam: Abraham Joshua Heschel 1907 - 1972", The Duke Divinity School Review, 
Vo1.38, No.2, p.93. 
13 Jacob Neusner, "Faith in the Crucible of the Mind", America, Vo1.l28, No.9, March 10 1973, p.207. 
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Doubtless there would have been some envy over the devotion of some of Heschel's 
students,I4 his successes as an author, his popularity on the lecture circuit, and his status as 
a public figure. There was certainly a lack of sympathy for his personal piety and 
observance amongst academics who prided themselves on their detachment, and there must 
have been some suspicion of the way he was feted by Christians. There was also the fact 
that he "stood for theology in a Jewish community which does not know the importance of 
theology": 
If you think I exaggerate, then read the reviews [by Jews] of his 
theological books. I doubt that any important theologian has found so 
little understanding in his task, let alone of his achievement of it, as 
Hesche!. He was called a poet and a mystic, "un-Jewish", and 
dismissed as a vapid rhetorician. I cannot recall a single review 
(though there may have been some) which both understood what he 
was about and offered interesting critical comment. IS 
Heschel's theology, then, was more accessible to his Christian neighbours, who at least 
understood the theological issues that concerned him, even when they failed to appreciate 
the distinctiveness of his specifically Jewish theology. He was aware of the main issues of 
contemporary philosophy of religion. He followed what was happening in Protestant 
theology: he knew and respected the work of Niebuhr and Tillich, and they knew and 
respected his work. Like them he had been trained in critical biblical scholarship, within a 
14 Richard Rubenstein, Power Struggle: An Autobiographical Confession, Charles Scribner's Sons, New 
York, 1974, p.62f, speaks of his own reaction to Heschel, when his student at Hebrew Union College, 
Cincinnati: "People reacted very strongly to [Heschel]. His disciples gathered together informally for prayer 
and study. . . The appearance of a group under Heschel' s influence devoted to traditional worship aroused 
great antagonism among some of the students. Heschel's disciples were referred to derisively as the 'piety 
boys'. Their newly found religiosity was regarded as somehow subversive of Reform Judaism. 
Undoubtedly, part of the antagonism toward the 'piety boys' was the hostility toward Heschel. People were 
seldom neutral about him. They were either devoted or took a strong dislike to him. Over the years my own 
feelings toward Hesche! ran the gamut from respect to extreme antipathy ... He had been influential in 
shaping my theological career at a number of crucial junctures ... Perhaps the root of distance between us lay 
in the fact that one could enter Heschel' s circle only as a disciple." 
15 Neusner, "Faith in the Crucible of the Mind", pp.207f. 
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liberal theological tradition committed to social activism. In his last and posthumous book. 
A Passion for Truth, Heschel revealed his knowledge of and affinity with the 19th century 
Danish existentialist theologian, S0ren Kierkegaard.16 
Although later, primarily in connection with the Second Vatican Council and with his 
involvement in social/political action, several Roman Catholic theologians entered his life 
(e.g. Gustaf Weigel and Thomas Merton),17 he was not in close contact with any of them 
in the earlier years of active theological enterprise, and a specific awareness of their 
thought cannot be detected in his major books. 
Heschel's reputation as a theologian of significance within Christian circles dates, then, 
from Niebuhr's 1951 review of Man Is Not Alone. Niebuhr's positive view of Hebrew 
Scripture and of Judaism must have come as a refreshing surprise to one whose academic 
work had begun in the Germany of the 1930s, when Protestant leaders had re-opened the 
16 Abraham Joshua Heschel, A Passion/or Truth, Farrar. Straus and Giroux, New York, 1973. 
17 Susannah Heschel, in her introduction to Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, New York, 1996, p.xxvii, lists Weigel and Merton, along with Theodore Hesburgh, Corita Kent, and 
Leo Rudloff, abbot of the Benedictine Abbey in Vermont. She also adds that he worked closely with Daniel 
and Philip Berrigan in the anti-war movement. For more about his relationship with Weigel, see Eva 
Fleischner, "Heschel's Significance for Jewish-Christian Relations", in Merkle (Ed.), Abraham Joshua 
Heschel, p.148f, also in Quarterly Review, Vo1.94, No.4, Winter 1984, p.70f. For his relationship with 
Merton, see William H. Shannon (Ed.), The Hidden Ground a/Love: The Letters a/Thomas Merton on 
Religious Experience and Social Concerns, Collins, London, 1990, pp.430-6, and Donald Grayston and 
Michael W. Higgins (Eds.), Thomas Merton: Pilgrim in Progress, Griffm House, Toronto, 1983, pp.8S-97. 
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Marcionite debate as to whether the Old Testament had any place in the Christian canon of 
Scripture, and distinguished Protestant theologians had supported the rise of National 
Socialism.18 
The early contacts between the tall American-born Protestant and the short Polish-born 
Jew grew into a close friendship. Near-neighbours, they often walked together on 
Riverside Drive, just a block away from their respective seminaries, and latterly, when 
Niebuhr's health was failing, whenever Heschel spotted Reinhold and Ursula Niebuhr from 
his apartment window he would go out and walk with them. 19 Niebuhr died on June 1st 
1971, and three days later, as Reinhold and Ursula Niebuhr had agreed together, Heschel 
spoke at the memorial service, held at First Congregational Church, Stockbridge.2o He 
quoted Niebuhr's claim to have "sought to strengthen the Hebraic-prophetic content of the 
18 Liberal theologians like Adolfvon Harnack (died 1930) had questioned the canonicity of the Old 
Testament for Christians, calling it "archaic and outmoded". The Deutsche Christen [German Christians], 
after the election of Ludwig Muller (1883-1946) as Reichs bishop in 1933, with the support of the Nazi 
Party, adopted an aryanising policy with respect to Holy Scripture and the person of Christ, aiming to rid 
traditional Christianity of all putatively Jewish components. After a strident rally in the Sports Palace, Berlin, 
13th November 1933, in which Reinhold Krause advocated "liberation from the Old Testament with its cheap 
Jewish morality of exchange and its stories of cattle traders and pimps", some prominent theologians publicly 
resigned from the German Christians, including Heinrich Bornkamrn, Gerhard Kittel and Friedrich Gogarten, 
but all remained supporters of National Socialism. During the war years of 1939-45, a group of professors, 
Protestant bishops and pastors organised the Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on 
Gelman Church Life, under the directorship of Walter Grundmann. It sponsored conferences, published 
liturgies purged of Jewish references and theological tracts describing the degeneracy of Judaism, and 
defended the authenticity of a de-Judaized Christianity. Members of the Bekennende Kirche [Confessing 
Church] opposed the Institution on the grounds of the radical changes it proposed to traditional Christianity, 
not because of its antisemitism, claiming that elimination of the Old Testament was not justified since it was 
an "anti-Jewish book". See Susannah Heschel, "Nazifying Christian Theology: Walter Grundmann and the 
Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church Life", Church History, Vo1.63, 
No.4, December 1994, pp.587-605, and Doris L. Bergen, The Twisted Cross: The German Christian 
Movement in the Third Reich, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1996, 
particularly pages 143-154. See also Robert P. Ericksen, Theologians Under Hitler: Gerhard Kittel. Paul 
Althaus and Emanuel Hirsch, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985. 
19 Told to me by Mrs. Sylvia Heschel, 15th June 1997. 
20 Richard Wightman Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography, Pantheon, New York, 1985, p.292f. See also 
Larry Rasmussen (Ed.), Reinhold Niebuhr: theologian o/public life, Collins, London, 1989, p.15f. 
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Christian tradition".21 He could have been writing his own obituary when he said of his 
late friend: 
He began his teaching at a time when religious thinking in America 
was shallow, insipid, impotent-bringing life and power to theology, 
to the understanding of the human situation, changing the lives of 
many Christians and Jews. He appeared among us like a sublime 
figure out of the Hebrew Bible. Intent on intensifying responsibility, 
he was impatient of excuse, contemptuous of pretense and self-pity.22 
Simply by living and teaching and practising his faith where, when and as he did, putting 
himself in positions where he was in relation to non-Jews, Heschel had a profound 
influence on Christian thinking about Judaism "because he was so incurably and 
consistently Jewish".23 Heschel succeeded in communicating the grandeur of Judaism to 
non-Jews, and thus enabled the process by which Christians have turned to Jews, rather 
than to Christian interpreters for their understanding of Judaism. Robert McAfee Brown 
says of him: 
Heschel's contribution to Christians consisted in his being such a good 
Jew, and this did not separate him from us but enabled us to work 
together more closely on the things that concerned us all. He has 
always left me finally disquieted, however, for when I have been in 
his presence and have talked with him and have heard him pray, I 
have been moved to ask myself, "What have I got to tell this man 
about God?" and thus far I have never found an answer. At this stage 
of the Jewish-Christian dialogue I remain content to learn.24 
21 Reinhold Niebuhr, introduction to Waldo Frank, The Jew in Our Day, Duell, Sloan, New York, 1944. 
22 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "A Last Farewell", Conservative Judaism, Vol.25, No.4, Summer 1971, p.62f. 
23 Brown, "A Passion for Sincerity", p.256. 
24 Brown, "Passion for Sincerity", p.257. 
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And what Heschel did for Robert McAfee Brown he did for many others. For W. D. 
Davies, "to encounter him was to 'feel' the force and spirit of Judaism, the depth and 
grandeur of it. He led one, even thrust one, into the mysterious greatness of the Jewish 
tradition, not so much conceptually as emotionally and existentially".25 For John C. 
Bennett, 
Abraham Heschel belonged to the whole American religious 
community. I know of no other person of whom this was so true. He 
was profoundly Jewish in his spiritual and cultural roots, in his 
closeness to Jewish suffering, in his religious commitment, in his love 
for the nation and land of Israel, and in the quality of his prophetic 
presence. And yet he was a religious inspiration to Christians and to 
many searching people beyond the familiar religious boundaries. 
Christians are nourished in their own faith by his vision and his 
words.26 
Heschel wrote all his major articles commenting on the Christian situation in response to 
specific requests from Christians: they were never gratuitous, unsolicited, but rather the 
sharing of his perceptions with Christians who asked for them. The article on Protestant 
Renewal (1963) he wrote for the editors of Christian Century,27 and "The Jewish Notion of 
God and Christian Renewal" is the text of an address he was invited to give to the (Roman 
Catholic) Congress on the Theology of the Church, Montreal (1967).28 
25 Davies, "In Memoriam", p.91. 
26 John C. Bennett, "Agent of God's Compassion", America, Vo1.l28, No.9, March 10 1973, p.205. 
27 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "Protestant Renewal: A Jewish View", Christian Century, Vo1.80, No.49, 
December 1963, pp.1501-4. Quotations are from the reprinting in Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom. 
28 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Jewish Notion of God and Christian Renewal", in L. K. Shook (Ed.), 
Renewal of Religious Thought: Proceedings of the Congress on the Theology of the Church. Centenal)' of 
Canada. 1867-1967, Palm Publishers, Montreal, 1968, pp.105-129. Reprinted as "The God ofIsrael and 
Christian Renewal", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, pp.268-285. The 
latter title was to one proposed in the initial invitation, but "emasculated on the way to the printer" according 
to Heschel' s opening comments: "The magnificent biblical saying 'The God of Israel' was replaced by a 
scholarly mis-saying, 'The Jewish Notion of God'." Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.268. 
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The major themes of Heschel's reflections on Christianity are the dejudaisation of 
Christianity, the desacralisation of the Bible, the dogmatisation of theology, and the 
necessity for a common critique of society (i.e., "what we might do together").29 
According to Heschel' s analysis, the emergence of a predominantly gentile Church in a 
world dominated by Hellenism resulted in Christianity's self-understanding focusing not 
on its vast indebtedness to Judaism but on its divergences from Judaism: 
The result was a conscious or unconscious dejudaization of 
Christianity, affecting the church's way of thinking and its inner life as 
well as its relationship to the past and present of Israel-the father and 
mother of the very being of Christianity. The children did not arise 
and call the mother blessed; instead, they called the mother blind.3o 
The issue for the Church, then, is whether to look for its roots in Judaism and to understand 
itself in relation to Judaism, or to look for its roots in pagan Hellenism and understand 
itself as the antithesis of Judaism. Hesche! discerns a symptom of incipient Marcionism in 
Christian neglect of the Hebrew Bible,31 offering an example from his experience of the 
Second Vatican Council: after Mass every morning an ancient copy of the Gospel was 
carried in procession to the high altar of St. Peter's Basilica and "deposited on a golden 
throne. It was the Gospel only and no other book".32 
29 Title of a series of addresses, one contributed by Heschel, given in Chicago (1967), published in Religious 
Education, Vo1.62, No.2, March 1967, pp.133-140. See below, p.324f. 
30 Heschel, "Protestant Renewal", in The Insecurity of Freedom, p.169. 
31 Ibid., p.170. 
32 Heschel "The God oflsrael and Christian Renewal", p.273. , 
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Heschel is concerned that modem scholarship has resulted in the Bible being treated as 
something about which we have so much to say that we no longer hear what the Bible has 
to say. The presumption that the Bible should be treated "like any other book-with 
objectivity and detachment"-has led to alienation from the Bible. 
The Bible is holiness in words. How are we to preserve within our 
involvement in critical studies the awareness of the holy; how are we 
to cultivate the understanding that the authority of the Bible is not 
merely an issue of either philology or chronology? More decisive 
than the dogmatic attempt to define the date and authorship of the 
biblical documents is the openness to the presence of God in the 
Bible. Such openness is not acquired offhand. It is the fruit of hard, 
constant care, of involvement; it is the result of praying, seeking, 
craving.33 
And then, says Heschel, we have forgotten that "the pnmary Issue of theology is 
pretheological"-the total human situation.34 Dogma is a means of "saving" rare moments 
of "rapport with the reality of the divine" so as to make them available for the long hours 
of functional living, and its adequacy depends on whether it claims "to fonnulate or 
allude". 
Unless we realize that dogmas are tentative rather than final, that they 
are accommodations rather than definitions, intimations rather than 
descriptions; unless we learn how to share the moment and the insight 
to which we are trying to testify, we stand guilty of literal mindedness, 
or pretending to know what cannot be put into words; we are guilty of 
intellectual idolatry. .. The time has come for us to break through the 
bottom of theology into depth theology.35 
33 Heschel, "Protestant Renewal", p.I72. See "The God of Israel and Christian Renewal", p.274. 
34 Ibid., p.l76. 
35 Ibid., p.177. See "The God ofIsrael and Christian Renewal", p.276. 
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It is the paradox of Heschel that "he was most Jewish and yet most universal".36 In being 
so, he helped some Christians appreciate the enduring grandeur and validity of Judaism, 
enabling them to put behind them the misunderstanding and prejudice that has so often 
fanned the flames of anti-Semitism. However, more than thirty-five years after the Second 
Vatican Council and the promulgation of Nostra Aerate, it is difficult to accede to 
Bennett's over-generalisation, made at the time ofHeschel's death: 
I truly believe that there has been a radical break in the minds and 
consciences of both Protestants and Catholics with their evil past of 
anti-Judaism, which so often helped to create a climate in which brutal 
racist anti-Semitism has flourished. I have great confidence that this 
turning has at last come, this turning away from so cruel and wicked a 
history, and Abraham Heschel has had an enormous influence in what 
one may call the consolidation of this change.37 
36 Davies, "In Memoriam", p.92. 
37 Bennett, "Agent of God's Compassion", p.205. 
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Interfaith Attitudes 
Most Protestant churches (as well as Roman Catholicism) have formally revised their 
attitude towards Judaism38 and there is little overt anti-Semitism within institutionalised 
Christianity in the West. Stereotypes persist, however, and are reinforced by uncritical 
assumptions made about "The Jews" as presented in the Gospels, particularly where there 
is little direct experience of Jewish people or a Jewish congregation. Within the Church of 
England the persistence of what used to be called "The Church's Mission to the Jews" in 
its present guise of "The Church's Ministry to the Jews", is a more subtle indication that 
"the Heschel line" (if such it may be called) on interfaith relations has failed to carry 
universal weight. The CMJ does good work in introducing Jewish customs and 
ceremonies to Christian congregations and schools, but it's basic agenda continues to be 
the proselytisation of Jews. Most western churches have, however, consciously broken 
with the concept of "the mission to the Jews", replacing it with dialogue and an attitude of 
listening to Judaism. 39 
38 See The Theology o/the Churches and the Jewish People: S~atements by the W01~ld Council o/Church~s 
and its member churches, WCC Publications, Geneva, 1988. BIlly Graham, followmg the World Evangehsm 
Conference in Berlin, said: "God, in His own time and way, will judge all men by the light accordin~ to 
which they live. We must distinguish him who lives by no revelation from one who kno~s ~at G.Od IS 
revealed in nature in the world, and in history. The believing Jew's whole approach to hfe IS testrrnony to 
his faithfulness to'the God of his fathers. Christians must respect such devotedness to God ... Christians 
must acknowledge that through our faith in Christ we are grafte? on to the Jewish peo~le, and ~ve shar,: with 
them the blessings of God." (A.DL Bulletin, December 1977) ill Eme~son~. Colaw, ~y DIalogue, 
Jakob J. Petuchowski, (Ed.), When Jews and Christians Meet, State Umverslty of New 1 ork Press, Albany 
NY, 1988, p.179. 
39 See Petuchowski (Ed.), When Jews and Christians Meet, p.57. 
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In any case, it must be appreciated that even if Heschel' s influence on Christians and their 
attitudes was half as great as the testimonials of more than a quarter of a century ago 
suggest, it was not that Christians turned to Heschel for their understanding of Judaism, but 
that he went out of his way to make contact with them. He reminded his fellow Jews that 
"what goes on in the Christian world affects us deeply",40 and was himself committed to 
fostering what he called "the new Christian understanding of Judaism".41 Even though he 
had "more than once come upon an attitude of condescension to Judaism, a sort of pity for 
those who have not yet seen the light; tolerance instead of reverence" in his encounters 
with both Protestant and Catholic theologians,42 Heschel sincerely believed that nothing 
less than an ecumenical revolution was taking place. 
Instead of nurturing hostility to the Jews and resentment of Judaism, 
there is a new climate of appreciation. .. Christians, in many parts of 
the world, have suddenly begun to look at the Jews with astonishment 
. .. Instead of hostility, there is expectation, a belief that we Jews 
have a message to convey, significant insights which other people 
might share. Many Christians believe that we Jews carry the Tablets 
in our arms, hugging them lovingly. They believe that we continue to 
relish and nurture the wisdom that God has entrusted to us, that we are 
loaded with spiritual treasures. This expectation is a challenge to the 
Jewish community ... The primacy, then, is not defense, but wisdom, 
self-understanding, communication.43 
40 Abraham Joshua Hesche1 "From Mission to Dialogue?", Conservative Judaism, Vo1.21, No.3, Spring 
1967, p.2. This article was adapted from his address to the 1966 Rabbinical Assembly Convention, an? 
incorporates sections of his Inaugural Address at Union Theological Seminary as Harry Emerson FosdIck 
Visiting Professor, November 10, 1965. See also Heschel's "Foreword" to James Parkes, Prelude to 
Dialogue, Vallentine Mitchell, New York, 1969, p.vii. 
4\ Ibid., p.9. 
42 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.10. 
43 Heschel, "From Mission to Dialogue?", p.9. 
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Although Judaism has traditionally expressed the belief that all people could attain 
salvation by following the Noahide Seven Commandments found in the Talmud, where it 
is asserted that "the righteous of all nations have a share in the world to come",44 the most 
widely held view amongst Jews down the ages has been that Judaism is the only true 
religion.45 The critical question where inter-faith dialogue is concerned is: can Jews grant 
validity to other religions whilst remaining true to Judaism itself as defined in the classical 
sources? Lord Jacobovits, former Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, exemplifies the widely held view: 
As a professing Jew, I obviously consider Judaism the only true 
religion . .. Judaism, to be true to itself, is bound to reject, for 
instance, the divinity of Jesus or the prophecy of Mohammed as false 
claims; otherwise its own claims, such as the supremacy of Moses's 
prophecy and the finality of the Mosaic law ... could not be true ... 
Two mutually exclusive and conflicting statements of fact can never 
both be true.46 
44 For a full exposition of the Noahide laws, see David Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: An 
Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws, Edwin Mellen, New York and Toronto, 1983. A 
sununary of the argument can be found in David Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue:' A Jewis.h !ustijication, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, Ch.I. The earliest presentation of the N oahide laws IS. m the Tosefta 
(late 2nd century CE): "Seven commandments were the sons of Noah commended: (1) co~cernmg 
adjudication, (2) and concerning idolatry, (3) and concerning blasphemy, (4) and concernmg se~ual 
immorality, (5) and concerning bloodshed, (6) and concerning robbery, (7) and concernmg the 11mb torn from 
a living animal". (Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue, p.27). 
45 Harold Kasimow, "Abraham Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue", Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies, Vol. 18, No.3, Sununer 1981, p.425f. 
46 Immanuel Jakobovits, in Himmelfarb (Ed.), The Condition of Jewish Belief, p.112f. 
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The rabbis m the early years of Christianity attacked the new faith for its perceived 
dualism in the doctrine of the Incarnation, God the Father and Jesus the Son being 
understood as "two powers".47 They therefore categorised it with other dualistic heresies 
such as Zoroastrianism and Gnosticism.48 In the Middle Ages, Maimonides regarded 
Christianity, in legal terms, as a form of proscribed polytheism,49 and considered it to be 
idolatrous (because of the practice, in all the Christian groups of his day-Catholic, 
Orthodox, Armenian, Ethiopic and Coptic--of using icons). In theological terms, he 
forcefully objected to trinitarianism.5o Indeed, many Orthodox Jewish theologians persist 
in the assertion that Christianity is not a purely monotheistic religion: 
[The] God of monotheism who tolerates no mediator between Himself 
and man, is not the deity that by its very nature necessitates a mediator 
[The] man of monotheism can only confront God without a 
mediator; in Christianity, man cannot confront God except by way of 
the mediator. 51 
47 Louis Jacobs, A Jewish Theology, Behrman House, New York, 1973, p.25. 
48 Ibid., p.285. 
49 It should be remembered that Maimonides always views Christianity along with Islam, and that, living 
entirely within Muslim societies in Spain and North Africa, his knowledge of Christianity was not first-hand. 
See Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue, p.57. 
50 "God's being One by virtue of a true Oneness, so that no composition whatever is to be found in H~ and 
no possibility of division in any way whatever-then you must know that He, may He be exalted, has.~ no 
way and in no mode any essential attribute, and that just as it is impossible that He .should be a b?dy, It IS also 
impossible that He should possess an essential attribute. If, however, someone.belIeves that ~e IS one, ~ut . 
possesses a certain number of essential attributes, he says in his words that He IS one, but belIeves Him III hiS 
thoughts to be many. This resembles what the Christians say: namely that He is one but also three, and that 
three are one". (Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, p.111). 
51 Eliezer Berkovits, in Hime1farb (Ed.), The Condition of Jewish Belief, p.27. 
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Joseph Soloveitchik, a leading spokesman of American Orthodox Judaism, declares it 
"absurd to speak of the commensurability of two faith communities", and counsels Jews 
that any "confrontation" between two faith communities must occur "not at a theological, 
but at a mundane level", because "the great encounter between God and man is a wholly 
personal private affair incomprehensible to the outsider".52 Similarly Jakobovits felt it 
"improper to express one's innermost beliefs and mode of worship to the judgement or 
comparative scrutiny of those who do not share the same religious commitment", since 
these things are so "intimate and personal" that it would be like "sharing with others our 
husband-wife relationship". 53 
However, traditional Judaism, whilst viewing all other religions as false, has distinguished 
between its "daughter religions"-Christianity and Islam-and the religions of the Far East 
which are completely unrelated to it. 
The Far Eastern religions ... cannot seriously be considered as rivals 
of Judaism. In their cruder forms they are idolatrous, in their higher 
forms atheistic .. , The attitude of Judaism to its "daughter religions" 
is more complicated. Many Jewish authorities hold that these faiths 
are not idolatry so far as non-Jews are concerned-that is to say, the 
good Christian or the good Muslim is a "saint of the nations of the 
world". For the Jew, however, Christianity, certainly, and Islam, 
possibly, are to be considered idolatrous and history informs us how 
many Jews gave their lives rather than embrace these faiths. Judaism 
rejects the claims made for both Jesus and Mohammed. It teaches that 
the central dogma of Christianity strikes at the roots of pure 
monotheism and that Islam is both too fatalistic and has too Iowan 
ethical standard as compared with Judaism. 
But this, of course, is not to deny that Judaism considers that there 
is much of value in her daughter religions. 54 
52 Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "Confrontation", Tradition, Vo1.6, No.2, Spring-Summer 1964, p.24. 
53 Immanuel Jakobovits, The Timely and the Timeless: Jews, Judaism and Society in a Storm-Tossed 
Decade, Vallentine Mitchell, London, 1977, p.120. 
54 Louis Jacobs, We Have Reason to Believe, Vallentine Mitchell, London, 1962, p.133f. 
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By the 18th century and the Age of Enlightenment, the traditional Jewish attitude towards 
other faiths was being brought into question. Jacob Emden (1698-1776) expressed vie\\'s 
that were a radical departure from the perception of Christianity as idolatry, declaring it to 
be "a holy communion of God".55 Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) adopted the "double 
covenant theory", which sees both Judaism and Christianity as true religions, the former 
for the Jews and the latter for others-a kind of "Judaism for the gentiles" through which 
non-Jews come to know and be with the God of Israe1.56 
However, in investigating the changing attitude of at least some Jews towards Christianity 
in more recent years, we must not lose sight of the phenomenon identified by Fritz 
Rothschild, that Jews as a minority in the Christian world "do not always voice their 
negative views of certain aspects of Christianity without considering the possible 
consequences".57 Every Jewish writer is in some way aware of what it means to engage in 
a critique of Christianity, or even to make the most circumspect attempt to defend Judaism 
against attacks, by the dominant faith that saw the refutation of Judaism and the conversion 
of Jews as an integral part of its divinely ordained mission. 58 
55 See BIu Greenberg, "Rabbi Joseph Emden: The Views of an Enlightened Traditionalist on Christianity", 
Judaism, Vol.27, No.3, Summer 1978, pp.351-363. 
56 Franz Rosenzweig, "The Star of Redemption", in Rothschild (Ed), Jewish Perspectives on. Christianio:, 
p.224f: "Before God, both Jews and Christians are laborers at the same task". For RosenzweIg, JudaIsm IS 
the fIre of the "star" and Christianity the rays. For an exposition of Rosenzweig's theology, see Novak, 
Jewish-Christian Dialogue, Ch.5. See also Seymour Siegel, introduction to Thomas Walker, Jel1-:ish Views of 
Jesus: An Introduction and an Appreciation, Amo Press, New York, 1973. See also Harold Kaslffiow, 
"Heschel's Prophetic Vision of Religious Pluralism", in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion Is an 
Island, p.84. 
57 Rothschild, Jewish Perspectives on Christianity, p.8. 
58 Ibid., p.3. 
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There were, for instance, the debates in Barcelona (1263) ordered by King James of 
Aragon, as a result of which, although Nahrnanides had been constrained by the rule that 
"the faith of the Lord Jesus Christ cannot, because of its certainty, be placed under 
dispute", there were anti-Jewish royal decrees, and laws forcing Jews to listen to 
missionary sennons in the synagogues. Nahrnanides himself was banished, and the last 
part of Maimonides' Code was burned as heresy. 
In 1769, despite anti-clerical writings having been prevalent for several decades, at the 
height of the European Enlightenment, Moses Mendelssohn "was afraid to publish his 
critique of Christianity and defense of Judaism as the more rational religion, lest he 
unleash a stonn of anti-Jewish outbursts all over Germany".59 When Martin Buber was 
accused of softening his analysis of Pauline theology for the pUblication of Two Types of 
Faith he accepted the judgement, but added that the "un-softened" version would have 
been "too much of an imposition on the Christians!" 
The purpose of reporting for the first time (at least in English!) 
Buber's personal remarks ... is to alert the reader to the complexity, 
occasional ambivalence, and social context in which a man like Buber 
tried to state his ideas without offending sensibilities and without 
distorting his own opinions, which are often as critical of traditional 
Judaism as they are of Pauline Christianity.60 
59 Rothschild (Ed.), Jewish Perspectives on Christianity, pp.3-5. 
60 Ibid., p.ll. 
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Rothschild, in the same context, also tells how Heschel asked his Christian friends in the 
anti-Vietnam War movement to sign a declaration condemning the terrorist massacre of 
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games (1972), but that so many refused that the 
statement was never published,61 and "the experience saddened the last three months of his 
life".62 The implication is that many of Heschel's Christian friends were "fair weather 
friends", or that their friendship towards him personally as an individual Jew simply did 
not extend to what he stood for in terms of Judaism. Their attitude toward Judaism may 
have been influenced by him, but when it came to "standing up and being counted" 
alongside Jews they simply reverted to form. 63 
Heschel himself went further than any of his predecessors in granting validity to 
Christianity, declaring that "perhaps it is the will of God that in this aeon there should be 
diversity in our forms of devotion and commitment to Him. In this aeon diversity of 
religions is the will of God".64 Heschel's radical position on inter-faith relations begins not 
from the Talmudic Noahide Seven Commandments, but with a passage from the 
prophecies of Malachi. Indeed, a careful reading of Heschel' s work reveals that his citing 
of Malachi is his only use of a classic Jewish source to justify his position: 
61 A well-wisher had offered to fmance a full-page advertisement in The New York Times. 
62 Rothschild, Jewish Perspectives on Christianity, p.5. 
63 Susannah Heschel speaks of the Christians she knew as a child, who were her. f~ther's go~d frie~ds: "I 
grew up thinking that all Christians were like my parents' friends who came to VISIt us on F~day mght at , 
Sabbath meals. When I got to college I was so surprised to discover that not ev~ryone was like my father s. 
friends". Edward Bristow (Ed.), No Religion is an Island: The Nostra Aetate Dwlogues, Fordham UnIversity 
Press, New York, 1998, p.179. 
64 Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island", in Kasimow and Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion Is an Island, p.14. 
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From the rising of the sun to its setting My name is great among the 
nations, and in every place incense is offered to My name, and a pure 
offering; for My name is great among the nations, says the Lord of 
Hosts. (Mal. 1: 11) 
This statement refers undoubtedly to the contemporaries of the 
prophet. But who were these worshippers of One God? At the time 
of Malachi there was hardly a large number of proselytes. Yet the 
statement declares: All those who worship their gods do not know it, 
but they are really worshipping Me. 
lt seems that the prophet proclaims that men all over the world, 
though they confess different conceptions of God, are really 
worshipping One God, the Father of all men, though they may not be 
aware ofit.65 
Heschel tackled the problem of conflicting truth claims by responding to the question, 
"Does not every religion maintain the claim to be true, and is not truth exclusive?" 
The ultimate truth is not capable of being fully and adequately 
expressed in concepts and words. The ultimate truth is about the 
situation that pertains between God and man. "The Torah speaks in 
the language of man". Revelation is always an accommodation to the 
capacity of man. No two minds are alike. The voice of God reaches 
the spirit of man in a variety of ways, in a mUltiplicity of languages. 
One truth comes to expression in many ways of understanding. 66 
Heschel's rapprochement with Christianity received little support from other Jewish 
leaders, and some, notably Norman Lamm and Joseph Soloveitchik, vigorously attacked 
him: 
65 Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island", p.14. 
66/bid., p.15. 
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We have no frame of reference for the Christians, not as a culture, and 
are as far removed from them as we are from Buddhism or any other 
religion. We cannot communicate with them on the religious level. 
Our quarrel is with the Jewish people, mainly with many sections of 
the Refonn Rabbis who were ready to betray the Jewish cause for a 
few Catholic compliments.67 
Heschel's approach, though, is different from other modem Jewish thinkers who take a 
significant interest in Christianity: he does not discuss Jesus, or Paul; he does not write 
about the New Testament; he does not debate doctrinal points. As his daughter reminds us: 
He is, rather, interested in helping Catholics be better Catholics. In 
fact, when he went to see Pope Paul VI, the Pope thanked him for his 
books for that reason, that they helped young Catholics be better 
Catholics, and he was so happy that young Catholics were reading my 
father's books. And that gave my father a great sense of satisfaction. 
My father asked, what can Jews learn, spiritually, from the great 
religious traditions of Christianity? That is a question that not enough 
Jews ask. 68 
67 Bristow (Ed.), No Religion is an Island, p.l72, quoting Joseph B. Soloveitchik (.The Jewish Horizon, 
September-October 1964, p.4). Clearly Soloveitchik is alluding to Heschel, as he IS when he d~mands. that 
Jews "refrain from suggesting to the [majority] community ... changes in its rit.ual or emendatIon~ to ItS 
texts. .. They will act in accordance with their convictions w.ithout .any promptm~ on our part. .It IS not 
within our purview to advise or solicit. For it would be both ImpertInent and unWIse for ~ outsI.der to . 
intrude upon the most private sector of the human existential experience, namely, the way III whIch a faIth 
community expresses its relationship with God" (Soloveitchik, "Confrontation", p.25). 
68 Susannah Heschel, in Bristow (Ed.), No Religion is an Island, p.172. 
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Vatican II 
Heschel's role in the Second Vatican Council was "mostly anonymous but fiuitful",69 and 
resulted in radical changes to Roman Catholicism's attitude towards Judaism and the Jews. 
His role was "mostly anonymous" because the principal in the submission to the 
Secretariat for Christian Unity was the American Jewish Committee, for whom Marc H. 
Tannenbaum was National Interreligious Affairs Director. The detailed history of 
Heschel's contribution has yet to be written. 70 
Augustin Cardinal Bea, the first president of the Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian 
Unity, had met Jules Isaac soon after taking up office, in July 1960. The French Jewish 
professor had gone to Rome, with the support of the French branch of B 'nai B'rith and a 
letter of introduction from Archbishop de Provencheres, to ask Pope John XXIII for the 
Council to do something to counter antisemitism and to improve Jewish-Christian mutual 
understanding,71 and the Pope had sent him to Bea. Two months later (18 September) Bea 
69 Edward K. Kaplan, "The Spiritual Radicalism of Abraham Joshua Heschel", Conservative Judaism, 
Vo1.28, No.1, Fall 1973, pA1. 
70 Susannah Heschel, in Bristow (Ed.), No Religion is an Island, p.179, replying to the question of an 
audience member concerning Heschel's response to the draft and [mal wordings of Nostra Aetate: "The first 
draft of Nostra Aetate was wonderful, and the second one was very disappointing and upsetting, and my 
father spoke out very forcefully against it and also tried to rally support from other theologians against it. 
There is a very interesting history to be written here". See also Samuel H. Dresner, "Abraham Joshua 
Heschel Ten Years after His Death", Conservative Judaism, Vo1.36, No.2, Winter 1982-3, p.6: "His crucial 
role at Vatican II has yet to be described". 
71 Jules Isaac was a Commander of the Legion d'Honneur, former Inspector-General of Education for the 
French government, and Honorary President of the Amities Judeo-chretiennes. He gave the Pope a dossier 
containing, 1. a brief for the correction of false and unjust statements about Jews in Christian instruction, 2. 
an example of such statements, in terms of the myth that the diaspora was punishment for the crucifixion of 
Jesus, and 3. an extract from the "Catechism of Trent", which Isaacs claimed proved the accusation of 
deicide did not belong to the true tradition of the Church. Isaac is the author of The Christian Roots of 
Antisemitism. 
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was officially commissioned to prepare a draft document on the Church and the Jews,12 In 
October the Pope met a large party of American Jews which, on a study trip through 
Europe and Israel, visited the Vatican to thank the Pope for his efforts at saving Jews from 
persecution under Hitler. 73 
Bea asked, among others, the American Jewish Committee to provide background material 
for a proposed conciliar statement on the Jews. Marc Tannenbaum had elicited Heschel's 
help, and two memoranda were submitted in June 1961, on the image of the Jew in 
Catholic teaching, and in November of the same year, on anti-Jewish elements in the 
liturgy. After a meeting between Bea, Heschel and Zachariah Shuster of the American 
Jewish Committee on 26th November 1961, Shuster wrote of Heschel: "He was deeply 
impressed by his experience in Rome. .. I can testify that he succeeded in creating a 
rapport with Christian leaders in a way few laymen or even Jewish religious leaders would 
have done",14 At the meeting Bea invited Heschel to submit suggestions to the Council as 
to how Catholic-Jewish relations might be improved. This third memorandum was 
72 S~epan Schmidt (Ed), trans. E. M. Stewart, Augustin Cardinal Bea: Spiritual Profile, Geoffrey Chapman, 
London, 1971, p.45. 
73 John M. Oesterreicher, The New Encounter Between Christians and Jews, Philosophical Library, New 
York, 1986, p.ll1. This book contains a detailed history of the Conciliar Declaration Nostra Aetate, the 
fourth section of which deals with the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish people, 
pp.l03-295, "Waking the Dawn". 
74 In Marc H. Tannenbaum, "Heschel and Vatican II: Jewish Christian Relations", unpublished paper 
delivered to the Memorial Symposium in honour of Heschel, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 
New York, February 23rd 1983, p.4. Quoted in Fleischner, "Heschel's Significance for Je,:ish-Chri.stian 
Relations", in Merkle (Ed), Abraham Joshua Heschel, p.51. Since the Tannenbaum paper IS unpublIshed 
references here are those given in the Fleischner article. 
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submitted the following May (1962), and has been described as "pure Heschel"J5 It calls 
for mutual respect between people of faith, lamenting religious and racial discrimination 
against anyone, and proposing that the Council should make a Declaration that would 
recognise the "permanent preciousness" of Jews as Jews. Jews should no longer be 
considered potential converts, and the deicide charge in particular, and anti-Semitism in 
general, should be repudiated. 
In view of the past historical events which brought great sacrifice and 
suffering to Jews on account of their faith as Jews and their race, and 
particularly in view of the fact that anti-Semitism has in our time 
resulted in the greatest crime committed in the history of mankind, we 
consider it a matter of extreme importance that a strong declaration be 
issued by the Council stressing the grave nature of the sin of anti-
Semitism.76 
The memorandum also proposed a number of concrete steps to combat anti-Semitism.77 In 
the meantime, in February 1962, three of Heschel's books (Man Is Not Alone, God in 
Search of Man, and The Sabbath) had been sent to Bea, who had welcomed them as 
indicative of "a strong spiritual bond between US".78 
75 Tannenbaum, "Heschel and Vatican II", p.8. 
76 Ibid., p.9. 
77 Heschel made four proposals: 1. That the Council brand Antisemitism as a sin, and conde~ false . 
teachings such as that holding all Jews responsible for the death of Christ; 2. That the CounCIl recogmse the 
integrity and value of Jews and Judaism; 3. That steps be taken to eliminate mutual ~gn~rance betw~en Jews 
and Christians; 4. That a high level commission be set up at the Vatican to erase prejUdICe and mom tor 
Christian-Jewish relations. See Oesterreicher, New Encounter, p.127f. 
78 Fleischner, "Heschel' s Significance for Jewish-Christian Relations", p.155. 
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Monsignor John Oesterreicher, Director of the Institute of Judeo-Christian Studies at 
Seaton Hall University, who was involved in all the preparations for the Statement on 
relations with the Jewish people, contends that these memoranda "had no influence to 
speak of on the discussion of the Conciliar Declaration or the shaping of its text" because 
they were drawn up in ignorance of the possibilities open to the Council. "Their proposals 
went into too much detail, and the fulfilment of some of their requirements presupposed a 
mentality which the Conciliar Declaration had yet to create".79 
Early in 1961a published interview with Bea had alerted the world to the Secretariat's 
intentions, and provoked a strong response from Arab governments, transforming what 
was intended to be a pastoral and theological statement into a political document. 
[T]hey were never given to understand unambiguously that the 
proposed Declaration was a measure necessary for the inner life of the 
Church, and that she could not renounce it; nor were they ever told 
that the Council had to be kept free of any improper influence, and 
that, accordingly, no intervention by political bodies would be 
tolerated. The slanders that appeared from time to time in a section of 
the Arab press, and likewise the occasional threats, could have been 
met with the assurance that, rather than give in, an appeal would be 
made to world opinion. Historical accuracy, however, requires the 
admission that what was perfectly possible after the Council was 
unthinkable before. 8o 
79 Oesterreicher, The New Encounter, pp.126-8. 
80 Ibid., p.130f. 
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The First Draft, Decretum de /udaeis, was completed towards the end of 1961, and was 
expected to be discussed during the Second Session. However, in the summer of 1962 all 
the preparations came under threat, when the Central Preparatory Commission decided to 
remove the draft decree on the Jews from the Council's agenda, not because of its 
teaching, but because of unfavourable political circumstances. The circumstances had 
been created by the decision of the World Jewish Congress to send a representative to 
Rome. A section of the press presented this as a unilateral decision to send a diplomatic 
representative to the Vatican, or an official observer to the Council. Offence was taken by 
some Roman officials, and Arab governments protested "preferential treatment" of the 
Jews. 
Bea appealed to Pope John, giving three important reasons for putting the draft before the 
Council: that the "bond of kinship" between Christians and Jews demanded it, especially 
in the aftermath of the Holocaust; that preachers had been guilty of accusing the Jewish 
people of deicide and depicting them as accursed; that the World Council of Churches had 
adopted a resolution on anti-Semitism at its New Delhi General Assembly (3 December 
1961).81 When the Pope had assured him of his full support, Bea once again brought the 
Declaration before the Co-ordinating Commission, and recommended its incorporation into 
the draft of Ecumenism. A Second Draft was prepared, this time as Chapter IV of the 
Schema on Ecumenism. A passage was added rebutting the charge of deicide, and warning 
81 Oesterreicher, The New Encounter, p.162ff. For the WCC resolution see The Theology of the Churches 
and the Jewish People: Statements by the World Council of Churches and its. member c.h~rche~, WCC r 
Publications, Geneva, 1988, p.12. At the time the Roman Catholic Church dId not partICIpate In the \\ orId 
Council of Churches. 
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against a hostile exposition of the Passion story. Another addition declared that the Jews 
were not a people accursed by God, but dear to God. It was issued only in November 
1963. 
In March that year Cardinal Bea presided over a Catholic-Protestant Colloquium at 
Harvard, and then went on to New York for an "interfaith dinner" in his honour, at which 
Heschel had been invited to speak. The day before the dinner, Bea and his staff had a 
private meeting with prominent Jewish leaders, with Heschel in the chair, to discuss the 
proposed Declaration on the Jews. Bea had responded in writing to a series of questions 
on the deicide charge, the need to combat anti-Jewish teaching, and the desirability of 
inter-religious co-operation. The participants hoped that Bea's answers, refined by the 
discussion, would fonn the basis for the expected Declaration. 
The dinner guests on April 1st were United Nations Officials, and political and religious 
leaders. Heschel began by referring to the common threat faced by all humankind-the 
threat of evil and the darkness all about us, partly of our own making: "the gap between the 
words we preach and the lives we live threatens to become an abyss. How long will we 
tolerate a situation [nuclear stockpiles] that refutes what we confess?" He went on to 
express some of his fundamental theological and inter-faith principles: 
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This is the agony of history: bigotry, the failure to respect each other's 
commitment, each other's faith. We must insist upon loyalty to the 
unique and holy treasures of our own tradition and at the same time 
acknowledge that in this aeon religious diversity may be the 
providence of God. 
Respect for each other's commitment, respect for each other's 
faith, is more than a political and social imperative. It is born of the 
insight that God is greater than religion, that faith is deeper than 
dogma, that theology has its roots in depth theology. 
The ecumenical perspective is the realization that religious truth 
does not shine in a vacuum, that the primary issue of theology is 
pretheological, and that religion involves the total situation of man, his 
attitudes and deeds, and must therefore never be kept in isolation.82 
Heschel then spoke of the "great spiritual renewal" inspired by Pope John XXIII, which 
"already has opened many hearts and unlocked many precious insights". He was later to 
describe Pope John as "a great miracle".83 But Pope John died in June 1963. When the 
second session of the Second Vatican Council opened on September 29th , it was under his 
successor, Pope Paul VI, who favoured the Secretariat's position on the proposed 
Declaration on the Jews. When The New York Times of October 1 i h 1963 carried a front-
page article on the draft of the Declaration, containing all the points agreed with Bea, 
Heschel issued a personal statement welcoming it as "an expression of integrity . . , 
inspired by the presence of God . ., May the spirit of God guide the work of the 
Council".84 
82 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Ecumenical Movement", in The Insecurity of Freedom, p.179. 
83 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "Why Not Choose Life?", in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and 
Spiritual Audacity, p.254. 
84 Tannenbaum, "Heschel and Vatican II", p.12. 
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However, the passage of the Declaration through the Council was not to be without 
controversy, and opposition to the proposals began to mount. On November 18th 1963, 
leaders of the Eastern Churches attacked Chapter IV of the Schema on Ecumenism. Some 
wanted to give way to the pressure from Arab governments, fearing of retaliation against 
Christians in Muslim countries. Others simply wanted it removed from the Schema on 
Ecumenism. In the daily briefing at the American Press Office, Fr. Gregory Baum, in 
defending the place of the Declaration in the decree on Ecumenism stated: "Christians 
believe that Israel is part of the eschatological dimension of the Church, in accordance with 
the saying of St. Paul, who teaches that the Church and Israel will be a single people".85 
On November 23rd , Heschel wrote to Bea, deeply concerned that the theme of the 
conversion of the Jews had been re-introduced. A few days later Heschel flew to Rome at 
the request of the American Jewish Committee, to meet with Monsignor Johannes 
Willebrands, who promised to bring Heschel's concerns to Bea. However, despite many 
interventions in support, and although Bea was given an opportunity to expound the draft, 
no discussion of the Declaration took place. It seems that the discussion was postponed so 
as not to affect Pope Paul VI's pilgrimage to the Holy Land in January 1964. 
A third draft of the Declaration, relegating it to the appendix of the proposed Schema on 
Ecumenism, attempted, by watering down and by omissions, to appease its opponents. It 
included the statement: 
85 Oesterreicher, The New Encounter, p.173. 
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[I]t is worthy of remembrance that the union of the Jewish people with 
the Church is a part of Christian hope. With unshaken faith and deep 
longing, the Church awaits, in accordance with the Apostle's teaching, 
the entry of this people into the fullness of the People of God which 
Christ has founded (Rom 11:25-26).86 
Through "an indiscretion", the new draft of the proposed Declaration was published, first 
by the American Press, shortly before the third session of the of the Council was due to 
open. Heschel strongly condemned it: 
It must be stated that spiritual fratricide is hardly a means for the 
attainment of "fraternal discussion" or "reciprocal understanding". A 
message that regards Jews as candidates for conversion and proclaims 
that the destiny of Judaism is to disappear will be abhorred by Jews all 
over the world and is bound to foster reciprocal distrust as well as 
bitterness and resentment. .. As I have repeatedly stated to leading 
personalities of the Vatican, I am ready to go to Auschwitz any time, 
if faced with the alternative of conversion or death. Jews throughout 
the world will be dismayed by a call from the Vatican to abandon their 
faith in a generation which witnessed the massacre of six million Jews 
and the destruction of thousands of synagogues in a continent where 
the dominant religion was not Islam, Buddhism or Shintoism.87 
Heschel and Thomas Merton, the Trappist Monk, had been in correspondence for several 
years, about their books and their theology. Heschel had visited Thomas Merton in the 
Abbey of Gethsemani, near Louisville, on the 13th July 1963. They discussed the 
proposed Declaration, and immediately afterwards Merton wrote to Bea: 
86 Oesterreicher, The New Encounter, p.186. 
87 Quoted in Tannenbaum, "Hesche! and Vatican II", p.16. 
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I am personally convinced that the grace to truly see the Church as she 
is in her humility and in her splendor may perhaps not be granted to 
the Council Fathers if they fail to take account of her relation to the 
anguished Synagogue. This is not just a question of a gesture of 
magnanimity. The deepest truths are in question ... If [the Church] 
forgoes this opportunity out of temporal or political motives ... will 
she not by that very fact manifest that she has in some way forgotten 
her own true identity? Is not then the whole meaning and purpose of 
the Council at stake? ... 
Would it not perhaps be possible, theologically as well as 
"diplomatically", to meet the objections raised by those who fear to 
alienate the Moslems? ... 88 
When the new draft of the Declaration was published, Heschel sent Merton (3 rd 
September) a mimeographed copy of his statement in response. Merton replied with 
incredulity, saying that he felt more "a true Jew under [his] Catholic skin" by "being 
spiritually slapped in the face by these blind and complacent people of whom I am 
nevertheless a 'collaborator'''. 89 
Despite great personal inconvenience, Heschel flew to Rome for a thirty-five minute 
audience with the Pope on September 14th 1964, the eve of Yom Kippur. He strongly 
restated his position, and left the Pope with an 18-page memorandum. The third session of 
the Council opened two days later, but the struggle over the wording of the Declaration 
was to continue for a further year. When the news broke of Heschel's visit to Pope Paul, it 
alienated the conservative Jewish community.9o Fear of such a response had led to the 
negotiations being conducted in secrecy, but according to one report Heschel had been 
88 William H. Shannon (Ed.), The Hidden Ground of Love: The Letters of Thomas Merton on Religious 
Experience and Social Concerns, Collins, London, 1990, p.433. 
89 Ibid., p.434. 
90 "Militant Mystic", Time, January 8th 1973, p.43. 
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sworn to secrecy by the Vatican. 91 When, later, Heschel was asked why he had "let 
himself' be involved in the Ecumenical Council's work, he replied: 
The issues at stake were profoundly theological. To refuse contact 
with Christian theologians is, to my mind, barbarous. There is a great 
expectation among Christians today that Judaism has something 
unique to offer.92 
Oesterreicher considers responses such as Heschel' s to the third draft of the Declaration to 
be "unconsidered, based upon inadequate translation", and defends the expression of 
eschatological hope for the union of Israel with the Church. 
This passage was much warmer in tone than the rest of the 
Declaration, and this could give the impression to a hasty reader, 
particularly a Jewish one, that what was intended here was nothing but 
proselytizing. An unprejudiced reader, however, who examines the 
statement carefully is bound to conclude that it does not recommend a 
"mission to the Jews", but expresses simply and solely the belief that 
at the end of time God will gather into union with himself all who 
profess His name.93 
Indeed, Oesterreicher singles out Heschel ("a man of deep insight, whose blood, however, 
boiled easily")94 for criticism for misunderstanding the thrust of the Declaration on this 
point, declaring HescheI's reference to Auschwitz to be the equation of "the Church's 
profession of faith in the union of all who worship the God of Israel with the ghastly 
excesses of the Middle Ages, when Jews were more than once faced with the choice of 
91 "The Audience That Was", by "Our Special Correspondent", The Jewish World, Yol.2, No.12, October 
1964, p.23. . . 
92 Fritz A. Rothschild, "Abraham Joshua Heschel", in Thomas E. Bird (Ed.), Modern Theology: Chrlstzans 
and Jews, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1967, p.173. 
93 Oesterreicher, The New Encounter, p.193. 
94 Ibid. 
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baptism or exile"-an equation "too fantastic to be refuted".95 He points out that Cardinal 
Heenan called Heschel's declaration that he was ready to go to Auschwitz, "pure rhetoric". 
Heenan, however, wondered if the compilers possessed the necessary tact and sensitivity to 
deal with questions concerning the Jews, ''whom frequent persecution had made 
understandably sensitive". Although he stressed that Jews were mistaken to understand the 
text to include a demand that they give up their religion, he did acknowledge that the fact 
that Jews had taken umbrage was sufficient reason to have the offending passage 
removed.96 
The protestations of the defenders of this draft of the Declaration that only a hasty (and 
Jewish) reader would understand the expression "the Church awaits ... the entry of [the 
Jewish] people into the fullness of the People of God which Christ has founded" as hope 
for the conversion of the Jews, and that an "unprejudiced reader ... is bound to conclude 
that it does not recommend a mission to the Jews", reveal their naivety, and their 
insensitivity in the use of language. It is all too easy to see how their well-intentioned 
comment, designed to justify the inclusion of the Declaration on the Jews in the Schema on 
Ecumenism, can be taken, on face value, to be what Heschel took it to be. The assertion 
that particular words do not mean what they appear to mean is matched by the insistence, 
during the preparation of the Declaration, that perfidia Iudaica in the Good Friday liturgy 
never meant "faithlessness, infidelity, or perfidy", and was never intended as invective,97 
95 Oesterreicher, The New Encounter, p.193. 
96 Ibid., p.l94. 
97 Oesterreicher, The New Encounter, p.52f. See p.317, where Johannes Reuchlin, addressing ~e Emperor 
Maximilian in 1510 refers to the Good Friday liturgy as a "public abuse" of the Jews, and explams perfidos 
JUdaeos as having the understood meaning "treacherous Jews", or "men in whom there is neither faith nor 
trust" . 
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or that in John's Gospel "The Jews" does not refer to the Jewish people but to the 
opponents of Jesus, or even "the hostility of 'the world' toward [Jesus]".98 Such 
protestations indicate a tendency to "explain away" perceived expressions of anti-Judaism, 
rather than confront them and deal with them. 
The Declaration on the Jews was not in the end presented to the Council as part of the 
Schema on Ecumenism as had originally been proposed, nor as an appendix to Lumen 
Gentium, the Schema on the Church, as had later been suggested, but became the heart of a 
separate declaration on the relation of the Church to other religions. Heschel' s critics were 
silenced when the Council gave overwhelming approval to Nostra Aetate on October 28th 
1965.99 The fourth section of the document absolves the Jewish people of guilt over the 
crucifixion of Jesus, makes no reference to proselytisation, and condemns anti-
Semitism.loo However, it fails to make specific mention of the deicide charge, and there is 
no reference to the Church's historical involvement in anti-Semitism, nor the Holocaust, 
nor the State of Israel. Heschel indicated that what he had expected was "a document, 
unconditional, without ambiguities, just full of love and reverence-the kind of love and 
98 Oesterreicher, The New Encounter, pp.78, 142f. 
99 The Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions "was accepted by about 
2300 to 80". See Schmidt, Augustin Cardinal Bea, p.144. 
100 Nostra Aetate, New Advent Catholic Website: www.knight.org/advent. " ... what happened in 
[Christ's] passion cannot be charged against all the Jews without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews 
of today ... the Jews should not be presented as rejected or accursed by God ... Furthermore, in her 
rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, mindful of the patrimony she shares with the 
Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel's spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutIOns, 
displays of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any time and by anyone". Nostra Aetate can also be 
found in Catholic-Jewish Relations: Documentsfrom the Holy See, and in Roger Brooks (Ed.), Unanswered 
Questions: Theological Views of Jewish-Catholic Relations, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 
Indiana, 1988, pp.17 -22. 
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reverence the gospel stands for".101 Although Nostra Aetate was not the "unconditional 
document" he had sought, Heschel nevertheless considered it important: "A milestone, but 
h 1· " ... not t e c Imax . 
The omission of any reference to conversion of the Jews in the 
Declaration must be regarded as a step of great importance, a new and 
indispensable preamble to a relationship of mutual esteem between 
Christians and Jews. I should like to express it bluntly and sharply: 
there is a deep suspicion on the part of a great many simple Jews that 
the Church still has in mind that there is only one way for the Jews, 
and that is conversion. .. Here I find a shift of emphasis, a new 
understanding of the problem of the Jews in relation to the Church, 
one which, may I say, is even missing in good Protestant 
denominations ... 102 
Although Oesterreicher concluded that the influence of the "Jewish lobby" on the wording 
of the Declaration was "minimal", from Heschel's point of view it was considerable, for 
the changes that were made as a result of his "rhetoric" enabled him to tum Nostra Aetate 
into a call for dialogue. Christians and Jews may disagree over "law, in creed, in 
commitments that lie at the very heart of our religious experience", but what unites us is of 
ultimate significance: "Our being accountable to God, objects of God's concern precious in 
his eyes". 
Our conceptions of what ails us may be different, but the anxiety is the 
same. The language, the imagination, the concretization of our hopes 
are different, but embarrassment is the same, and so is the sigh, the 
sorrow. And the necessity to obey? We may disagree about the ways 
of achieving fear and trembling, but the fear and trembling are the 
same. The demands are different, but the consciences are the same 
and so is arrogance, iniquity. The proclamations are different, the 
callousness the same. And so is the challenge we face in many 
moments of spiritual agony. Above all while dogmas, while forms of 
worship are divergent, God is the same. 103 
101 Abraham Joshua Heschel, transcript of discussion, John H. Miller (Ed.), Vatican II: An Interfaith 
Appraisal, Nortre Dame Press, Notre Dame and London, 1966, p.373. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Miller (Ed.), Vatican 1/: An Interfaith Appraisal, p.374. 
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In an article adapted from Heschel's address to the 1966 Rabbinical Assembly convention, 
incorporating selections from his Inaugural Address at Union Theological Seminary in 
1965, he reflects upon his successful campaign to have any reference to the hope of the 
conversion of the Jews deleted from Nostra Aetate: 
I must say that I found understanding for our sensitivity and position 
on this issue on the part of distinguished leaders of the Roman 
Catholic Church. The Schema on the Jews is the first statement of the 
Church in history-the first Christian discourse dealing with 
Judaism-which is devoid of any expression of hope for conversion . 
. , And let me remind you that there were two versions, and even in 
the first version there was a reference to hope for conversion, that was 
eliminated. .. In my own conversations with Catholic and Protestant 
leaders I have always maintained that unless the church will give up 
"the mission to the Jews" there can be no dialogue. What is required 
is mutual esteem for each other's faith and integrity rather than a 
confrontation of candidates for conversion. I04 
Nine years after the promulgation of Nostra Aetate, and almost three years after Heschel's 
death, the Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, under the 
Presidency of (now) Cardinal Wi 11 ebrands, issued some "Guidelines and Suggestions for 
Implementing the Conciliar Declaration Nostra Aetate (No.4)". The Guidelines are 
intended to specifically clarify wording left "creatively vague" by the Second Vatican 
Council, in response to criticisms made at the time, and seeking to overcome many of the 
omissions.lo5 Thus the Guidelines refer to false stereotyping of, e.g. Pharisees, in the New 
Testament or of Jews in the liturgy; they speak of the Jews of today, whereas Nostra Aetate 
104 Heschel, "From Mission to Dialogue?", Conservative Judaism, Vol.21, No.3, Spring 1967, p.10f. 
105 Eugene Fisher and Leon Klenicki (Eds.), In Our Time: The Flowering of Jewish-Catholic Dialogue. 
Stimulus, Paulist Press, New Yark, 1990, p.l9. 
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makes no mention of the post-biblical religious tradition of judaism; the Holocaust is 
referred to as the "historical setting" of Nostra Aetate and of ongoing Jewish/Christian 
dialogue; and supercessionist implications are avoided, with the statement, "The Old 
Testament and the Jewish tradition founded on it must not be set against the New 
Testament in such a way that the former seems to constitute a religion of only justice, fear 
and legalism with no appeal to the love of God and neighbour".106 
It is clear that Heschel's influence on the thinking of the Roman Catholic Church on 
Judaism went far beyond the Second Vatican Council, just as his influence on Pope Paul 
VI went far beyond their brief meeting at the Vatican in September 1964. Early in 1973, a 
month after Heschel' s death, the Pope reminded pilgrims to Rome at a General Audience 
that "even before we have moved in search of God, God has come in search of us". In the 
subsequent published text of the audience, Heschel' s writings were specifically cited as the 
source for the thought-an unprecedented public reference by a Pope to a non-Christian 
writer. 107 
106 Fisher and Klenicki (Eds.), In Our Time, pp.29-37. The more recent "Notes for Preaching and . . 
Catechesis, 1985", p.21f, affmns "the existence of the State oflsra.el" on the basis of the common p~~ncl~~es 
of international law, whilst warning against a biblical fundamentahst approach to the contemporary polltlcal 
options" in the Middle East. 
107 Editorial, America, Vo1.128, No.9, March 10th 1973, p.202. 
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"What we might do together" 
In November 1967 Heschel shared in a panel discussion in the Palmer House, Chicago, as 
part of the National Convention of the Religious Education Association. l08 Each of the 
three participants had been asked to contribute a paper entitled, "What We Might Do 
Together". 109 According to Heschel it was no coincidence that all three were also co-
chairmen of the National Committee of Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam. I 10 In 
the light of Auschwitz, Vietnam, and the threat of nuclear disaster, Heschel considered it to 
be "a grave hour for those who are committed to honour the name of God".111 
In his paper, Heschel declares the ultimate standards of living to be, according to Jewish 
teaching, Kiddush Ha-Shem and Hillul Ha-Shem, i.e. that one should do everything in 
one's power to glorify the name of God before the world, and at the same time do 
everything within one's power to avoid anything that would bring dishonour upon religion 
and thus desecrate the name of God. He interprets this to mean that even a slight injustice 
is a grave offence for a religious person, so that "we must learn to labour in the world with 
fear and trembling; while involved in public affairs, we must not cease to cultivate the 
secrets of religious privacy". 112 
108 The theme of the Convention was "The Ecumenical Revolution and Religious Education". 
109 "What We Might Do Together", Religious Education, Vo1.62, No.2, Match 1967, pp.127-146. Heschel's 
paper (alone) was also reprinted in Susannah Heschel (Ed.), Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, pp.290-
300. 
110 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "What We Might Do Together", p.134. The other participants were John C. 
Bennett, President of Union Theological Seminary, and Philip Scharper, Editor in Chie~ of Sheed .an? \V ard 
(New York publishers) and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Religious EducatIOn ASSOCiatIOn, who 
had been Chairman of the Programme Committee of the Convention. 
III Ibid. 
112 Ibid.,p.134f. 
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It is necessary to go to Ninevah; it is also necessary to learn how to 
stand before God. For many of us the march from Selma to 
Montgomery was both protest and prayer. Legs are not lips and 
w~lking is not kneeling. And yet our legs uttered songs. 'Even 
WIthout words our march was worship. I 13 
So it was that Heschel also exerted a powerful influence on Christians in his partnership 
with them in social action. Undoubtedly his very Jewish presence on the front line in the 
Civil Rights struggle and in the anti-Vietnam War movement had far more influence on 
many Christians than his books on theology.114 His friendship with Robert McAfee 
Brown, Martin Luther King Jr., Daniel and Philip Berrigan, William Sloane Coffin and 
others grew out of common cause. 
Heschel had first come to prominence as a moral leader in America in 1963, when he gave 
the keynote address to the National Conference on Religion and Race,115 which prompted 
the widespread involvement of clergy in the March on Washington. I 16 In the same year he 
brought the fate of Jews in the Soviet Union to the forefront of American Jewish awareness 
in his address to the Conference on the Moral Implications of the Rabbinate. 117 In his 
protest against the American involvement in the Vietnam War he co-authored Vietnam: 
Crisis of Conscience (1967).118 
113 Heschel, "What We Might DoTogether", p.135. 
114 This might appear to offer support for the "Soloveitchik Line" on Dialogue (~ee pp.1~9f and .302 above), 
except for the fact that, as Neusner predicted, the Heschel that has lasted, and whIch contInues to mfluence 
Christians as well as Jews is "in his books". (See above, p.4.) 
115 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "Religion and Race", in Insecurity of Freedom, pp.85-1 00. 
116 Merkle "Introduction" in Rothschild (Ed.), Jewish Perspectives, p.270. 
117 Abraha:n Joshua Hesche}, "The Jews in the Soviet Union", in Insecurity of Freedom, pp.262-273. First 
published in the Yiddish daily, The Day-Jewish Journal, September 12th, 13th and October 12th 1963. 
118 See above, p.46f. 
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George F. Thomas finds it to be obvious that 
... Heschel's social activism during the last years of his life his 
p~rticipation in the. civi.l rights movement and in the protest agains't the 
yIe.tnam. war, w~s m~p.Ire~ by his own prophetic sympathy with God's 
mdIgnatIOn agaInst mJustlce and war and his compassion for those 
who suffered from them. 119 
However, it should not be thought that Heschel failed to take a stand on social issues until 
the last decade of his life. Although Heschel himself attributed his direct involvement in 
social action to the revising of his dissertation on the Prophets for pUblication in English,120 
prophetic protest had begun early in Heschel' s life, perhaps as a response to that earlier 
encounter with the prophets in his doctoral studies at the University of Berlin. It is 
particularly evident in his anti-Nazi address to a conference of Quaker leaders at Frankfurt-
am-Main, March 1938. 121 
In his contribution to the "What We Might Do Together" discussion Heschel appears to 
accede to something akin to the "Soloveitchik line" on Jewish-Christian Dialogue. 
Drawing on his inaugural lecture at Union Theological Seminary, he identifies four 
dimensions in every God-human relationship: creed or teaching, faith or the assent of the 
heart, law or creed, and the community context within which faith is lived out. 122 He then 
119 George F. Thomas, "Philosophy and Theology: A Tribute to Abraham J. Heschel", Theology Today, 
Vo1.30, No.3, October 1973, p.277. 
120 Susannah Heschel, introduction to Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.xxiii. In an interview with 
Carl Stem for the NBC shortly before his death, Heschel stated: "I learned from the prophets that I have to be 
involved in the affairs of man the affairs of suffering man" (Susannah Heschel, Ed., Moral Grandeur and 
Spiritual Audacity, p.399. Se~ also Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Reasons for My Involvement in the 
Peace Movement", Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity, p.224-6. 
121 Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Meaning of this War (Hour)". 
122 Heschel, "What We Might Do Together", p.138. See also Abraham Joshua Heschel, "No Religion is an 
Island", in Kasirnow & Sherwin (Eds.), No Religion is an Island, p.8. 
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finds it obvious that in the "deed" dimension there are vast areas for inter-faith co-
operation, enhancing the divine image in people by building a world of justice and 
freedom; In the realm of faith we should share insights, confessing "the tragic 
insufficiency of human faith"; and although we disagree in law and creed, we are united in 
our sense of being accountable to God and the objects of his concern. But Heschel, 
drawing on his phenomenological method, proposed "bracketing" areas of disagreement 
over doctrine in order to enable dialogue to happen: 
There ought to be standards and rules for interreligious dialogue. An 
example of such a rule for Catholics and Protestants would be not to 
discuss the supremacy of the bishop of Rome or Papacy; and example 
of such a rule for Christians and Jews would be not to discuss 
Christology.123 
It was not just that these things get in the way of co-operation in other dimensions, but that, 
where they are most significant for faith, Heschel believed that each religion was entitled 
to the privacy of its Holy of Holies, so that Judaism too "must always be mindful of the 
mystery of aloneness and uniqueness of its own being".124 
However, Heschel' s was not the position advocated by Buber and Mordecai Kaplan 
amongst others, who maintained the inherent separatedness of religious traditions. 
According to this view, each religion is a self-contained entity, no religion has inherent 
relevance for another, and the nearest one can get towards dialogue is the ability to be a 
polite, sensitive, intelligent spectator of another religion, as if one were "looking in the 
window of a neighbour'S house". 
\2J Heschel, "What We Might Do Together", p.140. 
124 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p.5. 
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David Blumenthal, who describes himself as "Heschel's disciple" though never his 
student,125 re-examined Heschel's view of interfaith dialogue twenty years after his death, 
and questions the adequacy of the ecumenical perspective he finds there. He sums up 
Heschel's "post-Holocaust commandments for inter-faith dialogue" as 
Do not be cynical. Strive in co-operation against social evils. Work 
on the basis of shared faith. And, specifically for Christian-Jewish 
dialogue: Be rooted in God's faithful presence as depicted in the 
Bible. Recognise one another's different yet necessary roles in God's 
ultimate plan for the salvation of humankind. Do not be antisemitic. 
Do not proselytize. 126 
Blumenthal recognises that Heschel's views are the natural outgrowth of his God-centred 
theology (and therefore consistent with Heschel's other positions in the field of social 
action), and characterises Heschel as the epitome of one ecumenical position that evolved 
after World War II, i.e., 
... that all religions share one reality that transcends all, that through 
faithfulness in personal and social existence one can give concrete 
expression to the transcendent reality, that religious pluralism must be 
the byword of post-war existence, and that all religions have a 
common enemy in secular modernization, which produces 
impersonalism, exploitation, and the other social ills of our time. 127 
Observing the growth of neo-orthodoxy and neo-fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam in the years since Heschel's death, Blumenthal perceives that the pendulum has 
swung "from sensitive dialogue to grudging coexistence, from embracing universalism to 
truculent particularism": 128 
125 In conversation Yamton, Oxford, June 17th 1996. 
126 David Blumenthal, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Inadequacy of the Ecumenical Perspective", Journal 
of Ecumenical Studies, Vo1.29, No.2, Spring 1992, pp.250. 
127 Ibid., p.251. 
128 Ibid. 
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I foresee a period of increasing self-assertiveness . .. Jews will ask: 
Why cannot Christians just surrender their needs to proselytize us? 
Why can Christians not accept that Jews are largely not interested in 
religion but in history and culture? Why can Christians not 
understand that loyalty to the State of Israel is the litmus test of Jewish 
existence and, therefore, of interfaith dialogue, especially since we 
failed the test earlier this century? How can Christians, who do not 
see themselves as a minority and do not have their fate in the hands of 
others, be so confident about existence? Why are Christians really 
interested in interfaith dialogue? What is their hidden agendum? 
Christians will ask: Why do Jews tolerate civil and political abuses 
in the State of Israel that they would never tolerate anywhere else? 
Why can Jews not see that our understanding of our faith, not a secret 
Antisemitism, compels us to take up the cause of the Palestinians? 
Why cannot Jews take prayer, faith, grace and love more seriously? 
Why must Jews harp on the Holocaust? Why must they "proselytize" 
us on the State of Israel? Why must Jews be so insecure, not trusting 
anyone to help guarantee their existence?129 
Jews, says Blumenthal, want to be left alone to get on with being Jews without having to 
worry what their Christian neighbours will think; Christians want Jews to take Christianity 
seriously as a religion, not just as a useful ally on issues of social justice. A common sense 
of the holy, and a common social agenda, are no longer enough: "We need dialogue-
talking from the heart about what ails the heart, about fears and prejudices, about anger". 
There can be, he asserts, no "bracketing" of doctrinal differences, but "we will have to get 
to know and to accept one another's genuine differences".13o 
129 Blumenthal, "Inadequacy of the Ecumenical Perspective", p.252. 
130 Ibid., p.253. 
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This is, indeed the logic of Heschel's argument, but a conclusion from which he appears to 
have drawn back, to something more akin to the "Soloveitchik line" on dialogue. 
However, although Blumenthal's analysis of the current inter-religious climate might well 
be perceptive, any real dialogue that takes place remains in the spirit of Heschel. The neo-
orthodox, neo-fundamentalist engages in no real dialogue, even with co-religionists who 
do not happen to share their particular viewpoint. The interfaith meeting does not take 
place on either of the fanatical wings: neither the died-in-the-wool Southern Baptist nor the 
Lubervitcher Hasidim seeks to participate in Jewish-Christian dialogue. Despite the 
insistence of those committed to Jewish-Christian dialogue that "dialogue is almost always 
possible and usually worthwhile-even a member of The Churches Ministry to the Jewish 
People and a Lubervitch chasid could have a useful conversation", I 31 it is doubtful that 
either would be interested in dialogue with the other, or would see any point in it. 132 
From Heschel's perspective, then, 
The first and most important prerequisite of interfaith is faith. It is 
only out of the depth of involvement in the unending drama that began 
with Abraham that we can help one another toward an understanding 
of our situation. Interfaith must come out of depth, not out of a void 
absence of faith. It is not an enterprise for those who are half-learned 
or spiritually immature. If it is not to lead to the confusion of the 
many, it must remain the prerogative of the few. 133 
131 Tony Bayfield and Marcus Braybrooke (Eds.), Dialogue with a Difference: The Manor House Group 
Experience, SCM, London, 1992, p.24. . .. 
132 I have heard it suggested that Christian-Jewish dialogue might provide a forum in whIch ChristIans of 
differing traditions could talk to each other, and Jews of different tradi.tions c~uld ta~ to each o~er. 
However, I suspect that only those Jews and Christians already comrrutted to mter-falth ecumemsm are ready 
to participate in inter-faith dialogue. 
133 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p.11. 
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Indeed, for Heschel, such was the imperative of interfaith dialogue and co-operation that 
the only alternative he could see was what he called "inter-nihilism": 
We fail to realise that while different exponents of faith in the world 
of religion continue to be wary of the ecumenical movement there is 
another ecumenical movement, worldwide in extent and i~fluence: 
nihilism. We must choose between inter-faith and inter-nihilism. 
Cynicism is not parochial. Should religions insist upon the illusion of 
complete isolation? Should we refuse to be on speaking terms with 
one another and hope for each other's failure? Or should we pray for 
each other's health, and help one another in preserving one's 
respective legacy, in preserving a common legacy?134 
What, then, for Heschel, is the purpose of inter-religious dialogue? 
It is neither to flatter nor to refute one another, but to help one 
another; to share insight and learning, to cooperate in academic 
ventures on the highest scholarly level, and what is even more 
important to search in the wilderness for well-springs of devotion, for 
treasures of stillness, for the power of love and care for man. What is 
urgently needed are ways of helping one another in the terrible 
predicament of here and now by the courage to believe that the word 
of the Lord endures forever as well as here and now; to work for 
peace in Vietnam, for racial justice in our own land, to purify the 
minds from contempt, suspicion and hatred; 135 to cooperation in trying 
to bring about a resurrection of sensitivity, a revival of conscience; to 
keep alive the divine spark in our souls, to nurture openness to the 
spirit of the Psalms, reverence for the words of the prophets, and 
faithfulness to the Living God.136 
134 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p.6. 
135 The phrase "the teaching of contempt" was devised by Jules Isaac to describe the method used by the 
Church to reduce Jews "to the condition of pariahs". He identified seven principle themes: a degenerate 
Judaism; a sensual people; a blind and refractory people misunderstanding and rejecting Christ; a people 
reproved, degraded and denounced by God; a deicide people; the Dispersion as a punishment for the 
crucifixion; and the Synagogue of Satan, Judaism become diabolic. See Jules Isaac, The Christian Roots of 
Antisemitism (Tr. Dorothy & James Parkes), The Council for Christians and Jews, and The Parkes Library, 
London, 1960, p.8f. See also John Rousmaniere, A Bridge to Dialogue: The Story of !ewish-Christian 
Relations, Paulist Press, New York, 1991. Rousmaniere (p.6) maintains that the teachmg of contempt has 
been systematic. A distinction is made between antisemitism, which is a racial contempt, and anti-Judaism, 
which is a theological contempt because of Jewish disbelief in Jesus as Messiah and Saviour. Common to 
both is a contempt for Jews because they are Jews. 
136 Heschel, "What We Might Do Together", p.l40. Also in Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p.22. 
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Three factors, then, lie behind Heschel's attitude to Jewish-Christian relations: the 
extennination of six-million Jews in nominally Christian Europe, together with the 
contemporary manifestations of institutionalised intolerance, racism and oppression he saw 
manifested in the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights struggle; the crucial importance of the 
Bible as the common heritage of both Christians and Jews; and the repudiation of the 
biblical message, with the rapid spread of secularism. Heschel remained convinced that all 
three are interconnected, and that the future of western civilisation depends on an 
understanding of the implications of this connectedness. He does not, however, merely 
offer Judaism and Christianity a strategy for survival against a common enemy: he is 
convinced of a common legacy ultimately based on a deep attachment to God, so that "I 
rejoice where His name is praised, His presence sensed, His commandment done".137 
However, inter-faith, for Heschel, must not become a substitute for faith. The purpose of 
inter-faith is not syncretistic, reducing different traditions to a lowest common 
denominator. 138 Instead, the inter-faith process demands humility and a sense of reverence 
on both "sides": 
None of us pretends to be God's accountant, and His design for 
history and redemption remains a mystery before which we stand in 
awe. It is arrogant to maintain that the Jew's refusal to accept Jesus as 
the Messiah is due to their stubbornness and blindness, as it would be 
presumptuous for the Jews not to acknowledge the glory and holiness 
in the lives of countless Christians. "The Lord is near to all who call 
upon Him, to all who call upon Him in Truth" (Psalm 145: 18).139 
137 Heschel, "No Religion is an Island", p.IO. 
138 Ibid., p.ll. See Rothschild, "Abraham Joshua Heschel", p.182. 
139 Ibid., p.18. 
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Heschel's position continues to make a genuine contribution to Jewish-Christian dialogue, 
not only because of what he says, but also because of who he was and what he did. This 
observant, committed, devout Jew captured the ear of both Jews and Christians, and in the 
quarter century since his death, continues to grow in stature as a theologian who 
contributes to the self-understanding of both Jews and Christians. 
334 
CONCLUSION 
Abraham Joshua Heschel helped change the religious face of the Western world. He made 
it possible for people of different faiths to work together for social change and against the 
prevailing political climate. He enabled Jews and Christians not only to act together but to 
talk together for mutual benefit and understanding, without prejudice, suspicion and hidden 
agendas clouding the issue. His significance as a theologian of note is appreciated today 
more than in his own lifetime. 
I have shown how Heschel's theology stems from a multi-faceted background, itself the 
product of a prodigious and inquisitive mind. Indeed, without some understanding of the 
diverse sources of his theology it is difficult to appreciate both the style and the thrust of 
his work. In a Western world that likes to be able to "pigeon-hole" people and ideas, he 
has defied definition. In an increasingly polarised society his ability to speak to Orthodox 
and Reform in Judaism, to conservative and liberal in the wider theological enterprise, and 
to Catholic and Protestant (and, to some extent, Muslim) across religious divides gives 
credibility to such enterprises as "The Religious Situation of Our Time", from the Institute 
of Ecumenical Research in the University of Tiibingen (under Hans Kling). The project 
has a three-fold statement of principle with which Heschel would concur: "no peace among 
the nations without peace among the religions; no peace among the religions without 
dialogue between the religions; no dialogue between the religions without investigation of 
the foundations of the religions".l 
I Hans Kling, Judaism, SCM, London, 1992, and Christianity, SCM, London, 1995. The statement is found 
on the unnumbered page preceding the title page. 
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I have shown that the theory of language that underlies Heschel's work is what pennits 
him to negotiate frontiers, so that, recognising the profound limitations of language when it 
comes to expressing the ineffable, he evokes rather than agues towards responses. He is 
therefore concerned with "depth-theology" (the act of believing) rather than with 
theological concepts that "freeze" experience (the content of belief), and so believes that in 
describing the religious experience of Judaism he uncovers universal religious truths. He 
would not have been surprised, only gratified, to learn that his writings about Judaism for 
Jews, seeking to open American Jews to the influence of their own roots, speak also to 
Christians, who have all too often neglected, forgotten or denied their Jewish roots. 
I have expounded Heschel's central concept of the Divine Pathos, in the face of his critics, 
and shown that, as a direct result, the question of what it means to be a human being 
becomes the dominant religious question, since the change of perspective means that "the 
Bible is God's anthropology, not Man's theology".2 Indeed, all definitions of what it 
means to be human that view the object of the enquiry in splendid isolation are 
reductionist, since they fail to take account of the essential relatedness of humanity, not 
only in terms of human community, but in terms of relatedness to God who gives the 
meaning. So "meaning", too, is not a "given"-a fixed and final answer to the question of 
what human being is about-but is rather an ongoing process, or, rather, a relationship 
which, like any significant relationship, must be worked at, maintained, responded to, and 
developed. The word "spirituality" was not in common currency in Heschel's time, but 
could have been invented for him, so long as it is not understood as being a personal, 
private aspect of living, unrelated to the whole person or to the real world. 
2 Heschel, Man Is Not Alone, p.I29, and God in Search of Man, p.412. 
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Nor would Heschel have any truck with the triumphalism of much that passes for theology 
and the practice of religion today. He would have reminded us that "we all stand naked" 
before God, and that the only appropriate response for what we receive is gratitude, for it is 
all "grace". He would have urged a response that is not merely "religious", but political, 
social and cultural, recognising the essential humanity and intrinsic worth of every human 
being. 
Although HescheI's personal responses were triggered by his studies, as a result of his 
background, and in response to the national and world crises of his day, his fundamental 
insights into "what it means to be human" not only remain valid at the beginning of the 
third millennium of the Common Era, but are essential for the future of humanity. 
Although, at least for Western people, the threat of annihilation is less immediate, and life 
more comfortable, the question of how to be human-how to value human beings for no 
other reason than that they are human beings-remains urgent. Heschel' s contribution to 
the debate continues to push us towards an answer that is to be found, not in some strange 
new environment, but by "drinking from our own wells", as Christians and Jews. 
Heschel has shown us that Divine Pathos and human being are two sides of one 
relationship. To speak of one or the other in isolation is theological nonsense. 
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